The great American philosopher, Charles Peirce, calls his pragmatism a continuation of Jesus' teaching, "Ye may know them by their fruit," and labels his cosmology a doctrine of "Christian Love." Nonetheless, I have found Peirce's understanding of Christianity to be surprisingly unpragmatic. Peirce's pragmatism itself displays an unpragmatic side and the tension between his pragmatic and unpragmatic tendencies reappears in his philosophic theology. I am not certain what a consistently pragmatic Christian theology would look like, but I know pragmatism is (...) the rule rather than the exception in rabbinic Judaism, that is the classical, post-Biblical Judaism of the Talmud. In this paper, therefore, I evaluate Peirce's pragmatism and his Christian theology from the perspective of the rabbis. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer several claims about how postmodern preoccupation with DIFFERENCE may be reread, pragmatically. The claims are based on the following, creatively interpretive model of the pragmatic maxim, as applied to what Peirce calls "intellectual concepts." According to the model, the maxim may have a variety of uses, but it can be proven only in so far as it is applied to the one species of "intellectual concepts" that results when real doubts are misrepresented as paper doubts. (...) These concepts are the products of theoretical inquiries that represent themselves as merely theoretical, when in fact they are stimulated by urgent concerns. The pragmatic maxim offers a rule for converting this species of what appear to be merely intellectual concepts into symbols of some theoretically minded inquirer's attempt to respond to these urgent concerns. But what kind of urgent concern would tend to be misrepresented in this way? According to the model, these are not concerns about failed rules of everyday conduct — or about concrete cases of flesh-and-blood suffering; they are, instead, concerns about failed rules for repairing everyday suffering. The attempt to repair such rules of repair is both theory-laden and urgent (urgent because failed rules of repair are ultimately sources of suffering; theory-laden because they are not immediately so). According to the model, Peirce's name for the practice of urgent theorizing is philosophy, or coenoscopy: not a science of common or everyday practices, but of rules for repairing everyday practices. It is philosophy that is most prone to misrepresenting what is urgent AS what is merely theoretical, because both theory and urgency are proper to it. The pragmatic maxim is, in this view, a rule specifically for repairing urgent philosophy that presents itself as merely paper philosophy. (shrink)

Des lecteurs dune récente livraison de Monist, The Relevance of Charles Peirce, pourraient chercher l'actualité de Peirce chez des philosophes contemporains influencés par lui. J'essaie de montrer que Peirce est actuel parce que son apport principal, le pragmatisme, se rattache profondément à des sujets qui nous sont familiers. Formé dans la tradition cartésienne et kantienne de l'epistemologie, l'oeuvre de Peirce intéresse les héritiers de cette tradition.Cependant, son pragmatisme fait apparaître les hésitations de cette tradition qui offre à ses héritiers une (...) incertitude epistemologic ue générale dont l'effet est de les engager vers un fondationalisme égocentrique qui isole plusieurs philosophes de l'actualité. Readers of the recent Monist publication, The Relevance of Charles Peirce (La Salle, Illinois, 1983) may seek to locate Peirce's « relevance » in the number of contemporary philosophers influenced by any aspect of his work.I argue, instead, that Peirce is relevant because his central work, pragmatism, relates deeply to matters immediately at hand. Since he is trained in Cartesian-Kantian tradition of epistemology, Peirce's work interests disciples of that tradition. In the end, however, his pragmatism discloses the errent tendency of that tradition : to offer its disciples over-generalized epistemological uncertainty and, therefore, the compensatory need to engage in egocentric foundationalisms. These foundationalisms isolate many contemporary philosophers from « mutters immediately at hand ». (shrink)

I present and explain the Bohmian account of collapse in quantum mechanics.

By definition, “logic of postmodernism" would appear to be a contradiction in terms: philosophic post¬modernism emerged as a critique of attempts to found philosophy on some principle of reasoning and to found reasoning on some formal guidelines for how we ought to think. Nonetheless, there are two reasons why Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) ought to be labeled the logician of postmodernism — the philosopher who, more than any other, etched out the normative guidelines for postmodern thinking. The first reason is (...) that Peirce attempted to accomplish the impossible, or at least the contradictory. He launched his philosophic career with a logical critique of "Cartesianism" — his label for the modernist attempt to found philosophy on some formal principles of reasoning. He then attempted to replace the principles of Cartesian reasoning with a set of anti-modernist principles that proved themselves to be as modernist as their contraries. The second reason for giving Peirce his label is that his failures to accomplish the impossible engendered in him something he was unable to achieve willfully: a habit of self-critical yet self-affirming thinking that was neither modernist nor anti-modernist but, rather, a disciplined variety of postmodern thinking. In his later years, Peirce began to sketch out the principles of philosophic postmodernism by describing features of his own emergent habit of thinking. This sketching comes close enough to what I would label a logic of postmodernism — where the method of logic is as postmodern as the thinking it describes. (shrink)

