Kant repeatedly stresses that moral philosophy shall find completion in the shape of a system. The present chapter focuses on three main aspects that characterise his view of the need of a system of ethics, suggesting that Kant's view should be construed in contrast with the current assumptions on the role of a system in moral philosophy. First, I argue that, in Kant’s view, the system of ethics does not pursue the coherentist project of systematising moral beliefs. Systematicity in ethics (...) is, for him, about unfolding the obligations that are justified by the fundamental principle, according to a Pufendorfian paradigm widespread in the eighteenth century. Second, I show that, in contrast not only to current assumptions, but also to the Pufendorfian paradigm, Kant’s systematic treatment of ethics is neither a logically consistent arrangement of demands, nor a complete collection of ethical duties, but a system of ends that yields an open-ended system of duty types. Third, I suggest that in Kant’s view a systematic treatment of ethics is supposed to provide orientation to moral thinking through a broader perspective from which perplexing cases should be considered by emphasizing the holistic character of ethical demands and clarifying their connections. (shrink)

In this commentary, I propose a framework for thinking about data quality in the context of scientific research. I start by analyzing conceptualizations of quality as a property of information, evidence and data and reviewing research in the philosophy of information, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of biomedicine. I identify a push for purpose dependency as one of the main results of this review. On this basis, I present a contextual approach to data quality in scientific research, whereby (...) the quality of a dataset is dependent on the context of use of the dataset as much as the dataset itself. I exemplify the approach by discussing current critiques and debates of scientific quality, thus showcasing how data quality can be approached contextually. (shrink)

In § 37 of his "Elements of First Practical Philosophy", Baumgarten provides important qualifications to the controversial notion of ‘objective morality’, which had long been at the centre of the dispute between realists like Wolff and his adversaries. The chapter shall examine how he construes his view of morality in §§ 36-38 with a specific focus on the central § 37. I shall analyse that section, first considering how Baumgarten understands the key notion of ‘objective morality’ and how he argues (...) for it, focusing both on its relational character and its connection with God’s will. Then I will examine the last, and arguably most surprising of the implications that he draws per negativum from the main claim, namely that affirming objective morality does not amount to rule out what Baumgarten calls ‘subjective morality’. Finally, I will briefly consider how Baumgarten’s distinctive way to take side in the Wolffian camp in that dispute reflects, through the close dialogue with the "Elements" in Kant’s private notes and lectures, on the development of Kant’s own views in practical philosophy. (shrink)

This paper sheds light on Kant’s notion of autonomy in his moral philosophy by considering Kant’s critique of the rationalist theories of morality that Kant discussed in his lectures on practical philosophy from the 1760s to the time of the Groundwork. The paper first explains Kant’s taxonomy of moral theories and his perspective on the history of ethics. Second, it considers Kant's arguments against the two main variants of ‘rationalism’ as he construes it, that is, perfectionism and theological voluntarism, pointing (...) out the similarities to previous criticisms. Third, the paper argues that Kant’s discussion of the 'rationalist' views does not amount to an unqualified dismissal, but to an attempt at working out a novel rationalist position. Kant’s criticisms of rationalist views suggest that his project emerges from the failures of previous rationalism, with the aim to work out a rationalist view that can account for moral obligation by integrating insights from the theological conception. The combination of perfectionism and theological views yields the basic outline of the idea of autonomy, consisting in the lawgiving function of a rational will as a key to the legislation of a necessary law. (shrink)

In a recent essay in this journal, Ross Cameron presents a novel solution to the problem of musical creation.1 The solution is of the ‘using a sledgehammer to crack a nut’ variety, since side by side with a dissolution of the problem of musical creation, his approach, if successful, would yield a swift answer to pretty much every central question in the ontology of art, and, for that matter, to a wide variety of perennial metaphysical difficulties. Nothing of this magnitude (...) should be nonchalantly swept aside. Unfortunately, Cameron's approach does not survive close scrutiny. (shrink)

Kant's Notion of "Transcendental Truth". [English] The aim of this work is to elucidate the notion of “transcendental truth” and to show its role in the Kantian system. I will argue that this notion is in line with the traditional definition of truth, i.e., that it consists in the correspondence between knowledge and object. I will also argue that criteria of transcendental truth are provided by transcendental logic, and that it is this notion of truth what makes it possible to (...) establish the truth of a priori knowledge and delimitate the field of empirical truth. [Español] El objetivo de este trabajo es dilucidar la noción de “verdad trascendental” y mostrar su lugar en el sistema kantiano. Se defenderá que la verdad trascendental consiste, en línea con la definición tradicional de verdad, en un sentido de correspondencia entre conocimiento y objeto, que la lógica trascendental establece criterios de verdad trascendental, y que es esta noción de verdad la que permite establecer la verdad del conocimiento a priori y delimitar el territorio de la verdad empírica. (shrink)

