Response to Don Baxter, Don Garrett and Jennifer Marusic regarding my book Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects; initially delivered at the 2016 Hume Conference in Sydney, Australia as part of the Author Meets Critics session.

This book provides the first comprehensive account of Hume’s conception of objects in Book I of the Treatise. What, according to Hume, are objects? Ideas? Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? Through a close textual analysis, I show that Hume thought that objects are imagined ideas. However, I argue that he struggled with two accounts of how and when we imagine such ideas. On the one hand, Hume believed that we always and universally imagine that objects are (...) the causes of our perceptions. On the other hand, he thought that we only imagine such causes when we reach a “philosophical” level of thought. This tension manifests itself in Hume’s account of personal identity; a tension that, I argue, Hume acknowledges in the Appendix to the Treatise. As a result of presenting a detailed account of Hume’s conception of objects, we are forced to accommodate new interpretations of, at least, Hume’s notions of belief, personal identity, justification and causality. (shrink)

This paper shows that Hume was ultimately forced to conclude in The Treatise that all demonstrative and intuited claims can in fact, be imagined as otherwise. As a result, he was forced to conclude that all knowledge claims must, ultimately, reduce to probable claims, or in Hume’s own, and indisputably clear words: “all knowledge degenerates into probability." As a further result, it is suggested (briefly) that this anticipates Quine’s well-known attack on the analytic / synthetic distinction (Quine 1953).

In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise ("Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses"), Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume's position on objects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents the first (...) detailed analysis of this evolution, which includes an explanation of T 1.4.2's four-part system. (shrink)

This article shows that in 1.4.2.15-24 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents his own position on objects, which is to be distinguished from both the vulgar and philosophical conception of objects. Here, Hume argues that objects that are effectively imagined to have a “perfect identity” are imagined due to the constancy and coherence of our perceptions (what we may call ‘level 1 constancy and coherence’). In particular, we imagine that objects cause such perceptions, via what I call ‘indirect (...) causation.’ In virtue of imagining ideas of objects that have a perfect identity, our perceptions seem to be even more constant and coherent (what we may call ‘level 2 constancy and coherence’). Thus, in addition to seeing that Hume is presenting his own position on objects in this section of the Treatise, we see that he is working with a previously unrecognized kind of causation, i.e., indirect causation, and that he has two kinds of constancy and coherence in mind: level 1 and level 2. (shrink)

This paper argues that Husserl’s method is partially driven by an attempt to avoid certain absurdities inherent in Hume’s epistemology. In this limited respect, we may say that Hume opened the door to phenomenology, but as a sacrificial lamb. However, Hume was well aware of his self-defeating position, and perhaps, in some respects, the need for an alternative. Moreover, Hume’s “mistakes” may have incited Husserl’s discovery of the epoche, and thus, transcendental phenomenology.

Although Symons' recent book, On Dennett (Wadsworth, 2002), provides scientists with ahelpful, general introduction to Dennett'sthought, it presents a skewed version of the history of the philosophy of mind. In particular, the continental tradition is almost entirely ignored, if not glibly dismissed. As aresult, the unwary reader of this book wouldnever realize that Dilthey, Sartre and Husserl,like Dennett, offer a ``middle ground'' between naturalistic realism and naturalistic eliminativism. However, unlike Dennett, the respective positions of Dilthey, Sartre and Husserl are not (...) ontologically indifferent, but instead, present a non-naturalistic form of realism that does not simultaneously invoke Cartesian dualism. (shrink)