What would a Jewish process theology look like if it also adopted the a priori principles of rabbinic Judaism - among them, the authority of Torah given on Sinai, an historically particular revelation of divine instruction for a particular people, and the authority of the Oral Torah, an historically evolving hermeneutic, according to which that revelation becomes normative practice for communities of observant Jews? I trust this would not be a naturalism, since it would be a theology that found its (...) grammar or regulative logic in a textual hermeneutic rather than in an account of the orders of perception and imagination. It would not, for the same token, be an anti-naturalism, but rather a theology for which the distinction between natural and super- or non-natural was not definitional. For such a theology, for example, the world out there would belong to the order of creation (maaseh bereshit), rather than to "nature." This would mean that, since God creates through words, language (at least some sort of language) and world would be intimately connected rather than extrinsic phenomena, It would mean, furthermore, that for language to "know" the world would not be surprising and that something like a form of realism would not be out of the question, While it would presuppose the authority of divine speech and even of some human interpretations of it, this other-than natural theology would not, as naturalists might suppose, present a heteronomous conception of divine law, If the distinction nature/not nature would not be definitive for this theology, neither would those of autonomy/heteronomy, body/spirit, this world/other world, This theology would present its own variety of neutral monism; in this case, however, the undifferentiated plenum would be termed a plenum of undifferentiated signification (or pure semiosis), of which undifferentiated feeling (or pure experience) was an instance; "prehension" would be another term for interpretation, Max Kadushin was the first and, as far as I know, the only Jewish thinker to articulate a process theology in the service of what he considered the behavioral or halakhic authority of classical rabbinic literature. In this paper, I examine Kadushin's work as the foundation of a rabbinic text process theology, I assume, from the outset, that such a theology may complement a Jewish natural process theology and that a Jewish process theology, in general, would appear as a process of dialogue between textual- andnatural-process theologies. (shrink)

Modern philosophy's fascination with language - for the last century, its obsession- may illustrate the axiom that we love to talk about what we desire and we desire what we don't have. From the perspective of traditional Judaism, philosophic obsession with language reflects the modern philosopher's dislocation from those speech communities in which, alone, language has meaning. Natural speech communities, meaning those whose origins are either unknown or referred to an indefinite past, are characterized by inherent semiotic norms: rules for (...) transforming elements of the natural world into meaningful signs (morphology), for determining relations among those signs (syntax), for determining relations between signs and intended objects (semantics), and for determining relations between signs and the actual behavior which they recommend (what the American philosopher Charles Peirce calls pragmatics). For the traditional Jew, these norms are collected in what is called Torah: God's speech to Israel and the literary and behavioral history of Israel's attempts to interpret what that speech means. For this Jew, dislocation from the speech community of Israel would imply dislocation from Torah, and, thereby, from the possibility of meaningful speech and controlled behavior. Jewish philosophy is the attempt to find means of reintegrating dislocated persons into appropriate speech communities: in particular of reintegrating Jews into the speech community of Israel. On the following pages, I describe what modern philosophy looks like in terms set by Torah. Without apology, the Jewish philosopher first defines the non-problematic (the language of Torah), then the problematic (the enterprise of modern philosophy), then suggests means of placing the two in dialogue. (shrink)

Scriptural Reasoning (SR) is a practice of philosophic theology that is offered as a rationally warranted albeit fallible response to the inadequacies of modern liberal and anti-liberal theologies whether they are adopted as academic projects or as dimensions of lived religious practice. In terms of everyday religious practice in the West today, SR may be characterized as an effort, at once, to help protect Abrahamic folk traditions (that is, of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) from the cultural and theological effects of (...) residual western colonialism and to help protect religiously pluralist societies in the West from reactionary, anti-modern movements within these traditions. In the terms of recent academic discourse in theology, SR may be characterized as pragmatic, postliberal, scriptural, and inter-Abrahamic. SR may be labeled “pragmatic,” because it employs philosophic reasoning only to identify problems in its practitioners’ communities of everyday practice and in the institutions that are expected to repair them. SR may be labeled “postliberal,” because it emerges as a response to problems in the projects of modern, liberal theology, in particular this theology’s inadequate attention to problems in everyday practice. At the same time, SR is equally critical of anti-liberal theologies, or those that, rejecting the autonomy of human reason, argue for the opposite: grounding all projects of reasoning on a practice of “Christian reasoning” per se (or, comparably, of other confession-grounded reasonings). (shrink)

In 1992, Peter Ochs and a few Christian and Muslim colleagues began to gather small groups, in and outside the classroom, to practice close and attentive reading of the sacred Scriptures of the Jewish, Muslim, and Christian traditions. The hope was that members of different religions could hear one another through the patient, respectful reading of each other's Scripture. Hearing each other, participants might enter into interreligious relationships that might point a way to the peaceful engagement of religions--especially those (...) who, after September 11, 2001, too often found themselves at each other's throats. It was a hope for religion without violence. In Religion without Violence, Ochs reflects on the practical and philosophic lessons he has learned from hosting hundreds of Scriptural Reasoning engagements. He introduces the "scriptural pragmatism" of Scriptural Reasoning." He painstakingly recounts instances of successful scriptural reasoning and warns where and how it might fail. He provides guidance on how to introduce and facilitate Scriptural Reasoning in the classroom. He shows how reading out of the "hearth" of a faith can contribute to peace building across religions. And, drawing on the resources of rabbinic tradition, Augustine, and Charles Peirce, he moves beyond practice to reflect on the implications of Scriptural Reasoning for discerning what kinds of "reasoning" best address and help repair societal crises like religion-related violent conflict. (shrink)

