The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness (“justice”) are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution (through adequate definitions), the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war (...) theory.” However, “just war theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare (reducing it to an incomprehensible individual level, as if a group of people entered a battle in hopes of finding another group of people willing to respond). Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability (obtained through laws), is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability (which could simply be incompetence, or because peace, as a specific articulation of distribution of social power, is not tenable anymore) forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time (and expressed in customary and legal rules of warfare), with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)

El Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH) nació en Latinoamérica. Ante la creencia imprecisa de que el DIH surgió tras la batalla de Solferino (24 de junio de 1864), como consecuencia de la experiencia de Henry Dunant, se refuta y demuestra que tal aseveración carece de sustentación empírica y científica porque desconoce la importancia histórica y jurídica del Tratado de Regularización de la Guerra y el Tratado de Armisticio suscrito entre la República de Colombia (presidida por El Libertador Simón Bolívar) y el (...) Reino de España (representada por el Mariscal Pablo Morillo) en Trujillo, Venezuela, el 27 de noviembre de 1820, que culminó con el encuentro de ambos líderes combatientes en la histórica población de Santa Ana de Trujillo, llamada, desde entonces, "Morada de Paz" o "Cuna de la Diplomacia Americana". Se destaca en el texto que tales Pactos Internacionales, denominados los "Tratados de Trujillo", fueron aplicados, a modo de precedente jurídico y humanitario, en las diversas Capitulaciones y Acuerdos de Paz que van desde 1820 a 1830 durante el curso de la Lucha de Emancipación frente al imperio español, dando nacimiento al "Derecho de la Guerra" moderno sometido a los sentimientos de piedad, justicia y humanidad. La obra destaca que, a contrario sensu de la opinión mayoritaria, el DIH se configuró en Latinoamérica durante la Guerra de Independencia que lideraron El Libertador Simón Bolívar, El Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho Antonio José de Sucre y los Padres Libertadores de la Gran Colombia (antes integrada por los ahora Estados de Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panamá, Perú y Venezuela) frente al Reino de España, entre 1810 y 1830. La aseveración relacionada con que el DIH nación en dicho contexto local (y no en Europa), tiene como soporte legal, jurídico o dogmático un enorme cúmulo de instrumentos bilaterales y multilaterales (Acuerdos, Capitulaciones, Amnistías y Tratados) que sentaron las bases del "Derecho de la Guerra" o de la humanización del acto violento la guerra a través de su sometimiento a las reglas jurídicas como mecanismo para contener la venganza, la aniquilación y la destrucción de la vida y los bienes del enemigo en el conflicto bélico. Se sostiene que con dicha regulación, se generó y consolidó el Corpus Iuris Pro Humanitatis, para, en medio de la guerra sometida, a la legalidad y el sentido de justicia, resaltar y proteger la dignidad humana de los combatientes, heridos, enfermos, prisioneros de guerra, población civil (no beligerante), los bienes ajenos a las operaciones militares y lograr preservar la paz como valores y principios superiores de la humanidad. Para confirmarlo, vale la cita textual de lo afirmado por Simón Bolívar, El Libertador, cuando le escribió entonces a Pablo Morillo que ambos Estados estaban compelidos a suscribir "...un tratado verdaderamente santo, que regularice la guerra de horrores y crímenes que hasta ahora ha inundado de lágrimas y sangre a Colombia, y que sea un monumento entre las naciones más cultas, de civilización, liberalidad y filantropía..." (Simón Bolívar: Carta a Pablo Morillo, Cuartel General de Carache, 3 de noviembre de 1820). -/- Contenido del libro: Parte Primera. Elementos teóricos y normativos. Clásicos que forjaron el ius in bello hispano fuente jurídica primaria del ius in bello hispano-grancolombiano y del DIH contemporáneo: Capítulo I. Aportes de la edad antigua al ius in bello en general. Capítulo II. La Edad media y la Edad moderna: sus aportes en la definición de la «guerra justa» como teoría influyente en la fundamentación del ius in bello hispano. Parte Segunda. La Escuela de Salamanca y su influencia en el desarrollo del derecho internacional y el ius in bello hispano: Capítulo I. Sobre la Escuela de Salamanca y la ’guerra justa‘. Capítulo II. Otros referentes teóricos y regulatorios europeos y americanos relacionados con la conformación del ius in bello. Capítulo III. La edad contemporánea, el ius in bello y los DDHH. Parte Tercera. Acuerdos humanitarios entre la corona española y los beligerantes independentistas de Venezuela y la Nueva Granada antes de los tratados de Trujillo (1812/1819). Capítulo II. El trienio de los acuerdos humanitarios hispanograncolombianos durante el trienio liberal español: los tratados de Trujillo de 1820 y su aporte a la configuración del ius un bello hispano-grancolombiano. Parte Cuarta. El trienio de los acuerdos humanitarios hispanograncolombianos durante el trienio liberal español: otros acuerdos humanitarios convencionales para la regulación y humanización de la guerra posteriores a los tratados de Trujillo: Capítulo I. Las capitulaciones hispano-grancolombianas en Venezuela despues de los tratados de Trujillo. Capítulo II. Acuerdos humanitarios convencionales iberoamericanos en la campaña libertadora del sur del continente americano. Parte Quinta. Otros referentes normativos y conceptuales posteriores a los tratados de Trujillo y el impacto del ius in bello hispano-granclombiano en los principios basicos del DIH de las convenciones de Ginebra: Capítulo I. Referentes conceptuales y jurídicos posteriores a los tratados de Trujillo, que influyeron en la conformación del derecho humanitario de la guerra y del DIH contemporáneo. Capítulo II. La influencia notoria del ius in bello hispano-grancolombiano sobre la configuración de los principios básicos del DIH vigente. Capítulo III. Reflexiones sobre la odiosidad de la guerra y un proyecto de futuro para Iberoamérica y la familia humana. (shrink)

