Results for 'Worry'

972 found
Order:
  1. Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.
    In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one’s epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensionally adequate. Fallibilists about knowledge have special reason to be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  2. Consistency worries for Shashi Tharoor concerning “It reads like a translation”.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    I raise a worry that Shashi Tharoor’s criticism that “much of Narayan’s prose reads like a translation” is inconsistent with his criticism “the ABC of bad writing – archaisms, banalities and cliches – abounded” because these things tend to be worded in a way that exploits local linguistic features, such as alliteration, making translation difficult. I also flag another inconsistency worry, but earlier in this paper.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument.Tomas Bogardus - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):636-661.
    Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  4. Some Worries About the Probability Account of the Feelings of (Un)Certainty.Sergiu Spatan - 2024 - Erkenntnis.
    In recent papers, Peter Carruthers and others have argued that the feeling of uncertainty is not metacognitive (i.e., it is not elicited by second-order cognitive appraisals) but is elicited solely by first-order likelihood estimates—a probability account of the feeling of uncertainty. In this paper, I make a case for why a probability account is sufficient to explain neither the feeling of uncertainty nor the feeling of certainty in self-reflecting humans. I argue first that humans’ feelings of (un)certainty vary in ways (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Confucian Worries about the Aristotelian Sophos.Matthew D. Walker - 2016 - In Michael Slote Chienkuo Mi (ed.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Virtue Turn. pp. 196-213.
    This chapter examines key Confucian worries about the Aristotelian sophos as a model of human flourishing. How strong are these worries? Do Aristotelians have good replies to them? Could the Aristotelian sophos, and this figure's distinguishing feature, sophia, be more appealing to the Confucian than they initially appear?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. The Unconscious Mind Worry: A Mechanistic-Explanatory Strategy.Beate Krickel - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):39-59.
    Recent findings in different areas of psychology and cognitive science have brought the unconscious mind back to center stage. However, the unconscious mind worry remains: What renders unconscious phenomena mental? I suggest a new strategy for answering this question, which rests on the idea that categorizing unconscious phenomena as “mental” should be scientifically useful relative to the explanatory research goals. I argue that this is the case if by categorizing an unconscious phenomenon as “mental” one picks out explanatorily relevant (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):33-52.
    Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems from those limits. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil.Timothy Perrine - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5).
    Humean arguments from evil are some of the most powerful arguments against Theism. They take as their data what we know about good and evil. And they argue that some rival to Theism better explains, or otherwise predicts, that data than Theism. However, this paper argues that there are many problems with various methods for defending Humean arguments. I consider Philo’s original strategy; modern strategies in terms of epistemic probability; phenomenological strategies; and strategies that appeal to scientific and metaphysical explanations. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. A cure for worry? Kierkegaardian faith and the insecurity of human existence.Sharon Krishek & Rick Anthony Furtak - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (3):157-175.
    Abstract In his discourses on ‘the lily of the field and the bird of the air,’ Kierkegaard presents faith as the best possible response to our precarious and uncertain condition, and as the ideal way to cope with the insecurities and concerns that his readers will recognize as common features of human existence. Reading these discourses together, we are introduced to the portrait of a potential believer who, like the ‘divinely appointed teachers’—the lily and the bird—succeeds in leading a life (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  10.  33
    The Nature of Worry(ing).Ed Armitage - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    We all find ourselves worrying at one point or another, and we have an intuitive sense of what is communicated by phrases such as ‘I’m worried about this’ or ‘I can’t stop worrying about that’. Despite worry’s ubiquity, however, it is not altogether clear what exactly worrying is, or why it is we worry. And, surprisingly, there has been no dedicated philosophical account given of the nature of worry specifically, although there is a body of psychological literature (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Epistemic Circularity: Worry, Illusion, and Determination.Catalin Barboianu - manuscript
    Research on epistemic circularity has focused more on the problem of whether circular arguments are able to justify their conclusions rather than on the nature of circularity itself, and has kept a sharp delimitation from other types of circularities (logical, linguistic, and of definition). In this paper, I aim to move the focus toward the general concept of circularity, which I relate to the concept of ‘epistemic worry’. Through a brief overview on the known types of circularities, I show (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Metaethical Deflationism, Access Worries and Motivationally Grasped Oughts.Sharon Berry - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (3).
    Mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge (or normative knowledge more generally) can seem intuitively puzzling in similar ways. For example, taking apparent human knowledge of either domain at face value can seem to require accepting that we benefited from some massive and mysterious coincidence. In the mathematical case, a pluralist partial response to access worries has been widely popular. In this paper, I will develop and address a worry, suggested by some works in the recent literature like (Clarke-Doane, 2020 ), (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Must We Worry About Epistemic Shirkers?Daniele Bruno - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epistemic shirking, in which agents pre-emptively seek to avoid access to potentially morally relevant facts. As (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Another Thing to Worry About.Julian Friedland - 2022 - Boston Globe 20 (1):K2.
    Use of the word “worry” is on the rise. Does that reflect our anxious time — or make it worse?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. (1 other version)Token worries.Anca Gheaus - 2015 - Forum for European Philosophy Blog.
    There are many grounds to object to tokenism, but that doesn’t mean we should always avoid being the token woman, argues Anca Gheaus.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Why Worry about Business Ethics?R. E. Ewin - 1992 - Perth and Melbourne: Institute of Public Affairs.
    There are many problems about business ethics. What I want to deal with is only part of the problem: I want to consider just what can properly be expected of business in general terms by way of ethical behaviour and, along with that, what is special about business ethics and how it is related to the personal morality we are all expected to exhibit in our day-to-day lives; I want to consider how it is that ethical confusions arise from people's (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Hume and a Worry about Simplicity.Stewart Duncan - 2009 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (2):139-157.
    I discuss Hume's views about whether simplicity and generality are positive features of explanations. In criticizing Hobbes and others who base their systems of morality on self interest, Hume diagnoses their errors as resulting from a "love of simplicity". These worries about whether simplicity is a positive feature of explanations emerge in Hume's thinking over time. But Hume does not completely reject the idea that it's good to seek simple explanations. What Hume thinks we need is good judgment about when (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?Jack C. Lyons - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
    The New Evil Demon Problem is supposed to show that straightforward versions of reliabilism are false: reliability is not necessary for justification after all. I argue that it does no such thing. The reliabilist can count a number of beliefs as justified even in demon worlds, others as unjustified but having positive epistemic status nonetheless. The remaining beliefs---primarily perceptual beliefs---are not, on further reflection, intuitively justified after all. The reliabilist is right to count these beliefs as unjustified in demon worlds, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  19. Should we worry about conspiracy theorists rejecting experts?Melina Tsapos - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67:1-21.
    Concerns have been raised by both researchers and authorities regarding conspiracy theorists rejecting experts. To address the validity of these concerns, we need to delve into two key inquiries regarding who qualifies as an expert on conspiracy theories, and what constitutes an epistemically rational response (from a conspiracy theorist) when faced with expert testimony. The first inquiry presents a challenge when considering a reputationalist versus a realist account of experts. On the reputationalist account rejecting experts may be viewed as little (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. Relational Troubles Structuralist Worries for an Epistemology of Powers-Based Modality.Giacomo Giannini & Tom Schoonen - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1162-1182.
    Dispositionalism is the theory of modality that grounds all modal truths in powers: all metaphysically possible and necessary truths are to be explained by pointing to some actual power, or absence thereof. One of the main reasons to endorse dispositionalism is that it promises to deliver an especially desirable epistemology of modality. However, so far this issue has not be fully investigated with the care it is due. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. We will cast (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology.Simon Hewitt - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (2):159-166.
    Permissivist metaontology proposes answering customary existence questions in the affirmative. Many of the existence questions addressed by ontologists concern the existence of theoretical entities which admit precise formal specification. This causes trouble for the permissivist, since individually consistent formal theories can make pairwise inconsistent demands on the cardinality of the universe. We deploy a result of Gabriel Uzquiano’s to show that this possibility is realised in the case of two prominent existence debates and propose rejecting permissivism in favour of substantive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Don’t Worry, This Will Only Hurt a Bit: The Role of Expectation and Attention in Pain Intensity.Nada Gligorov - 2017 - The Monist 100 (4):501-513.
