Zygmunt Bauman was one of the leading revisionists in Poland before March 1968. Together with six other academics he was expelled from the University of Warsaw on the basis of the decision of the Minister of Higher Education taken on the 25st March 1968. It should be stressed, however, that at the beginning of his academic career Bauman had been a staunch believer of the Polish United Workers’ Party and an adherent of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. In his first revisionist paper, (...) published soon after the Polish October, he criticized the previous policy of the Party and expressed his hope that significant changes will take place in Poland. As a result of Party withdrawal from the reforms, his attitude towards both the communist rule and Marxism-Leninism had been changing. This paper analyses the evolution of his thought towards revisions. It presents the characteristic features of Bauman’s revisionism as well: an emphasis on human praxis, alternative thinking, and heterogeneity of culture. (shrink)

This paper proposes a specific approach to understanding the nature of technology that encompasses the entire field of technological praxis, from the making of primitive tools to using the Internet. In that approach, technology is a specific form of human agency that yields to (an imperfect) realization of human control over a technological situation—that is, a situation not governed to an end by natural constraints but by specific human aims. The components of such technological situations are (...) a given collection of natural or artificial beings, humans, human aims, and situation-bound tools. By performing technological situation analysis, the essential form of tool making, the complex system of relationships between science and technology, technological practices with and without machines, the finiteness or imperfectness of any technology, and engineering (i.e., the possibility of the creation of technological situations) can be considered. For a better characterization of the approach to technology, the paper also presents a comparison of other philosophies of technology. Following Feenberg’s comparative analysis, the so-called fundamental question of the philosophy of technology is formulated, its two sides are identified, and it is applied for clarification of our position within philosophy of technology. In our approach, all human praxis can be considered to be technological; more precisely, every human activity has a technological aspect or dimension. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the (...) question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models—a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism—I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good. (shrink)

Sind die Menschenrechte primär Ausdruck einer politischen Praxis und die Idee der Menschenrechte eine Art „Überbau“, den die Praxis epiphänomenal hervorbringt? Oder ist die Praxis der Menschenrechte das Ergebnis der Verwirklichung einer normativen Idee, die unabhängig von ihr existiert? Ist die Idee der Menschenrechte die Bedingung dafür, dass es die Praxis der Menschenrechte geben kann? Oder gibt es einen Vorrang der Praxis vor der Idee? In meinem Aufsatz argumentiere ich für zwei These: 1. These: Menschenrechte (...) sind prinzipiell unabhängig von jeder bestehenden rechtlichpolitischen Praxis und sind zugleich untrennbar an bestimmte rechtlich-politische Praktiken geknüpft. Darin besteht der konstitutive Widerspruch der Menschenrechte. 2. These: Aus diesem Widerspruch folgt nicht, dass wir aufhören sollten über Menschenrechte nachzudenken und eine Politik der Menschenrechte anzustreben. Der Widerspruch hat keine lähmende Wirkung, sondern ist theoretisch und praktisch produktiv. Um diese Thesen zu plausiblisieren, werde ich zunächst einige Grundzüge von Arendts Diskussion der Menschenrechte rekapitulieren (Abschnitt 2) und ihr Postulat eines den Menschenrechten vorgelagerten „Rechts, Rechte zu haben“ diskutieren (Abschnitt 3). Ausgehend von einer kritischen Diskussion der diskurstheoretischen Weiterentwicklung von Arendts These zu einem „Recht auf Rechtfertigung“ im diskurstheoretischen Konstruktivismus von Seyla Benhabib und Rainer Forst (Abschnitt 4) werde ich einen rechtfertigungstheoretischen Dekonstruktivismus vorstellen, der das Verhältnis von Praxis und Idee der Menschenrechte als produktiven Widerspruch fasst (Abschnitt 5). (shrink)

The article re-examines the Aristotelian backdrop of Arendt’s notion of action. On the one hand, Backman takes up Arendt’s critique of the hierarchy of human activities in Aristotle, according to which Aristotle subordinates action (praxis) to production (poiesis) and contemplation (theoria). Backman argues that this is not the case since Aristotle conceives theoria as the most perfect form of praxis. On the other hand, Backman stresses that Arendt’s notion of action is in fact very different from Aristotle’s (...) praxis, to the extent that Arendt thinks of action as an external to the means-ends scheme, whereas Aristotle ultimately remains caught in this scheme proper to poiesis in thinking of praxis as its own end. According to Backman, Arendt’s concept of action can therefore be understood as a critique, rather than as a rehabilitation, of Aristotelian praxis. (shrink)

Following the publication of his magnum opus L’être et l’événement (Being and Event) in 1988, Alain Badiou has been acclaimed as one of France’s greatest living philosophers. Since then, he has released a dozen books, including Manifesto for Philosophy, Conditions, Metapolitics and Logiques des mondes (Logics of Worlds), many of which are now available in English translation. Badiou writes on an extraordinary array of topics, and his work has already had an impact upon studies in the history of philosophy, the (...) history and philosophy of science, political philosophy, aesthetics, psychoanalysis, and ontology. This volume takes up the challenge of explicating, extending and, in many places, criticising Badiou’s stunningly original theses. Above all, the essays collected here put Badiou’s concepts to the test in a confrontation with the four great headings that he himself has identified as essential to our humanity: science, love, art and politics. Many of the contributors have already been recognised as outstanding translators of and commentators on Badiou’s work; they appear here with fresh voices also destined to make a mark. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the central role of praxis in Arendt’s conception of the human world and the structure of political life as a site of subjective interaction and narrative discourse. First, Arendt’s use of Aristotle will be presented in terms of the meaning of action as a unique philosophical category. Second, Arendt’s encounter with the work of Martin Heidegger will be shown to involve a critical response to his reading of Aristotle. Finally, the (...) revised conception of praxis that derives from her philosophical reflections will be related to the experience of narrative as a necessary complement to human plurality. (shrink)

Every metaphysic, according to Reiner Schürmann, involves the positing of a first principle for thinking and doing whereby the world becomes intelligible and masterable. What happens when such rules or norms no longer have the power they previously had? According to Cornelius Castoriadis, the world makes sense through institutions of imaginary significations. What happens when we discover that these significations and institutions truly are imaginary, without ground? Both thinkers begin their ontologies by acknowledging a radical finitude that threatens to destroy (...) meaning or order. For Schürmann it is the ontological anarchy revealed between epochs when principles governing modes of thinking and doing are foundering but new principles to take their place have not yet emerged. For Castoriadis it is chaos that names the indeterminationdetermination that governs the unfolding of the socio-historical with contingency and unpredictability. And yet for both thinkers their respective ontologies have political or ethical implications. On the basis of the anarchy of being, Schürmann unfolds an anarchic praxis or ethos of “living without why.” And on the basis of his notion of being as chaos, Castoriadis develops his political praxis of autonomy. The challenge for both is this move from ontology to practical philosophy, how to bridge theory and practice. The key for both seems to be a certain ontologically derived sense of freedom. In this paper, I analyze and compare their respective thoughts, and pursue the question of how anarchy or chaos and the implied sense of an ontological freedom might be made viable and sensible for human praxis, how radical finitude in the face of ontological groundlessness might nevertheless serve to situate a viable political praxis. (shrink)