The 2016-17 Iraqi offensive that recaptured the city of Mosul from the Islamic State have demonstrated the inability of contemporary armed forces to retake urban areas from a determined and ruthless enemy without either suffering debilitating casualties or causing thousands of civilian deaths and virtually destroying the city itself. The enemy’s willingness to refuse civilian evacuation via a humanitarian corridor and effectively take the inhabitants hostage is all it takes to impose this tragic dilemma on an attacking force. The civilian (...) death toll of the battle of Mosul alone is estimated to have reached between seven and forty thousand, with almost one million people internally displaced and large portions of the city levelled. Avoiding another such tragedy should be a priority for all practitioners and theorists of urban warfare. Indeed, confronting and defeating this challenge may be the most important task for ethics, theory and practice of urban combat in the coming decade. I argue that the only viable way of escaping the hostage siege dilemma consists of incorporating large numbers of unmanned and autonomous weapon systems into the blue force structure and using these to substitute for artillery and aerial fires presently being used to overpower defenders. While other measures may be used to marginally improve the outcome of hostage city assaults, only the automatization of the assault can dramatically change the calculus and in result either discourage rogue actors from creating hostage city dilemmas or defeat them decisively while suffering unequivocally proportional casualties. I proceed as follows: first, I provide an account of the 2016-17 Coalition assault on Mosul, giving special attention to the events and features relevant to the hostage city dilemma. I then use this case study to introduce the theoretical concept of the hostile city and the ethical dilemma it creates, discussing possible objections and making the case that the circumstances of the Battle of Mosul are bound to repeatedly transpire in the future. This generates a duty to find a way out of the hostage city dilemma. I argue that widespread use of unmanned and autonomous weapon platforms constitutes a viable way of assaulting hostage cities in a manner that assures respect for the ius in bello principles, proposing several ways in which such weapons may be designed and used to drastically limit both military and civilian casualties. Concluding that it may be not only permissible but morally required to employ autonomous weapons in the hostage city scenario, I briefly discuss the implications of this conclusion for a wider debate concerning the moral feasibility of autonomous weapons. (shrink)

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution, the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war theory.” However, “just war (...) theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare. Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability, is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time, with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)

Many nongovernmental forms of business regulation aim at reducing ethical violations in commerce. We argue that such nongovernmental ethics standards, while often laudable, raise their own ethical challenges. In particular, when such standards place burdens upon vulnerable market participants (often, though not always, SMEs), they do so without the backing of traditional legitimate political authority. We argue that this constitutes a structural analogy to wars of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, we show that, while some harms imposed by such standards are desirable, (...) others are best thought of as a form of collateral damage. We thus look at the well-developed literature on just war theory for inspiration and find that the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello contain many insights that can be fruitfully adapted to the case of nongovernmental standard-setting. Consequently, we propose the Ius ad Normam—a set of principles that should guide would-be standard-setters in assessing whether imposing those burdens is ethically justifiable in particular cases. We also discuss how powerful multinational businesses often act simultaneously as standard-takers and standard-setters and explore the normative implications of this dual role. (shrink)

Many philosophers have pointed out that statistical evidence, or at least some forms of it, lack desirable epistemic or non-epistemic properties, and that this should make us wary of litigations in which the case against the defendant rests in whole or in part on statistical evidence. Others have responded that such broad reservations about statistical evidence are overly restrictive since appellate courts have expressed nuanced views about statistical evidence. In an effort to clarify and reconcile, I put forward an interpretive (...) analysis of why statistical evidence should raise concerns in some cases but not others. I argue that when there is a mismatch between the specificity of the evidence and the expected specificity of the accusation, statistical evidence—as any other kind of evidence—should be considered insufficient to sustain a conviction. I rely on different stylized court cases to illustrate the explanatory power of this analysis. (shrink)

Smith argues that, unlike other forms of evidence, naked statistical evidence fails to satisfy normic support. This is his solution to the puzzles of statistical evidence in legal proof. This paper focuses on Smith’s claim that DNA evidence in cold-hit cases does not satisfy normic support. I argue that if this claim is correct, virtually no other form of evidence used at trial can satisfy normic support. This is troublesome. I discuss a few ways in which Smith can respond.

I comment on two analyses of the Simonshaven case: one by Prakken (2019), based on arguments, and the other by van Koppen and Mackor (2019), based on scenarios (or stories, narratives). I argue that both analyses lack a clear account of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because they lack a clear account of the notion of plausibility. To illustrate this point, I focus on the defense argument during the appeal trial and show that both analyses face difficulties in modeling key (...) features of this argument. (shrink)

This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms.

The literature on algorithmic fairness has examined exogenous sources of biases such as shortcomings in the data and structural injustices in society. It has also examined internal sources of bias as evidenced by a number of impossibility theorems showing that no algorithm can concurrently satisfy multiple criteria of fairness. This paper contributes to the literature stemming from the impossibility theorems by examining how informational richness affects the accuracy and fairness of predictive algorithms. With the aid of a computer simulation, we (...) show that informational richness is the engine that drives improvements in the performance of a predictive algorithm, in terms of both accuracy and fairness. The centrality of informational richness suggests that classification parity, a popular criterion of algorithmic fairness, should be given relatively little weight. But we caution that the centrality of informational richness should be taken with a grain of salt in light of practical limitations, in particular, the so-called bias-variance trade off. (shrink)

The primary aim of this chapter is to explain the nature of evidential reasoning, the characteristic difficulties encountered, and the tools to address these difficulties. Our focus is on evidential reasoning in criminal cases. There is an extensive scholarly literature on these topics, and it is a secondary aim of the chapter to provide readers the means to find their way in historical and ongoing debates.

This study investigated the consumption pattern of wild edible green leafy vegetables found in Osogbo Local Government Area of Osun State using a descriptive survey research design. The sample size for this study was two hundred and eleven (211) respondents. A four-likert scale structured questionnaire containing twenty-four (24) items was used for data collection. Data were analysed using mean scores and standard deviation. The findings of the study revealed that ”Yarin,” “Worowo,” “Gbure,” and “Ebolo" are major wild edible green leafy (...) vegetables found in the study area, and their consumption is quite low. The finding showed that wild edible green leafy vegetables have benefits such as alleviating malnutrition at no cost and can be a good source of income. The findings also showed that urbanisation's preference for cultivated vegetables over wild edible green leafy vegetables, as well as uncultured ideas like ignorance and poverty and well-researched information about cultivated leafy vegetables, are among the factors influencing the intake of wild edible green leafy vegetables. The findings of this study asserted that wild edible green leafy vegetables, when compared with cultivated ones, can alleviate malnutrition, prevent micronutrient deficiency, and equally serve as a source of income at little or no cost. Therefore, it was recommended that there is a need to explore, analyse, and document that wild green edible leafy vegetables are nutritious, health-promoting, and easy to cultivate, and bring out substantial yields even under difficult climatic and edaphic conditions. (shrink)