Hume and Quine argue that human beings do not have access to general knowledge, that is, to general truths . The arguments of these two philosophers are premised on what Jaakko Hintikka has called the atomistic postulate. In the present work, it is shown that Hume and Quine in fact sanction an extreme version of this postulate, according to which even items of particular knowledge are not directly accessible in so far as they are relational. For according to their fully (...) realized systems, human beings do not initially perceive any relations, or similar epistemological elements that can associate or combine terms on which a relational or general knowledge claim may be based. Nor, likewise, do human beings perceive the relations or the associations themselves as separate entities. ;In Chapters 1 and 2, respectively, it is shown precisely why Hume and Quine deny that human beings initially perceive either such associative elements or associations in general. Concomitantly, it is made clear why Hume's and Quine's respective epistemologies preclude human beings from initially apprehending not only general knowledge, but particular relational knowledge as well. But this is not to say that Hume and Quine do not think we can eventually acquire such associative elements and correspondingly, knowledge. Rather, Hume and Quine do provide an account of knowledge, but one that holds all relational and connective elements to be constructed by the human mind. In Hume's case, they are constructed by the imagination. In Quine's case, we are never told quite how this construction occurs, although the evidence suggests that Quine implicitly relies on a faculty similar to Hume's imagination. ;In the final chapter of this thesis, it is argued that both Hume and Quine must be read as philosophers who justify knowledge by reducing its possibility to a psychological faculty of construction, as well as to a few concepts of intuitively grasped relations. By way of conclusion, it is shown that this makes Quine's naturalism the psychological heir to Carnap's Aufbau. (shrink)

Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come from? “Why [do] we conclude that … particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects?” In 1.3.6 of the Treatise, Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason. However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists of Hume’s “negative” argument concerning induction. This argument has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention. How could causal inferences be justified if they are (...) not justified by reason? If we believe that p causes q, isn’t it reason that allows us to conclude q when we see p with some assurance, i.e. with some necessity? (shrink)

Here we will see that contrary to the party line, Hume’s notion of a relation should be understood, in all cases, as a peculiar non-necessary synthetic relation; unique, but similar in a certain constructive sense to what I characterize as a mathematical notion of synthesis. And, most controversially, I argue that this non-necessary synthetic notion of a relation includes Hume’s arithmetical relations, which have typically been interpreted as either “analytic,” necessary, or both. In this general respect, Hume anticipates Quine’s attack (...) on the analytic/synthetic distinction. (shrink)

An overview of Quine's understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, especially as it is conveyed in his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism.".

Is there a distinction between “art” and “craft,” where the former is motivated by something like “genuine” or “authentic” creativity and the latter by, at best, skill and skill alone, and at a worst, a fumbling attempt to fit in with popular modes of expression? In this paper, I suggest that there does seem to be such a distinction. In particular, I attempt to show that genuine creativity, and so, genuine art—in varying respects—is motivated by a certain recognition of what (...) we might understand as the most universal, and perhaps the most important property of all human beings: the brutal fact that our lives are limited; in the end, we all die. To show why I think this is the case, I have divided my paper into three parts. In the first, I briefly explain why we might view mortality as our most pressing issue and concomitantly, why we might understand it to be the driving force behind not only our desire to procreate, but also, to create. In the second part of the paper, I do something that is not strictly “philosophical”—I canvas a number of remarks by poets and writers who, like myself, are convinced that death is our primary muse, but not necessarily in a morbid, or despairing respect—in fact, we see that this is quite the opposite in some cases (c.f. Nabokov, 1966). Why do I do this? Because it seems obvious to me that we should ask the actual artists about what motivates them, rather than putting words into their mouths. In the third and final part of the paper, I offer a brief philosophical explanation of why and how—in light of sections one and two—we might begin to distinguish between genuine art and craft. -/- . (shrink)

I argue that Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s “radical” (FLPV; TDE 39) and “phenomenalistic” (FSS 15-16) reductionism—as it is manifest in the Aufbau—may be understood in terms of a broader historical context. In particular, it may be understood as a rejection of a contemporary variant of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. As a result, Quine’s motivation to adopt naturalism may be understood independently of his pragmatic concerns. According to Quine, it was simply unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) to adopt a Carnapian phenomenalistic/mentalistic (...) (non-naturalistic) approach to epistemology. Armed with what could only be his invigorated faith in the naturalistic method, he was then, as I see it, equipped to break what we may characterize as the physicalistic version of the naturalistic circle. This is a repudiation that, I show, entails his rejection of “attenuated” (FLPV; TDE 41) reductionism and concomitantly, his rejection of “analyticity,” if not “certainty” altogether. As a result, Quine could simultaneously dismiss what we may characterize as the Humean version of the naturalistic circle. Meanwhile, the practicality of an admittedly fallible science could be unashamedly embraced, although not just for the sake of its practicality—as Quine himself seems to misleadingly indicate throughout his work—but instead, as just noted, to avoid the seemingly Platonic paradox of Aufbauian reductionism. (shrink)

