Results for 'person-affecting views'

954 found
Order:
  1. Person-affecting views and saturating counterpart relations.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):257-287.
    In Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  2. A Non-Identity Dilemma for Person-Affecting Views.Elliott Thornley - manuscript
    Person-affecting views in population ethics state that (in cases where all else is equal) we’re permitted but not required to create people who would enjoy good lives. In this paper, I present an argument against every possible variety of person-affecting view. The argument takes the form of a dilemma. Narrow person-affecting views must embrace at least one of three implausible verdicts in a case that I call ‘Expanded Non-Identity.’ Wide person-affecting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Contractualism, Person-Affecting Wrongness and the Non-identity Problem.Corey Katz - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):103-119.
    A number of theorists have argued that Scanlon's contractualist theory both "gets around" and "solves" the non-identity problem. They argue that it gets around the problem because hypothetical deliberation on general moral principles excludes the considerations that lead to the problem. They argue that it solves the problem because violating a contractualist moral principle in one's treatment of another wrongs that particular other, grounding a person-affecting moral claim. In this paper, I agree with the first claim but note (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  52
    Medical Treatment, Genetic Selection, and Gene Editing: Beyond the Distinction Between Person-Affecting and Impersonal Reasons.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2024 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (8):50-52.
    According to what McMahan and Savulescu (2024) call the “popular position”, embryo selection is less ethically problematic than gene editing (other things being equal). The Two-Tier View, defended by McMahan and Savulescu, implies that the popular position is mistaken. The authors treat gene editing of embryos similarly to standard cases of medical treatments that promise expected benefits for the (subsequent) person even though gene editing also may create risks of harmful side effects for her. McMahan and Savulescu assume that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Affecting future individuals: Why and when germline genome editing entails a greater moral obligation towards progeny.Davide Battisti - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (5):1-9.
    Assisted reproductive technologies have greatly increased our control over reproductive choices, leading some bioethicists to argue that we face unprecedented moral obligations towards progeny. Several models attempting to balance the principle of procreative autonomy with these obligations have been proposed. The least demanding is the minimal threshold model (MTM), according to which every reproductive choice is permissible, except creating children whose lives will not be worth living. Hence, as long as the future child is likely to have a life worth (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. The Interpersonal Comparative View of Welfare: Its Merits and Flaws.Jonas Harney - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (3):369-391.
    According to the person-affecting view, the ethics of welfare should be cashed out in terms of how the individuals are affected. While the narrow version fails to solve the non-identity problem, the wide version is subject to the repugnant conclusion. A middle view promises to do better – the Interpersonal Comparative View of Welfare (ICV). It modifies the narrow view by abstracting away from individuals’ identities to account for interpersonal gains and losses. The paper assesses ICV’s merits and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Prudential Longtermism.Johan E. Gustafsson & Petra Kosonen - forthcoming - In Jacob Barrett, Hilary Greaves & David Thorstad (eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.
    According to Longtermism, our acts’ expected influence on the expected value of the world is mainly determined by their effects in the far future. There is, given total utilitarianism, a straightforward argument for Longtermism due to the enormous number of people that might exist in the future, but this argument does not work on person-affecting views. In this paper, we will argue that these views might also lead to Longtermism if Prudential Longtermism is true. Prudential Longtermism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. Papers in Population Ethics.Elliott Thornley - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    This thesis consists of a series of papers in population ethics: a subfield of normative ethics concerned with the distinctive issues that arise in cases where our actions can affect the identities or number of people of who ever exist. Each paper can be read independently of the others. In Chapter 1, I present a dilemma for Archimedean views in population axiology: roughly, those views on which adding enough good lives to a population can make that population better (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. (1 other version)Affective Representation and Affective Attitudes.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Synthese (4):1-28.
    Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of sense-perceptual experiences, even claiming the relevant affective experiences are perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  10. Affective ignorance.Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.
    According to one of the most influential views in the philosophy of self-knowledge each person enjoys some special cognitive access to his or her own current mental states and episodes. This view faces two fundamental tasks. First, it must elucidate the general conceptual structure of apparent asymmetries between beliefs about one’s own mind and beliefs about other minds. Second, it must demarcate the mental territory for which first-person-special-access claims can plausibly be maintained. Traditional candidates include sensations, experiences (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11. Personal identity and the Phineas Gage effect.Kevin P. Tobia - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):396-405.
