There are three main ways to acquire the knowledge of the existence of God and the knowledge of His nature. These are either the arguments taking into account the nature of the world and our thinking about the world, or it is the argumentation trying to prove the authenticity of certain historical events, or it is a reference to particular types of experiences, called mystical experiences. In the case of Christian philosophy we will have to consider, firstly, the cosmological and (...) ontological arguments for the existence of God, and, secondly, the attempts to show the authenticity of reports of the events regarding Jesus of Nazareth and, thirdly, the arguments in favor of the objectivity of mystical experiences recorded in the history of Christian religion. In regard to all of the above-mentioned three sources of knowledge about God, I would like to ask the following questions. How do we know that all of them refer to the same object? On what basis can we say that even if these three 'ways to God' are correct, they refer us to the same being? Are they independent of each other, and if they depend on each other in some way, what are the relationships among them? If we were not able to demonstrate that the item referred to by the term 'God' in all of these three ways is the same object or being, it would represent a significant weakness in Christian theology and philosophy. I will try to outline what relationship may exist between these three sources of knowledge about God. Then I will attempt to describe the criteria connecting all these sources of knowledge. (shrink)

It is widely assumed among contemporary philosophers that Descartes’ version of ontological proof, among other weaknesses, makes an impossible and unjustified move from the mental world of concepts to the real world of things. Contrary to this opinion I will try to show that Descartes’ famous principle of clear and distinct perception suffices to find an adequate inferential connection between the contents of the human mind and extra-mental reality. In a clear and distinct way we cognitively grasp the concept of (...) supremely perfect being as the concept that we do not construct by an arbitrary definition of the word ”God’. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga's notion of sensus divinitatis ("sense of divinity") refers to a human cognitive faculty designed to produce theistic beliefs that have warrant (positive epistemic status). While most of Plantinga's commentators focus on whether introducing this notion really helps to defend the rationality of theistic beliefs, the genetic aspect of the operation of the sensus divinitatis is often overlooked. This paper is devoted to fill this gap. On the basis of Plantinga's opus magnum titled Warranted Christian Belief, I distinguish three (...) different interpretations of how sensus divinitatis creates theistic beliefs. I also analyse the ways in which human sin impairs the proper functioning of this sense of divinity in each of these interpretations. (shrink)

The Cognitive Science of Religion represents a contemporary attempt at a naturalistic explanation of religion. There is debate as to whether its account of how religious beliefs arise is reconcilable with the religious account, which holds that religious beliefs are caused by God. In my paper, I argue that these two accounts cannot be reconciled when it comes to the specific question of how Christian religious beliefs arise if one accepts an important theological doctrine of the supernaturality of Christian belief. (...) This doctrine implies that there can be no natural explanation for how Christian beliefs arise because they are a gift of divine grace. This leads to a conundrum for Christian theists: they can either reject the CSR account of how their religious beliefs arise, or they can reject the supernaturality of Christian belief. I argue that the latter is preferable. I then draw on the work of the theologian Denis Edwards to illustrate how one can drop this doctrine without abandoning some other fundamental tenets of Christian theology. (shrink)

In his book Między ukryciem a jawnością [Between Hiddenness and Openness] (2023), Professor Jacek Wojtysiak argues that on the assumption of atheistic naturalism, no convincing explanation can be given for the ‘great fact of faith,’ that is, the phenomenon of the historical persistence and universality of the belief in the existence of God. The purpose of this paper is to challenge this thesis. Drawing on selected theories from the field of the Cognitive Science of Religion, I sketch a naturalistic explanation (...) of how religious belief arises. (shrink)

Cognitive science of religion is sometimes portrayed as having no bearing on the theological doctrines of particular religious traditions, such as Christianity. In this paper, I argue that the naturalistic account of the etiology of religious beliefs offered by the cognitive science of religion undermines the important Christian doctrine of the grace of faith, which teaches that the special gift of divine grace is a necessary precondition for coming to faith. This has some far-reaching ramifications for Christian theology. -/- .