    To cause pain, it is not enough to deliver a dose of noxious stimulation. Pain requires the interaction of sensory processing, emotion, and cognition. In this paper, I focus on the role of cognition in the felt intensity of pain. I provide evidence for the cognitive modulation of pain. In particular, I show that attention and expectation can influence the experience of pain intensity. I also consider the mechanisms that underlie the cognitive effects on pain. I show that all the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  23. (1 other version)Why Conceptual Engineers Should Not Worry About Topics.Steffen Koch - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1-21.
    This paper argues for explanatory eliminativism about topics (and cognates, such as subject matters) relative to the domain of conceptual engineering. It has become usual to think that topics serve an important explanatory role in theories of conceptual engineering, namely, to determine the limits of revision. I argue, first, that such limits can be understood either as thenormative limitspertaining to the justification of conceptual engineering, as themetaphysical limitspertaining to the identity of the concepts in question, or as theterminological limitspertaining to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  24. New Shmagency Worries.Olof Leffler - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (2):121-145.
    Constitutivism explains norms in terms of their being constitutive of agency, actions, or certain propositional attitudes. However, the shmagency objection says that if we can be shmagents – like agents, minus the norm-explaining features of agency – we can avoid the norms, so the explanation fails. This paper extends this objection, arguing that constitutivists about practical norms suffer from it despite their recent attempts to solve it. The standard response to the objection is that it is self-defeating for agents to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  25. Evaluating Health Inequalities: Residual Worries.J. Paul Kelleher - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics 15 (3):50-51.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. A Kantian Response to Futility Worries?Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - In Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson & Tyler Doggett (eds.), Food, Ethics, and Society: An Introductory Text with Readings. Oxford University Press USA. pp. 215-218.
    Due in no small part to Kant's own seemingly dim views on the value of animals, Kantian ethics has traditionally been understood to be rather unfriendly ground for arguments in favor of vegetarianism. This has started to change recently, which raises the question: do Kantian approaches offer a way of defending vegetarianism that doesn't run afoul of the sorts of futility worries that afflict consequentialist arguments for vegetarianism? I argue that Kantian approaches in fact face an analogous worry, due (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. Don’t Worry, Be Happy: The Gettability of Ultimate Meaning.Michael-John Turp, Brylea Hollinshead & Stephen Rowe - 2022 - Journal of Controversial Ideas 2 (1).
    Rivka Weinberg advances an error theory of ultimate meaning with three parts: (1) a conceptual analysis, (2) the claim that the extension of the concept is empty, and (3) a proposed fitting response, namely being very, very sad. Weinberg’s conceptual analysis of ultimate meaning involves two features that jointly make it metaphysically impossible, namely (i) the separateness of activities and valued ends, and (ii) the bounded nature of human lives. Both are open to serious challenges. We offer an internalist alternative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Rationality, Shmationality: Even Newer Shmagency Worries.Olof Leffler - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (2):371-404.
    Constitutivist approaches to the normativity of rationality have recently come into vogue. Unlike their moral counterparts, however, they have not been confronted with the shmagency objection. In this paper, I challenge them with two versions of the objection based on recent developments in the debate surrounding the normativity of morality. These are shmagency as modal escapability, which is based on taking sophisticated shmagents to be able to modally escape various norms, and shmagency as underdetermination, which is based on taking constitutive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Plenty to Worry About: Consent, Control, and Anxiety.Danielle Bromwich - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics 12 (3):35-36.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 3, Page 35-36, March 2012.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  30. A Triviality Worry for the Internal Model Principle.Imran Thobani - 2024 - Synthese 204 (1):1-16.