    Phineas Gage’s story is typically offered as a paradigm example supporting the view that part of what matters for personal identity is a certain magnitude of similarity between earlier and later individuals. Yet, reconsidering a slight variant of Phineas Gage’s story indicates that it is not just magnitude of similarity, but also the direction of change that affects personal identity judgments; in some cases, changes for the worse are more seen as identity-severing than changes for the better of comparable magnitude. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  12. The Non-Identity Objection to Intergenerational Harm: A Critical Re-Examination.Fausto Corvino - 2019 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (2):165-185.
    In this article I analyse those that I consider the most powerful counterarguments that have been advanced against the non-identity objection to the idea of intergenerational harm, according to which an action cannot cause harm to a given agent if her biological identity does actually depend—in a partial but still determinant way—on the performance of this action. In doing this, I firstly go through the deontological criticisms to the person-affecting view of harm, before moving on to sufficientarian and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Person as scientist, person as moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
    It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-held view, suggesting that people’s moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to say that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   181 citations  
  14. Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan.Nicholas Stang - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (1):99-106.
    In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's actions. Hogan's argument fails because the premise that we have empirical knowledge of one another's actions is ambiguous. On one reading, the argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  15. Forgiveness and Respect for Persons.Owen Ware - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3).
    The concept of respect for persons is often rejected as a basis for understanding forgiveness. As many have argued, to hold your offender responsible for her actions is to respect her as a person; but this kind of respect is more likely to sustain, rather than dissolve, your resentment toward her (Garrard & McNaughton 2003; 2011; Allais 2008). I seek to defend an alternative view in this paper. To forgive, on my account, involves ceasing to identify your offender with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  16. (1 other version)The epistemology of social facts: the evidential value of personal experience versus testimony.Luc J. Bovens & Stephen Leeds - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Dr. Haensel-Hohenhausen. pp. 43-51.
    "The Personal is Political": This was an often-heard slogan of feminist groups in the late sixties and early seventies. The slogan is no doubt open to many interpretations. There is one interpretation which touches on the epistemology of social facts, viz. the slogan claims that in assessing the features of a political system, personal experiences have privileged evidentiary value. For instancte, in the face of third person reports about political corruption, I may remain unmoved in my belief that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. (1 other version)The Worseness of Nonexistence.Theron Pummer - 2019 - In Solberg Gamlund and (ed.), Saving lives from the badness of death. Oxford University Press. pp. 215-228.
    Most believe that it is worse for a person to die than to continue to exist with a good life. At the same time, many believe that it is not worse for a merely possible person never to exist than to exist with a good life. I argue that if the underlying properties that make us the sort of thing we essentially are can come in small degrees, then to maintain this commonly-held pair of beliefs we will have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  18. Reactive Attitudes and Second-Personal Address.Michelle Mason - 2017 - In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
    The attitudes P. F. Strawson dubs reactive are felt toward another (or oneself). They are thus at least in part affective reactions to what Strawson describes as qualities of will that people manifest toward others and themselves. The reactive attitudes are also interpersonal, relating persons to persons. But how do they relate persons? On the deontic, imperative view, they relate persons in second-personal authority and accountability relations. After addressing how best to understand the reactive attitudes as sentiments, I evaluate the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  19. (1 other version)Economic Participation Rights and the All-Affected Principle.Annette Zimmermann - 2017 - Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 10 (2):1-21.
    The democratic boundary problem raises the question of who has democratic participation rights in a given polity and why. One possible solution to this problem is the all-affected principle, according to which a polity ought to enfranchise all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in a morally significant way. While AAP offers a plausible principle of democratic enfranchisement, its supporters have so far not paid sufficient attention to economic participation rights. I argue that if one commits oneself (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Sweatshops, Harm and Exploitation: A Proposal to Operationalise the Model of Structural Injustice.Fausto Corvino - 2020 - Conatus 5 (2):9-23.
    In this article, I firstly discuss the person-affecting view of harm, distinguishing between the liability and the structural models of responsibility, and also explaining why it is unsatisfactory, from a moral point of view, to interpret a given harm as a loss with respect to a diachronic baseline. Then, I take sweatshops as an example and I entertain two further issues that are related to the assessment of harm and that are necessary for operationalising a comprehensive model of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Peter Kivy, Sacred Music, and Affective Response: Knowing God Through Music.Julian Perlmutter - manuscript
    Knowing someone personally centrally involves engaging in various patterns of affective response. Inasmuch as humans can know God personally, this basic insight about the relationship between personal knowledge and affective response also applies to God: knowing God involves responding to him, and to the world, in various affectively toned ways. In light of this insight, I explore how one particular practice might contribute to human knowledge of God: namely, engaging with sacred music – in particular, sacred music in the Western, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Good and Good For You: An Affect Theory of Happiness.Laura Sizer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):133-163.