"Over three years of study and fellowship, sixteen Muslim, Jewish, and Christian scholars sought to answer one question: “Do our three scriptures unite or divide us?” They offer their answers in this book: sixteen essays on how certain ways of reading scripture may draw us apart and other ways may draw us, together, into the source that each tradition calls peace. Reading scriptural sources in the classical and medieval traditions, the authors examine how each tradition addresses the “other” within its (...) tradition and without, how all three traditions attend to poverty as a societal and spiritual condition, and what it means to read scripture while facing the challenges of modernity. Ochs and Johnson have assembled a unique approach to inter-religious scholarship and a rare look at scriptural study as a pathway to peace. “Scriptural reasoning, the growing practice of Jews, Christians, and Muslims reading their scriptures together, makes good academic and common sense in a time of crisis. This ground-breaking book, the outcome of an imaginative 3-year experiment by the Princeton Center of Theological Inquiry, shows scholars and thinkers of the Abrahamic traditions going deeper into the traditions and into their contemporary situation. The result is something new, wise, and relevant… full of promise for the future. Where else can one find testimonies to Jews, Christians, and Muslims coming together not only in study, thinking, and wisdom-seeking but also in play, joy, and friendship?”--David F. Ford, Regius Professor of Divinity, University of Cambridge and Director, Cambridge Inter-Faith Programme". (shrink)

This is a genealogical study that traces a “broadly Cartesian” pattern of argumentation: from Augustine’s scriptural semiotic to the “narrowly Cartesian” practice of foundationalism to Charles Peirce’s pragmatic and reparative semiotic. The essay argues (1) that Augustine transformed Stoic logic into a scriptural semiotic; (2) that this semiotic breeds both Cartesian foundationalism and the pragmatic semiotic that repairs it; (3) that Peirce’s semiotic displays the latter. In sum, Augustine’s inquiry risks foundationalism but also breeds a self-corrective “reparative reasoning.” This reasoning (...) is at once scriptural and philosophic. (shrink)

This manuscript presents an English translation of the work titled “Begründung Einer Strengen Implikation” by the German logician and mathematician Wilhelm Ackermann (1896-1962), first published in June 1956.

After twelve years of productive work, the Society for Textual Reasoning has reason to reflect on the rules of reasoning it has nurtured and tested but has not yet adopted, self-consciously, as the rules of its textual reasoning . This essay illustrates some ways of reflecting on these rules. The first section of the essay presents a brief history of STR. The following section, the focal section of the essay, illustrates the rules of TR as displayed in a recent internet (...) discussion sponsored by the Society. The brief third section suggests ways that the Society might go about adopting standards for selecting its rules of textual reasoning. The final section illustrates what these standards might look like. (shrink)

In the course of. his philosophic career, Charles Peirce made repeated attempts to construct mathematical definitions of the commonsense or experimental notion of 'continuity'. In what I will label his Final Definition of Continuity, however, Peirce abandoned the attempt to achieve mathe­matical definition and assigned the analysis of continuity to an otherwise unnamed extra-mathematical science. In this paper, I identify the Final Definition, attempt to define its terms, and suggest that it belongs to Peirce's emergent semiotics of vagueness. I argue, (...) further, that it marks the transformation of Peirce's synechism. Before the time of his Final Definition, Peirce adopted a theory of continuity as a foundational principle of metaphysics and assumed this principle might be formalized in a mathe­matics of continuity. After the Final Definition, Peirce abandoned his foundationalism in favor of what he called a critical common-sensism. This is the claim that philosophy (and with it, logic) derives its norms from the observation of actual cognitive practices and that continuity is a distinguishing mark of actual as opposed to merely possible or imagined practices. (shrink)

In HEBREW SCRIPTURES, in rabbinic literature and for most Jewish thinkers, "truth" (emet) is a character of personal relationships. Truth is fidelity to one's word, keeping promises, saying with the lips what one says in one's heart, bearing witness to what one has seen. Truth is the bond of trust between persons and between God and Humanity. In Western philosophic tradition, however, truth is a character of the claims people make about the world they experience: the correspondence between a statement (...) and the object it describes, or the coherence of a statement with what we already know about the world. As if divided by their dual allegiance to the traditions of Jerusalem and of Athens, Jewish philosophers often believe themselves forced to choose between the two meanings of truth, producing what we may call objectivist and personalist trends in Jewish thought. I suggest that, for a type of scripturally grounded Jewish philosophy, truth names the end of a process of inquiry that passes through several stages of trusting, reexamining, yearning, witnessing, critically testing, and re-sourcing. I suggest that this process bears analogy to Charles Peirce's pragmatic account of the stages of problem solving. -/- . (shrink)