dolce, the first top-level (foundational) ontology to be axiomatized, has remained stable for twenty years and today is broadly used in a variety of domains. dolce is inspired by cognitive and linguistic considerations and aims to model a commonsense view of reality, like the one human beings exploit in everyday life in areas as diverse as socio-technical systems, manufacturing, financial transactions and cultural heritage. dolce clearly lists the ontological choices it is based upon, relies on philosophical principles, is richly formalized, (...) and is built according to well-established ontological methodologies, e.g. OntoClean. Because of these features, it has inspired most of the existing top-level ontologies and has been used to develop or improve standards and public domain resources (e.g. CIDOC CRM, DBpedia and WordNet). Being a foundational ontology, dolce is not directly concerned with domain knowledge. Its purpose is to provide the general categories and relations needed to give a coherent view of reality, to integrate domain knowledge, and to mediate across domains. In these 20 years dolce has shown that applied ontologies can be stable and that interoperability across reference and domain ontologies is a reality. This paper briefly introduces the ontology and shows how to use it on a few modeling cases. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to shed light on some of the most original elements of Fichte’s conception of morality as expressed in his account of specific obligations. After some remarks on Fichte’s original classification of ethical duties, the paper focuses on the prohibition of lying, the duty to communicate our true knowledge, and the duty to set a good example. Fichte’s account of those duties not only goes beyond the mere justification of universally acknowledged demands, but also deploys (...) different arguments than his contemporaries, most notably Kant. Fichte thereby sketches a conception of morality in which the agent is crucially required to contribute to the morality of others. The chapter explores the contrast between Fichte’s view and Kant’s thought of an end in itself and suggests that Fichte’s view of morality amounts to a form of normative perfectionism that is qualified by the underlying claim of the agent-neutral character of moral demands. (shrink)

The chapter shows how Kant’s ethical thought as reflected in the lectures, responds to Baumgarten’s works on moral philosophy. I argue that Kant chose Baumgarten’s textbooks for his classes for genuinely philosophical reasons. The thorough discussion of Baumgarten’s views provided Kant with important clues for developing an original position, even if mostly in opposition to Baumgarten. I illustrate this complex role of Baumgarten with a few significant examples, that also highlight some original aspects of Baumgarten’s position in comparison to Wolff’s: (...) (1) Kant follows Baumgarten’s in focusing on obligation as the crucial issue in moral philosophy, but Kant regards Baumgarten’s account as not satisfying. (2) Baumgarten’s sharply theistic foundation of morality is rejected by Kant. (3) Kant rejects also several significant aspects of Baumgarten’s division of ethical duties, thereby revealing profound differences in their conceptions of morality. (shrink)

Both in historical debates and in recent discussions, the Guise of the Good Thesis represents a genuine dogma of rationalism in moral philosophy. Many influential commentators have maintained that Kant belongs in that camp, even that he “explicitly endorses” the Thesis. Attributing the Thesis to Kant, however, faces scarce textual support and amounts to a dubious understanding of the relationship of Kant’s moral philosophy to previous rationalist views. I suggest that, in Kant’s view, the Thesis only applies to the determination (...) of the will through the moral law. The principle that prior rationalists regarded as descriptive acquires in Kant’s terms a normative status. (shrink)

In current philosophical discussions on evidence in the medical sciences, epidemiology has been used to exemplify a specific version of evidential pluralism. According to this view, known as the Russo–Williamson Thesis, evidence of both difference-making and mechanisms is produced to make causal claims in the health sciences. In this paper, I present an analysis of data and evidence in epidemiological practice, with a special focus on research on the exposome, and I cast doubt on the extent to which evidential pluralism (...) holds in this case. I start by focusing on the claim that molecular data allows for the production of mechanistic evidence. On the basis of a close look at the ways in which molecular data is used in exposome research, I caution against interpretations in terms of mechanistic evidence. Secondly, I expand my critical remarks on the thesis by addressing the conditions under which data is categorised as evidence in exposome research. I argue that these show that the classification of a dataset as a type of evidence is dependent on the ways in which the data is used. This is in contrast with the approach of evidential pluralism, where evidence is classified in different types on the basis of its intrinsic properties. Finally, I come back to what I consider the core of the thesis and suggest that the epidemiological research analysed in the paper indicates different interpretations of evidential pluralism and its applicability in the health sciences. (shrink)

After qualifying in which sense ‘realism’ can be applied to eighteenth-century views about morality, I argue that while Kant shares with traditional moral realists several fundamental claims about morality, he holds that those claims must be argued for in a radically different way. Drawing on his diagnosis of the serious weaknesses of traditional moral realism, Kant proposes a novel approach that revolves around a hybrid view about moral obligation. Since his solution to that central issue combines elements of realism with (...) elements of voluntarist ascent, Kant’s position can be characterized as an idealist version of moral realism or, more specifically, as the combination of a strong realism about the moral law with an idealist account of moral obligation. (shrink)