This paper re-assesses the place of theology in Leibniz’s thought focusing on the relationship between theory and praxis. It takes as its point of departure a general conclusion established in previous work, namely that Leibniz’s key formulations of his overarching plan for the reform and advancement of all the sciences, are devoted to a set of objectives which is both shaped by broadly theological concerns and ultimately practical. Against this backdrop, the discussion will then turn to an exploration of (...) how Leibniz thought of theology as such. I argue that Leibniz was committed to the elaboration of a robust Christian dogmatic which was rationally defensible, and that this commitment resulted in a genuine engagement with Christian theology which took very seriously its theoretical content. The key additional thesis argued for in this paper is that this theoretical engagement was in the service of a science which he conceived as ultimately practical. For Leibniz, the ultimate aim of theology was to lead to the love of God above all things and, in so doing, to salvation and eternal happiness. It is in the light of this practical end that his theological pragmatism should be evaluated. When this is done, it becomes apparent that, beneath Leibniz’s efforts at theological reconciliation in the context of his Kirchenpolitik, there lies a deeper, fundamental and properly theological emphasis on praxis, grounded in Leibniz’s epistemology and driven by his conception of salvation as ultimately dependent on a practical attitude – the love of God above all things. Leibniz’s theological pragmatism was remarkably -- perhaps even surprisingly -- close to the family of prudential approaches to religious belief proposed by Pascal and later authors such as William James. The paper concludes that Leibniz’s conception of theology as ultimately practical is very much in line with the whole thrust of Leibniz’s intellectual programme as expressed in the over-arching plans discussed in the first section. These plans too were driven by a practical end: the promotion of the common good and of human happiness as the celebration of the glory of God in his creation. At the same time, the end of happiness – whether worldly or eternal -- should not be regarded as competing with Leibniz’s theoretical endeavours – whether in the sciences or in theology -- but as directly supported by them. (shrink)

This chapter will explore the dynamics of power underpinning ethical issues within smart cities via a new paradigm derived from Systems Theory. The smart city is an expression of technology as a socio-technical system. The vision of the smart city contains a deep fusion of many different technical systems into a single integrated “ambient intelligence”. ETICA Project, 2010, p. 102). Citizens of the smart city will not experience a succession of different technologies, but a single intelligent and responsive environment through (...) which they move. Analysis of such an environment requires a framework which transcends traditional ontologically-based models in order to accommodate this deep fusion. This chapter will outline a framework based on Latour’s Actor-Network Theory and Luhmann’s treatment of society as an autopoetic system. We shall use this framework to map the influence of relevant factors on ethical issues, irrespective of their composition or type. For example, under this treatment, both human praxis and technical design can be viewed as comparable tools of domination. This chapter will provide a framework for the analysis of relations between any elements of the smart city, ranging from top-level urban management processes down to individual device operations. While we will illustrate the use of this schema through examination of ethical issues arising from power dynamics within the smart city, it is intended that this example will demonstrate the wider utility of the model in general. (shrink)

Theoretical and practical activity have traditionally been understood as complementary activities: through theoretical activity the subject would internalize the external world, while through practical activity she would externalize her internal goals. Hegel scholars have often attempted to interpret the difference and relation between subjective and objective spirit on the basis of that way of understanding theoretical and practical activity. Such approach, however, raises serious exegetical and conceptual problems about the meaning and formal structure of Hegel´s entire philosophy of spirit. Indeed, (...) if what primarily characterizes subjective spirit is the activity of knowing considered as the process of idealization and internalization of the external world and what characterizes, in turn, objective spirit is the externalization of the goals of the will, how should we conceive within such explanatory framework the specificity of the acts of absolute spirit, that is to say, of the human behavior in art, religion, and philosophy? I will first attempt to clarify what exactly defines, according to Hegel, theoretical and practical activity, in order to develop on that basis an exegetical model that can satisfactorily account for Hegel´s peculiar periodization of the different forms of human activity. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to establish that Lewis Mumford’s historical and philosophical writings were heavily influenced by the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud. It is argued that Freudian ideas and concepts played a foundational role in the construction of Mumford’s views on the nature and function of mind, culture and history, which in turn founded his views on the relationship between technology and society. Indeed, it is argued that a full understanding of Mumford’s technological writings cannot be achieved (...) until one has grasped their psychoanalytic influence. To this end, this article will reconstruct the psychological views of Lewis Mumford and indicate how they draw upon and modify Freudian theory. It will then be shown how Mumford’s theory of the psyche interacts with Mumford’s own concept of the idolum. This interaction, I will argue, considerably underpins Mumford’s holistic views on the relationship between society and the individual and between the internal and external world and will require us to reconsider our understanding of Mumford’s philosophy of technology, particularly with regard to his descriptions of monotechnics and biotechnics, the authoritarian and democratic technological forms. It will be argued that for Mumford the division intechnics corresponds to a division in the human psyche, and indeed arises from it. Not only will an appreciation of Mumford’s Freudian influence alter our understanding of Mumford’s technological writings in general, but also in particular it can enable us better to comprehend the reasoning behind Mumford’s recommended method of resistance to the modern power complex of the megamachine. Such a revised understanding of Mumford’s philosophy also undercuts any attempts to characterize his position as being a technological determinist one. Rather, his philosophy of technology is better understood as a form of technological voluntarism. (shrink)

Purpose – A key cybernetics concept, information transmitted in a system, was quantified by Shannon. It quickly gained prominence, inspiring a version by Harvard psychologists Garner and Hake for “absolute identification” experiments. There, human subjects “categorize” sensory stimuli, affording “information transmitted” in perception. The Garner-Hake formulation has been in continuous use for 62 years, exerting enormous influence. But some experienced theorists and reviewers have criticized it as uninformative. They could not explain why, and were ignored. Here, the “why” is (...) answered. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – A key Shannon data-organizing tool is the confusion matrix. Its columns and rows are, respectively, labeled by “symbol sent” (event) and “symbol received” (outcome), such that matrix entries represent how often outcomes actually corresponded to events. Garner and Hake made their own version of the matrix, which deserves scrutiny, and is minutely examined here. Findings – The Garner-Hake confusion-matrix columns represent “stimulus categories”, ranges of some physical stimulus attribute (usually intensity), and its rows represent “response categories” of the subject’s identification of the attribute. The matrix entries thus show how often an identification empirically corresponds to an intensity, such that “outcomes” and “events” differ in kind (unlike Shannon’s). Obtaining a true “information transmitted” therefore requires stimulus categorizations to be converted to hypothetical evoking stimuli, achievable (in principle) by relating categorization to sensation to intensity. But those relations are actually unknown, perhaps unknowable. Originality/value – The author achieves an important understanding: why “absolute identification” experiments do not illuminate sensory processes. (shrink)

Well elucidated and defined education policy is the most essential criteria for comprehensive progress of all human beings. From the time immemorial it is known that progress can be ushered only through education. A futuristic education policy both at the school and university level is extremely imperative. Countries at the global level have been adopting effective education policies to meet the changing needs of education and society at large. There is a need to shift educational approach from rote learning (...) to understanding, from exhaustive learning techniques to excitement of discovery and towards the joyful exploration. True education must encompass a synchronized working of body, mind and spirit. The ultimate aim of education must be to help the growing soul draw out the best and make it perfect for a noble use. The aim of education is not only to prepare an individual to succeed in life and society, but to reach the optimum. With this background, the paper is attempting at the theoretical level, to study the Integral philosophy, in the light of NEP 2020. It also tries to inquire into the modalities of Integral thinking, propose the application of the same in education and pedagogies to characterize its practice and goals in Integral Education. (shrink)