This paper introduces the special issue on the Concept of God of the Journal of Applied Logics (College Publications). The issue contains the following articles: Logic and the Concept of God, by Stanisław Krajewski and Ricardo Silvestre; Mathematical Models in Theology. A Buber-inspired Model of God and its Application to “Shema Israel”, by Stanisław Krajewski; Gödel’s God-like Essence, by Talia Leven; A Logical Solution to the Paradox of the Stone, by Héctor Hernández Ortiz and Victor Cantero; No New (...) Solutions to the Logical Problem of the Trinity, by Beau Branson; What Means ‘Tri-’ in ‘Trinity’ ? An Eastern Patristic Approach to the ‘Quasi-Ordinals’, by Basil Lourié; The Éminence Grise of Christology: Porphyry’s Logical Teaching as a Cornerstone of Argumentation in Christological Debates of the Fifth and Sixth Centruies, by Anna Zhyrkova; The Problem of Universals in Late Patristic Theology, by Dirk Krasmüller; Intuitionist Reasoning in the Tri-unitrian Theology of Nicolas of Cues, by Antonino Drago. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to interpret S. Kierkegaard's concept of a leap as a metaphor for the process of moving from one conceptual scheme to another. The basis for this reading of the concept is provided by the growing recognition of Kierkegaard's philosophy as dealing with conceptual schemes, equipements or paradigms through which reality is interpreted. I use Kierkegaard's metaphor as a point of departure for the analysis of the conditions of possibility and the very process of changing (...) conteptual schemes in general. I use the story of Abraham and Isaac, as described in „Fear and Trembling”, as a source of examples illustrating more general points I make during my analysis. Firstly, I present a general understanding of what a conceptual scheme is and how it is functioning. Afterwards, I show how this functioning is impaired in case of Abraham and Isaac. Finally, I put forward a hypothesis that the problems that Abraham's scheme is encountering due to God's demand to sacrifice Isaac can all be reduced to the fact that a very deep change in meaning of certain terms within the conceptual scheme, such as "God", "good" or "duty", has occured. The adoption of new meanings would be equivalent to moving into another conceptual scheme. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically analyse Jerome Gellman’s proposal that there existsa type of experience in which a subject experiences evil and perceives in this evil that there is no God. This a-religious experience gives prima facie support to the belief that there is no God. I show how accepting Gellman’s pro-posal allows us to go beyond the classical distinction between the intellectualand the emotional problem of evil. It also allows us to defend the rationality of some atheists, who do (...) not believe in God because they experienced evil, but do not know the relevants arguments from evil. I suggest that there are twoproblems with Gellman’s account. The first is that there are no clear criteria of identifying a given experience of evil as the perception of God’s non-existence. The second problem concerns the scope of Gellman’s proposal. It is possible that some experiences of evil, which lead people to the belief that there is no God, do not count as perceptions that there is no God. In case of beliefsformed on the basis of such experiences, one must therefore look for another,non-perceptual grounds for justifying such beliefs. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest krytyczna analiza koncepcji J.H. Newmana, zgodnie z którą doświadczenie sumienia prowadzi jednostkę do wiary w Boga. Fenomenologiczna analiza doświadczenia moralnego prowadzi Newmana do wniosku, że doświadczenie to jest zrozumiałe tylko wtedy, jeśli zinterpretujemy sumienie jako głos Boga. Pokazuję – wbrew Newmanowi – że doświadczenie sumienia nie jest jednoznaczne. Nie da się wyjaśnić, dlaczego jednostka interpretuje je w kategoriach teistycznych, a nie jakichś innych. Potrzebne jest przyjęcie dodatkowych mechanizmów, które tłumaczą, dlaczego jednostka zinterpretowała swoje sumienie w kategoriach teistycznych. (...) Wskazuję, że w dziele Newmana można wyróżnić trzy takie mechanizmy. (shrink)

The authors of the book have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to effectively use modern approaches to developing and implementation strategies of sustainable socio-economic development in order to increase efficiency and competitiveness of economic entities. Basic research focuses on economic diagnostics of socio-economic potential and financial results of economic entities, transition period in the economy of individual countries and ensuring their competitiveness, assessment of educational processes and knowledge management. The research results have been implemented in the different (...) models and strategies of supply and logistics management, development of non-profit organizations, competitiveness of tourism and transport, financing strategies for small and medium-sized enterprises, cross-border cooperation. The results of the study can be used in decision-making at the level the economic entities in different areas of activity and organizational-legal forms of ownership, ministries and departments that promote of development the economic entities on the basis of models and strategies for sustainable socio-economic development. The results can also be used by students and young scientists in modern concepts and mechanisms for management of sustainable socio-economic development of economic entities in the condition of global economic transformations and challenges. (shrink)