Epistemic closure under known implication is the principle that knowledge of "p" and knowledge of "p implies q", together, imply knowledge of "q". This principle is intuitive, yet several putative counterexamples have been formulated against it. This paper addresses the question, why is epistemic closure both intuitive and prone to counterexamples? In particular, the paper examines whether probability theory can offer an answer to this question based on four strategies. The first probability-based strategy rests on the accumulation of risks. The (...) problem with this strategy is that risk accumulation cannot accommodate certain counterexamples to epistemic closure. The second strategy is based on the idea of evidential support, that is, a piece of evidence supports a proposition whenever it increases the probability of the proposition. This strategy makes progress and can accommodate certain putative counterexamples to closure. However, this strategy also gives rise to a number of counterintuitive results. Finally, there are two broadly probabilistic strategies, one based on the idea of resilient probability and the other on the idea of assumptions that are taken for granted. These strategies are promising but are prone to some of the shortcomings of the second strategy. All in all, I conclude that each strategy fails. Probability theory, then, is unlikely to offer the account we need. (shrink)

El texto de Martin Heidegger Was ist das - die Philosophie? es una de las obras claves para hacer una hermenéutica de su pensamiento. En ella se explica como lo que pretendía la filosofía en su origen no tiene un correlato con sus conquistas a lo largo de la tradición, que están más bien teñidas de un tinte racionalista que obvia los estados afectivos, tan necesarios para entender el pensar filosófico. De este modo, volvemos con Heidegger a remontarnos al inicio (...) de la filosofía, hasta Heráclito, para así poder establecer unas pautas que nos ayuden en nuestras disquisiciones dentro del filosofar. Para ello será necesario retomar el verdadero sentido griego de λὀγος tal y como fue planteado por Heráclito: como fluir y como lucha. --- Martin Heidegger’s text Was ist das - die Philosophie? is one of the key works to make a hermeneutic of his thought. In it he explains how what philosophy originally intended has no correlation with its conquests throughout tradition, which are rather tinged with a rationalist tint that obviates the affective states, so necessary for understanding philosophical thinking. In this way, we return with Heidegger to go back to the beginning of philosophy, until Heraclitus, so that you can establish some guidelines that help us in our disquisitions within philosophy. To do so, it will be necessary to take up again the true Greek sense of λὀγος as it was proposed by Heraclitus: how to flow and how to fight. (shrink)

El objetivo propuesto en el siguiente trabajo es elucidar cómo desde la finitud de la existencia puede establecerse la problemática de la temporalidad dentro del entramado de pensamiento de Martin Heidegger. Para ello realizaremos un análisis de la conferencia de 1924 Der Begriff der Zeit, uno de los textos que allanan el camino a Sein und Zeit, en lugar de centrar la investigación en la considerada obra magna de Heidegger. Una reflexión acerca de este texto previo permitirá avanzar en el (...) análisis de la existencia al mostrar cómo el tiempo está arraigado en la existencia individual, no como un solipsismo, sino como apertura de posibilidades respecto del mundo (a la postre compartido con los otros). Una descripción fenomenológica de la muerte posibilitará la apertura al mundo, definiendo una temporalidad existencial que incluye no sólo al instante presente, sino también al pasado (concebido bajo la forma del «haber-sido») y al futuro. ---- The aim of the following paper is to elucidate how, from the finitude of existence, the problematic of temporality can be established within the framework of Martin Heidegger's thought. To this end, we will analyse the 1924 lecture Der Begriff der Zeit, one of the texts that pave the way for Sein und Zeit, instead of focusing our investigation on Heidegger's considered masterpiece. A reflection on this earlier text will advance the analysis of existence by showing how time is rooted in individual existence, not as a solipsism, but as an opening of possibilities with respect to the world (ultimately shared with others). A phenomenological description of death will make it possible to open up to the world, defining an existential temporality that includes not only the present instant, but also the past (conceived in the form of "having-been") and the future. (shrink)

The paper deals with the ways in which Edmund Husserl develops the question of God. Six ways to reach God are shown as present in Husserl’s writings, some of them seem to be very close to the traditional philosophical ways to go as far as God (the objective and the subjective ways) others are very original, in particular the way that starts from the analysis of the hyletic sphere of the human being, a sphere which is present in all the (...) reality too. At last it is possible to notice Husserl’s interest in the mystical approach to God. (shrink)

According to the principle of epistemic closure, knowledge is closed under known implication. The principle is intuitive but it is problematic in some cases. Suppose you know you have hands and you know that ‘I have hands’ implies ‘I am not a brain-in-a-vat’. Does it follow that you know you are not a brain-in-a-vat? It seems not; it should not be so easy to refute skepticism. In this and similar cases, we are confronted with a puzzle: epistemic closure is an (...) intuitive principle, but at times, it does not seem that we know by implication. In response to this puzzle, the literature has been mostly polarized between those who are willing to do away with epistemic closure and those who think we cannot live without it. But there is a third way. Here I formulate a restricted version of the principle of epistemic closure. In the standard version, the principle can range over any proposition; in the restricted version, it can only range over those propositions that are within the limits of a given epistemic inquiry and that do not constitute the underlying assumptions of the inquiry. If we adopt the restricted version, I argue, we can preserve the advantages associated with closure, while at the same time avoiding the puzzle I’ve described. My discussion also yields an insight into the nature of knowledge. I argue that knowledge is best understood as a topic-restricted notion, and that such a conception is a natural one given our limited cognitive resources. (shrink)

Intergovernmental relation is an interaction among different levels of government. Intergovernmental relation is often times conflict-ridden, and the extent of the conflict depends on how they are managed by the actor operating at the government levels. This study examines conflict management in intergovernmental relation in Nigeria. The content analysis method would be used. This will be carried out by analyzing data obtained from extant literature on the subject matter. This paper found that intergovernmental conflicts mainly borders on tax jurisdiction and (...) revenue allocation. Other areas of conflict were found to include domination by the centre of other units, as well as, parallel and vertical misunderstanding among units on administrative, legal, social and economic matters. It was suggested that levels of government should introduce such method as discussion, integration, good management of communication in other to attain a peaceful intergovernmental relations regime. (shrink)

People often reason about omissions. One line of research shows that people can distinguish between the semantics of omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions: for instance, not flunking out of college enabled you (but didn’t cause you) to graduate. Another line of work shows that people rely on the normative status of omissive events in inferring their causal role: if the outcome came about because the omission violated some norm, reasoners are more likely to select that omission as a cause. (...) We designed a novel paradigm that tests how norms interact with the semantics of omissive enabling conditions. The paradigm concerns the circuitry of a mechanical device that plays music. Two experiments used the paradigm to stipulate norms and present a distinct set of possibilities to participants. Participants chose which causal verb best described the operations of the machine. The studies revealed that participants’ responses are best predicted by their tendency to consider the semantics of omissive relations. In contrast, norms had little to no effect in participants’ responses. We conclude by marshaling the evidence and considering what role norms may play in people’s understanding of omissions. (shrink)