In recent years, documentary formats have entered prominently into the realm of the culture industry, especially since Hollywood and Netflix started to invest in costly productions addressed to the mainstream. Many of these documentaries claim to show reality in its immediacy (“as it really is”), to reveal that which is obscured, or to critically assess societal evils. They use aesthetic strategies that reinforce the appearance of authenticity, while concealing the mediation of what they represent, and the authoritarian stances they presuppose. (...) This turns them into powerful instruments for diffusing authoritarian and populist ideologies. Their political impact on society, their performative power of opinion-shaping, and their subliminal influence on how we perceive and understand reality call urgently for critical assessment. Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of the culture industry, along with their philosophical, sociological, and aesthetic writings, provide a constructive starting point. This essay aims to mobilize their critical theory of society for the problematization of documentary films in terms of their dialectical relation to society. (shrink)

Chung Kuo, Cina, a documentary film by Michelangelo Antonioni, aroused fierce criticism both in China and in Europe when it was released in 1973. While these objections contradicted one another, they all share a conceptual core : the notion of realism understood in a Marxian sense as a critical representation of reality. Yet by refusing to grant a coherent and essentialist meaning to its images, Chung Kuo, Cina problematizes the presuppositions of such an understanding of realism. In this way, the (...) film anticipates some of its intrinsic difficulties and inaugurates a new form of criticism. -/- À sa sortie en 1973, le film documentaire Chung Kuo, Cina de Michelangelo Antonioni a provoqué des critiques farouches aussi bien en Chine qu’en Europe. Bien qu’elles se contredisent entre elles, ces objections se rejoignent toutes dans un noyau conceptuel autour de la notion de réalisme, entendu au sens marxiste comme représentation critique de la réalité. Cependant, en refusant d’accorder un sens cohérent et essentialiste à ses images, ce film permet de problématiser les présupposés de cette compréhension même du réalisme. Il préfigure ainsi certaines difficultés qui lui sont inhérentes et permet de concevoir une autre manière d’entendre la critique. (shrink)

In Book I, III §9 of the Treatise, Hume makes the claim that “[all general] belief arises only from causation” (T 107). Following, he makes the even stronger claim that all general beliefs are to be thought of as beliefs in reality, and thus, all belief in reality is dependent on pre-established beliefs in both specific causal relations and the causal relation in general (T 108). In the first part of this paper, I explain Hume’s motivation behind both claims, while (...) in the second part, I argue that to some extent, Hume is correct; our belief in “reality”—a notion to be defined—is fundamentally dependent on a pre-established belief in the general notion of cause and effect and a cache of specific causal relations. Thus, epistemologically speaking, we must conclude that our notion of “reality” is intrinsically causal (note that this reading has been corrected/augmented in Rocknak 2013). (shrink)

The Atlas Group appeals to philosophical thinking in multiple ways—both through its aesthetic figuration and its conceptual references. Presented as a foundation dedicated to the research and the compilation of documents on Lebanese contemporary history and organized in the form of an invented archive, this artistic project deliberately coalesces real and fictitious elements and confronts, subversively, Western views on the socio- political reality of the Middle East with implicit knowledge and experiences from the region. The singular constitution of this curious (...) archive subtly undermines the rational classification to which it alludes, thereby frustrating unilateral appropriations. Moreover, the question of the mediation of subjective experience and factual reality is consistently raised through the hysterical documents. This article aims to deploy how Walid Raad's project subtly criticises objectivist hegemonic claims by confronting divergent, often incommensurate approaches to the conflictual reality in Lebanon and its appropriation by media, historiography and politics. (shrink)

Hume’s understanding of the external world, particularly, his conception of objects, or what he occasionally refers to as “bodies,” is the subject of much dispute. Are objects mind-independent? Or, are they just what we see, feel, smell, taste, or touch? In other words, are objects just sense data? Or, are they ideas about sense data? Or, are objects, somehow, mind-independent, but we have ideas of them, and we receive sense data from them? In this paper, I provide some answers to (...) these questions—by way of distinguishing between the vulgar position, the philosophical position, and Hume’s position. (shrink)