STANISŁAW BRZOZOWSKI – TO THINK RADICALLY Stanisław Brzozowski is one of the most radical philosophers. Radicalism of his thought involves not only the idea of fundamental social change, but also the reinterpretation of some philosophical concepts. Two main concepts are nature and history. They are reinterpreted in order to show their human origins. According to Brzozowski nature and history are human constructions, namely they are set by human praxis. Brzozowski’s understanding changed over the time. In my article I (...) focus on two phases of Brzozowski’s thought. The first is Kantian and Fichtean. At that point Brzozowski interprets human praxis as moral act. The second one is Marxian. At that point human praxis is understood as labour. (shrink)

Stanisław Lem is mostly known as a sci-fi writer and not widely perceived as a visionary of the cyber age, despite the fact that he foresaw the future of information technology better than most scientific experts. Indeed, his visions of future information-based societies have proved to be remarkably accurate. Lem’s stories fuse together elements of fantasy, philosophy, and science, but what we can really learn from them is the nature of humanity, technology, and philosophy, as well as the values (...) of technological prophecies. Moreover, Lem gave birth to, without naming it as such, the concept of philosophy in technology, which is a perspective on technology and philosophy that explores the deep implicit philosophical foundations of technology and humanity. (shrink)

Stanislaw Lesniewski’s interests were, for the most part, more philosophical than mathematical. Prior to taking his doctorate at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov, Lesniewski had spent time at several continental universities, apparently becoming relatively attached to the philosophy of one of his teachers, Hans Comelius, to the chapters of John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic that dealt specifically with semantics, and, in general, to studies of general grammar and philosophy of language. In these several early interests are already to be (...) found the roots of the work that was to occupy Lesniewski’s life: a search for a definitive doctrine of what sorts of things there are in the world, or better, of what language must be like if it is adequately and efficiently to represent the world. (shrink)

Solaris este un roman filozofic de ficțiune din 1961 al scriitorului polonez Stanisław Lem. Cartea se axează pe temele naturii memoriei umane, experienței și inadvertenței comunicării între speciile umane și non-umane. În cercetarea și examinarea suprafeței oceanice a planetei Solaris de la o stație de cercetări, oamenii de știință umani, la rândul lor, sunt aparent studiați de planeta în sine, care sondează și examinează gândurile ființelor umane care o analizează. Solaris are capacitatea de a le scoate la suprafață preocupările (...) secrete, preocupările vinovate, într-o formă materială, astfel încât fiecare om de știință se confruntă personal cu acestea. (shrink)

This article relates the ideas of Stanisław Brzozowski (1878-1911) with those of Bernard Stiegler (1952-2020), both of whom problematize the "work" of art understood as a labor practice. Through the conceptual analysis of epigenetics and epiphylogenetics for aesthetic theory, I claim that both thinkers develop practical concepts relevant to contemporary art philosophy. First, I present an overview of Brzozowski's aesthetics, for whom literature and the arts are linked with ethics, and aesthetic form is tied with moral judgment. Then, I (...) continue with an outline of Stiegler's, for whom the role of artists is to sculpt a new culture and historical epoch called the Neganthropocene. Finally, the notion of "work" as a type of memory practice is analyzed. The comparison shows that Stiegler develops epigenetics phenomenologically via memory ("tertiary retentions") and phylogenetics to epiphylogenetics. Both philosophers argue against determinism. This study suggests that their key ideas advance and complement each other. (shrink)

Tarkovsky recognizes these differences, saying that there is a contradiction with Lem's initial idea, because he was interested in the problems of inner life, spiritual problems, so to speak, and Lem was interested in the collision between man and Cosmos. In an ontological sense of the word, in the sense of the problem of knowing and the limits of this knowledge - it is about that. Lem even said that mankind was in danger, that there was a crisis of knowledge (...) when man did not feels ... This crisis is growing, a snowball, takes the form of various human tragedies, including scientists. (shrink)