    The Good Regulator Theorem and the Internal Model Principle are sometimes cited as mathematical proofs that an agent needs an internal model of the world in order to have an optimal policy. However, these principles rely on a definition of “internal model" that is far too permissive, applying even to cases of systems that do not use an internal model. As a result, these principles do not provide evidence (let alone a proof) that internal models are necessary. The paper also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Being Good in a World of Need: Some Empirical Worries and an Uncomfortable Philosophical Possibility.Larry S. Temkin - 2019 - Journal of Practical Ethics 7 (1):1-23.
    In this article, I present some worries about the possible impact of global efforts to aid the needy in some of the world’s most desperate regions. Among the worries I address are possible unintended negative consequences that may occur elsewhere in a society when aid agencies hire highly qualified local people to promote their agendas; the possibility that foreign interests and priorities may have undue influence on a country’s direction and priorities, negatively impacting local authority and autonomy; and the related (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. On a Thomistic Worry about Scotus's Doctrine of the Esse Christi.Michael Gorman - 2009 - Antonianum 84:719-733.
    According to authoritative Christian teaching, Jesus Christ is a single person existing in two natures, divinity and humanity. In attempting to understand this claim, the high-scholastic theologians often asked whether there was more than one existence in Christ. John Duns Scotus answers the question with a clear and strongly-formulated yes, and Thomists have sometimes suspected that his answer leads in a heretical direction. But before we can ask whether Scotus‘s answer is acceptable or not, we have to come to a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Rising Industrial Inventories Worry Businesses and Bankers.Vietnamica Net - 2011 - Stratfor Worldview.
    Vietnamese media keep telling the public about the problem of rising financial burdens caused by interest rates and shrinking funds availability, pushing many non-financial SMEs to the verge of collapse. However, little attention was paid to the issue of rising inventories at manufacturing and processing firms, which potentially could lead to more emergent and apparent risks.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. The advice to become a narrow specialist: two personal worries.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    There are philosophers and literary figures who write on a variety of topics. I suppose I do as well. Here I present two personal worries about the advice to become a narrow specialist.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Respect Post-Persons.Ethan Terrill - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies 31 (1):1-14.
    Advocates of the Respect Model of moral status have expressed skepticism about the possibility that radically enhanced persons will have a higher threshold of moral status over non-radically enhanced persons. While several philosophers have already argued that advocates of the Respect Model of moral status should recognize such a possibility in a world with radically enhanced persons, I make room for a stronger claim: advocates of the Respect Model of moral status should not only recognize the possibility of higher thresholds (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  37. In Praise of Depth: or, How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Hidden.Joshua Landy - 2020 - New Literary History 1 (51):145-76.
    [Proofs; please cite published version] In recent years, some prominent scholars have been making a surprising claim: examining literary texts for hidden depths is overblown, misguided, or indeed downright dangerous. Such examination, they’ve warned us, may lead to the loss of world Heidegger warned of (Gumbrecht), to the world-denying metaphysics Nietzsche warned of (Nehamas), or to the suspicious form of hermeneutics Ricoeur warned of (Best, Marcus, Moi). This paper seeks to suggest that, though the concerns are understandable, there’s ultimately nothing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Hohfeldian Infinities: Why Not to Worry.Visa A. J. Kurki - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):137-146.
    Hillel Steiner has recently attacked the notion of inalienable rights, basing some of his arguments on the Hohfeldian analysis to show that infinite arrays of legal positions would not be associated with any inalienable rights. This essay addresses the nature of the Hohfeldian infinity: the main argument is that what Steiner claims to be an infinite regress is actually a wholly unproblematic form of infinite recursion. First, the nature of the Hohfeldian recursion is demonstrated. It is shown that infinite recursions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Non-Naturalism and Reasons-Firstism: How to Solve the Discontinuity Problem by Reducing Two Queerness Worries to One.Victor Moberger - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):131-154.
    A core tenet of metanormative non-naturalism is that genuine or robust normativity—i.e., the kind of normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements, and perhaps also of prudential, epistemic and even aesthetic requirements—is metaphysically special in a way that rules out naturalist analyses or reductions; on the non-naturalist view, the normative is sui generis and metaphysically discontinuous with the natural. Non-naturalists agree, however, that the normative is modally as well as explanatorily dependent on the natural. These two commitments—discontinuity and dependence—at least (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. When betting odds and credences come apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments.Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):119-127.
