In this paper, I am going to explore an alternative explanation of causation in Graham Priest’s modal meinongianism. Priest proposes an understanding of causation, which is either too confusing, or against the metaphysical core of modal meinongianism. In his proposals, causation is discussed in the context of defining purely fictional and abstract objects, by using a counterfactual approach. In this case, causation is understood as an existence-entailing relation. I will argue that such an account of causation proves ineffective. Instead, I (...) will give another interpretation for causation, which is based on Peter Menzies and Huw Price’s version of agency theory of causation. The end result of my work will be the fact that causation as agency can, at best, be useful in understanding intentional acts, but not suitable for explaining what it means for a particular object to causally interact with us. (shrink)

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant remarks that the feeling of the dynamically sublime is actually conditioned and that its foundation is the moral feeling, which he addressed in the Critique of Practical Reason. In order to elucidate those transient yet significant remarks, this paper confronts the analytic of the dynamically sublime from the third Critique with the analytic of the moral feeling from the second Critique. By uncovering an architectonic, constitutive and structural kinship between the two (...) feelings, the paper contributes to the reconsideration of the relation between Kant’s aesthetics and his ethics. (shrink)

The notion of computation has changed the world more than any previous expressions of knowledge. However, as know-how in its particular algorithmic embodiment, computation is closed to meaning. Therefore, computer-based data processing can only mimic life’s creative aspects, without being creative itself. AI’s current record of accomplishments shows that it automates tasks associated with intelligence, without being intelligent itself. Mistaking the abstract for the concrete has led to the religion of “everything is an output of computation”—even the humankind that conceived (...) the computer. The hypostatized role of computers explains the increased dependence on them. The convergence machine called deep learning is only the most recent form through which the deterministic theology of the machine claims more than what it actually is: extremely effective data processing. A proper understanding of complexity, as well as the need to distinguish between the reactive nature of the artificial and the anticipatory nature of the living are suggested as practical responses to the challenges posed by machine theology. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the main characteristics of the epistemology of modal rationalism by proceeding from the critical investigation of Peacocke’s theory of modality. I build on arguments by Crispin Wright and Sonia Roca-Royes, which are generalised and supplemented by further analysis, in order to show that principle-based accounts have little prospects of succeeding in their task of providing an integrated account of the metaphysics and the epistemology of modality. I argue that it is unlikely that we will able (...) to develop an exhaustive and accurate principle-based account that discriminates objectively between correct and deviant modal knowledge. Even if such an account can be formulated, a non-circular way of justifying its necessity also seems to be out of our reach. (shrink)

In his article “Issues of Pragmaticism” published in 1905, in The Monist, Charles S. Peirce complains that “Logicians have been at fault in giving Vagueness the go-by, so far as not even to analyze it.” That same year, occupying himself with the consequences of “Critical commonsensism,” he affirmed, “I have worked out the logic of vagueness with something like completeness,” a statement that causes the majority of the commentators on his work, including the editors of the Collected Papers to ask (...) where this logic is to be found. The fever for finding Peirce's manuscripts is fed by the hope of some researchers of discovering the logic of vagueness, a hope that has grown since Carolyn Eisele's publication of his mathematical works. Others - and I count myself among them - believe that in reality this is a matter of something already known. That is, they interpret the affirmation ending the paragraph of reproach addressed to logicians, “The present writer has done his best to work out the Stechiology, Critic, and Methodeutik of the subject,” as a tripartite semiotic of the vague, still limited, according to Peirce's older works, to symbols, that is, to the signs of natural language examined from the perspective of logic. (shrink)

The paper identifies in Cartesian dualism a common target of the middle Wittgenstein and the early Merleau-Ponty. By relegating pain to mental awareness and location to bodily extension, Cartesian dualism renders common localizations of pain throughout the body as unintelligible ascriptions. Wittgenstein’s and Merleau-Ponty’s efforts to do justice to common localizations of pain illuminate one another. In their light, Cartesian dualism involves an objectification and a deappropriation of one’s body. Further, Wittgenstein’s acknowledgment of a heterogeneous multiplicity of corporeal spaces (e.g. (...) tactile space, feeling space) restores the view, reinforced by Merleau-Ponty, that corporeal pain is intimately related to corporeal localization, while corporeal space is not a continuation of the physical space of things. (shrink)