    Philosophers tended to identify happiness with either subjective psychological states or conditions (feelings, emotions or a set of judgments), or with the objective conditions of a life—how well the life is going for the person living it. Each approach captures different but important features of our intuitions, making it difficult to accept either a purely subjective or objective view. This has led some philosophers to suggest that these are not competing accounts of one thing, ‘happiness,’ but accounts of several (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  23. Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity.Per Algander - 2013 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
    This thesis in an invistigation into the concept of "harm" and its moral relevance. A common view is that an analysis of harm should include a counterfactual condition: an act harms a person iff it makes that person worse off. A common objection to the moral relevance of harm, thus understood, is the non-identity problem. -/- This thesis criticises the counterfactual condition, argues for an alternative analysis and that harm plays two important normative roles. -/- The main ground (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. The procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptance.Elliott Thornley - 2023 - Analysis 83 (3):517-526.
    Many philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all else equal) because that person never exists and so cannot complain about your act. In this paper, I present two problems for such theories: the problem (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. (4 other versions)A View to a Kill: Perspectives on Faux-Snuff and Self.Steve Jones - 2016 - In Neil Jackson, Shaun Kimber, Johnny Walker & Thomas Joseph Watson (eds.), Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 277-292.
    Scholarly debate over faux-snuff’s content has predominantly focused on realism and affect. This paper seeks to offer an alternative interpretation, examining what faux-snuff’s form reveals about self. Faux-snuff is typically presented from a first-person perspective (killer-cam), and as such is foundationally invested in the killer’s experiences as they record their murder spree. First then, I propose that the simulated-snuff form reifies self-experience in numerous ways. Faux-snuff’s characteristic formal attributes capture the self’s limited, fractured qualities, for example. Second, I contend (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  48
    Attuning the world: Ambient smart environments for autistic persons.Janko Nešić - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Autism spectrum disorder is usually understood through deficits in social interaction and communication, repetitive patterns of behavior, and hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input. Affordance-based Skilled Intentionality that combines ecological-enactive views of cognition with Free Energy and Predictive Processing was proposed as the framework from which to view autism integrally. Skilled Intentionality distinguishes between a landscape of affordances and a field of affordances. Under the integrative Skilled Intentionality Framework, it can be shown that autistic differences in the field of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Is Mental Privacy a Component of Personal Identity?Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2021 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 15:773441.
    One of the most prominent ethical concerns regarding emerging neurotechnologies is mental privacy. This is the idea that we should have control over access to our neural data and to the information about our mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. A key issue is whether this information needs more stringent protection than other kinds of personal information. I will articulate and support the view, underlying recent regulatory frameworks, that mental privacy requires a special treatment because (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28. „Eyen mi nyamkkenyam, nnọ ke ndọ…’:Deconstructing Some Stereotypic Views on Marriage in Efik Culture.Emmanuel Orok Duke - 2018 - International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) 2 (XII).
    Stereotypes within any society have consequences that are sometimes harmful and also affect targeted group of persons or ethnic group in a common way. One of the cultural stereotypes about Efik women is that they hardly believe in ‘…till death do us apart’ promised during monogamous marriage rite, that is, they walk out of marriage when conditions are unbearable. The misinterpretations of some exhortations given to the couples at Efik traditional marriage rite seem to support this claim. For example: ‘Eyen (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. An Unblinkered View of Best Interests.Wayne Martin, Fabian Freyenhagen, Elizabeth Hall, Tom O’Shea, Antal Szerletics & Vivienne Ashley - 2012 - British Medical Journal 1 (345):1-3.
    Wayne Martin and colleagues argue that decisions about patients’ best interests must sometimes take into account the interests of others Doctors often find themselves in circumstances where they must make decisions on behalf of an incapacitated patient. As a matter of both ethics and law, such decisions must be taken in the best interests of the patient, but uncertainty remains about what is meant by best interests, especially in relation to the interests of others. Should the interests of others enter (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. (1 other version)Corporate Reputation in Tourism: Customer’s Point of View.Oleksandr P. Krupskyi, Maxym M. Kochevoi, Olha B. Kolomina & Iryna Steblianko - 2019 - Journal of Social Sciences Research 6 (5):1039-1051.