Uno de los aspectos destacados del pensamiento de Martin Heidegger es la crítica a la ciencia. En Heidegger esta crítica parte del supuesto de la falta de base, de soporte que la sostenga, que tiene la ciencia al no contemplar precísamente que haya de tener un fundamento último, sino que se centra únicamente en su propio progreso sin volver la vista atrás hacia aquello que tiene como raíz. Heidegger señala en su obra en repetidas ocasiones que "la ciencia no piensa". (...) Ese no pensar de la ciencia suena en el propio Heidegger como paradójico porque la misma ciencia implica precísamente el ejercicio del pensar, siendo ese el cometido de la actividad científica. Pero a lo que se refiere Heidegger con ese no-pensar de la ciencia es a que ésta ha derivado en una ciencia del ente sin tener en cuenta para nada el ser que la funda. Nuestro propósito en este trabajo entonces será el de esclarecer la crítica a la ciencia que hace Heidegger. --- One of the highlights of Martin Heidegger's thought is criticism to science. In Heidegger, this criticism is based on the assumption of lack basis, of support that sustains, which science has to not consider precisely that it has to have an ultimate ground, but it focuses solely on its own progress without looking back to that which has as its root. Heidegger indicates in his work repeatedly that "science does not think". That not-thinking of science in Heidegger himself appears as paradoxical because precisely science itself involves the exercise of thinking, being this the task of scientific activity. But what Heidegger refers with that not-thinking of science is that this has led to a science of being (seiende) without regard to anything Being (Sein) that grounded. Our purpose in this paper then will be to clarify the critique of science that Heidegger makes. (shrink)

For decades AI researchers have built agents that are capable of carrying out tasks that require human-level or human-like intelligence. During this time, questions of how these programs compared in kind to humans have surfaced and led to beneficial interdisciplinary discussions, but conceptual progress has been slower than technological progress. Within the past decade, the term agency has taken on new import as intelligent agents have become a noticeable part of our everyday lives. Research on autonomous vehicles and personal assistants (...) has expanded into private industry with new and increasingly capable products surfacing as a matter of routine. This wider use of AI technologies has raised questions about legal and moral agency at the highest levels of government (National Science and Technology Council 2016) and drawn the interest of other academic disciplines and the general public. Within this context, the notion of an intelligent agent in AI is too coarse and in need of refinement. We suggest that the space of AI agents can be subdivided into classes, where each class is defined by an associated degree of control. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to analyse the benefits that remote work could bring in the development of the country. It is organized in three parts. In the first part it engages with the concept of public policy, how it is shaped and should be done to make visible problems that need to be addressed. The second part analysis the benefits of teleworking and potential models for city organization and population distribution to support country development. The last part analyses the (...) case of Albania to discover that remote work, demography, and country development are concepts not yet analyzed in connection for exploring the benefits they could bring. The paper concludes that government should invest in developing human resources in the field of digitalization, so that the number of employees who could telework and companies that could use that expertise is increased. In this way, companies and staff do not necessarily need to locate in the capital or big cities but could locate in medium size cities and periphery. This would contribute to the development of currently neglected areas and decrease living expenses in big cities, making thus more affordable the life for the low-income workers. In doing so, not only the living conditions will improve but the gap between centre and periphery will narrow down and lead to a better distribution of economic benefits across country. (shrink)

Domestic violence is identified across the globe as a menace as it poses a threat to the mental health of its victims, the significant others of the victim and the security of a nation at large. In some cases, the victim of domestic violence is a pregnant woman and harm is caused not only to a woman but her fetus also and this calls for urgent psychological assessment and intervention. Although there is no doubt that psychological tests are effective in (...) the assessment of domestic violence, using the psychometric properties obtained from a different population may produce generate inaccurate findings. This paper therefore attempts the validation study of Women Abuse Screening Tool (WAST) using a sample of 379 pregnant women attending antenatal clinic at the State Specialist Hospital, Osogbo, Osun State, Nigeria. The study derived a Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability of 0.758, p <.05 and a Guttman split-half coefficient of 0.683, p <.05. Furthermore, concurrent validity of Women Abuse Screening Tool (WAST) and Ongoing Abuse Screen (OAS) was established as 0.29, p<.05. The norms of the instrument were given as 2.38 for tolerable level of domestic violence and 5.79 for severe and pathological level of domestic violence. Authors conclude that Women Abuse Screening Tool has acceptable psychometric properties to justify its usage for the assessment of level of domestic violence among pregnant women in Nigeria and other nations with similar socio-cultural backgrounds. (shrink)

Interest in just war theory has boomed in recent years, as a revisionist school of thought has challenged the orthodoxy of international law, most famously defended by Michael Walzer [1977]. These revisionist critics have targeted the two central principles governing the conduct of war (jus in bello): combatant equality and noncombatant immunity. The first states that combatants face the same permissions and constraints whether their cause is just or unjust. The second protects noncombatants from intentional attack. In response to (...) these critics, some philosophers have defended aspects of the old orthodoxy on novel grounds. Revisionists counter. As things stand, the prospects for progress are remote. In this paper, we offer a way forward. We argue that exclusive focus on first-order moral principles, such as combatant equality and noncombatant immunity, has led revisionist and orthodox just war theorists to engage in “proxy battles.” Their first-order moral disagreements are at least partly traceable to second-order disagreements about the nature and purpose of political theory. These deeper disputes have been central to the broader discipline of political theory for several years; we hope that bringing them to bear on the ethics of war will help us move beyond the present impasse. (shrink)

People more frequently select norm-violating factors, relative to norm- conforming ones, as the cause of some outcome. Until recently, this abnormal-selection effect has been studied using retrospective vignette-based paradigms. We use a novel set of video stimuli to investigate this effect for prospective causal judgments—i.e., judgments about the cause of some future outcome. Four experiments show that people more frequently select norm- violating factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some future outcome. We show that the abnormal-selection effects (...) are not primarily explained by the perception of agency (Experiment 4). We discuss these results in relation to recent efforts to model causal judgment. (shrink)

Traditional just war theory maintains that the two types of rules that govern justice in times of war, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), are logically independent of one another. Call this the independence thesis. According to this thesis, a war that satisfies the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that the in bello rules will be satisfied; and a war that violates the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that the (...) in bello rules will be violated. A controversial implication of this is that it’s possible for soldiers to undergo acts that are instrumental in bringing about victory in an unjust war and yet do nothing morally wrong. Some authors – call them purists – claim that this cannot be correct. Participating in an unjust war is by itself morally wrong. Yitzhak Benbaji has given what is to my mind the strongest defense of the independence thesis. In this paper I critically examine Benbaji’s argument and conclude that it is not persuasive. My argument against Benbaji incorporates the concept of honor in the military. I seek to show, in part, that if the recent literature is correct concerning both the nature of honor and the importance of instilling it in soldiers, then Benbaji hasn’t given the purist a compelling reason to give up her view. (shrink)