Within science fiction the topic of ‘first contact’ is a popular theme. How will an encounter with aliens unfold? Will we succeed in communicating with them? Although such questions are present in the background of many science fiction novels, they are not always explicitly dealt with and even if so, often in a poor way. In this article, I will introduce a typology of five dominant types of solutions to the problem of first contact in science fiction works. The first (...) four solutions are the more dominant, but also the least interesting ones. There is a fifth category that addresses the question of first contact in a more interesting way, exemplified by the work of Stanisław Lem. This fifth option defines itself as a critique of the four previous categories, or of their shared assumption of what Lem (1967) has called ‘the myth of cognitive universality’. Lem is sceptical of the common optimism that first contact will always be successful. In books such as Solaris (1961), His Master’s Voice (1967) and Fiasco (1986), humanity makes first contact with an alien phenomenon, but fails to comprehend the phenomenon. Fundamentally, it will be argued that Lem’s work shows that in such an encounter we will typically not only lack the right answers to our questions, but that we also often lack the correct questions: we simply do not have the right categories or instruments to even recognize, let alone meaningfully interrogate, the alien phenomenon. The article ends with an exploration of the implications of Lem’s pessimism and whether it is the most plausible option for first contact. Moreover, the article will draw some lessons for philosophy of science, by exploring the parallel with the confrontation of novel or deviant phenomena in science. Lem’s work is helpful here because it succeeds in articulating what has not always been appreciated in the philosophy of science, namely that the right questions by which to interrogate scientific phenomena are not given, but that their articulation always requires work. (shrink)

Looking into the future is always a risky endeavour, but one way to anticipate the possible future shape of AI-driven societies is to examine the visionary works of some sci-fi writers. Not all sci-fi works have such visionary quality, of course, but some of Stanisław Lem’s works certainly do. We refer here to Lem’s works that explore the frontiers of science and technology and those that describe imaginary societies of robots. We therefore examine Lem’s prose, with a focus on (...) the Cyberiad stories, to see what challenges our future technological societies may face when they entrust their lives to AI technology. For example, what questions should we ask, and what questions do we forget to ask, when developing AI systems and allowing these systems to control our lives. The technologically honed minds of our current technocrats are perhaps too limited to guide us into this future, because AI-based technology is relatively unchartered territory, as any new, complex technology is by nature. Lem’s visions of future societies oriented around AI and robotics portray AI technology in a deeper and more nuanced way than the current technological visions offered by our leading technological prophets. Based on Lem’s visions, what is to come may not turn out to be an AI-driven nirvana. (shrink)

Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz and Franciszka and Stefan Themerson constitute a rare constellation of outstanding artists of the 20th century avant-garde. Their best known contributions were a concept of Pure Form and an idea of Semantic Poetry respectively. They all shared multiplicity and diversity of interests and areas of not only artistic activities. Philosophy and science influenced to large extent form and content of their works. Despite their mutual interest in each other’s work they had never met personally and no (...) correspondence between them was found. However similarities in attitudes resulted then in intertwining of their paths of artistic development. One of early Stefan Themerson’s novels featured strong influence of Witkacy works but all his later writings were fully original and individual. However the author believes one can still find some flavours, tones and traces leading to the oeuvre of the author of Insatiability. After leaving Poland in 1938 Themersons had still maintained their interest in Witkiewicz works what finally led to translation and preparation for publishing by Gaberbocchus Press of his two plays – Gyubal Wahazar and Mother featuring Franciszka’s drawings. A brief review of Gaberbocchus Press achievements and resources of the Themersons Archive, established by Jasia Reichardt after their death, constitute a background for an analysis of relationships between Witkacy and Themersons. The fact National Library in Warsaw acquired Themersons heritage alleviated very much access to many very interesting source documents. The author focused on a part of the Archive related to the all aspects of Witkacy’s works. Typescripts of publication ready translated and adapted plays, Vahazar and Mother, which finally remained not published by the Gaberbocchus Press triggered an idea to take up the challenge of publishing a “bestlooker” today. A draft of a bibliophilic bilingual edition of the Gyubal Wahazar drama illustrated with Franciszka Themerson’s drawings (samples are included in the paper) is proposed as a final thought. (shrink)

Stanisław Lem, a philosopher and futurologist, in his many works devoted much attention to the condition of human and the relation between human and technology. He coined the term ‘autoevolution’ in the course of forecasting unlimited technological augmentation of human abilities. Nowadays, the term may be associated with the conceptions presented by transhumanism, a 20th-century-born philosophical movement which advocates radical transformation of Homo sapiens by means of the achievements of scientific and technological progress. Lem’s attitude towards such a transformation (...) of human is complicated yet ultimately critical due to the fact that it poses a threat to human culture as such. The phenomenon of autoevolution undermines existing values and raises a question of authenticity of a future posthuman. We examine dependence between technology and culture, present Lem’s conception of autoevolution and his philosophy of culture, then we sketch a post-metaphysical dispute about authenticity, and finally show that Lem’s thought belongs to one of the arguing sides. (shrink)