The paper brings a challenge to Cartesian dualism, while introducing some under-explored manuscript remarks from Wittgenstein’s middle period, which are methodologically and thematically akin to some passages from Merleau-Ponty’s early period. Cartesian dualism relegates pain to mental awareness and location to bodily extension, thus rendering common localizations of pain throughout the body as unintelligible ascriptions. Wittgenstein’s and Merleau-Ponty’s attempts at doing justice to common localizations of pain are mutually illuminating. In their light, Cartesian dualism turns out to involve an objectification (...) and a deappropriation of one’s body. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s unveiling a heterogeneous multiplicity of corporeal spaces (e.g. visual-space, tactile-space, feeling-space) rehabilitates the view, reinforced by Merleau-Ponty, that corporeal pain is intimately related to corporeal localization, while corporeal space is not part of the physical space of things. (shrink)

The paper brings a challenge to Cartesian dualism, while introducing some under-explored manuscript remarks from Wittgenstein’s middle period, which are methodologically and thematically akin to some passages from Merleau-Ponty’s early period. Cartesian dualism relegates pain to mental awareness and location to bodily extension, thus rendering common localizations of pain throughout the body as unintelligible ascriptions. Wittgenstein’s and Merleau-Ponty’s attempts at doing justice to common localizations of pain are mutually illuminating. In their light, Cartesian dualism turns out to involve an objectification (...) and a deappropriation of one’s body. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s unveiling a heterogeneous multiplicity of corporeal spaces (e.g. visual-space, tactile-space, feeling-space) rehabilitates the view, reinforced by Merleau-Ponty, that corporeal pain is intimately related to corporeal localization, while corporeal space is not part of the physical space of things. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s mention of the term “phenomenology” in his writings from the middle period has long been regarded as puzzling by interpreters. It is striking to see him concerned with that philosophical approach, generally regarded as foreign to the tradition of Russell and Frege, in which Wittgenstein’s thought is commonly taken to have primarily developed. On the basis of partially unpublished material from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, the thesis provides a reconstruction of the rationale and fate of his conception of phenomenology, which he (...) advances after his return to Cambridge in 1929. On the one hand, that conception is tributary to his longstanding task to philosophically clarify the workings of language. On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s concern with phenomenology develops against the background of his reconsideration of the resources for clarification provided by his early philosophy. His 1929 paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form” is elucidatory in this respect. The paper expresses a dissatisfaction with the Tractarian account of logical grammar and pleas for a “logical investigation of the phenomena themselves”. That plea echoes Wittgenstein’s notion of a “phenomenological language” in the manuscripts from the same period. The thesis addresses the intricacies of that notion and the reasons for Wittgenstein’s coming to criticize it. By contrast to the prevalent view in the literature, it turns out that he did not fully endorse for a definite period, and then suddenly abandoned, the idea of phenomenological language. Wittgenstein rather attempts to develop a viable means of clarification and of philosophical expression through phenomenological language, while critically exploring the assumptions and implications of that attempt at the very same time. (shrink)