Recently, it has been argued that the use of Big Data transforms the sciences, making data-driven research possible and studying causality redundant. In this paper, I focus on the claim on causal knowledge by examining the Big Data project EXPOsOMICS, whose research is funded by the European Commission and considered capable of improving our understanding of the relation between exposure and disease. While EXPOsOMICS may seem the perfect exemplification of the data-driven view, I show how causal knowledge is necessary for (...) the project, both as a source for handling complexity and as an output for meeting the project’s goals. Consequently, I argue that data-driven claims about causality are fundamentally flawed and causal knowledge should be considered a necessary aspect of Big Data science. In addition, I present the consequences of this result on other data-driven claims, concerning the role of theoretical considerations. I argue that the importance of causal knowledge and other kinds of theoretical engagement in EXPOsOMICS undermine theory-free accounts and suggest alternative ways of framing science based on Big Data. (shrink)

The contrast between Kant’s moral philosophy and Feder’s is not less crucial than the controversy caused by the Göttingen review of the first Critique. One of main targets of Kant’s moral philosophy was Feder’s view, which can be regarded as Kant's main competitor in the contemporary debate. I thus argue that the background provided by the conflict with Feder shows significant distinctive traits of Kant's view, with regard to three fundamental issues. First, I examine how the project of a pure (...) moral philosophy opposes Feder’s empirical investigation into the will, which is in fact one of the targets of Kant's criticism against universal practical philosophy. Second, a central element of Kant’s anti-eudaemonism, the contrast between happiness and self-contentment, is a rejection of the strongly moralized view of happiness that underlies Feder’s eudaemonism. Finally, I examine Tittel's objection that Kant had provided "only a new formula" of morality and Kant's response, which display a fundamental contrast between Kant’s understanding of the aims of moral theory with Feder’s common-sense conception. (shrink)

Digital technologies hold promise to modernize healthcare. Such opportunity should be leveraged also to address the needs of rapidly ageing populations. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the use of wearable devices for promoting healthy ageing. Previous work has assessed the prospects of digital technologies for health promotion and disease prevention in older adults. However, to our knowledge, ours is one of the first attempts to specifically address the use of wearables for healthy ageing, and to offer ethical insights for (...) assessing the prospects of leveraging wearable devices in this context. We provide an analysis of the considerable opportunities associated with the use of wearables for healthy ageing, with a focus on the five domains of intrinsic capacity: locomotion, sensory functions, psychological aspects, cognition, and vitality. We then highlight current limitations and ethical challenges of such approach to healthy ageing, including issues related to access, inclusion, privacy, surveillance, autonomy, and regulation. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis in light of current debates on the ethics of digital health, and suggest measures to address the identified challenges. (shrink)

This paper aims to show the significance of respect in revealing the normative structure of Kant’s ethics to the agent as a finite rational being. I argue that understanding the moral law as a fact of reason is insufficient for fully recognizing its absolute value and the normative consequences it entails. Indeed, the finiteness of the human agent requires the experience of the feeling of respect, which not only has a motivational role but also an epistemic one. I thus start (...) by clarifying the nature of feeling for Kant in a way that highlights its complex structure. Then, I show how respect – as a particular kind of feeling – gives the agent a deeper understanding of her relationship with the moral law, thereby allowing the unveiling of Kant’s normative theory. (shrink)

My chapter deals with an important part of how Wolff pursued the normative ambitions of his ethics in giving practical guidance with regard to specific moral issues. I first consider how Wolff’s ethics tackles the duties to others, which traditionally represent a difficult issue for moral perfectionism. In this regard, I argue that Wolff’s strategy combines two aspects: (a) he includes in perfection non-active aspects and (b) operates with an agent-neutral notion of perfection, in spite of important passages that might (...) suggest differently. I then focus on Wolff’s treatment of the duties concerning veracity and lying, and show how it follows that general strategy. Combining its two aspects, Wolff examines specific moral issues by adopting a non-welfarist notion of benefit and harm as the standard that can give guidance about practical cases. (shrink)

Schnieder (2020) argues, against Orilia (2009) and Koslicki (2013), that claims of existential grounding of the form “the fact that x exists is grounded in the fact that y is F” cannot be grounded in claims of existential dependence of the form “x existentially depends on y” and defends the view that the latter claims are grounded, via a definition of existential dependence, in the former. I will firstly argue that Schnieder’s main point against the claim that existential grounding is (...) grounded in existential dependence is not conclusive; I will then put forward a proposal concerning how claims of existential grounding can be grounded in claims of existential dependence. The proposal is a third way between those of Schnieder and Orilia/Koslicki which, although accepting the former’s definition of existential dependence in terms of grounding, makes room for the latter’s idea that existential dependence does the real job in structuring reality. (shrink)

