Results for 'Torgeir Sørensen'

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  1. Kant's Taxonomy of the Emotions.Kelly D. Sorensen - 2002 - Kantian Review 6:109-128.
    If there is to be any progress in the debate about what sort of positive moral status Kant can give the emotions, we need a taxonomy of the terms Kant uses for these concepts. It used to be thought that Kant had little room for emotions in his ethics. In the past three decades, Marcia Baron, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Allen Wood and others have argued otherwise. Contrary to what a cursory reading of the Groundwork may indicate, Kant (...)
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  2. Destigmatizing the Exegetical Attribution of Lies: The Case of Kant.Ian Proops & Roy Sorensen - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (4):746-768.
    Charitable interpreters of David Hume set aside his sprinkles of piety. Better to read him as lying than as clumsily inconsistent. We argue that the attribution of lies can pay dividends in historical scholarship no matter how strongly the theorist condemns lying. Accordingly, we show that our approach works even with one of the strongest condemners of lying: Immanuel Kant. We argue that Kant lied in his scholarly work and even in the first Critique. And we defend the claim that (...)
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  3. Kant and the king: Lying promises, conventional implicature, and hypocrisy.Roy Sorensen & Ian Proops - 2024 - Ratio 37 (1):51-63.
    Immanuel Kant promised, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’, to abstain from all public lectures about religion. All past commentators agree this phrase permitted Kant to return to the topic after the King died. But it is not part of the ‘at-issue content’. Consequently, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’ is no more an escape clause than the corresponding phrase in ‘I guarantee, as your devoted fan, that these guitar strings will not break’. Just as the guarantee stands regardless of whether the (...)
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  4. Is Pain “All in your Mind”? Examining the General Public’s Views of Pain.Tim V. Salomons, Richard Harrison, Nat Hansen, James Stazicker, Astrid Grith Sorensen, Paula Thomas & Emma Borg - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):683-698.
    By definition, pain is a sensory and emotional experience that is felt in a particular part of the body. The precise relationship between somatic events at the site where pain is experienced, and central processing giving rise to the mental experience of pain remains the subject of debate, but there is little disagreement in scholarly circles that both aspects of pain are critical to its experience. Recent experimental work, however, suggests a public view that is at odds with this conceptualisation. (...)
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  5. Sorensen's Disappearing Act: A Response.Gregory Fowler & Joshua Spencer - manuscript
    Roy Sorensen has discussed a scenario he calls 'the Disappearing Act', introduced a puzzle based on this scenario, and offered a solution to this puzzle. We argue against Sorensen's solution and offer our own.
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  6. On Silhouettes, Surfaces and Sorensen.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - In Thomas Crowther & Clare Mac Cumhaill (eds.), Perceptual Ephemera. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 194-218.
    In his book “Seeing Dark Things” (2008), Roy Sorensen provides many wonderfully ingenious arguments for many surprising, counter-intuitive claims. One such claim in particular is that when we a silhouetted object – i.e. an opaque object lit entirely from behind – we literally see its back-side – i.e. we see the full expanse of the surface facing away from us that is blocking the incoming light. Sorensen himself admits that this seems a tough pill to swallow, later characterising it as (...)
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  7. Sorensen's argument against vague objects.Ned Markosian - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (1):1-9.
    In his fascinating and provocative paper, "Sharp Boundaries for Blobs," Roy Sorensen gives several arguments against the possibility of "vague objects," or objects with indeterminate boundaries.1 In what follows, I will examine the main argument given by Sorensen in his paper. This argument has a great deal of initial plausibility. Moreover, I happen to sympathize with its conclusion. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Sorensen's argument fails to establish that conclusion. The purpose of this paper is to show why. I (...)
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  8. Do desacordo ao paradoxo epistêmico: uma análise da concepção de serviço de autoridade de Raz à luz da teoria do “ponto-cego” de R. Sorensen.Ramiro Ávila Peres - 2019 - Dissertatio 48:242-257.
    Abstract: Using a critical review of the literature, we study a challenge from philosophical anarchism to J. Raz's theory of legal authority: it would be irrational to follow an order with which one disagrees, since it would mean acting against what is considered more justified. Through references from decision theory and epistemology, and deploying examples about tools for assisting in routine decision-making, we sketch two possible answers: first, it may be justifiable to put yourself in a situation that leads to (...)
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  9. Modal-Logical Reconstructions of Thought Experiments.Ruward Mulder & F. A. Muller - 2023 - Erkenntnis 2023 (7):2835-2847.