The management of Higher Education Systems has continued to suffer from plethora of concerns and issues, cardinal amongst them, is the application of conventional administrative strategies and leadership patterns, sometimes without appropriate modifications so much so, that the management effectiveness of higher education systems is gradually being eroded. This is evident in the increasing distasteful gamut of multidimensional outcomes arising from the used of dogmatic and stereotype variants of managerial principles or nothing at all, in the circumstance. Given this premise, (...) there is an urgent desire to rejig and re-engineer learning experiences that will culminate into dynamic, goal oriented and robust management packages for higher education systems with results for global acclamations, thereby, chatting new directions to fill this existing gap in the management of higher education systems in Nigeria. With humility, I introduce to you this book titled: Management of Higher Education Systems, a collection of well-researched essays. The essays in this book promises to deliver on the deliverables of its raison d’tre of job specifications and management dynamics of higher education landscape, reflecting on the global realities. This is because scholarly evidences abound, to proof that looking into the National Universities Commission’s Bench Mark Minimum Academic Standard (BMAS) of the curriculum for Educational Management as a discipline, it is obvious, that the BMAS has fallen short of global expectations and appears to be revolving within neo-colonial conventional administrative theorizing, with little or no emphasis on the practical demonstration of acquired skills, competences and capabilities for trained educational administrators, to deal with peculiarities of the moment, especially in the developing world. This felt need pushes for a paradigm shift in our curricula endeavours. It is even worse off, when experiences have continued to show, that there are deficiencies noticeable in the understanding of job requirements of educational managers of higher education systems in Nigeria. -/- It is this gap therefore, that the current effort is geared towards building this literature which seeks to address this lacuna by re-chiseling and retooling educational management practices through equipping this sophisticated discipline with up-to-date information and knowledge that will enhance the full optimaization of the job specifications, of higher educational managers, to bring into a perfect nexus of the man, job and social milieu. It is also in public domain, that managers of higher educational systems with such limitations are very often left with no option than to resort to on -the- job training by bureaucrats, who are in themselves their acolytes ab-initio and who sometimes take over leadership of the organization, owing to the existing gaps that manifest in the knowledge of educational managers, thereby reducing substantive higher education executive head to a titular head or at best ceremonial heads. -/- This book brings together articles and chapters to be published in these directions by researchers, policy makers and practitioners to re-inform, reeducate and reorient higher educational managers on their job expectations. The volume also offers a rich and relevant literature of the dynamic state of higher education in global perspective. While this publication will be freely available online, the essays in this volume are carefully selected and they will provide a basis for thematic and analytical perspectives on the concerns of management of contemporary higher education systems. -/- The book is divided into twelve thematic sections with each addressing the demands of its Kernel, as it is reflected in Historical development of higher education systems and its organs, Gloabilization of higher education, Internationalization and the labour market, Funding of higher education systems, Proliferations of higher education systems, Corruption in higher education systems and the deterioration of its estate, Internationalization and massification, Politics and leadership in higher educational systems, Academic freedom and access to higher education, Academic planning and affiliation relationship of higher education systems, Conflict management in higher education systems, Research and training in higher education systems and Inclusivity in higher education. -/- Another striking feature of this book is in its efforts at globalizing the curriculum of management of higher education and providing opportunity for scholars with different shades of opinion even on same issues but from different perspectives with the hope that it will guarantee overall effectiveness in the management of higher education systems. I recommemd this book to all with passion for the management of diferentiated higher education systems, and invite you to this intellectual feast prepared so deliciously like a meal for the gods. -/- Finally, let me reflect on what may appears to be an aberration in this context, by appreciating all authors who had found time to respond to this academic calling by their various chapter contributions. This singular act is in itself enough justification as show of interest and further demonstration of your continuous determination to address gaps in Nigerian educational landscape. Similarly, my gratitude is equally extended to all members of my editorial team for their thoughtfulness and very constructive criticisms which have shaped these scholarly presentations thereof. May the Almighty God continue to enrich the contents of your cerebrum most intellectually, for the benefit of man but to His glory. -/- The PDF contains just the preliminary pages of the book. You can order the full copy of the book by contacting the editor-in-chief, Professor John A. Undie, FNAEAP, KSM. (shrink)

Democracy is a government form based on the general consent, is seen to becoming common in global nations; and that if the tenet is followed it facilitates national development. This study used the content analysis method to examine democracy in Nigeria and national development. It was found that some pre-colonial administrations in Nigeria had embraced democratic tenets before the colonials master came; the difference, however, border on structural arrangements. It was found that the version of western democracy has not adapted (...) the Nigeria environment making its practice difficult and also difficult to attain national development. It was also found that the phase Nigeria democracy passed, especially, during the military regimes has not provided opportunities for development. The ethnic diversity of Nigeria and inabilities of leadership to manage it was found to pose legislative influence on democracy and national development. It was found that Nigeria environment lacks the absorptive capacity to accommodate liberal democracy considering the death of institutions and the skewed electoral process. It was found that absence of effective democracy in Nigeria disarticulated the pre-colonial democratic structure, and the exclusivist approach to liberal democracy and the rule of the game, manifest in incessant agitations, militancy, insurgency, banditry, and general underdevelopment. It was also suggested that a change in leadership approach is necessary, more importantly, to allow a breath of democratic participation in policy-making for national development. It was also recommended that all forms of discriminations are addressed and that constitutionalism should be upheld. (shrink)

The present paper argues that the Venezuelan-Chilean philosopher Andrés Bello constitutes an important but heretofore neglected prefiguration of Richard Rorty. I argue for this thesis by articulating first an Inter-American philosophical narrative (based on previous work by Alex Stehn and Carlos Sanchez) that enables me to highlight certain common characteristics in philosophical projects that flourished across the Americas. Having done this, I show that Rorty’s anti-representationalism and anti-foundationalism are prefigured in Bello’s most important philosophical treatise, Filosofía del Entendimiento, (...) to the extent that Bello recognizes the problems posed by the ocular metaphors that are systematically used by Early modern philosophers such as Descartes or Locke, and suggests their elimination and replacement by other metaphors. Finally, I conclude that, if my arguments are correct, the intellectual geography of neo-pragmatism needs to be expanded beyond traditional geographies such as Europe and the US. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that sportspersonship is a means of performing fundamental sociality; it is about the conversion of a foe (inimicus) into an enemy (hostis). Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s distinction between enemy and foe – inimicus and hostis – as well as his discussion of the ius publicum Europaeum, I suggest a model of sportspersonship that sees it as expressing the competitive relations between equals that undergird the most minimal form of sociality; relations that any deeper union takes (...) as its foundation. It is the performance of this fundamental sociality, I argue, that grounds the value of sport in general (though this does not mean that there cannot be other, contingent values in sport). (shrink)

In studying in depth Nietzsche’s description of Greek tragedy and Dionysian art, as well as flamenco art –both phenomenologically and hermeneutically–, enormous similarities appear. Especially between the characteristics of the fundamental aesthetic category of flamenco, lo jondo –the deep–, and the features of Dionysian art. What shows that, just as those of the beautiful and the sublime are the aesthetic categories of the Apollonian, the aesthetic category of Dionysian art is the deep.