Wearable devices are increasingly present in the health context, as tools for biomedical research and clinical care. In this context, wearables are considered key tools for a more digital, personalised, preventive medicine. At the same time, wearables have also been associated with issues and risks, such as those connected to privacy and data sharing. Yet, discussions in the literature have mostly focused on either technical or ethical considerations, framing these as largely separate areas of discussion, and the contribution of wearables (...) to the collection, development, application of biomedical knowledge has only partially been discussed. To fill in these gaps, in this article we provide an epistemic (knowledgerelated) overview of the main functions of wearable technology for health: monitoring, screening, detection, and prediction. On this basis, we identify 4 areas of concern in the application of wearables for these functions: data quality, balanced estimations, health equity, and fairness. To move the field forward in an effective and beneficial direction, we present recommendations for the 4 areas: local standards of quality, interoperability, access, and representativity. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse the relation between the use of environmental data in contemporary health sciences and related conceptualisations and operationalisations of the notion of environment. We consider three case studies that exemplify a different selection of environmental data and mode of data integration in data-intensive epidemiology. We argue that the diversification of data sources, their increase in scale and scope, and the application of novel analytic tools have brought about three significant conceptual shifts. First, we discuss the EXPOsOMICS (...) project, an attempt to integrate genomic and environmental data which suggests a reframing of the boundaries between external and internal environments. Second, we explore the MEDMI platform, whose efforts to combine health, environmental and climate data instantiate a reframing and expansion of environmental exposure. Third, we illustrate how extracting epidemiological insights from extensive social data collected by the CIDACS institute yields innovative attributions of causal power to environmental factors. Identifying these shifts highlights the benefits and opportunities of new environmental data, as well as the challenges that such tools bring to understanding and fostering health. It also emphasises the constraints that data selection and accessibility pose to scientific imagination, including how researchers frame key concepts in health-related research. (shrink)

The Question of Truth in Kant’s Transcendental Logic [English] In the third section of the “Introduction” to transcendental logic, Kant dedicates a couple of paragraphs to the subject of truth (KrV B82-83). Based on this passage, Kant’s com¬mentators have justified various and sometimes contradictory interpretations of the Kantian notion of truth. However, few have analyzed the passage in its own context, that is, as part of the strategy to introduce the idea of transcendental logic. In this work, I intend to (...) take a position in this regard. I will try to show that this passage does not subscribe to the distinction between general and transcendental logic, but between analytic and dialectic logic. [Español] En la tercera sección de la “Introducción” a la lógica trascendental, Kant dedica un par de párrafos al tema de la verdad (KrV B82-83). Basándose en este pasaje, los comentaristas de Kant han justificado diversas y a veces contradictorias interpretaciones de la noción kantiana de verdad. Sin embargo, pocos han analizado el pasaje en su propio contexto, es decir, como parte de la estrategia para introducir la idea de una lógica trascendental. En este trabajo se pretende tomar postura a este respecto. Se intentará mostrar que este pasaje no abona a la distinción entre lógica general y lógica trascendental, sino entre analítica y dialéctica. (shrink)

I suggest that looking at how Kant’s arguments relate to the stand of the discussion on the relationship between right and ethics in his times contributes to a better understanding of his own position in this matter. I contrast the terms of the pre-Kantian debate with Kant’s take on the matter, in order to point out how Kant gains a new perspective concerning the rela- tionship between ethics and right. While the most prominent pre-Kantian view construed right and ethics as (...) either resulting from the application of a general principle to di erent domains or reciprocally independent, Kant’s own account centres on the difference between outer and inner freedom. I argue that Kant thereby only differentiates two relations of freedom to different hindrances, without implying any separation. This distinction allows him to construe right and ethics as sharing the same normative force of moral obligation. Therefore I suggest that Kant’s view understands the relationship between right and ethics neither as dependence nor as independence, but highlights the normative continuity throughout morals. (shrink)

The wide dissemination of Aristotle’s philosophical works was encouraged not only by Averroes’s commentaries, but also by the many works of medieval and Renaissance commentators. In particular, Walter Burley commented on some of Aristotle’s works and also extracted what he considered to be the main philosophical problems discussed by Aristotle. The Conclusiones super Physicam are published here together with the Dubia et Rubrice from the 1524 edition of Burley’s commentary.