You ask if metaphysics is possible after modernity, or after Barth and Wittgenstein and Derrida and the critique of foundationalism? May I invite you, by way of response, to listen in on a conversation? It is a dialogue between what I will call a postcritical philosopher ("P") and a postcritical scriptural theologian —— I'll label the latter a "textualist" ("T"). What I mean by "postcritical" would be displayed as the pattern of inquiry traced by this dialogue. I take the term (...) "postcritical" from George Lindbeck, whose theological work is described by his commentators as more properly "textualist" rather than "philosophic." I believe my usage is, however, true to Lindbeck's discourse. This means that one of the arguments of this essay is that there is a mode of philosophic inquiry proper to the postcritical orientation in theology that we may associate with such Christian theologians as Hans Frei, etc., as well as Lindbeck. A second argument, offered indirectly, is that there is a family of Jewish thinkers whose work may also be labeled "postcritical" on the model of these Christian thinkers, and that this Jewish postcritical theology would also be displayed in dialogues between philosophic and textualist tendencies. A third argument is that, if we listen in on the philosophic side of any of these dialogues, we will hear a postcritical philosophy. By philosophy, I mean primarily logic, defined as an inquiry that examines problematic rules of reasoning and recommends testable ways of correcting them. Secondarily, philosophy includes metaphysics, defined as an inquiry that, for the sake of assuring people about the reliability of a given logic, constructs pictures of the world whose existence would warrant this logic. We need not assume either that logic and metaphysics can be conducted only in the manner of modern and scholastic foundationalism, or that non-foundationalist theology must be "textualist" in a manner that excludes any philosophic generalization. I will argue that there are, indeed, non-foundationalist ways of conceiving of both logical and metaphysical inquiry and that these ways contribute to the dialogic activity of postcritical inquiry. (shrink)

The problem with ontological commitment is that when we symbolize the statements that we make about what 'exists' or what is 'real', they do not always translate to exactly that which we intend to express. In this essay, I explore the relation between 'Reality' and how we describe reality. I evaluate the accounts of three prominent philosophers on the topic, address their shortcomings, and introduce my own account; which I call "The Natural Definition of Reality".

How is Jewish-Christian theological dialogue possible today? Assuming that the possibility of dialogue is not something to be envisioned by any individual thinker a priori, I offer here a study of two examples of successful Jewish-Christian theological dialogue: George Lindbeck's dialogue with Jewish sources and Michael Wyschogrod's dialogue with Christian sources. To garner some general lessons from these examples, I try to reconstruct the general conditions of dialogue which they appear to share. Discovering that the two dialogues may share identifiable (...) conditions of problem-solving, I label these "pragmatic" conditions, after Charles Peirce's definition of pragmatism as the claim that the purpose of rational inquiry is to solve the problems that stimulate it. I conclude that these are the conditions that may underlie theological dialogue among the specific group of Jewish and Christian theologians to which I believe Lindbeck and Wyschogrod belong. These conditions may underlie dialogues typical of other groups, too, but there is no way to know this a priori. (shrink)

This is a response to a Symposium on Phenomenology and Scripture. In examining a move from phenomenology to scripture, this symposium does not address all possible readers; it addresses a specific readership, for a specific reason, and within the framework of specific assumptions. By way of response, I want first to identify a few features of what I take to be the symposium’s specific address or context. Then, I will comment on what messages I believe the authors have delivered to (...) this context. The symposium specifically addresses those who participate willy nilly in the transcendental project of modern philosophy and of modern northern Europe. In that project, knowing, as noesis, means intentionality: its subject or agent is ultimately reducible to the unity of apperception; and its object— noema—is the object of the ego’s intentional knowing—the thematized object. It appears, furthermore, that the symposium identifies phenomenology not only with the species of Husserlian philosophy, but also with the broader genus of all efforts, from Descartes to Kant to Hegel to Husserl to Heidegger, to identify philosophy with an effort to frame the a priori conditions for, or the possibility of, knowing what we would know: from self to world to being itself—or to God. (shrink)

The German Jewish philosophers Hermann Cohen, Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig introduced a critique and extension of Kant's transcendental philosophy that looks to us today like the foundations of a rabbinic semiotics. It is a theory about the semiotic character of our knowledge of the world, of other humans and of God. And it is a claim that such a theory is embedded in the classical literature of rabbinic Judaism. More recently, the American rabbinic thinker Max Kadushin presented a more (...) elaborate analysis of the logic of what he called the rabbis' "organic thinking." While influenced in some ways by Charles Peirce, Kadushin did not offer his analysis as a semiotic. In this paper, I suggest that Kadushin's analysis is better served if it is restated more precisely in the vocabulary of Peirce's semiotics. The resulting construction then serves as a complement to the work of the German Jewish philosophers. (shrink)