    If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  41.  60
    Should Strategists Worry About the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence?Vincent Carchidi - 2023 - Military Strategy Magazine 9 (1):43-49.
    This article explores an implicit philosophical assumption in strategy formation: that biological intelligence can be replicated, granting capabilities sufficient to justify a medium- and long-term strategic focus on artificial intelligence. It explains how an implicit and unstudied philosophy of AI often makes its way into force structure planning and national policy objectives across states.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Political Normativity.Adrian Kreutz & Enzo Rossi - forthcoming - Political Studies Review.
    Do salient normative claims about politics require moral premises? Political moralists think they do, political realists think they do not. We defend the viability of realism in a two-pronged way. First, we show that a number of recent attacks on realism, as well as realist responses to those attacks, unduly conflate distinctively political normativity and non-moral political normativity. Second, we argue that Alex Worsnip and Jonathan Leader-Maynard’s recent attack on realist arguments for a distinctively political normativity depends on assuming moralism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Don’t Worry, Be Stoic. [REVIEW]William O. Stephens - 2007 - Ancient Philosophy 27 (2):452-456.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 'Sherlock Holmes': A Reply to Garcia-Carpintero.Heidi Savage - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 1 (XXXIX):105-134.
    In “Semantics of Fictional Terms,” Garcia-Carpintero critically surveys the most recent literature on the topic of fictional names. One of his targets is realism about fictional discourse. Realists about fictional discourse believe that: (a) it contains true sentences that have fictional names as their subjects; (b) sentences containing names can be true only if those names have referents; (c) fictional names have fictional characters – abstract objects – as their referents. The fundamental problem that arises for realists is that not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. How interventionist accounts of causation work in experimental practice and why there is no need to worry about supervenience.Tudor M. Baetu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4601-4620.
    It has been argued that supervenience generates unavoidable confounding problems for interventionist accounts of causation, to the point that we must choose between interventionism and supervenience. According to one solution, the dilemma can be defused by excluding non-causal determinants of an outcome as potential confounders. I argue that this solution undermines the methodological validity of causal tests. Moreover, we don’t have to choose between interventionism and supervenience in the first place. Some confounding problems are effectively circumvented by experimental designs routinely (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. The Harms of the Internalized Oppression Worry.Nicole Dular & Madeline Ward - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.
    In this paper, we locate a general rhetorical strategy employed in theoretical discourse wherein philosophers argue from the mere existence of internalized oppression to some kind of epistemic, moral, political, or cognitive deficiency of oppressed people. We argue that this strategy has harmful consequences for oppressed people, breaking down our analysis in terms of individual and structural harms within both epistemic and moral domains. These harms include attempting to undermine the self-trust of oppressed people, reinforcing unjust epistemic power hierarchies, undermining (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. How I learned tro stop worrying and love panpsychism.Michael Tye - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies. Translated by None None.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  27
    If you go shopping frequently, here’s one thing to worry.Portal Admin - 2025 - Sm3D Portal.
    Apparently, we don’t want to see this environmental problem around us (see the photo). At least, our conscience does not allow us to accept it. Nonetheless, we might accidentally become the culprit when going shopping, with our habit of using Single-use plastic (SUP) bags.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. A Comedy of Errors or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Sensibility‐Invariantism about ‘Funny’.Ryan Doerfler - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):493-522.
    In this article, I argue that sensibility‐invariantism about ‘funny’ is defensible, not just as a descriptive hypothesis, but, as a normative position as well. What I aim to do is to make the realist commitments of the sensibility‐invariantist out to be much more tenable than one might initially think them to be. I do so by addressing the two major sources of discontent with sensibility‐invariantism: the observation that discourse about comedy exhibits significant divergence in judgment, and the fact that disagreements (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. When betting odds and credences come apart : more worries for Dutch book arguments.Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb - 2011 - Analysis 66 (2).
    If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 972