An antinaturalist defense of causality of mental states. The argument is based on the properties of causal models in cognitive research. Bibliografia prac przywołanych w tekście -/- Damasio A., 1994/1999, Błąd Kartezjusza. Emocje, rozum i ludzki mózg, tłum. M. Karpiński, Poznań: Rebis. Davidson D., 1963/2001, „Actions, reasons, and causes”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 3-19. Davidson D., 1967/2001, „Causal relations”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 149-62. Davidson D., 1970/2001, „Mental events”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 207-25. Davidson D., 1976/2001, „Hempel on explaining action”, (...) w: (Davidson 2001), s. 261-75. Davidson D., 2001, Essays on actions and events, Oxford: Clarendon. Farmer A., McGuffin P., Williams J., 2002, Measuring psychopathology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freedman D. A., Petitti D. B., 2002, „Salt, blood pressure, and public policy”, International Journal of Epidemiology, t. 31, s. 319–320. Greyson B., 2000, „Near-death experiences”, w: Varieties of anomalous experience. Examining the scientific evidence, red. E. Cardeña, S. J. Lynn i S. Krippner, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, s. 315-52. Judycki S., 1995, Umysł i synteza, Lublin: RW KUL. Judycki S., 2000, „Transkauzalność a determinizm”, Kognitywistyka i media w edukacji, t. 3, s. 73-86. Kawalec P. 2005, „Understanding science of the new millennium”, http://philsci archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002558/ Kawalec P., 2006, Jak odkryć przyczynę? Studium z ogólnej metodologii i filozofii nauki, Lublin 2006, w przygotowaniu. Kim J., 1998/2002, Umysł w świecie fizycznym, tłum. R. Poczobut, Warszawa: IFiS PAN. Lauritzen S., 1996, Graphical models, Oxford: Clarendon. Menzies P., 2003, „The causal efficacy of mental states”, w: Physicalism and mental causation. The metaphysics of mind and action, red. S. Walter i H.-D. Heckmann, w druku. Pearl J., 2000, Causality. Models, reasoning, and inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Piłat R., 1999, Umysł jako model świata, Warszawa: IFiS PAN. Rosenbaum P., 2002, Observational studies, Nowy Jork: Springer. Sabom M., 1998, Life and death. One doctors’s fascinating account of near-death experiences, Grand Rapids: Zondervan. Spirtes P., Glymour C., Scheines R., 2000, Causation, prediction, and search, Cambridge, MA.: MIT. van Fraassen B., 1980, The scientific image, Oxford: Clarendon. van Fraassen B., 2002, The empirical stance, New Haven: Yale University Press. Woodward J., 2003, Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation, Nowy Jork: Oxford University Press. Żegleń U., 2003, Filozofia umysłu, Toruń: A. Marszałek. (shrink)

The paper discusses peculiarity of the comparative method applied in philosophysince 1920s. It presents its basic foundations and objectives, as well as the early and most recent definitions of “comparative philosophy”. The author aims at reconsidering in terms of philosophy both the reasons for bias against this method and its advantages in the context of cross-cultural comparative studies. The crucial question is whether various incommensurate schemata of thought, including these which are determined by distinct cultural milieus, may be the subject (...) of comparison at all. To answer this question, she refers, among others, to Ludwik Fleck’s conception of a socially constructed “thought style” and“the truth”, being completely determined within a thought style. The author also consults the conceptions of Stanisław Schayer, Daya Krishna, Bimal K. Matilal and Jitendra NathMohanty who recommend the comparative method as highly useful for the on-going philosophical debates as long as it is not confined to tracing merely similarities between different intellectual traditions, i.e. analogical ideas and equivalent arguments. What seems to the present author the most valuable philosophical contribution to the comparative studies is the perspective of polilogue suggested by Franz M. Wimmer, and the metacomparative self-reference recognized by Wilhelm Halbfass and Robert W. Smid as precious enhancement and challenge for profound philosophical inquiry as such. (shrink)