Over the last two centuries, the relationship between philosophy and science has completely broken down, so the question we are confronted with is: How can we develop a new philosophy, which will influence science decisively? The physicists of the last century rejected their contemporary philosophy. They considered that “philosophy today is dead” (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010). However, we believe that the great scientific problems are always philosophical, and only philosophical problems. Therefore, these problems can be solved only by philosophers and (...) scientists who operate at the greatest level of thinking: that of the “paradigm of thinking”. In fact, these great scientific problems can usually be solved by changing the “paradigm of thinking” for scientists. This book furnished more applications of the “epistemologically different worlds” (that replaced the “world”/”universe” – in their previous books (2008, 2010, 2011, etc.), the authors indicated that the notion of the world/universe is wrong). Following Aristotle’s “Prime Mover” (or the “Unmoved Mover”), we stop the regress ad infinitum by discovering the first EW, the EW0 (the Hypernothing). Even if one EW does not exist for any EDW, the Hypernothing was the first EW and all other EDWs correspond to the EW0. Chapter 2 is about the “Hypernothing”. The other chapters continue our works of applying the EDWs to different concepts/areas of Physics: quantum mechanics, elementary particles, thermodynamics (with its main notion, “entropy”), etc. In the last chapter, knowing that Einstein’s special and general theory of relativity are very correct (but in a book 2016 we showed that “spacetime” cannot ontologically exist), we re-write both theories without “spacetime”. Content, Introduction and Chapter 1, FREE at https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=gabriel+vacariu&rh=i %3Aaps%2Ck%3Agabriel+vacariu . (shrink)

The 1929 confrontation between Heidegger and Cassirer in Davos (Switzerland) is pivotal for the history of the twentieth-century philosophy. The stake of that encounter was the appropriation of Kant’s legacy during the first half of the last century and the fate of Neo-Kantianism between the two World Wars. Since then, the “Davos disputation” has become controversial among researchers of the development of philosophical orientations in the twentieth century. Moreover, not only these researchers, but also the attendants of that dispute, express (...) opposite views on its outcome. Central at Davos was the issue of human finitude and transcendence within a Kantian framework. Although Kant addresses this issue most explicitly in his moral philosophy, the research of the Davos disputation tends to focus primarily on theoretical matters. The thesis revaluates Heidegger’s and Cassirer’s debate on human finitude and transcendence against the background of their written interpretations of Kant’s critical ethics. Heidegger’s reading of Kant’s conception of human finitude turns out to underestimate Kant’s views on the human potential for transcending, while Cassirer turns out to overestimate that potential by downplaying Kant’s arguments for ineluctable finitude. According to a moderate interpretative position, halfway between Heidegger’s and Cassirer’s, a finite being has, for Kant, a potential to transcend “within” – not “beyond” – finitude. (shrink)

The paper argues, in a nutshell, that Wittgenstein’s reconsideration, after Ramsey’s review, of the Tractatus provides the rationale for the methodological reflections from the former’s manuscripts, which are less sceptical than Schlick’s, on the viability of a phenomenological philosophy. The argument proceeds like this. Section 1 exposes a charge against a Tractarian account of logical syntax: for Ramsey, early Wittgenstein holds unjustifiably that any proposition taken to exhibit logical impossibility, like the impossibility of a fleck of two colours, is analysable (...) into formal contradiction. Section 2 explores ways in which Ramsey’s charge is taken on board by Wittgenstein’s 1929 “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, while bringing forth the view that propositions like “This is of two colours” cannot be analysed into formal contradiction. Section 3 reconstructs a mirror image of early Wittgenstein’s approach to colour-exclusion, from Schlick’s claim that propositions like “This cannot be of two colours” exhibit logical necessity and amount to formal tautologies. Section 4 isolates two responses two Schlick’s approach to colour-exclusion, suggesting that it is not more viable than early Wittgenstein’s. Section 5 assesses the rationale of Wittgenstein’s reflections on phenomenology, as informed by his approaches to colour-exclusion from early onwards. (shrink)

A leitmotif of the interviews Werner Herzog gave throughout several decades is his portrayal of himself as an anti-intellectualist, an anti-theorist, and an anti-philosopher. The text resorts to an established philosopher, who may have actually welcomed Herzog’s anti-intellectualist and anti-theoretical posture: Ludwig Wittgenstein. They both attempt to do justice – the former cinematically, the latter philosophically – to what is sometimes called the “human condition,” its quirks and fancies included. And they are both concerned with the trouble we experience in (...) putting up with what there is, with what there may be at hand or before our eyes. Thus, the obstinacy of Herzog’s protagonists to achieve something come what may, and the dogmatism of Wittgenstein’s interlocutors to conceive of something in just one way, are two sides of the same coin. This coin is the unbounded attachment to a theory: one’s exclusive manner of acting upon, or looking at, the world around oneself. (shrink)