Poverty, understood as basic capability deprivation, can only be solved through a process of expanding the freedoms that people value and have reason to value. This process can only begin if the capability to imagine and aspire for an altenative lifestyle worthy of human dignity is cultivated by an education program that develops both the capability to reason and to value. These two facets play a major role in the creative exercise of human agency. This program of humane (...) education can only come from an adequate description of the human agent as a persona that seeks to actualize itself based on his/her understanding of the good. Education must therefore seek to cultivate the capability to have an adequate conception of the good (normative) as well as the capability to constantly re-evaluate one’s conception of the good (evaluative) in order to freely and reasonably choose a life that one values and has reason to value. Education must therefore entail not merely the development of skills nor specialization in a particular field but must concentrate on the integration of the human person as a whole which leads to self-creative praxis. (shrink)

In many universities and related knowledge transmission organisations, professional focus on empirical data shows as in vocational education that preparation for real life technical work is important, as one would expect from “career education”. University is as the name shows on the contrary focusing on the universality of some sort of education, which is neither a technical one, nor much concerned by preparing oneself for a career. The scope of this chapter is to propose an analysis of inclusion as the (...) very essence of an ethics of reformation of education, which in our opinion cannot come from the institution of education as much as from a common basis between everyday learning capacities and curriculum based learning methods. Inclusive vision and values should be theoretically explained by philosophers in order to be refined and adapted into our current experience of values, pointing out issues about method and knowledge parameters. In particular a focus on epistemic values should bring good indications on how to empower others, and leave a more inclusive life, assuming the somehow paradoxical and surprising idea that knowledge is as important in real life outside the university as it is in the classroom, being the real universal value and currency across disciplines, times and contexts. University learns from being inclusive, i. e. by bringing not only a higher point of view on technical education but also a wider view on the human being. (shrink)

What is logotherapy based on? How does logotherapy differ from psychotherapies or other traditional forms of therapy? What disorders does logotherapy help with? These are the questions to which the 'Handbook for logotherapists' gives a clear and consistent answer. The Handbook starts from two logotherapeutic premisses, according to which there is a Noological dimension in human consciousness, which differs from the psychic dimension of consciousness and human has a will to purpose. These premisses are basic assumptions set by (...) Viktor Frankl himself. ‘Handbook for Logotherapists’ aims to verify these premisses by starting with studying the Noological dimension of human consciousness in relation to the psychic dimension. Based on research, the Handbook draws e.g. the following conclusions: a) The Noological dimension differs in its function and content from the psychic dimension, b) the human will to purpose is a characteristic of the Noological dimension that cannot be found in the psychic dimension, and c) there can be disorders in the Noological dimension that originate from the experienced conflict between the functioning of (the agents of) the Noological dimension (self-distancing and self-transcendence) and the situational reality. Purpose cannot be invented, but is to be found outside of a person, in the situational reality. Searching, finding, realizing and implementing purposes always involve the functioning of both self-transcendence and self-distancing. That is why self-distancing and self-transcendence are the primary agents of the Noological dimension. However, the process of searching, finding and implementing a purpose can become corrupted, as purpose may be missing, it may be lost or gone, it may be distorted, or the situation may have distorted the purpose, even if the functioning of the agents of the Noological dimension is healthy. Although these distortions with experiencing a purpose often manifest themselves unfavorably also in a person's somatic condition and in the functioning of the psychic dimension in many different ways, they are - nevertheless - distortions that are a person's healthy reaction to a sick state or situation, and their basis is in the Noological dimension of consciousness. With the help of logotherapy, it is possible to separate disorders of the Noological dimension from disorders of the psychic dimension, to detect what kind of distortion with experiencing a purpose is involved, and to treat a particular distortion with logotherapy's own treatment methods. 'Handbook for logotherapists' shows why logotherapy as a specific form of therapy is the most appropriate aid for the treatment of purpose-centered distortions and demonstrates, how these distortions can be detected and treated with logotherapeutic tools. -/- . (shrink)

I argue that anarchist ideas for organising human communities could be a useful practical resource for Christian ethics. I demonstrate this firstly by introducing the main theological ideas underlying Maximus the Confessor’s ethics, a theologian respected and important in a number of Christian denominations. I compare practical similarities in the way in which ‘love’ and ‘well-being’ are interpreted as the telos of Maximus and Peter Kropotkin’s ethics respectively. I further highlight these similarities by demonstrating them in action when it (...) comes attitudes towards property. I consequently suggest that there are enough similarities in practical aims, for Kropotkin’s ideas for human organising to be useful to Christian ethicists. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism is an ancient concept whose meaning and significance have shifted over the last two millennia. Most recently, cosmopolitanism has been resurrected to mean “world citizenship” – a renunciation of one’s national identity for the sake of the universal human family. While such an endeavor seems as though it should correspond to Catholic social thought, its iterations in academia and elsewhere have resulted in a preoccupation with personal identity and political doctrine rather than love. Cosmopolitanism is complex and harbors (...) many weaknesses in both theory and practice. Considered in relation to universalism in Catholic social thought, one weakness is thrown into specific relief: cosmopolitanism as a personal identity or political doctrine lacks a unified philosophy of the human person. This essay recasts the desire to form solidarity across national boundaries as universalism within Trinitarian anthropology and discusses accompaniment as exemplary of the love this thought system requires. (shrink)

STANISŁAW BRZOZOWSKI – TO THINK RADICALLY Stanisław Brzozowski is one of the most radical philosophers. Radicalism of his thought involves not only the idea of fundamental social change, but also the reinterpretation of some philosophical concepts. Two main concepts are nature and history. They are reinterpreted in order to show their human origins. According to Brzozowski nature and history are human constructions, namely they are set by human praxis. Brzozowski’s understanding changed over the time. In my (...) article I focus on two phases of Brzozowski’s thought. The first is Kantian and Fichtean. At that point Brzozowski interprets human praxis as moral act. The second one is Marxian. At that point human praxis is understood as labour. (shrink)

Chapter 5 of an e-book 'Handbook for Logotherapists' 2024 (Niiles-Mäki Anne). Institute for Purpose-centered Philosophy Finland.

Corruption has assumed a new turn in 4th Republic Nigeria, particularly where non-human animals are alleged by human animals to deep their hands into the public tilt for their selfish non-human animal purposes. This is a clear case of hypocrisy on the part of human animals in that, at one instance we contend that non-human animals are inferior to human beings and at the other instance, we affirm though inadvertently that non-human animals are (...) not inferior but equal since they have the capacity to steal: we, therefore, are unable to steer ourselves out from the dilemma of our ambivalence to arrogate to ourselves a god-like status over non-human animals. We contend that this is another profound inhumane case of violation of non-human animals which is condemnable. We have suggested that the solution to this quagmire is first to admit that non-human animals have basic rights like human animals especially when we understand this notion of Rights going beyond its parochial conception. The method we have employed in showing moments of human's inhumanity to non-human animals is what has been conceived as Ibuanyidanda Philosophy according to which we aver that ihe di nwereisinaodu (anything that exists serves a missing link of reality). We have argued in favour of the thesis that the federal government should allow justice prevails against acts of theft by either civil or public servants. -/- . (shrink)