This chapter describes the process of institutionalization of natural law at the University of Pisa, essential to interpreting the conditions in which the first public law chair of Italy was founded. The study of legal education in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century will allow a more in-depth understanding of both the development of natural law in teaching practice throughout the long eighteenth century, and the features of the two processes of reception, respectively for educational and political purposes. In (...) fact, although both processes were founded on appreciation of the centrality of Roman law and philosophy in the construction of doctrines by the so-called ‘modern natural law school’, and developed through mediation of traditional Roman legal culture of the Pisan ‘historical-critical school’, there were some differences. In this initial phase, the didactic reception was indirect, although not entirely implicit, whereas the political reception was direct and explicit. (shrink)

Like previous theorists of natural law, Kant believes in the possibility of a rational theory of ius, but also claims that the very concept of ius naturae and the method of investigation of its principles must be thoroughly reformulated. I will maintain that Kant solves the methodological problem of natural law theories by stating that a rational doctrine of Right concerns pure rational knowledge. Right must be conceived as a metaphysical doctrine in which its principles and laws are determined a (...) priori. By conceiving the idea of a “metaphysics of morals” and linking Right with it, he finds a way both to conserve the notion of ius naturae ) and to purify it from any empirical or anthropological element. (shrink)

Just War Theory debates discussing the principle of the Moral Equality of Combatants involve the notion of Invincible Ignorance; the claim that warfi ghters are morally excused for participating in an unjust war because of their epistemic limitations. Conditions of military deployment may indeed lead to genuinely insurmountable epistemic limitations. In other cases, these may be overcome. This paper provides a preliminary sketch of heuristics designed to allow a combatant to judge whether or not his war is just. It delineates (...) the sets of relevant facts uncontroversially accessible and inaccessible to contemporary professional soldiers. Relevant facts outside these two sets should by default be treated as inaccessible until proven otherwise. Even such a rudimentary heuristic created in this way demonstrates that practical recommendations of MEC-renouncing Just War Theory are not too challenging to follow and still signifi cantly impact a compliant combatant’s behavior. (shrink)

The Theatre for Development idea is essentially aimed at reinstating the function of the theatre as a creative tool for self-expression and articulation and as an empowering process through which people could develop a critical awareness of the environment. Accordingly, the guiding principle of TfD and what sets it apart from conventional western oriented theatre is its ability to liberate voices and engender people‟s participation thus propelling them to act upon their reality. It is this capacity to engender people to (...) action that makes TfD a veritable development tool. Arguably, TfD as a development tool enables participatory communication which is at the heart of development as affirmed by Victor Hugo R. Banda‟s observation that theatre is a “conversation shared with society something that transforms them” (2006). (shrink)

The destruction wrought by even just wars lends undeniable appeal to radical pacifism, according to which all wars are unjust. Yet radical pacifism is fundamentally flawed. In the past decade, a moderate and more defensible form of pacifism has emerged. According to what has been called ‘contingent pacifism’, it is very unlikely that it is morally permissible to wage any given war. This chapter develops the doctrine of contingent pacifism by distinguishing and developing various versions of it, and by assessing (...) the merits and drawbacks of each. According to ‘proportionality-based’ contingent pacifism, almost all wars with just causes are unjust ‘tout court’ because the in bello harms such wars impose on the innocent are too great relative to the relevant evils averted by achieving the war’s aims. After arguing against this view, the chapter introduces a novel, more defensible form of contingent pacifism, called ‘epistemic-based’ contingent pacifism, according to which the prevalence of mistaken judgements regarding the justness of wars, combined with the devastating harmfulness of unjust wars, requires imposing prohibitions against waging war, where the strength of the prohibition varies according to whether the government has a history of mistakes or deception regarding the justness of wars. (shrink)

I shall argue that in some wars both sides are (as a collective) justified, that is, they can both satisfy valid jus ad bellum requirements. Moreover, in some wars – but not in all – the individual soldiers on the unjustified side (that is, on the side without jus ad bellum) may nevertheless kill soldiers (and also civilians as a side-effect) on the justified side, even if the enemy soldiers always abide by jus in bello constraints. Traditional just war (...) theory and self-proclaimed “revisionist” just war theory think otherwise since the former focuses on the law enforcement or public authority justification for inflicting harm and the latter on the self-defense justification. These are both intrinsically asymmetrical justifications: there is no justified self-defense (properly understood) against justified self-defense, nor is there justified law-enforcement against justified law-enforcement. However, there can, as I will show, be justified self-defense against force that is justified by a necessity justification, and there can be force justified by a necessity justification being used against force that is also justified by a necessity justification. The necessity justification is not intrinsically asymmetrical, and it is an indispensable justification in the context of war. Moreover, with regard to some forms of inflicting harm on others one may give special weight to one’s own interests and the interests of those to whom one has special responsibilities when assessing the proportionality of those acts. That is, the proportionality calculation may be agent-relative. This is in particular so in the case of foreseeably preventing innocent and non-threatening people from being saved (for instance, by shooting down a tactical bomber who would have saved them by destroying an ammunitions factory) but less so in the case of the intentional or foreseeable direct harming of innocent and non-threatening people (dropping bombs on people standing near an ammunitions factory). In the light of these considerations, I will then answer the question as to when soldiers may justifiably participate in war (and when not). (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to draw attention to an issue which has been largely overlooked in contemporary just war theory – namely the impact that the conditions under which an army is assembled are liable to have on the judgments that are made with respect to traditional principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I argue that the way in which an army is assembled can significantly alter judgments regarding the justice of a war. In (...) doing so, I present and defend a principle of ‘just assembly’ and argue that satisfying this principle is an essential part of any deliberation regarding the justice of a particular conflict. (shrink)