    Sorensen (1992) has provided two modal-logical schemas to reconstruct the logical structure of two types of destructive thought experiments: the Necessity Refuter and the Possibility Refuter. The schemas consist of five propositions which Sorensen claims but does not prove to be inconsistent.We show that the five propositions, as presented by Sorensen, are not inconsistent, but by adding a premise (and a logical truth), we prove that the resulting sextet of premises is inconsistent. Häggqvist (2009) has provided a different modal-logical schema (...)
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  10. Semantic pathology and the open pair.James A. Woodbridge & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):695–703.
    In Vagueness and Contradiction (2001), Roy Sorensen defends and extends his epistemic account of vagueness. In the process, he appeals to connections between vagueness and semantic paradox. These appeals come mainly in Chapter 11, where Sorensen offers a solution to what he calls the no-no paradox—a “neglected cousin” of the more famous liar—and attempts to use this solution as a precedent for an epistemic account of the sorites paradox. This strategy is problematic for Sorensen’s project, however, since, as we establish, (...)
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  11. The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism.Mark Jago - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):320-329.
    Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the form ‘it is (...)
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  12. Vagueness, Truth and Varzi.Gerald Hull - manuscript
    Is 'vague' vague? Is the meaning of 'true' vague? Is higher-order vagueness unavoidable? Is it possible to say precisely what it is to say something precisely? These questions, deeply interrelated and of fundamental importance to logic and semantics, have been addressed recently by Achille Varzi in articles focused on an ingenius attempt by Roy Sorensen ("An Argument for the Vagueness of 'Vague'") to demonstrate that 'vague' is vague.
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  13. Hope, knowledge, and blindspots.Jordan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):531-543.
    Roy Sorensen introduced the concept of an epistemic blindspot in the 1980s. A proposition is an epistemic blindspot for some individual at some time if and only if that proposition is consistent but unknowable by that individual at that time. In the first half of this paper, I extend Sorensen work on blindspots by arguing that there exist blindspots that essentially involve hopes. In the second half, I show how such blindspots can contribute to and impair different pursuits of self-understanding. (...)
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  14. Does Being Rational Require Being Ideally Rational? ‘Rational’ as a Relative and an Absolute Term.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):245-265.
    A number of formal epistemologists have argued that perfect rationality requires probabilistic coherence, a requirement that they often claim applies only to ideal agents. However, in “Rationality as an Absolute Concept,” Roy Sorensen contends that ‘rational’ is an absolute term. Just as Peter Unger argued that being flat requires that a surface be completely free of bumps and blemishes, Sorensen claims that being rational requires being perfectly rational. When we combine these two views, though, they lead to counterintuitive results. If (...)
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  15. Must We Worry About Epistemic Shirkers?Daniele Bruno - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epistemic shirking, in which agents pre-emptively seek to avoid access to potentially morally relevant facts. As Roy (...)
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  16. A New Anti-Expertise Dilemma.Thomas Raleigh - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-19.
    Instability occurs when the very fact of choosing one particular possible option rather than another affects the expected values of those possible options. In decision theory: An act is stable iff given that it is actually performed, its expected utility is maximal. When there is no stable choice available, the resulting instability can seem to pose a dilemma of practical rationality. A structurally very similar kind of instability, which occurs in cases of anti-expertise, can likewise seem to create dilemmas of (...)
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  17. Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Lying.James Mahon - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 32-55.
    The chapter examines fifty years of philosophers working on lying - from the 1970s to the current day – focusing on how lying is defined (descriptively and normatively), whether lying involves an intention to deceive (Deceptionists) or not (Non-Deceptionists), why lying is wrong, and whether lying is worse than other forms of deception, including misleading with the truth. Philosophers discussed include Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan, Alan Donagan, Sissela Boy, Charles Fried, David Simpson, David Simpson, Bernard Williams, Paul Faulkner, Thomas (...)
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  18. What Do We See When We See Total Darkness?Emmanuel Ordóñez Angulo - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1039-1061.
    Seeing total darkness is a peculiar perceptual state: in it, the subject is visually aware of something while seeming to fail to be aware of anything. Recent treatments of the topic (Sorensen 2008, Soteriou 2000) leave this particular puzzle unsolved. Here, I attempt a solution. Following Dretske, I begin by suggesting that the perceptual report ‘S sees (total) darkness’ is ambiguous between two distinct kinds of perceptual states: epistemic and non-epistemic. This will lead to an examination of the metaphysics of (...)