The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Crisis) marks the culmination of Husserl’s Genetic Phenomenology and the beginning of a new philosophy of science, one that viewed science not as a fact but as a problem that needed philosophical understanding. For Husserl, the crisis of Galilean Science is born out of the severance of its relation to the life-world and the erroneous identification of “Nature” with its constituted mathematical or quantifiable object. In the phenomenological philosophy of science, science is (...) a tradition formed through human praxis, like any other cultural enterprise. Objectivity in scientific praxis is a regulative principle constituted by the consensus of judgements of the scientific community. The continuity of scientific knowledge shows in its unity of propagated transference of meaning, the sedimentation of which is carried through language. Despite the scientific world being ontologically grounded in the life-world, Husserl sought to preserve the autonomy of both worlds. To fully appreciate the implications of Husserl’s contribution to the philosophy of science, this paper identifies the ‘spatial turn’ that Husserl brought in through his “less mathematical, more physical” notion of life-world with the 90° shift in the social studies of science that Latour proposed. The life-world fuses “Nature” and “Society” as one ontological entity that gives rise to science, moving away from a one-dimensional science that kept the ontology of science grounded in one of those poles alone. Despite the limits of Husserlian phenomenological epistemology, Crisis radically departed from positivism, the then-official philosophy of science, embracing historicity and language to broaden our discourse on science and even coming close to certain later developments in Philosophy of Science. Husserl’s meditations on spatiality also urged a transition to the contemporary understanding of space, opening possibilities of dialogue with Foucault. (shrink)

Husserl’s transcendental philosophy has frequently been disparaged in many of the central philosophical debates of the 20th century. And many of his most virulent critics have been adherents of phenomenological philosophy. Critiques have stressed the bankruptcy of the concept of ultimate foundation in relation to a transcendental subject that is allegedly solipsistic and conditioned by modern prejudices. Two essential insights have led me to reconsider such critical assessments.1 On the one hand, the open-ended and infinite nature of Husserlian intentional analysis (...) seems to indicate what could be characterized as a “withdrawal of ground” or an endless deferral of a self-sufficient, “ultimate foundation” in Descartes’s sense. On the other hand, a close examination of Husserlian concepts such as ‘ground’ and ‘rational knowledge’ reveals that their original Cartesian meaning has undergone semantic changes in Husserlian thought. In the present essay, I aim to lend support to these insights by examining the Fourth and, very briefly, Fifth Cartesian Meditations. The examination comprises four stages. First, it makes a case for focusing on the Cartesian Meditations, where Husserl’s “Cartesian option” seems obvious. Second, it attempts to disclose a differentiated foundational discourse in the Fourth Meditation, one that is dedicated to the difficult and core issue of the “ego’s self-constitution.” Third, it reassesses the foundational discourse of the intersubjective transcendental theory sketched in the "Fifth Meditation," after pointing out some misunderstandings concerning the sense of Husserl’s transcendental “idealism” and “solipsism.” And, finally, it asks whether the notions of ‘ground’ and ‘reason’—whose sense is shown in the foregoing stage to have been transformed—do, in fact, belong to a project that is, as Husserl’s critics claim, no longer feasible. The guiding thesis here is that if these steps are taken and my hypotheses confirmed, then Husserl’s work will still be able to contribute significantly to contemporary debates on the status of scientific discourse and the nature and goals of practical discourse, where both are conceived of as grounded in a radically understood human praxis. (shrink)

The value of science partly lies on the development of useful products for humanity’s needs, but basic sciences cannot be said the “protagonists” of their obtention. Human history shows that these processes occur as a result of interactions between science and technology, mathematics, and engineering, as well as ethics and aesthetics. This network of disciplinary relationships facilitating the impact of scientific knowledge on human lives is at the center of discussions in the field of Science, Technology, Engineering, and (...) Mathematics (STEM) education, and will be the focus of this article. Since the problems encountered in people’s everyday activities cannot be solved with the knowledge and skill of a single discipline, there emerges an aim for general education to attain more holistic understandings required by human needs. Our conceptualization of STEM education, based on classical Greek philosophy, addresses this issue. We acknowledge that the traditional paradigm of monodisciplinary education, formed as a result of the separation of sciences over history, has been challenged in the last two decades with the rise of integrating approaches in science and technology education. STEM is consistently mentioned as a way for gaining the integrated knowledge and skills deemed important for the near future, but theoretical searches towards solving its basic problems are still ongoing and we take this as our general research problem. In this argumentative study, the philosophical approach proposed to shed light on STEM education practices is structured along two conceptual axes: integration of disciplines and inclusion of humanistic goals. Suitable foundations for our proposal are sought in Aristotelian philosophy: We use Aristotle’s conception of a particular kind of human activity—poiesis, that aims to create “useful” and “aesthetic” products in order to propose an engineering “center” or “core” in the design of STEM school practices. Our model, labeled as “poietic” STEM, incorporates key elements of the nature of engineering; under the light of such a model, some aspects of what is called the “nature of STEM” are discussed. We conclude that, in an education envisaging more holistic approaches towards citizen literacy, it is necessary to connect the performance of STEM with responsible human interaction. In accordance with this requirement, our approximation to STEM centered on an epistemologically sophisticated conception of engineering makes room for fostering shared awareness in students. (shrink)

Spirituality connotes praxis informed by religious or faith convictions. This can transform the individual and society at large. Christian spirituality is centered on how a person’s relationship with the God of Jesus Christ informs and directs one’s approach to existence and engagement with the world. The ecosystem concerns humanity and relationship with it is invariably influenced by faith or religious informed praxis. The reality of climate change is convincing many people that humankind’s common homeland needs to be treated (...) with care and respect if created beings are to have a congenial habitat now and in the future. This article avers that Christian spirituality can contribute to eco-friendly behavior through re-formation of the behavior of people and emboldening their goodwill as regards the responsibility of all towards the care of the earth. Finally, this research proffers a three-fold model of eco-spirituality - scriptural, selfcontrol, and sacramental approaches to the earth – as a contribution towards stemming the tide of ecological assaults on creation. Textual analysis is the method used in this research. (shrink)

The current appeal of non-standard economic alternatives is backgrounded against the vulnerability of mainstream capitalism to meltdown and crisis as shown in recent times. There is an increasing number of governments, institutions, and civil societies (NGOs) that have been advocating economic systems, structures, or dynamics that would promote the good of the human person (dignity, personhood, values, and worth). People have started to realize that doing economics is not always within the realm of rationalized judgments and mathematized calculations (highly (...) impersonal) but must look after the human person, at all costs. This paper attempts to contribute to this agendum by employing an interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and economics; drawing a moral-cultural framework towards a compassion-based economics. Together with the positive traits of today’s economic alternatives and the salient features of Jesus’ praxis of compassion, this paper would offer fourteen (14) criteria as basis for what could be the most feasible base/locus for an economics of compassion. Eventually, what has been considered as the suitable base/locus is the Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs). Hence, a BEC-based Economics of Compassion or BEC-EC. (shrink)

Based on recent trends in philosophy of science, in philosophy of technology, and in technosience studies it can be concluded that the following formula expresses a significant relationship of the relevant disciplines: science is equal to technology plus philosophy. In order to disclose the meaning of this relationship first of all we have to characterize a kind of philosophy of technology. In this view, the human rule over technological situations and the creation/use of tools play a fundamental role. The (...) tools are created by interpretation, and any technological praxis is situation-bound. The characteristics of sciences are very different – or even the opposite – ones: in sciences we want to reach a situation-free knowledge. Scientific knowledge is not situation-bound, it is universally valid. The question is: how can we use the situation-bound technological praxis for building up of situation-free scientific knowledge? It can be shown that a specific application of philosophical principles and ideas makes this possible. Philosophy can create worlds from situations. Consequently, following certain prescriptions of both technology and philosophy, we can perform a scientific praxis. In this paper, some historical and philosophical arguments will be presented to show this interrelatedness, the most fundamental relationships between science, technology, and philosophy. (shrink)