William James declared a moral war, Charles Peirce a metaphysical one: "fall into the ranks then" was his battle cry, follow your colonel. Keep your one purpose steadily and alone in view, and you may promise yourself the attainment of your sole desire, which is to hasten the chariot wheels of redeeming love. (6.448:1893) Peirce's was a war not against war, but against the metaphysical equivalent of war, individuation. In the field of social philosophy, Peirce's enemy appeared under the alias (...) of Darwinism, which Peirce fought with Christian Love. In the field of metaphysics, it appeared under the alias of nominalism, which Peirce fought with his special brand of pragmatic realism. But most challenging of all, the enemy appeared within Peirce's own thought under the alias of what I call Kantian conceptualism, and it took Peirce most of his career to win the battle. (shrink)

A Pragmatic Method of Reading Confused Philosophic Texts: The Case of Peirce's "Illustrations" In 1878, Charles Peirce introduced a method for making confused ideas clear. In this essay, I put Peirce's method to work as a method for making confused writing clear, in particular, for clarifying the meaning of confused philosophic arguments as they appear in philosophic essays. In Section I, I introduce the method as a Pragmatic Method of Reading Confused Philosophic Texts. In Section II, I re• view Peirce's (...) 1877-78 "Illustrations of the Logic of Science"\ as examples of confused texts. In Section III, I apply the Pragmatic Method, reading Peirce's "Illustrations' as expressions of fundamentally contradictory "leading tendencies of thought." While it does not resolve such contradictions, the Pragmatic Method renders a confused text clear by enabling us to read it as a collection of two "implicit" texts, or two sets of meanings. (shrink)

I propose an account of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to the account, probabilities are objective chances of centered propositions. As I show, the account solves a number of problems concerning the role of probability in the Everett interpretation. It also challenges an implicit assumption, concerning the aim and scope of fundamental physical theories, that is made throughout the philosophy of physics literature.

I show that centered propositions—also called de se propositions, and usually modeled as sets of centered worlds—pose a serious problem for various versions of Lewis's Principal Principle. The problem, put roughly, is that in scenarios like Elga's `Sleeping Beauty' case, those principles imply that rational agents ought to have obviously irrational credences. To solve the problem, I propose a centered version of the Principal Principle. My version allows centered propositions to be objectively chancy.

I formulate a theory of groups based on pluralities and counterparts: roughly put, a group is a plurality of entities at a time. This theory comes with counterpart-theoretic semantics for modal and temporal sentences about groups. So this theory of groups is akin to the stage theory of material objects: both take the items they analyze to exist at a single time, and both use counterparts to satisfy certain conditions relating to the modal properties, temporal properties, and coincidence properties of (...) those items. (shrink)

According to the Best System Account of lawhood, laws of nature are theorems of the deductive systems that best balance simplicity and strength. In this paper, I advocate a different account of lawhood which is related, in spirit, to the BSA: according to my account, laws are theorems of deductive systems that best balance simplicity, strength, and also calculational tractability. I discuss two problems that the BSA faces, and I show that my account solves them. I also use my account (...) to illuminate the nomological character of special science laws. (shrink)

Roughly put, explanatory circles — if any exist — would be propositions such that (i) each explains the next, and (ii) the last explains the first. In this paper, I give two arguments for the view that there are explanatory circles. The first argument appeals to general relativistic worlds in which time is circular. The second argument appeals to special science theories that describe feedback loops. In addition, I show that three standard arguments against explanatory circles are unsuccessful.

I explore the relationship between a prominent analysis of intrinsic properties, due to Langton and Lewis, and the phenomenon of quantum entanglement. As I argue, the analysis faces a puzzle. The full analysis classifies certain properties of entangled particles as intrinsic. But when combined with an extremely plausible assumption about duplication, the main part of the analysis classifies those properties as non-intrinsic instead. I conclude that much of Lewis’s metaphysics is in trouble: Lewis based many of his metaphysical views—his thesis (...) of Humean supervenience, for instance, and his account of recombination—on an analysis of intrinsicality which does not sit well with quantum phenomena. (shrink)

If a proposition is typically true, given your evidence, then you should believe that proposition; or so I argue here. In particular, in this paper, I propose and defend a principle of rationality---call it the `Typical Principle'---which links rational belief to facts about what is typical. As I show, this principle avoids several problems that other, seemingly similar principles face. And as I show, in many cases, this principle implies the verdicts of the Principal Principle: so ultimately, the Typical Principle (...) may be the more fundamental of the two. (shrink)

Instances of the law of large numbers are used to model many different physical systems. In this paper, I argue for a particular interpretation, of those instances of that law, which appeals to typicality. As I argue, the content of that law, when used to model physical systems, is that the probability of an event typically—rather than probably—approximates the frequency with which that event occurs.

I propose an account of possible worlds. According to the account, possible worlds are pluralities of sentences in an extremely large language. This account avoids a problem, relating to the total number of possible worlds, that other accounts face. And it has several additional benefits.