The objection from the insolvability of principle-based modal disagreements appears to support the claim that there are no objective modal facts, or at the very least modal facts cannot be accounted for by modal rationalist theories. An idea that resurfaced fairly recently in the literature is that the use of ordinary empirical statements presupposes some prior grasp of modal notions. If this is correct, then the idea that we may have a total agreement concerning empirical facts and disagree on modal (...) facts, which is the starting point of the objection from the insolvability of modal disagreement, is undercut. This paper examines the no-separation thesis and shows that some of the arguments against the classical (empiricist) distinction between empirical and modal statements fail to be conclusive if they are taken to defend a strong notion of metaphysical possibility. The no-separation thesis appears to work only in theoretical frameworks where metaphysical modalities are considered (broadly) conceptual. For these reasons, the no-separation thesis cannot save modal rationalism from the insolvability of modal disagreement. (shrink)

A predicate of personal taste occurring in a sentence in which the perspectival information is not linguistically articulated by an experiencer phrase may have two different readings. In case the speaker of a bare sentence formed with a predicate of personal taste uses the subjective predicate encoding perspectival information in one way and the hearer interprets it in another way, the agents’ acts are not coordinated. In this paper I offer an answer to the question of how a hearer can (...) strategically interact with a speaker on the intended perspectival information so that both agents can optimally solve their coordination problem. In this sense, I offer a game-theoretical account of the strategic communication with expressions referring to agents’ perspectives, communication which involves the interaction between a speaker who intends to convey some perspectival information and who chooses to utter a bare sentence formed with a predicate of personal taste, instead of a sentence in which the perspectival information is linguistically articulated by an experiencer phrase, and a hearer who has to choose between interpreting the uttered sentence in conformity with the speaker’s autocentric use of the predicate of personal taste or in conformity with the speaker’s exocentric use. (shrink)

Justified by spectacular achievements facilitated through applied deep learning methodology, the “Everything is possible” view dominates this new hour in the “boom and bust” curve of AI performance. The optimistic view collides head on with the “It is not possible”—ascertainments often originating in a skewed understanding of both AI and medicine. The meaning of the conflicting views can be assessed only by addressing the nature of medicine. Specifically: Which part of medicine, if any, can and should be entrusted to AI—now (...) or at some moment in the future? AI or not, medicine should incorporate the anticipation perspective in providing care. (shrink)

Migration generates well-being for individuals and communities, but the pursuit of well-being is not without risks. Tens of thousands of Romanian children are affected by the migration of their parents, others have to cope with the effects of their own migration. Should migrants have difficulties adjusting when returning “home”? Is readjustment even possible for all remigrants, without support? The article aims to present some issues that the remigrants are confronted with when trying to readjust to their communities of origin. The (...) article shows how readjustment is influenced by the social image, which in turn influences the social support for their adjustment and subsequent development. (shrink)

Regarding the connection between the Qur'an and the New Testament, we noted that Jesus Christ is often presented in the pages of the Qur'an as a moral model, along with his mother Mary. The events of the life of "Qur'an Jesus" are marked by marginal Christianity of the Monophysitism and by the Christian apocrypha circulating in the time of Muhammad in the Eastern space. The Qur'anic images of the figure of Jesus Christ present Him in His dignity as the Messiah, (...) the Prophet, the Divine Sign, and the Word of God. The Qur'anic exegesis proposes variants that diminish the image of Jesus in the Qur'an, reducing him to a mere Prophet, despite obvious Qur'anic texts that state otherwise. The Qur'an does nothing but reforms the Christian morality and change the sense to other meanings assessed by Muhammad and the Caliphs of Islam as suitable for the social life of Muslim communities. References to the Biblical Jesus Christ in the text of the Qur'an are generally divided into four main themes, which are discussed in detail in this article: Birth and Childhood; Teaching and Miracles; Nature and Status before God (Allah); The Death and the Resurrection. (shrink)