In several places of his work, Kant distinguishes between two senses of self-consciousness: a pure one and an empirical one. The aim of this work is to analyze these two senses of consciousness and show that, for Kant, self-consciousness does not occur unrestrictedly: a relation with something other than consciousness is needed for it to become conscious of itself. I carry out these objectives throughout six sections. In the first one I lay out the Kantian principle of pure apperception. In (...) the second one, I present the limits of pure apperception through Kant’s critique of rational psychology. Then, in the third section, I set the basis to understand the relationship that Kant establishes between the I think and the I exist. In the fourth one I show that pure apperception, despite being pure, is not possible without the opportunity of perception. Next, in the fifth one, I introduce the notion of empirical apperception, establish its relationship with pure apperception, and elucidate its meaning. Finally, in the last section, I explain the way in which empirical self-consciousness is determined, in relation to the knowledge of objects of the external sense. (shrink)

The idea of autonomy, presented as Kant’s main achievement in the Groundwork and the second Critique, is hardly present in the ethics of the “Doctrine of Virtue”. Against Pauline Kleingeld’s recent interpretation, I argue that this does not amount to a disappearance of the Principle of Autonomy, but to an important development of the notion of autonomy. I first show that Kant still advocated the Principle of Autonomy in the 1790s along with the thought of lawgiving through one’s maxims. I (...) then argue that the role of autonomy in Kant’s later ethics has a different focus than in the previous works, which requires to connect autonomy with autocracy. Conversely, in the “Doctrine of Virtue”, autocracy, which Kant had employed before as an independent notion, is construed as a new layer of autonomy. What Kant there calls subjective autonomy is thereby considered as reason’s self-government in the maxims of each rational agent. -/- . (shrink)

To his pupil Nero and to Lucilius (friend and, as metonymy, representative of the entire mankind), Seneca testifies to his pedagogic vocation. With conviction he applies himself to demonstrate the perfect correspondence between the Stoic doctrine and the edu¬cational strategy that he proposes. Firstly, the reciprocity of the relationship between educator and pupil appears fundamental; both further their individual knowledge. Secondly, the limitations of an ethical precept that is not anchored in the intensity and concreteness of human life becomes clearly (...) apparent. Furthermore, it brings to question the weakness of a world vision not inspired by an innovative and original path. The starting point is therefore a rigorous examination of conscience to ultimately reach the revolutionary experience of risk in the moment of the last decision. In the name of truth the wise man must have the courage to embrace fate in order to really understand who he is (in a process of oikeiosis both as experience and as target), and he must instil in his pupils the courage to take risks along their own independent journey. In so doing, self-scrutiny and politics can become intertwined. It is herein that the educator’s risk and responsibilities lie. (shrink)

This paper discusses an anonymous manuscript Dissertatio against Descartes’s and Gassendi’s theories of knowledge, dating from the first half of the eighteenth century and now preserved in the Biblioteca Forteguerriana in Pistoia. It is probably the result of Jesuit pedagogy, stemming from the lectures in which Aristotle’s works were commented on, drawing heavily on the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas.

I propose an approach that expands philosophical views of scientific change, on the basis of an analysis of contemporary biomedical research and recent developments in the philosophy of scientific change. Focusing on the establishment of the exposome in epidemiology as a case study and the role of data as a context for contrasting views on change, I discuss change at conceptual, methodological, material, and social levels of biomedical epistemology. Available models of change provide key resources to discuss this type of (...) change, but I present the need for an approach that models transfer, alignment, and influence as key processes of change. I develop this as a pragmatic approach to scientific change, where processes might change substantially depending on specific circumstances, thus contributing to and complementing the debate on a crucial epistemological issue. (shrink)

According to the so-called Lockean thesis, a rational agent believes a proposition just in case its probability is sufficiently high, i.e., greater than some suitably fixed threshold. The Preface paradox is usually taken to show that the Lockean thesis is untenable, if one also assumes that rational agents should believe the conjunction of their own beliefs: high probability and rational belief are in a sense incompatible. In this paper, we show that this is not the case in general. More precisely, (...) we consider two methods of computing how probable must each of a series of propositions be in order to rationally believe their conjunction under the Lockean thesis. The price one has to pay for the proposed solutions to the paradox is what we call “quasi-dogmatism”: the view that a rational agent should believe only those propositions which are “nearly certain” in a suitably defined sense. (shrink)

The 14 essays in this volume explore the relationship between philosophy and religion from antiquity to the contemporary age, as well as the development of a philosophy of religion in modern times. It does so by focusing on the topics of atheism, the nature of Christ, and the Cartesian origins of rational theology, on the one hand, and on the contemporary ramifications of philosophy of religion: in hermeneutics, phenomenology, and historical materialism, on the other.