No reader of The Relevance of Charles Peirce will fail to be impressed by what Max Fisch calls "The Range of Peirce's Relevance.' This exciting volume invites scholars in many of the fields of contemporary philosophy to see what Peirce has to contribute to their methods and their conclusions. Articles in the collection offer a more divided interpretation, however, of the meaning of Peirce's relevance. For some, Peirce's relevance is "extensive": like a Renaissance genius, his intellect surveys the universe of (...) human expression, and, by Jove, he has some• thing smart to say about everything! The authors of these articles show us how Peirce enriches the various, established disciplines of philosophy of interest to them, pointing out both the significance and the limitations of his contribution. For others, Peirce's relevance is "intensive": like some philosophic physician, Peirce struggles to cure a malady that infects the Cartesian-Kantian tradition to which he ultimately belongs. Selecting particular instances of this struggle, the authors of these articles try to show how Peirce challenges accepted practices in contemporary philosophy, succeeding in his critical task without necessarily offering unproblematic alternatives. As a whole, the collection successfully promotes the first interpretation of Peirce's relevance, but fails to give sufficient attention to the second. Perhaps the failure is prudent. For the sake of attracting interest among the uninitiated, The Relevance of Charles Peirce offers the most Peirce with the least offense. For that, we are indebted to Eugene Freeman, editor of the collection, as well as of The Monist Library of Philosophy. Freeman first proposed devoting two issues of The Monist to "Peirce's Relevance" (Vol. 63, No. 3, and Vol. 65, No. 2), then did us the service of publishing the present volume by binding The Monist articles together with five other already published pieces. (shrink)

The centered Everett interpretation solves a problem that various approaches to quantum theory face. In this paper, I continue developing the theory underlying that solution. In particular, I defend the centered Everett interpretation against a few objections, and I provide additional motivation for some of its key features.

It is often assumed that theorizing in terms of natural properties is more objectively valuable than theorizing in terms of non-natural properties. But this assumption faces an explanatory challenge: explain the greater objective value of theorizing in terms of natural properties. In this paper, I answer that challenge by proposing and exploring three different accounts of the objective value of naturalness. Two appeal to constitutive natures: it is part of the constitutive nature of explanation, or of objective value, that theorizing (...) in terms of natural properties is more objectively valuable. The third appeals to the theoretical role that naturalness plays. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explore some ways in which reasoning based on mysticism can be rational, focusing on the episode “The Fortuneteller,” in which Aang, Katara, and Sokka save a village from a volcanic eruption. Throughout this episode, Sokka advocates a purely empirical approach to reasoning. The villagers, however, believe that no source of knowledge is more reliable than Aunt Wu, the local fortuneteller. At several points in the episode, Sokka claims that the villagers’ reliance on Aunt Wu is irrational. (...) The villagers claim otherwise: since Aunt Wu has never led them astray, it is rational to rely on her. As we will see, the villagers are right. Their approach to reasoning – based on Aunt Wu’s fortunetelling – is more rational than it initially seems to be. Roughly put, despite their belief in the mystical, the villagers behave in accord with a standard philosophical theory of rational decision-making, a theory of what makes some decisions rational and other decisions not. So Sokka is wrong to claim that the villagers’ reliance on Aunt Wu is irrational. The villagers behave quite rationally. (shrink)

A Review of Outward Signs: The Powerlessness of External Things in Augustine’s Thought by Phillip Cary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), xxiv + 344 pp. -/- Phillip Cary has written another highly significant book on Augustine, and his writing displays the art of a master stylist. A complement to his Inner Grace, Outward Signs extends Cary’s thesis in Augustine and the Invention of the Inner Self: that Augus- tine’s Trinitarian and semiotic theology, groundbreaking as it was, remains beholden to a (...) Platonist privileging of inner vs. outer and idea over sacramental performance. Outward Signs should be of special interest to readers of Modern Theology, because the inwardness Cary interrogates displays a dimension of Augustine’s work that receives significant attention from a number of Modern Theology authors. Once again, Cary has offered an appropriate warning about any uncritical embrace of Augustine as theologian for the church today: the embrace could bring with it a turn to spiritualism, subjectivism, intellectualism, and also supersessionism (since the Old Testament and Jewish “law” belong to the merely outward life of the Word). Like Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Rorty before him, Cary captures the line of potential influence that moves from Plato to Augustine to Descartes and Kant. Here, knowledge tends to ocular knowing, and Cary shows how inadequate that model is to account for performative knowing in the church, of which sacramental life is one instance. But performative knowing would apply, as well, to the study of Augustine’s writ- ings. Read “outwardly,” Augustine’s corpus generates several possible vectors of theological practice. The stronger vectors may point “inward,” but readers should also attend to those (weak or strong) which point to that which is inward, outward, both, and neither. (shrink)

This volume contains more than 60 original translations of papers written by the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). As well as contributing to Leibniz scholarship, it is intended to function as an introductory text for students.