What are and where are the ethical limits of neuroeducation? The article reflects on a necessary question for the evolution of cognitive processes through critical deliberation, the delimitation of boundaries and the estimation of progress. On the one hand, it argues that the experimental turn could call into question the ethical and humanistic goal of education; on the other hand, it argues that a systematic renunciation of neuroscientific advances would also mean abandoning the quest for human flourishing. The humanities (...) alone do not provide the biopsychosocial approach from which we must understand our self-realisation. Thus, the first of the limits that is the origin of all the others arises from a scientific-humanist dilemma. The new boundaries to be delimited are the neuroscientific implications in themselves and how these are translated into educational, if they were to be valid in this field. Here neuromyths play an important role. It is precisely neuroethics as an applied ethics or branch of bioethics that takes up these aspects through neuroeducational ethics and educational neuroethics. In its fundamental branch, this discipline opens up the debate on moral neuroeducation. But the possibility of reducing morality and all that we are to our neural bases leads to new limits. To overcome them, he highlights the potential of a sociocultural and biological symbiosis with the notions of 'neuroculture' and 'proactive epigenesis'. Finally, the essay deliberates on the more speculative boundaries between what we are and our possibilities for understanding it on the basis of transhumanism. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________________________¿Cuále s son y dónde están los límites éticos de la neuroeducación? El artículo reflexiona sobre una cuestión necesaria para el devenir de los procesos cognitivos mediante la deliberación crítica, la delimitación de fronteras y la estimación del progreso. Su hilo argumental proyecta, por un lado, que el giro experimental podría poner en entredicho el objetivo ético y humanista de la educación; por otro lado, que una renuncia sistemática a los avances de las neurociencias supondría, igualmente, abandonar la búsqueda del florecimiento humano. Las humanidades solo no brindan el enfoque biopsicosocial desde el que hemos de entender nuestra autorrealización. Por ende, el primero de los límites que es origen de todos los demás surge dada una disyuntiva científico-humanista. Los nuevos confines a delimitar subyacen de las implicaciones neurocientíficas en sí mismas y de cómo estas se trasladan a la praxis escolar, si es que tuviesen validez en este campo. Aquí los neuromitos juegan un papel importante. Precisamente, la neuroética como ética aplicada o rama de la bioética recoge estos aspectos mediante la ética neuroeducativa y la neuroética educativa. En su rama fundamental, dicha disciplina abre el debate sobre la neuroeducación moral. Pero la posibilidad de reducir lo moral y todo lo que somos a nuestras bases neurales deriva en nuevos límites. Para superarlos, destaca el potencial de una simbiosis sociocultural y biológica con las nociones de ‘neurocultura’ y de ‘epigénesis proactiva’. Finalmente, el ensayo delibera sobre los límites más especulativos entre lo que somos y nuestras posibilidades para entenderlo en base al transhumanismo._____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______HOW TO CITE / CÓMO CITAR: Castillo, P. (2023). Los límites éticos de la neuroeducación. Teoría de la Educación. Revista Interuniversitaria, 35(2), 191-208. (shrink)

Open Access: What if it doesn’t get better? Against more hopeful and optimistic views that it is not just ideal but possible to put an end to what John Rawls calls “the great evils of human history,” I aver that when it comes to evils caused by human beings, the situation is hopeless. We are better off with the heavy knowledge that evils recur than we are with idealizations of progress, perfection, and completeness; an appropriate ethic for living (...) with such heavy knowledge, which I call an ‘Imperfectionist Ethic,’ could include resisting evils, improving the lives of victims, and even enjoying ourselves. Better conceptions of the objects of hope, and the good life, inform a praxis-centered, nonideal ethic, supportive of sustained moral motivation, resilience, and even cheer. I connect elements of stoic and pessimistic philosophy in order to outline some normative recommendations for living with evils. A praxis-centered ethic would helpfully adjust our expectations from changing an uncontrollable future, to developing better skills for living in a world that exceeds our control. (shrink)

Following neo-Aristotelians Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, we claim that humans are story-telling animals who learn from the stories of diverse others. Moral agents use rational emotions, such as compassion which is our focus here, to imaginatively reconstruct others’ thoughts, feelings and goals. In turn, this imaginative reconstruction plays a crucial role in deliberating and discerning how to act. A body of literature has developed in support of the role narrative artworks (i.e. novels and films) can play in allowing us (...) the opportunity to engage imaginatively and sympathetically with diverse characters and scenarios in a safe protected space that is created by the fictional world. By practising what Nussbaum calls a ‘loving attitude’, her version of ethical attention, we can form virtuous habits that lead to phronesis (practical wisdom). In this paper, and taking compassion as an illustrative focus, we examine the ways that students’ moral education might usefully develop from engaging with narrative artworks through Philosophy for Children (P4C), where philosophy is a praxis, conducted in a classroom setting using a Community of Inquiry (CoI). We argue that narrative artworks provide useful stimulus material to engage students, generate student questions, and motivate philosophical dialogue and the formation of good habits which, in turn, supports the argument for philosophy to be taught in schools. (shrink)

By bringing feminist science studies scholar Donna J. Haraway’s A manifesto for cyborgs (1985) and Situated knowledges (1988) in line with contemporary critical new materialist thought (see Colman & Van der Tuin, 2024; Dolphijn & Van der Tuin, 2012; Geerts, 2022), this critical pedagogical and philosophical think piece tackles the problematic of Anthropocenic disruptions of the planetary biosphere for critical pedagogies and higher education (also see Carstens, 2016). It additionally encourages its readers to think through their own pedagogical conceptions and (...) praxes by means of irruptive (Geerts & Carstens, 2024; Koro-Ljungberg, 2015) selfreflection- stimulating questions. Our situated – and thus limited and open-ended – response to this all-encompassing Anthropocenic crisis is rooted in a rethinking of Harawayan cyborgian and situated knowledges and the critical pedagogical lessons drawn from the latter. Rereading Haraway’s work through contemporary critical new materialist and related scholarship reveals that it already contained an ecofeminist onto-epistemological shift toward more-than-human agency and relationality. This shift has major consequences for all things critical pedagogical and educational, as our pedagogical thinking-doings are deeply embedded in today’s crisis-ridden lifeworld. This rereading exercise furthermore underlines the necessity of an updated critical new materialist pedagogical praxis for learning and teaching, inspired by Harawayan ecofeminism, that takes the entanglements between human, dehumanised, and more-than-human actors seriously. (shrink)

This paper compares two influential but conflicting contemporary models of politics as an activity: those of Hannah Arendt and Alain Badiou. It discovers the fundamental difference between their approaches to politics in their opposing evaluations of the contemporary political significance of the legacy of Plato, Platonism, and the Platonic Idea. Karl Popper’s and Arendt’s analyses of the inherently ideological nature of totalitarianism are contrasted with Badiou’s vindication of an ideological “politics of the Idea.” Arendt and Badiou are shown to share (...) an understanding of politics as a realm for the human deployment of novelty and world-transformation. Their key disagreement concerns the form of activity that accomplishes this deployment. For Arendt, political activity has the basic form of noninstrumental and nonteleological action (praxis), devalued by the Platonic tradition of political philosophy. Badiou, by contrast, follows Plato in regarding politics essentially as a process of production (poiēsis) oriented to an ideal end. (shrink)