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  19. The Surprise Quiz Paradox: A Dialogue.Ernani Magalhaes - manuscript
    Despite having been solved numerous times, the surprise quiz paradox persists in the intellectual imagination as a riddle. This dialogue aims to dispel the fallacies of the paradox in an intuitive way through the causal format of a dialogue. Along the way, two contributions are made to the literature. Even if the student knew there would be a quiz at the end of a quizless Thursday, the fact that the quiz will be a surprise Friday would provide a Gettier-style defeater (...)
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  20. Many many problems.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):481–501.
    Recently four different papers have suggested that the supervaluational solution to the Problem of the Many is flawed. Stephen Schiffer has argued that the theory cannot account for reports of speech involving vague singular terms. Vann McGee and Brian McLaughlin say that theory cannot, yet, account for vague singular beliefs. Neil McKinnon has argued that we cannot provide a plausible theory of when precisifications are acceptable, which the supervaluational theory needs. And Roy Sorensen argues that supervaluationism is inconsistent with a (...)
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  21. Deep Indeterminacy in Physics and Fiction.George Darby, Martin Pickup & Jon Robson - 2017 - In Otávio Bueno, Steven French, George Darby & Dean Rickles (eds.), Thinking About Science, Reflecting on Art: Bringing Aesthetics and Philosophy of Science Together. New York: Routledge.
    Indeterminacy in its various forms has been the focus of a great deal of philosophical attention in recent years. Much of this discussion has focused on the status of vague predicates such as ‘tall’, ‘bald’, and ‘heap’. It is determinately the case that a seven-foot person is tall and that a five-foot person is not tall. However, it seems difficult to pick out any determinate height at which someone becomes tall. How best to account for this phenomenon is, of course, (...)
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  22. Breaking Out of the Circle.Caravello John - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (1):25-35.
    What’s wrong with begging the question? Some philosophers believe that question-begging arguments are inevitably fallacious and that their fallaciousness stems from a shared “formal” deficiency. In contrast, some philosophers, like Robinson deny that begging the question is fallacious at all. And others characterize begging the question as an “informal” fallacy of reasoning that can only be understood with the aid of epistemic notions. Sorensen joins this last camp by offering a powerful argument against both Robinson’s skepticism and fully formal approaches (...)
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  23. The form of the Benardete dichotomy.Nicholas Shackel - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):397-417.
    Benardete presents a version of Zeno's dichotomy in which an infinite sequence of gods each intends to raise a barrier iff a traveller reaches the position where they intend to raise their barrier. In this paper, I demonstrate the abstract form of the Benardete Dichotomy. I show that the diagnosis based on that form can do philosophical work not done by earlier papers rejecting Priest's version of the Benardete Dichotomy, and that the diagnosis extends to a paradox not normally classified (...)
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  24. Surprise, surprise: KK is innocent.Julien Murzi, Leonie Eichhorn & Philipp Mayr - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):4-18.
    The Surprise Exam Paradox is well-known: a teacher announces that there will be a surprise exam the following week; the students argue by an intuitively sound reasoning that this is impossible; and yet they can be surprised by the teacher. We suggest that a solution can be found scattered in the literature, in part anticipated by Wright and Sudbury, informally developed by Sorensen, and more recently discussed, and dismissed, by Williamson. In a nutshell, the solution consists in realising that the (...)
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  25. „Kauza Afthonios“: Ilustrácia k otázke správneho riešenia antických paradoxov.Vladimir Marko - 2014 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 1 (20):88-103.
    The article deals with the question of correct reconstruction of and solutions to the ancient paradoxes. Analyzing one contemporary example of a reconstruction of the so-called Crocodile Paradox, taken from Sorensen’s A Brief History of Paradox, the author shows how the original pattern of paradox could have been incorrectly transformed in its meaning by overlooking its adequate historical background. Sorensen’s quoting of Aphthonius, as the author of a certain solution to the paradox, seems to be a systematic failure since the (...)
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  26. Has Vagueness Really No Function in Law?David Lanius - 2013 - Sektionsbeiträge des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft Für Analytische Philosophie E.V.
    When the United States Supreme Court used the expression “with all deliberate speed” in the case Brown v. Board of Education, it did so presumably because of its vagueness. Many jurists, economists, linguists, and philosophers accordingly assume that vagueness can be strategically used to one’s advantage. Roy Sorensen has cast doubt on this assumption by strictly differentiating between vagueness and generality. Indeed, most arguments for the value of vagueness go through only when vagueness is confused with generality. Sorensen claims that (...)