Este artigo investiga a possibilidade de questões morais possuírem a mesma natureza de ocorrências no mais das vezes (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) discutidas na Física, Metafísica e nos Analíticos, em contraste com as categorias de necessário sem mais e de acaso/acidente. Tal categoria (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) ora é aproximada daquilo que é necessário (necessidade sem mais), quando Aristóteles realça a exclusão do acaso/acidente da ciência, ora é afastada do necessário sem mais, quando busca especificar as diferenças entre essas categorias (...) em termos das conclusões passíveis de serem obtidas em silogismos de ambos os tipos. O que parece é que as ações decorrentes de um caráter formado são ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, podendo ser compreendidas no registro de um necessário hipotético, dado que o caráter é como uma “segunda natureza” do agente. Se tal hipótese for correta, ações decorrentes de um caráter formado não possuiriam estatuto de abertura aos contrários. (shrink)

Examina-se o conhecimento científico e a aquisição dos primeiros princípios em Aristóteles partindo da dificuldade suscitada pelo argumento pla- tônico, apresentado em Mênon (80e). Parece que, em Aristóteles, o problema não é que não se possa conhecer, como sugere a dificuldade apresentada em Mênon. Através das sensações obtidas dos particulares e que se tornam expe- riência, engendram-se a arte e a ciência. O conhecimento prévio é suficiente para que se possa prosseguir na investigação e chegar a um conhecimento de um (...) nível maior de abstração. (shrink)

In this book, Schmitt claims that Hume, however implicitly, employs a fully-developed epistemology in the Treatise. In particular, Hume employs a “veritistic” epistemology, i.e. one that is grounded in truth, particularly, true beliefs. In some cases, these true beliefs are “certain,” are “infallible” (78) and are justified, as in the case of knowledge, i.e. demonstrations. In other cases, we acquire these beliefs through a reliable method, i.e. when they are produced by causal proofs. Such beliefs are also “certain” (69, 81) (...) and are (defeasibly) justified. Thus, although demonstrative knowledge and beliefs produced by causal proofs are produced by different psychological processes, and so, admit of specific kinds of “certainty,” they are nevertheless, both certain, and so, they share the same “epistemic status” (68-69). As a result, although it is clear that Hume makes a psychological distinction between demonstrations and causally produced beliefs (proofs) it may be argued that Hume does not make an epistemological distinction between knowledge (demonstrations) and causally produced beliefs (proofs). Thus, in regard to epistemic status, the latter are not necessarily inferior to the former. This has larger implications for Hume’s method; if we can say that he employs a method that invokes knowledge, or at least, beliefs that share the same epistemic status as knowledge, then Hume need not be entirely skeptical about the results of his method. Rather, the possession of true belief is Hume's ultimate goal. (380). (shrink)

Most artists who are familiar with the contemporary art scene—especially the New York City scene—know that “beauty” is not especially hip. Unless, that is, it serves a “deeper” purpose, e.g., it helps to make a conceptual or political point. Danto’s influence, it would seem, pervades and persists (31). But, as Brand points out in her introduction, in the past twenty years or so, the philosophical study of beauty has been making a comeback; she lists over fifty titles that have been (...) written on the subject since the nineties. Brand’s book, Beauty Unlimited, promises to add to the feminist oeuvre on the subject. The book is comprised of twenty essays, with a foreword by Carolyn Korsmeyer and an introduction by Brand. Although the majority of the essays are interdisciplinary, they are primarily written by trained philosophers. Other essays are written by practicing artists and writers, historians, and cultural anthropologists. (shrink)

Tamas Demeter presents a clear and compelling new perspective of Hume’s methodology and conceptual structure in David Hume and the Culture of Scottish Newtonianism. Hume, he argues, is a Newtonian of the Scottish tradition, but not the mechanical kind that is modeled after the Principia. Instead, Hume should be understood as a kind of European Enlightenment “vitalist.” As a result, his work reflects the more organic methodology that defines Newton’s Opticks.