In the period after the First World War when the various national-ideological “truths” that led to it were not well resolved which resulted in the Second World War, one of the greatest world crises occurs. In those turbulent times, one philosopher renounces his national identity (changes his religion and name), wanting not to save himself from an evil world that is emerging but to join the creation of a completely new world – the world of modern logic. This man is (...) Alfred Tarski, whom many recognize as “the man who defined truth”, linking him to the formulation of the distinction between object and metalanguage. In the paper, I argue with historians of philosophy who claim that this distinction was first set by the logician and philosopher of the Lvov-Warsaw school Stanislaw Leśniewski (whose Tarski was the only doctoral student) accusing Tarski of violating professional laws without attributing the authorship of this distinction to Leśniewski. I show that this is not true and I cite the places where Tarski clearly emphasizes Leśniewski ‘s contribution. (shrink)

Who and how revised Marxism in Poland? The simple answer is that it was done by young intellectuals seeing themselves as obligated to social and political activity, eager to participate in the process of the constitution of a new postwar Communist society. Marxism was for them a philosophical world-view and a political program rising hopes for a better socio-economic reality. Revisionists were committed Communists and their attitude toward Marxism was almost religious. Marxism, Promethean and scientific at the same time, was (...) supposed to replace religion, for which the radically secular revisionists saw no place in the new society. (See: Mikołajczyk 2013, p. 44-48) After the shock of 1956 they stuck by the slogan: ’socialism–yes, distortions–no,’ they thought that “Marxist socialism was possible without Leninist political forms, that Communism might be attacked within «the framework of Marxism»,” and they “believed for some time ... that Stalinism was curable in the sense that Communism could be restored or «democratized» without questioning its foundations” (Kolakowski 1978, p. 461). They saw themselves in an elitist way, i.e., as true and devoted Marxists fighting with dogmas, orthodoxy, myths, and unfounded faith both within Marxism-Leninism and outside it. They were willing to accept the position of sectarians, heretics, or apostates. Their political and ideological involvement forced them to attack pre-war but still active Polish philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School and other nonMarxist thinkers (Roman Ingarden, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Stanisław Ossowski), who were classified as “bourgeois thinkers” unable to understand and assimilate Marxism. (shrink)

Celem niniejszej pracy jest zastosowanie wizji „Lewiatana” Thomasa Hobbesa do koncepcji superinteligencji lub nadludzkiej inteligencji, które dyskutowane jest wśród transhumanistów i poruszone jest przez takich filozofów i futurologów jak między innymi Nick Bostrom, Stanisław Lem, albo Ray Kurzweil. Inspiracją mojej pracy były pytania w rodzaju: „kiedy człowiek przestaje być autonomicznym podmiotem?” albo „czy człowiek w ogóle może być samodzielny?”. Niemniej jednak wydaje mi się, że takie pytania mogą się pojawić wtedy, kiedy człowieka rozpoznamy jako zwierzę polityczne (politikon zoon w (...) sensie Arystotelesowskim). Albowiem trudno wyobrażać sobie wyłonienie pojęcia polityki wobec człowieka samotnego, to znaczy w izolacji od innych ludzi i bez odniesienia się lub ustosunkowania się do nich. Będę argumentował z perspektywy historyka ewolucyjnego. Za badaczy posiadających wkład do takiego stanowiska można uznać Karola Darwina, Samuela Butlera, George’a Dysona i szczególnie Yuvala Noaha Harariego. Opieram się głównie na pracach dwóch ostatnich. (shrink)

Bringing together literary scholars, computer scientists, ethicists, philosophers of mind, and scholars from affiliated disciplines, this collection of essays offers important and timely insights into the pasts, presents, and, above all, possible futures of Artificial Intelligence. This book covers topics such as ethics and morality, identity and selfhood, and broader issues about AI, addressing questions about the individual, social, and existential impacts of such technologies. Through the works of science fiction authors such as Isaac Asimov, Stanislaw Lem, Ann Leckie, Iain (...) M. Banks, and Martha Wells, alongside key visual productions such as Ex Machina, Westworld, and Her, contributions illustrate how science fiction might inform potential futures as well as acting as a springboard to bring disciplinary knowledge to bear on significant developments of Artificial Intelligence. Addressing a broad, interdisciplinary audience, both expert and non-expert readers gain an in-depth understanding of the wide range of pressing issues to which Artificial Intelligence gives rise, and the ways in which science fiction narratives have been used to represent them. Using science fiction in this manner enables readers to see how even fictional worlds and imagined futures have very real impacts on how we understand these technologies. As such, readers are introduced to theoretical positions on Artificial Intelligence through fictional works as well as encouraged to reflect on the diverse aspects of Artificial Intelligence through its many philosophical, social, legal, scientific, and cultural ramifications. (shrink)