For feminists, working in/with the ‘posts’ is, always has been, and must be, a collective and collaborative endeavour. Increasingly, post-inquiry involves taking seriously multiplicities of humans, nonhumans, more-than-and-other-than-humans, multispecies and natureculture entities, including viral, microbial, elemental and atmospheric relationalities. The individual papers in this Special Issue, this editorial, and the Special Issue as a whole attest to this imperative pull to the collective-collaborative in seeking to explore the entangled relations of/between feminisms and the ‘posts’. As a collaborative-collective multiplicity, the Special (...) Issue interrogates what these entangled relations offer for reconfiguring gender and education research, theory, pedagogic practice, activism and praxis. (shrink)

“Do Anthropocene narratives confuse an important distinction between the natural and the historical past?” asks Giuseppina D’Oro. D’Oro defends the view that the concept of the historical past is sui generis and distinct from that of the geological past against a new, Anthropocene-inspired challenge to the possibility of a humanistically oriented historiography. She argues that the historical past is not a short segment of geological time, the time of the human species on Earth, but the past investigated from the (...) perspective of a distinctive kind of interest, that of uncovering the norms which governed historical agents in different periods of time. The past for the Egyptologist, or for the Roman historian, is not the same past studied by the palaeontologist or the geologist, not because it is infinitesimal short in comparison to geological time, but because the questions asked by historians concerned with the Egyptian or Roman civilization are not the same kind of questions asked by empirically minded scientists. She argues that the accusation that the distinction between the historical and the natural/geological past, rests on unacceptable form of human exceptionalism is based on the conflation of the concept of the historical past with that of the human past and that keeping alive the nature/culture distinction has important implications for praxis. If the distinction between nature and culture is collapsed, and the corollary that historical agents are not distinct in kind from natural agents (such as yeast and microbes) is accepted, then “the anticipation of the future would become a mere spectator’s sport analogous to the activity of predicting the weather”: collapsing the nature culture distinction, D’Oro argues, undermines the possibility of political action against the very threat (climate change) that motivates Anthropocene narratives in the first instance. (shrink)

In what follows I will provide an explication of what the principle of philosophical sufficiency (PPS) refers to as conceptualized by François Laruelle, whereas, at the moment, suffice it to say that it is comparable to Marx’s extolling of the principle of praxis over that of philosophy as a critique of the philosophical “self-mirroring,” a thesis that pervades Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General (Marx, Manuscripts), German Ideology (1968), Theses on Feuerbach (1969). The self-mirroring thought (philosophy is) subsumes the (...) Real itself reducing it to a postulate, to its transcendental aspect exclusively rather than reversing the hierarchy whereby thought submits to the Real albeit radically foreclosed for philosophy’s totalizing ambition. Instead of revisiting the dialectics between thought and the real, or reviving a Kantian dilemma, in his critique of Feuerbach’s materialism and the critique of Hegel’s philosophy under the aforementioned several titles, in particular in “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General,” Marx proposes that a shift toward “objectivism” would proffer a proper foundation for a truly scientific discussion of human reality. It is probably an undisputable fact that subjectivity-centered thinking and anthropocentric ontology, epistemology, and morality have determined the civilizational legacy of modernity: it begins with Kant’s practical philosophy and metaphysics of morals, if we must choose a single philosophical threshold in the Western history of ideas. Certainly, it coincides with the birth of republicanism as the model state promulgated by the French and the American Revolution and the completion of the enlightenment project. In Karl Marx’s politico-philosophical project, subjectivity, political state, and secularism are not what a modern society should consist in but quite the opposite their transcendence by way of sublation when confronted with a materialist, objective science of the species-being of humanity. Secularism is, argues Marx in The Jewish Question, a name for a “political” state that has alienated itself from the society precisely by way of relegating everything pertaining to the individual to the so-called “civil society.”. (shrink)

“I myself still find my way of philosophizing new, & it keeps striking me so afresh, & that is why I have to repeat myself so often. […] [R]epetitions […] [f]or me […] are necessary.” (CV 1998: 3e) Wittgenstein's style is well known for its recursive—and according to some interpreters, even obsessive-compulsive—quality, but they are part of a thinking method: “I suggest repetition as a means of surveying the connections.” (AWL 1979: 43) The style also mirrors recurring ideas such as (...) “concepts are not for use on a single occasion” (Z 1981: 568), or the “bustle (Getriebe) of life […] comes about only through constant repetition” (RPP 1980b: 625 – 626). The aim of this essay is to show how the notion of repetition (Wiederholung) plays a significant role in the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought. It is the manifestation of a philosophical praxis, and although the notion of repetition remains in the background, it is a constant presence in his production, often featuring alongside his best-known concepts, like rule following, aspect seeing, and his thoughts on music and mathematics. This article will examine the different ways in which Wittgenstein reflects on the question of repetition in relation to the idea of identity, variation, and diversity, and as a fundamental aspect of human practice that is not the mere manifestation of underlying rules or principles, but a necessary condition for their emergence. (shrink)

The present book, “Essays on Positive Philosophy” is an anthology of revised papers presented in several places. I am thankful to the organizers of the seminars who gave me an opportunity to share my ideas on their platform. The first paper “Philosophy and Values in Public Affairs: An Appraisal” presented in National Seminar on Philosophy in Practice: Making Sense of Human Existence organized by Society for Philosophical Praxis Counselling and Spiritual Healing held on 23rd Feb, 2014 at Department (...) of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. This paper discusses the nature of philosophy and different values and their use in public affairs. Second paper “Higher Education and Research in India: An Overview” presented in 28th National Conference of Council for Teacher Education on the theme “Emerging Perspectives in Indian Teacher Education: Search for Identity and Building Humane Society” held on November 1-2, 2014 organized by CTE (HSC) at Kurukshetra which discuss status of higher education and research. The last paper, “The Role of Religious and Spiritual Values in Shaping Humanity (A Study of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s Religious Philosophy) in 3rd International Dharma-Dhamma Conference on Harmony of Religions: Welfare of Humankind, held on 24-26 October, 2015 at Indore (MP). This paper is related to the religious philosophy of Dr. B.R.Ambedkar. Since philosophy, education and religion are highly inter-related subjects, you can find my views about them in my these papers. Hope this short volume will help us to understand some basics of these subjects. (shrink)

Ein Homunkulus im philosophischen Sprachgebrauch ist eine postulierte menschenähnliche Instanz, die ausdrücklich oder unausdrücklich zur Erklärung der Arbeitsweise des menschlichen Geistes herangezogen wird. Als Homunkulus-Fehlschluß wird die Praxis bezeichnet, Prädikate, die auf kognitive oder perzeptive Leistungen einer ganzen Person zutreffen, auch auf Teile von Personen oder auf subpersonale Vorgänge anzuwenden, was typischerweise zu einem Regreß führt. Der vorliegende Beitrag erörtert den Homunkulus-Fehlschluß zunächst in argumentationstheoretischer Hinsicht und stellt dabei ein Diagnoseschema auf. Dann werden zwei Anwendungsfelder erörtert: Instanzenmodelle der Psyche (...) (Platon, Freud) sind ihrer Natur nach homunkulusgefährdet, denn es ist aufgrund der holistischen Zuschreibungsbedingungen mentaler Fähigkeiten schwer plausibel zu machen, wie eine innerpsychische Instanz den ihr zugedachten Beitrag leisten soll, ohne über eine eigene Psyche zu verfügen. Der zweite Anwendungsfall ist das Problem des invertierten Netzhautbildes in der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung, das wissenschafts- und philosophiegeschichtlich eingebettet und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Descartes diskutiert wird. Schließlich werden offensive Rechtfertigungen homunkularer Redeweisen erörtert und größtenteils zurückgewiesen. -- The homunculus fallacy is committed when someone tries to explain how the human mind works by postulating a little man within the mind or the brain. Homunculi are rarely posited with one’s eyes open. Rather, the fallacy occurs when predicates that properly apply to cognitive or perceptual achievements of persons get applied to subpersonal processes or to parts of persons (e.g., brains). The paper suggests a pattern for diagnosing homunculus fallacies. After taking a look at Freud’s and Platon’s homuncular metapsychologies, a case study is discussed in detail: the problem of the inverted retinal image which plagued the philosophy of perception since Kepler formulated it in 1604. It is argued that the irradiation patterns on the retina are not images, on pain of committing the homunculus fallacy. The paper closes with the repudiation of some frank apologies of homuncular explanations. (shrink)