In 1986, David Esterly won a competition to carve a replacement of a Grinling Gibbons “wall drop” for Hampten Court Palace, in East Molesey, England. His task was an onerous one: Gibbons invented a style of carving that has been matched by few, and surpassed by still fewer. Esterly is one of the latter few; his technique is superb. -/- The Lost Carving gives us an account of those fateful days at Hampton Court. Interwoven with memories of recreating the Gibbon’s (...) piece, Esterly explains how he got involved with the esoteric field of limewood carving. Although he successfully completed his Ph.D. in English literature, he chose to avoid academia. Gibbons got to him instead, thanks to a chance encounter with one of his carvings in the 1970’s. Ever since, Esterly has struggled to understand, if not reach beyond, Gibbon’s vision and talent. (shrink)

In this ambitious, far-reaching book, Robert Roecklein argues that the philosophical notion of "atomism" has had, and continues to have, a rather crippling effect on philosophy and politics. In particular, Roecklein claims, "atomism" is a metaphysical theory, that, generally speaking, maintains that the ultimate, smallest bits of the universe are not perceivable. Moreover, these bits constitute "indestructible and eternal 'being.'" (xiii) As a result, according to the atomist, "ordinary" experience, particularly, "ordinary" perception -- where we appear to apprehend objects, e.g. (...) tables and chairs -- does not, in fact, access "being." Concomitantly, the "ordinary" person is effectively disenfranchised from most political discussions because, Roecklein claims, political philosophers must have access to being: "Atomism is metaphysics. It leads us back into the domain of 'being.' The domain of 'being' of course is the domain of what exists. Political philosophers above all need to begin with what exists, because political philosophy in truth must begin as opinion" (33). (shrink)

Self-tracking-technologies can serve as a prominent example of how digital technologies put to test established practices, institutions, and structures of medicine and healthcare. While proponents emphasize the potentials, e.g., for individualized healthcare and new research data, opponents stress the risk that these technologies will reinforce gender-related inequalities. -/- While this has been made clear from—often intersectional—feminist perspectives since the introduction of such technologies, we aim to provide a queer-feminist perspective on self-tracking applications in healthcare by analyzing three concrete cases. In (...) this way, we want to show why such a perspective is helpful in assessing self-tracking technologies and how such a perspective might contribute to a queering of healthcare. -/- After a short introduction to self-tracking in healthcare and the corresponding risks of reproducing gender-related inequalities, we introduce queer bioethics as a methodology to examine structural discrimination and marginalization in bioethical research. We apply this framework in the analysis of three exemplary self-tracking applications from the areas of nutrition/fitness, reproductive health, and mental health. In the subsequent discussion of these results against the backdrop of already existing queer-sensitive technologies, we identify an equal access, a subversive design, an inclusive database, and a diversity-sensitive and discriminatory-critical definition of purposes as well as individualized usage possibilities as first possible starting points for a queering of self-tracking applications. Finally, we draw conclusions, how such a critical perspective on self-tracking applications might also contribute to a queering of the healthcare system at a structural level. (shrink)

El presente estudio analiza el avance del populismo penal en Ecuador, tomando en cuenta los últimos índices de violencia, las reformas constitucionales más recientes y los lineamientos para un correcto desarrollo de la política criminal. Se busca contribuir a un debate informado en la academia sobre este tema crucial para la seguridad pública y la justicia en el país, en este momento de coyuntura social en el que el populismo penal ha tomado auge en Ecuador. La presente investigación tiene como (...) objetivo desarrollar un método neutrosófico para la evaluación del avance del populismo penal en Ecuador. Se caracteriza por reformas legislativas que endurecen las penas, amplían el catálogo de delitos y restringen los beneficios penitenciarios. Si bien estas medidas pueden generar una sensación de falsa seguridad en la población, no abordan las causas estructurales de la criminalidad y, en muchos casos, tienen consecuencias negativas en los derechos humanos y la reincidencia delictiva. (shrink)

Extended critical discussion of Stefanie Grüne's *Blinde Anschauung*.