Jus post Bellum is, like Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, a part of just war theory. Jus post Bellum is distinguished from the other parts of just war theory by being primarily concerned with the principles necessary for securing a just and lasting peace after the end of a war. Traditionally, jus post bellum has focused primarily on three goals: [1] compensating those who have been the victims of unjust aggression, while respecting the rights of the aggressors, (...) [2] punishing and rehabilitating those guilty of war crimes and other violations of the principles of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello and [3] developing measures that will prevent future war and violence (Orend 2000 and May 2012). In this chapter, I outline an account of political forgiveness and explain the role that political forgiveness can have in promoting the goals of jus post bellum. My conception of political forgiveness requires some unpacking. Let me begin with individual forgiveness, which I understand along familiar Butlerian lines as the renunciation of resentment (Butler, Sermon IX in McNaughton 2017: 75-83), though with a bit of a twist. More exactly, ● An individual, I, forgives J for doing F if and only if I renounces all her own warrant for resenting J for doing F. Resentment is a judgment-sensitive attitude, and, therefore, it tends to track judgments concerning its warrant (Scanlon 1998: 20 and Smith 2015). In cases of perfect forgiveness, I’s renunciation causes her to cease feeling resentment toward J for doing F, though, of course, less perfect cases are possible. I reject the idea that there is a sharp discontinuity between individual and political forgiveness, a position argued for by, e.g., Peter Digeser (1998 and 2001). By contrast, I understand political forgiveness as the renunciation of resentment by the relevant political body in question. With greater precision, ● A sovereign political body, P, forgives J for doing F if and only if P renounces all warrant that its citizens have for resenting, as part of their public lives, J for doing F. A little more explanation is in order. Sovereign political bodies, such as national governments, claim degrees of control over the lives of their citizens, in both their public and their private aspects, though the claims with respect to the former tend to be considerably more expansive than the claims with respect to the latter. I assume here that, at least in the case of legitimate governments, these claims of control are often valid. Such governments may reasonably renounce certain grounds for motivating action in the public sphere. For example, governments may renounce all warrant that its citizens have, as part of their public lives, for hating members of marginalized groups. In practice, this means that, while citizens might continue to act in their private lives out of hatred for members of these groups, their appeal to this hatred is seen by the state as irrelevant to matters of law and public policy as well as being wholly out-of-place in public discourse. Political forgiveness toward J for doing F, as I understand it, involves an analogous rejection of resentment, on the part of citizens in their public lives, toward J for doing F. I turn now to the matter of how political forgiveness supports securing a just and lasting peace between former belligerents. With respect to the first goal of jus post bellum, political forgiveness helps to balance compensation for victims and respect for the rights of defeated aggressors by countering the all-too-human tendency to overvalue harms done to oneself and to members of one’s group. As regards the second goal, political forgiveness plays a similar role but also provides a model for rehabilitation by exemplifying among the victorious the behavior to be emulated by the vanquished. Finally, political forgiveness promotes the third goal of jus post bellum by providing a space for nations to meet as moral equals rather than allowing one nation to have the moral high ground over the other. None of this, of course, means that political forgiveness should be unearned or that it should be confused with condonation (Kolnai 1973 and Pettigrove 2004). However, the question of what is required to put oneself in a position to be forgiven as part of jus post bellum is a matter that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. (shrink)

*North American Society for Social Philosophy (NASSP) Book Award 2019.* -/- *International Studies Association (ISA) - International Ethics Section Book Award 2021.* -/- Although military mores have relied primarily on just war theory, the ethic of cooperation in warfare (ECW)—between enemies even as they are trying to kill each other—is as central to the practice of warfare and to conceptualization of its morality. Neither game theory nor unilateral moral duties (God-given or otherwise) can explain the explicit language of cooperation in (...) developing and enforcing principles of military ethics and the law of armed conflict. -/- The ethic of cooperation is borne of various motivations: reciprocity, self-preservation, and efficiency, to be sure, but also a sense of warrior honor and concern with human rights. This shared morality can persist despite making it more difficult for one side or the other to win and, unfortunately, its well-meaning motivations often lead to unintended tragic consequences. -/- This book explores three manifestations of this significant yet overlooked ethic of cooperation in warfare: (1) for a “fair fight,” (2) to protect classes of individuals (e.g., non-combatants or prisoners of war), and (3) to end the war quickly. Such cooperation can take unexpected forms, from ad hoc decisions on the battlefield to institutionalization in international law, and is the source of some critical tensions in one of the most significant developments in warfare in recent years: namely, how to handle terrorism or other forms of warfare that lie outside the purview of international law. -/- Each type of ECW raises questions internal to that ethic, such as inconsistencies in the concept of “parity” across different weapons bans, contradictions within the warrior ethic that heavily influence—and therefore confuse—notions of the “fair fight,” the disconnect between what protections a person receives and his responsibility for the war (e.g., political leaders), or the limited decisiveness of outcomes generated by very short wars. -/- Their simultaneous application also generates significant tensions and raises questions about the proper relationship of ECW to the immediate goal of war itself, which is to win, and thus yield either a political settlement or a justicial decision. For example, the ECWs for a “fair fight” and to protect classes of individuals can make it harder to win the war, but even more concerning is that they can also kill more people, which in the latter case contravenes its very purpose. -/- Human history is in some ways the story of trying to concurrently wage and tame war, and the architecture of warfare itself is informed by the ECW, in particular: (a) the political nature of war, (b) the abdication from jus ad bellum judgments in order to concentrate on justice within war (jus in bello), and (c) the ways in which modern nation-states collude to define “legitimacy” in war. -/- The combination of these three features leave questions of justicial right and responsibility for war disturbingly unresolved, it also generates new challenges in a geopolitical context in which cooperative and non-cooperative (e.g. contemporary terrorism) forms of warfare clash. (shrink)

Those of us who are not pacifists face an obvious challenge. Common-sense morality contains a stringent constraint on intentional killing, yet war involves homicide on a grand scale. If wars are to be morally justified, it needs be shown how this conflict can be reconciled. A major fault line running throughout the contemporary just war literature divides two approaches to attempting this reconciliation. On a ‘reductivist’ view, defended most prominently by Jeff McMahan, the conflict is largely illusory, since such killing (...) can be justified by aggregating individuals’ ordinary permissions to use force in self- and other-defence. In opposition, a rival ‘nonreductivist’ approach holds that these considerations are insufficient for the task. One prominent version of non-reductivism grounds the permission to kill in combatants’ membership in certain kinds of group or association. The key claim is that participation in certain morally important relationships can provide an independent source of permission for killing in war. This paper argues that non-reductivism should be rejected. It does so by pushing a dilemma onto non-reductivists: if they are successful in showing that the relevant relationships can generate permissions to kill in war, they must also jettison the most intuitive restrictions on conduct in war—the constraint on intentionally killing morally innocent non-combatants most saliently. Since this conclusion is unacceptable, non-reductivism should be rejected. (shrink)