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  27. Moore’s Paradoxes and Iterated Belief.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.
    I give an account of the absurdity of Moorean beliefs of the omissive form(om) p and I don’t believe that p,and the commissive form(com) p and I believe that not-p,from which I extract a definition of Moorean absurdity. I then argue for an account of the absurdity of Moorean assertion. After neutralizing two objections to my whole account, I show that Roy Sorensen’s own account of the absurdity of his ‘iterated cases’(om1) p and I don’t believe that I believe that (...)
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  28. It’s Chicken and Eggs again: Vagueness, Quasi-Species, and Evolution.Ludger Jansen - 2006 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 36 (89):71-77.
    Wether the chicken or the egg came first, is not only a mind-boggling but a substantial question. Its answer depends on the biological background theory one assumes. I review recent work on the topic (by Teichmann, Sorensen, Waller and Raatzsch) and resolve some of the disputes between these authors by borrowing from Aristotle the distinction between chicken-producing eggs. I then introduce the concept of a quasi-species to make explicit the vagueness involved in species-terms and prove 13 different priority-claims within a (...)
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  29. Vagueness and contradiction. [REVIEW]Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):290 – 292.
    Book Information Vagueness and Contradiction. Vagueness and Contradiction Roy Sorensen Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 208 £25 By Roy Sorensen. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. 208. £25.
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  30. Gametogênese Animal: Espermatogênese e Ovogênese.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscript
    GAMETOGÊNESE -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE Embrapa Semiárido -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- Os estudantes bem informados, estão a buscando conhecimento a todo momento. O estudante de Veterinária e Zootecnia, sabe que a Reprodução é uma área de primordial importância para sua carreira. Logo, o conhecimento da mesma torna-se indispensável. No primeiro trabalho da série fisiologia reprodutiva dos animais domésticos, foi abordado de forma clara, didática e objetiva os mecanismos de diferenciação (...)
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  31. Hormônios e Sistema Endócrino na Reprodução Animal.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva & Emanuel Isaque Da Silva - manuscript
    HORMÔNIOS E SISTEMA ENDÓCRINO NA REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL -/- OBJETIVO -/- As glândulas secretoras do corpo são estudadas pelo ramo da endocrinologia. O estudante de Veterinária e/ou Zootecnia que se preze, deverá entender os processos fisio-lógicos que interagem entre si para a estimulação das glândulas para a secreção de vários hormônios. -/- Os hormônios, dentro do animal, possuem inúmeras funções; sejam exercendo o papel sobre a nutrição, sobre a produção de leite e sobre a reprodução, os hormônios desempenham um primordial papel (...)
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  32. Kant and the Faculty of Feeling. Denis and Sensen (Eds.). Cambridge University Press, 2018. [REVIEW]Michael H. Walschots - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (2):322-327.
    Review of: Kant and the Faculty of Feeling, edited by Kelly Sorensen and Diane Williamson. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
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  33. A Minimalist Framework for Thought Experiment Analysis.Marek Picha - 2016 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 23 (4):503-524.
    Thought experiments are frequently vague and obscure hypothetical scenarios that are difficult to assess. The paper proposes a simple model of thought experiments. In the first part, I introduce two contemporary frameworks for thought experiment analysis: an experimentalist approach that relies on similarities between real and thought experiment, and a reasonist approach focusing on the answers provided by thought experimenting. Further, I articulate a minimalist approach in which thought experiment is considered strictly as doxastic mechanism based on imagination. I introduce (...)
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  34. Truthmakers, paradox and plausibility.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):11-23.
    In a series of articles, Dan Lopez De Sa and Elia Zardini argue that several theorists have recently employed instances of paradoxical reasoning, while failing to see its problematic nature because it does not immediately (or obviously) yield inconsistency. In contrast, Lopez De Sa and Zardini claim that resultant inconsistency is not a necessary condition for paradoxicality. It is our contention that, even given their broader understanding of paradox, their arguments fail to undermine the instances of reasoning they attack, either (...)
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  35. Real Vagueness.Vincent C. Müller - 1997 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Analyomen 2: Perspectives in analytical philosophy. de Gruyter. pp. 398-403.
    The nature of vagueness is investigated via a preliminary definition and a discussion of the classical sorites paradox ; this is carried further by asking for the origins of vagueness and a critique of several attempts to remove it from language. It is shown that such attempts are ill motivated and doomed for failure since vagueness is not just a matter of ignorance but firmly grounded in epistemic and metaphysical facts. Finally, the philosophical interest of real vagueness is illustrated by (...)
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