Erarbeitet von Dominik Balg, Anne Burkard, Henning Franzen, Aenna Frottier, David Lanius, David Löwenstein, Hanna Lucks, Kirsten Meyer, Donata Romizi, Katharina Schulz, Stefanie Thiele und Annett Wienmeister. -/- Die Entwicklung argumentativer Fähigkeiten ist ein zentrales Ziel des Ethik- und Philosophieunterrichts, ja überhaupt ein zentrales Bildungsziel. Wie aber kann das gelingen? In vielen verfügbaren Unterrichtsmaterialien werden argumentative Fähigkeiten eher vorausgesetzt als systematisch gefördert. Auch curriculare Vorgaben bleiben zumeist sehr unspezifisch. Lehrpersonen werden so weitgehend allein gelassen mit der Aufgabe, Lernende beim (...) Erwerb argumentativer Fähigkeiten zu fördern. Die vorliegende Aufgabensammlung soll dazu beitragen, diese Lücke zu schließen. Sie bietet Lehrpersonen reichhaltige Materialien für die spiralcurricular angelegte, systematische Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeit anhand exemplarischer Inhalte. Orientiert an klaren fachlichen Standards finden sich hier Aufgaben auf vier Niveaustufen, jeweils in Verbindung mit übersichtlichen Merkblättern. Die Aufgaben der beiden unteren Niveaustufen lassen sich bereits für jüngere Lernende der Sekundarstufe einsetzen, Aufgaben der obersten Niveaustufe richten sich an Lernende von Abschlussklassen oder der Studieneingangsphase. Für die Hand der Lehrpersonen werden die Aufgaben und Merkblätter durch fachliche und didaktische Kommentare sowie Lösungshinweise ergänzt. (shrink)

[Replies to My Friends] This is an answer to the critics of my book WHAT IT'S LIKE, OR WHAT IT'S ABOUT? THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MATERIAL WORLD (2017). I proceed from the least to the most serious objections. I start with Jakub Mihálik’s defense of Russellian Monism against my claim that it is not a genuine alternative to standard dualism and materialism. In reply, I claim this is a side issue to the central aim of my book, which (...) is to undermine the concept of phenomenal consciousness assumed by Russellian Monism as much as by every other standard theory. One of these standard theories is reductive materialism, pursued by Michal Polák and Tomáš Marvan. Both Polák and Marvan are worried by Dennett’s alleged eliminativism, even though their arguments somewhat differ. Polák believes in a deflationary concept of consciousness, which I am afraid lacks a definite content. Marvan offers an “innocent” concept of consciousness, on which there is supposed to be a general consensus, but I think he just assumes that the concept of phenomenal property is part of the definition of consciousness. Curiously, while Polák and Marvan take me as to be a Dennettian, Stefanie Dach argues that I misinterpret Dennett. Conversely, I believe that she overlooks weak points in Dennett’s theory. (shrink)

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant’s writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant’s critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant’s account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? (...) How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role does self-consciousness play in our judgments? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self ? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe? These essays showcase the depth of Kant’s writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant’s writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self. Contents: 0. Introduction Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson 1. Kant, The Philosophy Of Mind, And Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy Anil Gomes 2. Synthesis And Binding Lucy Allais 3. Understanding Non-Conceptual Representation Of Objects: Empirical Models Of Sensibility’s Operation Katherine Dunlop 4. Are Kantian Intuitions Object-Dependent? Stefanie Grüne 5. Intuition And Presence Colin McLear 6. Imagination And Inner Intuition Andrew Stephenson 7. Inner Sense And Time Ralf M. Bader 8. Can’t Kant Cognize Himself? Or, A Problem For (Almost) Every Interpretation Of The Refutation Of Idealism Andrew Chignell 9. A Kantian Critique Of Transparency Patricia Kitcher 10. Judging For Reasons: On Kant And The Modalities Of Judgment Jessica Leech 11. Kant On Judging And The Will Jill Vance Buroker 12. Self and Selves Ralph C. S. Walker 13. Subjects Of Kant’s First Paralogism Tobias Rosefeldt 14. The Lessons Of Kant’s Paralogisms Paul Snowdon. (shrink)