Abstract. The aim of this paper is first to defend the intuition that truth is grounded in how things are and, second, to argue that this fact is consistent with Minimalism. After having cashed out that intuition in terms of explanatory claims of the form ‘if it is true that p, it is true that p because p’, I set out an argument against Minimalism which is based on the same intuition, and I argue that a strategy the minimalist could (...) adopt to resist the argument, i.e. to deny the correctness of the intuition, is flawed. Then I explain why the intuition is correct and I make some claims concerning the kind of explanations which are involved in it. Now the stage is set up to present the right way for the minimalist to resist the argument. I finally answer some objections. (shrink)

The book includes 13 contributions that deal with the first attempts of opposition to the of Aristotle's thought. From Theophrastus to Epicurus, and to Plotinus. The best specialists have collaborated (among others: M. Mignucci, E. Berti, K. Ierodiakonou, C. Natali, S. Maso, F. Ferrari, D. Taormina, A. Falcon, A. Schiaparelli).

Subjective judgments and judgments about subjects. A distinction regarding judgments of perception [English] It is well known the number of problems that arise from the distinction between "judgments of perception" and "judgments of experience" delivered in the Prolegomena. This article focuses on the impossibility of assigning truth value to judgments of perception since it seems counterintuitive to indicate that judgments such as "I am cold" or "sugar tastes sweet" cannot be true. To solve this difficulty, it is proposed here to (...) distinguish between true judgments of perception (true subjective judgments) and "judgments about subjects". The latter would be those that, despite referring in a certain sense to a subject, do so using categorical links and, therefore, are judgments of experience with claims of objective validity and with truth value. However, there is another reason for this distinction besides solving the difficulty posed. Above all, it is important to offer a key to understand the true nature of judgments of perception, showing the impossibility of understanding them as judgments that describe subjective mental states, and trying to distinguish the way in which we enunciate them from the merely subjective unit that, according to Kant, characterizes them. To carry out these objectives, we will first analyze the basis of the distinction between perception judgments and experience judgments; secondly, a distinction between subjective judgments and judgments about subjects is proposed and explained, while the role of truth in the empirical illusion is examined; and finally, we will underline the impossibility of formulating judgments (including those of perceptions) independently of any objective link. [Español] Es moneda común la diversidad de problemas que plantea la introducción de la distinción entre “juicios de percepción” y “juicios de experiencia” en los Prolegómenos. Este trabajo centra su atención en la imposibilidad de asignar valor de verdad a juicios de percepción —dada su carencia de pretensión de validez objetiva— pues parece contraintuitivo indicar que juicios como “tengo calor” o “el azúcar me sabe dulce” no pueden ser verdaderos. Para solucionar esta dificultad, se propone aquí distinguir entre los verdaderos juicios de percepción (verdaderos juicios subjetivos) y “juicios sobre sujetos”. Estos últimos serían aquellos que, a pesar de referirse en cierto sentido a un sujeto, lo hacen con enlaces categoriales y, por tanto, son en realidad juicios de experiencia con pretensión de validez objetiva y con valor de verdad. Sin embargo, a esta distinción subyace otro motivo además de solucionar la dificultad planteada. Interesa, sobre todo, ofrecer una clave para comprender la verdadera naturaleza de los juicios de percepción, mostrando la imposibilidad de entenderlos como juicios que describen estados mentales subjetivos, e intentando distinguir la forma en que los enunciamos de la unidad meramente subjetiva que, según Kant, los caracteriza. Para llevar a cabo estos objetivos se analiza, primero, el fundamento de la distinción entre juicios de percepción y juicios de experiencia; en segundo lugar, se propone y explica la distinción entre juicios subjetivos y juicios sobre sujetos, a la par que se examina el papel de la verdad en la ilusión empírica; y por último se subraya la imposibilidad de formular juicios (incluso de percepción) independientemente de cualquier enlace objetivo. (shrink)

Playing in counterpoint with the general theoretical orientation of the book, this chapter does not focus its attention on the recording and archiving capabilities of the digital medium. Instead, it proposes an understanding of the digital medium that focuses on its disclosing various forms of “doing.” Gualeni’s chapter begins by offering an understanding of “doing in the digital” that methodologically separates “doing as acting” from “doing as making.” After setting its theoretical framework, the chapter discusses an “interactive thought experiment” designed (...) by the author that is analyzed as a digital artifact leveraging both dimensions of “doing in the digital” for philosophical purposes. In extreme synthesis, one could say that this chapter is about several kinds of soups. (shrink)

The chapter deals with the two most distinctive elements of the Introduction of the Naturrecht Feyerabend, namely the notions of an end in itself and autonomy. I shall argue that both are to be interpreted with regard to the aim of explaining the ground of right. In this light, I suggest that the notion of an end in itself counters a voluntarist conception like Achenwall’s with a claim whose necessity has a twofold ground: First, the representation of an unconditional worth (...) emerges as a structural element of the practical use of reason. Second, that representation concerns the necessary self-understanding of moral subjects. Finally, I argue that the other distinctive element, the occurrence of the notion of autonomy, is best understood as an application of that idea to a specific issue, which Kant addresses by showing that freedom is a self-regulating domain. (shrink)

Philosophical games are games designed to invite players to think philosophically within (and about) their gameworlds. They are interactive fictions allowing players to engage with philosophical themes in ways that often set them apart from non-interactive kinds of speculative fictions (such as philosophical novels or thought experiments). To better understand philosophical games, this entry proposes to distinguish two primary ways in which a philosophical game can approach its themes: dialectically or rhetorically.