This paper reviews some major episodes in the history of the spatial isomorphism problem of dynamical systems theory. In particular, by analysing, both systematically and in historical context, a hitherto unpublished letter written in 1941 by John von Neumann to Stanislaw Ulam, this paper clarifies von Neumann's contribution to discovering the relationship between spatial isomorphism and spectral isomorphism. The main message of the paper is that von Neumann's argument described in his letter to Ulam is the very first proof that (...) spatial isomorphism and spectral isomorphism are not equivalent because spectral isomorphism is weaker than spatial isomorphism: von Neumann shows that spectrally isomorphic ergodic dynamical systems with mixed spectra need not be spatially isomorphic. (shrink)

The GOLEM XIV’s forecast for the development of the human civilisation and a typology of technological singularities: In the paper, a conceptual analysis of technological singularity is conducted and results in the concept differentiated into convergent singularity, existential singularity, and forecasting singularity, based on selected works of Ray Kurzweil, Nick Bostrom, and Vernor Vinge respectively. A comparison is made between the variants and the forecast of GOLEM XIV (a quasi-alter ego and character by Stanisław Lem) for the possible development (...) of Homo sapiens civilisation. According to the prediction, the scientific and technological progress is to bring humanity to transfer its civilisational primacy to a nonhuman superhuman intelligence xor a posthuman one. Both scenarios are best described by forecasting singularity, yet all variants are applicable only conditionally. As GOLEM did not undertake, the trajectories may also intersect or combine. (shrink)

W filozofii czasu Ingardena szczególną rolę odgrywa charakterystyka ontologiczna teraźniejszości. Należy do niej m.in. szczelinowość. Okazuje się, że pojęcie to można powiązać z koncepcją tzw. teraźniejszości pozornej (specious present). Opierając się ponadto na pewnych rozważaniach S. Lema oraz B. Ogrodnika wiążę różne wartości szczelinowości (trwania kwantu teraźniejszości), ze złożonością formalną budowy przedmiotów. Uogólnienie tych wyników umożliwia dopełnienie rozważań Ingardena nad szczelinowością – sformułowanie zarysu ontologicznej teorii względności trwania teraźniejszości.

Friedrich Nietzsche is considered one of the most brilliant thinkers in the history of philosophy, although a number of myths have grown up about the character, also surrounded by many controversies. His works and thoughts have provided inspiration for humanists with a wide spectrum of most different interests. Nietzsche did not want to be regarded as a philosopher, but he has been living in the contemporary consciousness as a thinker nonetheless. According to the extraordinary style of Nietzsche’s works, however, he (...) also is considered a poet, one of the most distinctive stylists, even the most virtuoso writer in the history of German. What is more, the stylistic level of Nietzsche’s oeuvre leads to discourses upon its affinity with philosophical or literary studies. The aim of the present article is to review the question mentioned in the title, following the opinions of representative literary figures (such as Heinrich Mann, Thomas Mann, Gottfried Benn, Stanisław Przybyszewski) and philosophers (e.g. Martin Heidegger, Wilhelm Dilthey, Karl Jaspers) as well. (shrink)

1971. Discourse Grammars and the Structure of Mathematical Reasoning II: The Nature of a Correct Theory of Proof and Its Value, Journal of Structural Learning 3, #2, 1–16. REPRINTED 1976. Structural Learning II Issues and Approaches, ed. J. Scandura, Gordon & Breach Science Publishers, New York, MR56#15263. -/- This is the second of a series of three articles dealing with application of linguistics and logic to the study of mathematical reasoning, especially in the setting of a concern for improvement of (...) mathematical education. The present article presupposes the previous one. Herein we develop our ideas of the purposes of a theory of proof and the criterion of success to be applied to such theories. In addition we speculate at length concerning the specific kinds of uses to which a successful theory of proof may be put vis-a-vis improvement of various aspects of mathematical education. The final article will deal with the construction of such a theory. The 1st is the 1971. Discourse Grammars and the Structure of Mathematical Reasoning I: Mathematical Reasoning and Stratification of Language, Journal of Structural Learning 3, #1, 55–74. https://www.academia.edu/s/fb081b1886?source=link . (shrink)