The recent political developments in the Philippines require a reevaluation of the nature of the State under the Rodrigo Duterte regime. Just years ago, scholars illustrated the regime of Duterte to be a populist, illiberal, or authoritarian one. But since then, and especially during the pandemic, a lot of things have changed. In this paper, I will argue that Duterte’s regime is a fascist one. Unlike how Walden Bello characterized Duterte as a fascist original, a characterization laden with theoretical (...) inconsistencies and practical difficulties, I will develop a concept of fascism proper to the neoliberal and semi-colonial conditions of the Philippines. I will likewise trace the rise, development, and stabilization of the regime’s fascism. The discussion will be supported and illuminated by some illustrative examples taken from the experience of the mass movement in Cebu. (shrink)

In Switzerland, institutions through which legal knowledge and education are produced have systemi-cally enabled epistemic injustice through forms of silencing and the cultivation of active ignorance along individual and institutional dimensions. As such, we argue that an important form of intervention in the legal education system, which would not only provide instruments to address epistemic injustice, but also better equip lawyers as individuals and as members of a collective, epistemic community, is feminist critical theory. Providing access and engagement with critical (...) legal methodology, throughout legal studies, is integral to the development of epistemic capacities. It would help prevent formation of insensitivities to experiences of injustice and interrupt the perpetuation of silencing and cultivation of active ignorance along individual and institutional dimensions. -/- . (shrink)

Robert Sparrow (among others) claims that if an autonomous weapon were to commit a war crime, it would cause harm for which no one could reasonably be blamed. Since no one would bear responsibility for the soldier’s share of killing in such cases, he argues that they would necessarily violate the requirements of jus in bello, and should be prohibited by international law. I argue this view is mistaken and that our moral understanding of war is sufficient to determine (...) blame for any wrongful killing done by autonomous weapons. Analyzing moral responsibility for autonomous weapons starts by recognizing that although they are capable of causing moral consequences, they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy in the moral sense. As such, their military role is that of a tool, albeit a rather sophisticated one, and responsibility for their use is roughly analogous to that of existing “smart” weapons. There will likely be some difficulty in managing these systems as they become more intelligent and more prone to unpredicted behavior, but the moral notion of shared responsibility and the legal notion of command responsibility are sufficient to locate responsibility for their use. (shrink)

Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. According to the orthodox view, provided that jus in bello principles are respected, combatants have an equal right to fight, regardless of the justice of the cause pursued by their state. According to “revisionists” whenever combatants lack reasons to believe that the war they are ordered to fight is just, their duty is to disobey. I argue that when members of a legitimate state acting in good faith are ordered to (...) fight, they acquire a pro-tanto obligation to obey which does not depend for its validity on the justice of the cause being pursued. However, when the war is unjust, this obligation may be overridden, under certain conditions, by the obligation not to contribute to the unjustified killing of innocents. This is because the pro-tanto force of the duty to obey the law is best understood in terms of “presumptive”, rather than “exclusionary” reasons for action. This approach captures the insights of both the orthodox and the revisionist view, while avoiding the problems that afflict each of them. (shrink)

A famous Indian argument for jus ad bellum and jus in bello is presented in literary form in the Mahābhārata: it involves events and dynamics between moral conventionalists (who attempt to abide by ethical theories that give priority to the good) and moral parasites (who attempt to use moral convention as a weapon without any desire to conform to these expectations themselves). In this paper I follow the dialectic of this victimization of the conventionally moral by moral parasites to (...) its philosophical culmination in the fateful battle, which the Bhagavad Gītā precedes. Arjuna’s lament is an internalization of the logic of conventional moral expectations that allowed moral parasitism, and Krishna’s push for a purely procedural approach to moral reasoning (bhakti yoga) does away with the good as a primitive of explanation and provides the moral considerations that allow us to see that the jus ad bellum and jus in bello coincide: the just cause is the approximation to the procedural ideal (the Lord), which is also just conduct. Jeff McMahan is correct in claiming that it is wrong for the unjust to attack the just. But it is also not obviously correct that it is the same set of moral considerations in war and peace that mark out the sides, for peace is largely characterizable by conventional morality, which all are forced to abandon in war. Walzer is correct that there are different sets of standards at play at war and peace, and that getting hands dirty in immorality is a price worth paying in war, but Walzer is thereby incorrect for a subtle reason: conventional standards by way of which jus ad bellum and jus in bello appear corrupt are themselves actually corrupt when the need for a just war arises. It is because moral parasites use conventional morality as a means of hostility and not as a means of fair, inclusive social interaction that conventional morality is corrupted and turned into a tool of the unjust. It is hence unjust to employ these standards to judge those whose cause is just, though such a judgement is conventional. Those who fight for a just cause thereby justly get their hands dirty by departing from conventional moral standards. But this is to the disadvantage of parasites who can only function in a climate where the conventionally good are constrained by conventional morality. Just war so understood deprives parasites their weapon of choice. (shrink)

Rita Floyd’s "The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization" is an important and insightful book that delineates a theory of just securitization (modified from the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria in just war theory) involving three sets of principles governing the just initiation of securitization, just conduct of securitization, and just desecuritization. This book is a much-needed addition to the security studies and just war scholarship. -/- Here, I explore the potential of Floyd’s just (...) securitization theory (JST) to provide insights into the moral justifiability of non-state groups that are not political entities engaging in resistance against forms of structural violence that pose an existential threat to those groups. Using the case study of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and the threat of white supremacy to African Americans as an illustrative example, I argue that structural forms of violence can meet Floyd’s definition of an objective existential threat, justifying the resort to securitization by groups such as BLM. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that recourse to war is justifiable only as a last resort. If a situation can be resolved by less harmful means, then war is unjust. It is also commonly accepted that violent actions in war should be necessary and proportionate. Violent actions in war are unjust if the end towards which those actions are means can be achieved by less harmful means. In this article, I argue that satisfaction of the last resort criterion depends in part (...) upon the likelihood of success of non-violent alternatives to war, and that the actual and potential effectiveness of non-violent resistance means that the last resort criterion of the jus ad bellum and the proportionality criterion of the jus in bello are harder to satisfy than is often presumed. (shrink)