    Modern tourism is an industry which role in ensuring the economic development of individual states and the world economy as a whole cannot be overestimated. The success of tourism and travel enterprises often depends on their corporate reputation. This article is devoted to the study of the elements and their connection with the peculiarities of different segments behavior. To assess the consumer's response to the corporative reputation the ranking methods were used in course of decrease of exponent importance; Likert five-grade (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. A fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction.Jacob M. Nebel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2779-2787.
    According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. The Person-Affecting/Identity-Affecting Distinction between Forms of Human Germline Genome Editing Is Useless in Practical Ethics.Benjamin Gregg - 2022 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (9):49-51.
    Would direct genetic modification of human embryos affect the welfare of future persons? Sparrow’s approach to answering this question fails a core goal of bioethics: to generate perspectives capab...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Sources of transitivity.Daniel Muñoz - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):285-306.
    Why should ‘better than’ be transitive? The leading answer in ethics is that values do not change with context. But this cannot be the entire source of transitivity, I argue, since transitivity can fail even if values never change, so long as they are complex, with multiple dimensions combined non-additively. I conclude by exploring a new hypothesis: that all alleged cases of nontransitive betterness, such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, can and should be modelled as the result of complexity, not context-relativity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. What Will Be Best for Me? Big Decisions and the Problem of Inter‐World Comparisons.Peter Baumann - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):253-273.
    Big decisions in a person’s life often affect the preferences and standards of a good life which that person’s future self will develop after implementing her decision. This paper argues that in such cases the person might lack any reasons to choose one way rather than the other. Neither preference-based views nor happiness-based views of justified choice offer sufficient help here. The available options are not comparable in the relevant sense and there is no rational (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. On Schechtman’s Person Life View.Radim Bělohrad - 2014 - Ethical Perspectives 21 (4):565–579.
    In this paper, I provide an analysis of Marya Schechtman's theory of personal identity defended in her book Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Losing Meaning: Philosophical Reflections on Neural Interventions and their Influence on Narrative Identity.Muriel Https://Orcidorg Leuenberger - 2021 - Neuroethics (3):491-505.
    The profound changes in personality, mood, and other features of the self that neural interventions can induce can be disconcerting to patients, their families, and caregivers. In the neuroethical debate, these concerns are often addressed in the context of possible threats to the narrative self. In this paper, I argue that it is necessary to consider a dimension of impacts on the narrative self which has so far been neglected: neural interventions can lead to a loss of meaning of actions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  37. The Extreme Claim, Psychological Continuity and the Person Life View.Simon Beck - 2015 - South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):314-322.
    Marya Schechtman has raised a series of worries for the Psychological Continuity Theory of personal identity (PCT) stemming out of what Derek Parfit called the ‘Extreme Claim’. This is roughly the claim that theories like it are unable to explain the importance we attach to personal identity. In her recent Staying Alive (2014), she presents further arguments related to this and sets out a new narrative theory, the Person Life View (PLV), which she sees as solving the problems as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. The aesthetics of coming to know someone.James H. P. Lewis - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (5-6):1-16.
    This paper is about the similarity between the appreciation of a piece of art, such as a cherished music album, and the loving appreciation of a person whom one knows well. In philosophical discussion about the rationality of love, the Qualities View (QV) says that love can be justified by reference to the qualities of the beloved. I argue that the oft-rehearsed trading-up objection fails to undermine the QV. The problems typically identified by the objection arise from the idea (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39. On Parfit’s Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle.Michal Masny - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):114-139.
    In the posthumously published ‘Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles’, Derek Parfit presents a novel axiological principle which he calls the Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle and claims that it does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion. This paper shows that even the best version of Parfit's principle cannot avoid this conclusion. That said, accepting such a principle makes embracing the Repugnant Conclusion more justifiable. This paper further addresses important questions which Parfit left unanswered concerning: the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. The Problem of Induction and the Problem of Free Will.Avijit Lahiri - manuscript
    This essay presents a point of view for looking at `free will', with the purpose of interpreting where exactly the freedom lies. For, freedom is what we mean by it. It compares the exercise of free will with the making of inferences, which usually is predominantly inductive in nature. The making of inference and the exercise of free will, both draw upon psychological resources that define our ‘selves’. I examine the constitution of the self of an individual, especially the involvement (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Causation and Liability to Defensive Harm.Lars Christie - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (3):378-392.