LEIBNIZ AND THE TWO SOPHIES is a critical edition of all of the philosophically important material from the correspondence between the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and his two royal patronesses, Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630-1714), and her daughter, Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia (1668-1705). In this correspondence, Leibniz expounds in a very accessible way his views on topics such as the nature and operation of the mind, innate knowledge, the afterlife, ethics, and human nature. The correspondence also contains (...) the only known philosophical writings by Sophie and Sophie Charlotte, and thus provides a valuable insight into their views and concerns, as well as throwing light on their characters. The texts are accompanied by a substantial introductory essay which sets the context for the correspondence and analyzes its main philosophical themes. (shrink)

In this unpublished Latin fragment (which dates from May 1702) G. W. Leibniz criticizes the Cartesian conception of body and force and develops his own notion of matter, extension and his theory of forces. He argues against Descartes and Cartesians that 1) the essence of corporal bodies cannot be reduced to extension alone but the latter arise from the primitive force itself, 2) consequently Cartesian quantity of motion falls short to account the motive force of a moving body since the (...) true nature of physical bodies which can only be understood through a careful analysis of dynamical forces. -/- Mayıs 1702’de kaleme aldığı ve ölümünden sonra yayımlanan bu Latince fragmanda G. W. Leibniz, Kartezyen felsefenin cisim ve kuvvet anlayışını eleştirir ve kendi madde, uzam ve kuvvetler teorisini geliştirir. Leibniz, Descartes ve Kartezyenlere karşı 1) cisimlerin özünün yalnızca uzama indirgenemeyeceğini, bunun ilksel kuvvetin kendisinden kaynaklandığını, 2) sonuç olarak da Kartezyen hareket miktarının hareket eden bir cismin kuvvetini açıklamakta yetersiz kaldığını, çünkü fiziksel cisimlerin gerçek doğasının ancak dinamik kuvvetlerin dikkatli bir analiziyle anlaşılabileceğini ileri sürer. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is, to tentatively sketch and try defend some observations regarding the ontological dignity of object references, as they may be used from within in a formalized language. -/- Hence I try to explore, what properties objects are presupposed to have, in order to enter the universe of discourse of an interpreted formalized language. -/- First I review Frege′s analysis of the logical structure of truth value definite sentences of scientific colloquial language, to draw suggestions from (...) his saturated vs. unsaturated sentence components paradigm. -/- Next try investigate, in how far reference to non pure math objects might allow for a role as argument of a truth value function. Object kinds to be considered are: common sense objects, technical objects, humanities object kinds (social, psychical, ...), objects of art, ... , be they abstract, concrete, or in this respect mixed objects. -/- Then have a comment on the just referenced label abstract objects. -/- Next try to get an idea wrt the ontological significance of the fact, that pure math objects and functions in some important classical cases can be uniquely defined by means of categorical theories. Here, in the course of my argument, I have a little corollary wrt the standard model of first order Peano arithmetic, reducing the epistemological significance of the existence of the non standard models. -/- Next, wrt a special concept of a formalized empirical theory, I care for whether the impure math objects and mixed objects described here, and complying best with truth value function mapping, are also reliable candidates for the ontological commitment of such theories: and discuss an alternative, which reduces the ontological significance of the universe of discourse of the theories intended models. -/- In the end I sum up what is - from my point of view - the status quo, according to my respective findings. (shrink)

”It is often assumed that knowledge claims must be justified. But what kind of justification is required for knowledge ? . . . ” (*) -/- presupposition: the kind of epistemic justification depends on the type of the knowledge claim and its respective knowledge claim tradeoff ’vague vs. precise’. -/- procedere: in two - almost purely logical - case studies I account for this tradeoff and question in each case what (if any) were its general outcome wrt justification -/- first (...) for basic measurement statements of the form ′′ϕ(x) = r ∈ IR ± δ′′ (wrt ”measurement accuracy realism” debate) -/- and secondly predication statements of the form ′′x is ( a case of )P′′ (wrt ”epistemic vagueness” debate). (shrink)

This paper aims to argue for, else illustrate the epistemological significance of the use of non transitive similarity relations, mapping only to "types", as methodologically being on a par with the use of transitive similarity relations (equivalence relations), mapping as well to "predicates". -/- In this paper the sketch of an exact but simple geometrical model of the above construct is followed by mentioning respective use cases for non transitive similarity relations from science and humanities. A well known metaphysics example (...) is elaborated along these lines to some extent. (shrink)

We aim to compile some means for a rational reconstruction of a named part of the start-over of Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza's metaphysics in 'de deo' (which is 'pars prima' of the 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata' ) in terms of 1st order model theory. In so far, as our approach will be judged successful, it may, besides providing some help in understanding Spinoza, also contribute to the discussion of some or other philosophical evergreen, e.g. 'ontological commitment'. For this text we (...) assume the reader familiar with 'de deo' as well as with some basic concepts and results of 1st order model theory. Before we start reconstruction, we will first revisit shortly the concept of 'attributum' (definitio IV) in it's setting in 'de deo' , next scan for formalizable aspects of 'in suo genere finita' ('de deo', definitio II), subsequently list the model theoretic constructs we will make use of. Then we begin reconstruction by stating "coordinative definitions" for the notions of 'attribute (of a substance)', 'modus (as conceived via an attribute)' and 'substance (as conceived via an attribute)', reasoning shortly for each of them. The "coordinative definitions", we will arrive at, must not be understood as literal translations of Spinoza's concepts - of course, there can't be such a thing as a literal translation - they are meant as formal analoga of these concepts, mapping some logical structure. But even with this caveat they may seem strange to the reader at this stage of discussion. Additional justification for them then should be found in our endeavour, to map some argumentation of Spinoza's proofs of some of his propositions from this starting point. -/- [ Version 1 of this paper originated from 2020-03-14. This is version 2 from 2021-09-12 with some readability amendments. ]. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to communicate - as a proposal - a general method of assigning a 'truthmaker' to any 1st order sentence in each of its models. The respective construct is derived from the standard model theoretic (recursive) satisfaction definition for 1st order languages and is a conservative extension thereof. The heuristics of the proposal (which has been somewhat idiosyncratic from the current point of view) and some more technical detail of the construction may be found in (...) my article on part I of Spinoza's 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata', which is the context within which I elaborated the assignment. But this context need not be repeated here, the presentation of the truthmaker assignment will be comprehensible to anybody with solid basic knowledge in 1st order model theory, anything used is standard and no advanced techniques are required. (shrink)