It is common for social theorists to utilize the metaphors of ‘flow’, ‘fluidity’, and ‘liquidity’ in order to substantiate the ways in which speed and mobility form the basis for a new kind of information or network society. Yet rarely have these concepts been sufficiently theorized in order to establish their relevance or appropriateness. This article contends that the notion of flow as utilized in social theory is profoundly metaphysical in nature, and needs to be judged as such. Beginning with (...) a discussion of the accelerating timescape that characterizes the network society, it will then move on to examine three main issues with this ‘metaphysics of flux’. First, that the concept of flows unjustly privileges the process of becoming and, as a result, is unable to account for the materiality, substantiality, and agency of the objects being mobilized, and the contingency of their mediation. Second, that it posits the accelerating tendencies of capital as an ontological inevitability, thus discounting resistance to such forces. Finally, that it ignores the human faculty for reason and speculative thought in developing alternative means of political praxis. The solution, it will be argued, is not to abandon metaphysical accounts of the network society, but rather to challenge those accounts that, in exhibiting a crude empiricism, work to justify the status quo. (shrink)

Many twentieth-century accounts of history have used geological tropes to describe the phenomenon of historical knowledge, and such terms have been of particular importance in the phenomenological tradition. In Heidegger's references in Being and Time to the "soil of history," Husserl's account in his later work of "sedimentation" in the lifeworld, and the reformulation of this notion in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, geological tropes are used to illustrate important insights into the relation between contingency, a priority and historicity. This paper (...) seeks to contribute to an understanding of history understood phenomenologically as historicity through an analysis of these geological tropes. I argue that such geological tropes help the phenomenologist to describe the way in which history is always determined within a complex interplay between only temporarily fixed determining structures - such as riverbanks, insoluble sediment, soil, etc. - and free-flowing praxis, a situation in which historical events are at once determinant of and themselves determined by human activity. Paradoxically, the constant and "grounding" element in such conceptions of history is not the sediment and hard rock of historical fact, but the the constant change and variability-despite the sense giving continuity - of human experience structured by historicity. I begin with a brief overview of the landscape on the philosophy of history in which these views arose, and then continue to an analysis of the tropes themselves. (shrink)

Feminists of a philosophical sort, lovers of women and wisdom, political critics and witnesses! What unusual and important opportunities we face as we bring the lessons of the last few years to bear on complex theorizing, multi-issue praxis, and the work of twenty-first century democracy. We've been on the streets, in th classroom, and on the Internet, opposing war and occupation, protesting police brutality, demanding global peace and justice. We've helped organize teach-ins and lectures, meetings and potlucks, concerts and (...) art exhibitions. From the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan to New Yorkers Say No to War, from Women in Black to Code Pink, feminists were some of the first vocal opponents of the Bush rush to war. In February 2003 we helped create the greatest global protest for peace in human history, proclaiming "The World Says No to War" under banners of the swirling blue earth, cracking open the hegemony of you're-either-with-us-or-you're-with-the-terrorists, and activating a phenomenal range of new coalitions. (shrink)

One of the most popular concepts in recent times is globalization. Globalization is a complex and multifaceted concept that has generated controversy from its meaning, its tenets, and its future as well as whether it is serving the interest of all or it is benefiting just a few countries or individuals in the world. Throughout the process of human development, philosophers have constantly worked to clarify the meaning of right and wrong, justice and injustice, of fairness and basic (...) class='Hi'>human rights. These had won philosophical concepts that can be very useful in reasoning about globalization in praxis to Africa values. Globalization has also produced benefits and harms. Globalization is a process integrating not just the economy but, culture, technology, and governance. This paper examines some of the ethical problems of globalization in this 21st century. (shrink)

This chapter offered in hommage to Jacques Taminiaux’s long and fruitful career reflecting on ontological, political, and aesthetic issues, starts following the lead of his reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of these issues, as following the same “Platonic filiation” as in most of German Idealism’s representatives. Namely, Heidegger seems to interpret praxis beyond all relation to interaction and interlocution, but also that his revaluation of the role of art in politics is because he confers the utmost importance upon poiêsis as (...) an “internal potency in the human understanding of Being, of the Lichtblick,” namely, as a “high-ranked theôria.” It primarily addresses the question of how theôria-Sophia, praxis-phronêsis, poiêsis-technê in their relatedness and oppositions, are connected with the “ethical” (practical) dimension of transcendental reduction, following some hints from Taminiaux’s (2004) reflections on Heidegger’s “metamorphosis” of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction (both eidetic and transcendental), as having proved that “reduction was at the core of Husserl’s theoretical project.” However, Taminiaux thinks that “it is not an exaggeration to claim that the contrast” he has just sketched “entails as many difficulties as those implicit in Husserl’s concept of reduction” (Taminiaux 2004, 44). Thus, the primal motivation for this text’s proposal stems from its interest in finding out whether this appealing and well-argued reading of the Greek and Platonic connivance between theôria-poiêsis in contrast to the fragility and contingency of human practical judgments and the human intrigue of our worldly abode—a reading retrieved by modern and contemporary German philosophers, including Heidegger—is in seamless accordance with the canonical contemporary interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and reduction. Or whether an alternative reading could be risked. What has characterized the success of Taminiaux’s original and piercingly acute reading of the history of philosophy is his close and severe scrutiny of texts transmitted by the tradition in dialogue with our experience of the “matters themselves.” Hence, in the wake of this essential and everlasting teaching, this text risks an alternative reading of the phenomenological reduction, specifically of its transcendental version, as an eminently practical—namely, ethical—achievement (Leistung), driven by a practical virtue, responsibility. (shrink)