The paper examines Kant’s self-criticism to the account of hypothetical imperatives given in the "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals". Following his corrections in the introductions to the third "Critique", the paper traces the consequences of that change in his later writings, specifically with regard to the status of prudence. I argue that the revision of the account of hypothetical imperatives leads to differentiate, and ultimately separate, two functions in prudence: the setting of ends through maxims, and the pragmatic rules (...) establishing means to reach those ends. Accordingly, I furthermore argue, there is ultimately no genuine structural distinction between the rules of prudence and skill. The only difference lies in the domain in which prudence unfolds, that is, the field of human relations, and in the relevant cognitions. (shrink)

Self-reflexive videogames are videogames designed to materialize critical and/or satirical perspectives on the ways in which videogames themselves are designed, played, sold, manipulated, experienced, and understood as social objects. This essay focuses on the use of virtual worlds as mediators, and in particular on the use of videogames to guide and encourage reflections on technical, interactive, and thematic conventions in videogame design and development. Structurally, it is composed of two interconnected parts: -/- 1) In the first part of this essay, (...) I will discuss NECESSARY EVIL (Gualeni et al., 2013), an experimental videogame that I designed as a self-reflexive virtual artifact. With the objective of clarifying the philosophical aspirations of self-reflexive videogames – and in order to understand how those aspirations can be practically pursued – I will dissect and examine the design decisions that contributed to the qualities of NECESSARY EVIL as an example of “playable philosophy”. -/- 2) Taking off from the perspectives on self-reflexive videogames offered in the first part of the essay, the second half will focus on virtual worlds as viable mediators of philosophical thought more in general. In this section, I will argue that, both through the practice of game design and through the interactive experiences of virtual worlds, twenty-first century philosophers have the possibility to challenge the often-unquestioned understanding of written discourse as the only context in which philosophical thought can emerge and be developed. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relationship between Kant and the traditional view of dignity. I argue that some amendments to Sensen’s description of the traditional paradigm enable us to see more clearly both where Kant adheres to the latter and where his view is original. First, a consideration of Pufendorf’s use of dignity suggests (1) that, contrary to Sensen’s reconstruction, the traditional paradigm does not entail a connection between dignity and duties to oneself, and (2) that Pufendorf’s understanding of dignity (...) as a kind of esteem, as opposed to price, provides a crucial mediation between the traditional view and Kant’s view. Finally, I argue that the traditional understanding of dignity also includes a subordinate justificatory element that helps to explain Kant’s use of dignity in the Doctrine of Virtue. (shrink)

Scholars disagree about whether and how Kant manages to avoid dualistic outcomes in the relation between freedom and sensibility within the moral agent. If he does not – if he portrays a moral agent who must judge and act without taking emotions, sentiments, and passions into account – then authors such as Blackburn can rightly argue that Kantian ethics loses sight of the concrete individual, whose sensibility has a fundamental role, taking part in the definition of her specific identity. I (...) argue that this portrait comes from a disputable and incomplete reading of Kant’s works. There is no dualistic outcome in the relation between freedom and sensibility in Kant. My aim is to show that there is a bridge between the rational and the sensible elements within the Kantian agent and that it can be reconstructed by analysing Kant’s works on ethics, aesthetics, and anthropology. Specifically, those elements must be thought of as in accordance, not in opposition, because sensibility is necessary for Kant’s ethics to be effective, both for the agent’s awareness of the moral law and for the agent’s motivation. (shrink)

Questo breve volume prende in considerazione, analizza e commenta alcune interpretazioni magistrali della filosofia di Giordano Bruno, che hanno attraversato l'800 ed il '900, indirizzandone l'orizzonte di comprensione. Il testo inizia con l'interpretazione di G.W.F. Hegel e di B. Spaventa, per poi accedere a quella di G. Gentile. Il volume si conclude con l'analisi ed il commento dell'interpretazione fornita da N. Badaloni. Una piccola bibliografia bruniana conclude il testo.

Questo volume prende in considerazione, analizza e commenta in modo critico alcune recenti interpretazioni della filosofia di Giordano Bruno, che hanno attraversato la seconda parte del '900, indirizzandone l'orizzonte di comprensione. Il testo inizia con l'interpretazione di M.A. Granada e di M. Ciliberto, per poi accedere a quella di M. Ghio e A. Ingegno. Il volume si conclude con l'analisi ed il commento dell'interpretazione fornita da W. Beierwaltes. Una piccola bibliografia bruniana conclude il testo.