Vagueness does not necessarily come in with vague predicates, nor need it be expressed by them , but undoubtedly 'vague predicates' are traditionally in the focus of main stream discussions of vagueness. In her current modal logic presentation and discussion of the Sorites paradox Susanne Bobzien[1] lists among the properties of a Sorites series a rather weak modal tolerance principle governing the 'grey zone' containing the borderline cases of the Sorites series, which later proves crucial for her solution of the (...) Sorites paradox by use of epistemic interpreted modal operators in 1st order modal logic. We suggest (for different research interest) instead a non-modal description of the switch in the grey zone (respecting tolerance), by resort to similarity sequences, thus getting tangent to two other areas of research in the field. Let's say -any way- the Sorites paradox vanishes, the Sorites series does not. (shrink)

La traducción al latín de la obra de Maimónides Moreh Nevukhim | Guía para Perplejos, ha sido la obra judía más influyente en los últimos milenios (Di Segni, 2019; Rubio, 2006; Wohlman, 1988, 1995; Kohler, 2017). Ésta marcó el comienzo de la escolástica, «hija del judaísmo nutrida por pensadores judíos, » según el historiador Heinrich Graetz (Geschichte der Juden, L. 6, Leipzig 1861, p. xii). Impresa por la primera imprenta mecánica de Gutenberg, su influencia en Occidente se extendió hasta el (...) Quinto Concilio de Letrán (1512-1517) « donde se instó a los eruditos a eliminar las dificultades que parecían dividir el conjunto de la teología y la filosofía (Leibniz, Teodicea, 11 ). » Durante siglos, la Guía revolucionó el currículo de estudios de la instrucción escolar al reintegrar en el ámbito de la fe las leyes del pensamiento (la cuarta de las cuales se convirtió en el principio de la razón suficiente de Leibniz). La colección completa de las notas que exponen las ideas de la Guía incluye todos los pasajes seleccionados y reescritos por Leibniz. Esta primera traducción bilingüe completa y anotada de los manuscritos originales en latín sirve como una puerta de entrada a la fe conforme a la Razón. -/- « El excelente libro del rabino Moisés Maimónides, Guía para perplejos, es más filosófico de lo que había imaginado y merece una lectura atenta. El autor, distinguido por su inteligencia filosófica, fue versado en matemáticas, en el arte de la medicina, y también en el conocimiento de las Sagradas Escrituras. » — GW LEIBNIZ, 1685. Antología de Leibniz de la Guía de Maimónides, Capítulo III. (shrink)

La traduction latine du livre de Maïmonide Moreh Nevukhim | Guide des égarés, a été l'ouvrage juif le plus influent des derniers millénaires (Di Segni, 2019 ; Rubio, 2006 ; Wohlman, 1988, 1995 ; Kohler, 2017). Elle marqua le début de la scolastique, fille du judaïsme élevée par des penseurs juifs, selon l'historien Heinrich Graetz (Geschichte der Juden, L. 6, Leipzig 1861, p. xii). Imprimée par la première presse mécanique de Gutenberg, son influence en Occident s'étendit jusqu'au Vème concile du (...) Latran (1512-1517) « où les savants furent encouragés à lever les difficultés qui semblaient diviser l'ensemble de la théologie et de la philosophie — (Leibniz, Théodicée, 11 ) ». Pendant des siècles, le Guide a révolutionné le programme d'instruction scolaire en réintégrant dans le domaine de la foi les lois de la pensée (dont la quatrième est devenue le principe de la raison suffisante de Leibniz). Cette collection complète de notes qui expose les idées du Guide fournit tous les passages sélectionnés et réécrits par Leibniz. Cette première traduction complète bilingue annotée des manuscrits originaux en latin sert de porte d'entrée à la foi conforme à la Raison. -/- « L'excellent livre du Rabbin Moïse Maïmonide, le Guide des égarés, est plus philosophique que je ne l'avais imaginé et mérite une lecture attentive. L'auteur, distingué par son intelligence en philosophie, était versé dans les mathématiques, l'art médical, et aussi dans la connaissance de Saintes Écritures. » — G. W. LEIBNIZ, 1685, Anthologie de Leibniz du Guide de Maïmonide, Chapitre III. (shrink)