Could a person ever transcend what it is like to be in the world as a human being? Could we ever know what it is like to be other creatures? Questions about the overcoming of a human perspective are not uncommon in the history of philosophy. In the last century, those very interrogatives were notably raised by American philosopher Thomas Nagel in the context of philosophy of mind. In his 1974 essay What is it Like to Be a (...) Bat?, Nagel offered reflections on human subjectivity and its constraints. Nagel’s insights were elaborated before the social diffusion of computers and could not anticipate the cultural impact of technological artefacts capable of materializing interactive simulated worlds as well as disclosing virtual alternatives to the “self.” In this sense, this article proposes an understanding of computers as epistemological and ontological instruments. The embracing of a phenomenological standpoint entails that philosophical issues are engaged and understood from a fundamentally practical perspective. In terms of philosophical praxis, or “applied philosophy,” I explored the relationship between human phenomenologies and digital mediation through the design and the development of experimental video games. For instance, I have conceptualized the first-person action-adventure video game Haerfest (Technically Finished 2009) as a digital re-formulation of the questions posed in Nagel’s famous essay. Experiencing a bat’s perceptual equipment in Haerfest practically corroborates Nagel’s conclusions: there is no way for humans to map, reproduce, or even experience the consciousness of an actual bat. Although unverifiable in its correspondence to that of bats, Haerfest still grants access to experiences and perceptions that, albeit still inescapably within the boundaries of human kinds of phenomenologies, were inaccessible to humans prior to the advent of computers. Phenomenological alterations and virtual experiences disclosed by interactive digital media cannot take place without a shift in human kinds of ontologies, a shift which this study recognizes as the fundamental ground for the development of a new humanism (I deem it necessary to specify that I am not utilizing the term “humanism” in its common connotation, that is to say the one that emerged from the encounter between the Roman civilization and the late Hellenistic culture. According to this conventional acceptation, humanism indicates the realization of the human essence through “scholarship and training in good conduct” (Heidegger 1998, p. 244). However, Heidegger observed that this understanding of humanism does not truly cater to the original essence of human beings, but rather “is determined with regard to an already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and […] beings as a whole.” (Heidegger 1998, p. 245) The German thinker found this way of embracing humanism reductive: a by-product of Western metaphysics. As Heidegger himself specified in his 1949 essay Letter on Humanism, his opposition to the traditional acceptation of the term humanism does not advocate for the “inhuman” or a return to the “barbaric” but stems instead from the belief that the humanism can only be properly understood and restored in culture as more original way of meditating and caring for humanity and understanding its relationship with Being.). Additionally, this study explicitly proposes and exemplifies the use of interactive digital technology as a medium for testing, developing and disseminating philosophical notions, problems and hypotheses in ways which are alternative to the traditional textual one. Presented as virtual experiences, philosophical concepts can be accessed without the filter of subjective imagination. In a persistent, interactive, simulated environment, I claim that the crafting and the mediation of thought takes a novel, projective (In Martin Heidegger’s 1927 Being and Time, the term “projectivity” indicates the way a Being opens to the world in terms of its possibilities of being (Heidegger 1962, pp. 184–185, BT 145). Inspired by Heidegger’s and Vilem Flusser’s work in the field of philosophy of technology as well as Helmuth Plessner’s anthropological position presented in his 1928 book Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie, this study understands the concept of projectivity as the innate openness of human beings to construct themselves and their world by means of technical artefacts. In this sense, this study proposes a fundamental understanding of technology as the materialization of mankind’s tendency to overcome its physical, perceptual and communicative limitations.) dimension which I propose to call “augmented ontology.”. (shrink)

In Paulo Freire’s emancipatory model, violence as a mode of struggle is rejected. The revolutionary movement should never appropriate violence in pursuing prospects of emancipation. For Freire, an authentic struggle for emancipation and autonomy does not utilize the praxis of the oppressor which is mainly characterized by dehumanization and violence. This emancipatory model also contends that the oppressor should also be subjected to emancipation as they have also been dehumanized in their subjection of the oppressed. Thus, liberation does not (...) only pursue the humanization of the oppressed but also their oppressors. It follows, therefore, that physical violence is out of the picture as the revolutionary movement recognizes the humanity of the oppressed and her oppressor. Therefore, the movement headed by the oppressed does not operate within the praxis of their oppressors which, for Freire, is a negation of humanity. An alternative position, however, contends that violence is an indispensable aspect of the emancipatory movement. In fact, violence is not only a consequence of the conflict but, for Frantz Fanon, the overarching dynamic over the colonized order. An oppressive paradigm which, for Fanon, could only be overturned by counter-violence. The dismantlement of the colonial order implies the destruction of the “colonist’s sector” which in so doing, necessitates the utilization of violence in the struggle. This work, therefore, challenges the pacificist inclination of Freirean emancipatory model through the lenses of Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. This paper argues that though ideal emancipatory politics should be discursive and dialogical which Freire advocates, violence remain to be an indispensable aspect of liberation and resistance. In order to ground these arguments, this paper will appropriate the case of the revolutionary movement of the Katipunan vis-à-vis the Reformists. (shrink)

Modern rationalism transformed the modern homeland to a discursive space and time by means of institutes governing the modern society in all its walks. Based on the Newtonian and Kantian conception of space and time the discursive field is just a scene wherein any human individual adopts stewardship to create progress by reducing landscape and non-human life to auxiliary items for human’s benefit. In contrast, Aldo Leopold considered humans, non human life and the landscape as mutually (...) influencing participants and enlarged ethical care to all living participants and the landscape, called ´the land´. Integrity and autonomy of the homeland are the central topics of Leopold’s land ethics. Baird Callicott suggested to complete it with new metaphysical conceptions of space and time. -/- We formulated a metaphysical background for Leopold’s land ethics by phenomenology of space and time based on the Leibnizian conception of space-time. The latter is constructed by particular places and events called ´ecotopois´ embracing all human participants, locals and foreigners in a varying symbolic temporal and spatial field of dynamic process of identification and self consciousness. Adopting Warwick Fox´ transpersonal identification idea non-human life and landscape enriches these processes. Finally, it is not a matter of conquering the land, it is matter of making a community. -/- Though landscape and participants are particular, integrity and autonomy of the homeland claim the universal status of the land. Adopting Gadamer hermeneutical way of understanding, we reject mutual and equally understanding. Only acceptance of mutual prejudice makes room for asymmetric praxis between locals and foreigners as well as between humans and non-humans. What is more, Gadamer´s hermeneutics makes an ontological status of the foreigner possible and recognizes the interest of homeland’s particularity. This universal status is guaranteed as a priori space-time that links subject’s tradition and that of the land to actual contact with the foreigner. Transpersonal identification is a consequence of converging hermeneutical understanding of foreigner’s particularity and that of the landscape. Ethics of the land evolves from the ethical status of any foreigner in the own homeland. -/- . (shrink)

Feminist considerations have induced a rethinking of many aspects of our contemporary world, such as the concept of gender and power relations. This has led to a re-examination of the entire previous tradition of thought, finding in phallogocentrism the paradigm of reference. This term indicates, starting with Derrida's considerations, the Western tendency to have centred not only the logos, but also the phallus, weaving an intricate relationship between masculinity and language. It's precisely this bond that makes man the archetype on (...) which society is founded, placing his supremacy in the natural order, defining power relations and nailing pre-established categories. A being-nailed in the Lévinasian sense, thus an adherence between the agreement of voices and being, which produces 'category-beings' in which pre-delineated social identity is concealed in a condition of 'nature', such as the 'being-male'. It's precisely this naturalness, discursively produced, that has made man universal. Consequently, man has convinced himself that he can speak for all humanity, becoming the logos through which he declines the rest. Declinations that have produced rigid and hierarchical categories that precede and define each person, prescribing 'consonant' ways, rhetorically assumed as 'human nature'. The "nature" of being man or woman does not, in fact, concern monolithic essentialisms, but rather movements of intertwined meanings in a process that Derrida defines as différance. A process, therefore, in becoming, which has over time produced unequal power relations, justifying them as "natural", and which daily reiterates a hegemonic and sexist social model. The aim of this analysis, hence, will be to bring phallogocentric masculinity and consequent hegemonic structures into the field of philosophical reflection, with the purpose of redirecting praxis towards performative processes of characterisation the person, rather than a pre-delineated categorisation. Thus, to release being from socio-cultural categories, which historical-performative praxis nails to each body. (shrink)