Questo breve volumetto cerca di descrivere in modo abbastanza rapido, ma nello stesso tempo preciso ed articolato, la struttura in divenire del pensiero di G.F.W. Hegel. Dalla sua prima fase, animata dagli ideali giacobini e rivoluzionari, alla sua conclusione, quando il pensiero hegeliano sembrava prestarsi bene - come strumento ideologico - al movimento di restituzione regressiva ed autoritaria del potere, imposto dallle sconfitte di Napoleone e dal Congresso di Vienna. Il testo è stato prodotto come tesina per il superamento dell'esame (...) finale For.Com nell'anno accademico 2010-2011. (shrink)

Il volume raccoglie il lavoro di ricerca, di analisi e di commento, dedicati ai "Dialoghi Italiani" di Giordano Bruno, che è stato presentato quale tesi di dottorato in filosofia presso l'Università degli studi di Padova, nel febbraio del 2002. Il testo comprende un confronto fra la tradizione dei testi aristotelici della "Metafisica", "Fisica" e "Il cielo" ed i testi in volgare di Giordano Bruno, analizza i testi bruniani giungendo alla scoperta del principio dell'infinito creativo e doppiamente dialettico e presenta una (...) panoramica delle principali interpretazioni fornite al pensiero bruniano durante l'800 ed il '900. (shrink)

La rivoluzionarietà della speculazione bruniana si esercita nei confronti della tradizione di alcuni testi aristotelici fondamentali nella trasmissione del pensiero e della civiltà occidentale. In modo principale essa attacca e demolisce i capisaldi della "Metafisica" di Aristotele, per poter cominciare ad affermare - o, se si vuole, a riaffermare - il principio dell'infinito creativo e doppiamente dialettico. Il breve saggio segue la formulazione e lo sviluppo progressivo del testo aristotelico attraverso la critica esposta dalla riflessione bruniana. Alla fine viene presentata (...) una breve bibliografia bruniana. (shrink)

Le argomentazioni presentate in questo volume costituiscono il primo contributo dell’autore al progettato compito di un’analisi e commento completi e puntuali dei principali testi filosofici di Giordano Bruno. Iniziando con il "De umbris idearum" e procedendo con le prime opere in latino, l’autore intende svelare le basi teoretiche della prima speculazione bruniana, destinate ad essere riprese, ampliate ed approfondite nei testi successivi, i "Dialoghi Italiani", così come, in una originale prospettiva atomistica, in quelli latini delle ultime fasi. Il "De umbris (...) idearum" costituisce in questa prospettiva il testo base della difficile e complessa speculazione bruniana: assolutamente lontano – come del resto indicato dalle esplicite affermazioni del filosofo di Nola – dall’impiego pragmatico e retorico della tradizionale arte della memoria, esso piuttosto costruisce progressivamente uno spazio di riflessione di natura ontologica, metafisica e teologica, con influssi sulle considerazioni razionali e naturali. In questo modo l’arte di memoria bruniana diventa la memoria di un arte filosofica civile, la necessità del ricordo di una possibilità del pensiero e della prassi incardinata sulla presenza di un plesso centrale creativo e dialettico, che progressivamente consente l’inserimento della principale innovazione escogitata dalla filosofia bruniana: il concetto dell’infinito. Direttamente tematizzato nei dialoghi in italiano, il concetto creativo e dialettico dell’infinito bruniano separa progressivamente l’autore nolano dalla tradizione neoplatonico-aristotelica, definendo in tal modo uno schema interpretativo della realtà diverso ed opposto rispetto a quello che – oltre l’apparente rivoluzionarietà della scienza moderna – ha innervato i principali sviluppi della civiltà occidentale moderna e contemporanea. (shrink)

Attraverso una breve e veloce premessa storico-critica e storico-filosofica il testo proposto fa emergere il tema del rapporto problematico sussistente fra l'attuale ideologia che sorregge il fenomeno economico, sociale e politico della globalizzazione internazionale dei capitali (soprattutto finanziari) ed i riflessi di ordine umano e naturale che ne sono l'effettiva conseguenza. Da un punto di vista psicologico, sociale ed educativo l'impianto ideologico neoliberista viene allora contrastato dalla ripresa di un pensiero critico, radicale e rivoluzionario, che riutilizza il principio dell'infinito creativo (...) e doppiamente dialettico, di lontana matrice presocratica e bruniana. Il testo analizza la progressione di avvicinamento a tale principio preparata dalle riflessioni di H. Marcuse, W. Reich, G. Deleuze, C. Castoriadis e A. Badiou. (shrink)