    An influential view in the ethics of self-defence is that causal responsibility for an unjust threat is a necessary requirement for liability to defensive harm. In this article, I argue against this view by providing intuitive counterexamples and by revealing weaknesses in the arguments offered in its favour. In response, adherents of the causal view have advanced the idea that although causally inefficacious agents are not liable to defensive harm, the fact that they may deserve harm can justify harming them (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. Managing shame and guilt in addiction: A pathway to recovery.Anke Snoek, Victoria McGeer, Daphne Brandenburg & Jeanette Kennett - 2021 - Addictive Behaviors 120.
    A dominant view of guilt and shame is that they have opposing action tendencies: guilt- prone people are more likely to avoid or overcome dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, making amends for past misdoings, whereas shame-prone people are more likely to persist in dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, avoiding responsibility for past misdoings and/or lashing out in defensive aggression. Some have suggested that addiction treatment should make use of these insights, tailoring therapy according to people’s degree of guilt-proneness versus shame-proneness. In this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Empathy and Moral Psychology: A Critique of Shaun Nichols's Neo-Sentimentalism.Lawrence Blum - 2011 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 170-193.
    Nichols’s view of empathy (in Sentimental Rules) in light of experimental moral psychology suffers from several deficiencies: (1) It operates with an impoverished view of the altruistic emotions (empathy, sympathy, concern, compassion, etc.) as mere short-term, affective states of mind, lacking any essential connection to intentionality, perception, cognition, and expressiveness. (2) It fails to keep in focus the moral distinction between two very different kinds of emotional response to the distress and suffering of others—other-directed, altruistic, emotions that have moral value, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. Is depressive rumination rational?Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff - 2016 - In Timothy Joseph Lane & Tzu-Wei Hung (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. London, U.K.: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 121-145.
    Most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population. On the reasonable assumption that minds or brains are prone to occasional malfunction, these disorders do not seem to pose distinctive explanatory problems. Depression, however, because it is so prevalent and costly, poses a conundrum that some try to explain by characterizing it as an adaptation—a trait that exists because it performed fitness-enhancing functions in ancestral populations. Heretofore, proposed evolutionary explanations of depression did not focus on thought processes; instead, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Disease: An Ill-Founded Concept at Odds with the Principle of Patient-Centred Medicine.Arandjelovic Ognjen - forthcoming - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.
    Background: Despite the at least decades long record of philosophical recognition and interest, the intricacy of the deceptively familiar appearing concepts of ‘disease’, ‘disorder’, ‘disability’, etc., has only recently begun showing itself with clarity in the popular discourse wherein its newly emerging prominence stems from the liberties and restrictions contingent upon it. Whether a person is deemed to be afflicted by a disease or a disorder governs their ability to access health care, be it free at the point of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. "I am feeling tension in my whole body": An experimental phenomenological study of empathy for pain.David Martínez-Pernía, Ignacio Cea, Alejandro Troncoso, Kevin Blanco, Jorge Calderón, Constanza Baquedano, Claudio Araya-Veliz, Ana Useros, David Huepe, Valentina Carrera, Victoria Mack-Silva & Mayte Vergara - 2023 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich knowledge of the empathic experience of pain by using an experimental phenomenological method. Method: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality.Robert Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3179-3197.
    Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent’s control positively affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Kinds of moral luck are differentiated by the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the circumstances in which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted. Many philosophers accept the existence of some of these kinds of moral luck but not others, because, in their view, the existence of only some of them would (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  48. Do You Remember Who You Are? The Pillars of Identity in Dementia.Nada Gligorov & Christopher Langston - 2021 - In Veljko Dubljevic & Frances Bottenberg (eds.), Living With Dementia. pp. 39-54.
    Loss of personal identity in dementia can raise a number of ethical considerations, including the applicability of advance directives and the validity of patient preferences that seem incongruous with a previous history of values. In this chapter, we first endorse the self-concept view as the most appropriate approach to personal continuity in healthcare. We briefly describe two different types of dementia, Alzheimer’s dementia (AD) and behavioral-variant frontotemporal dementia (bv-FTD). We identify elements considered important for the continuation of a self-concept, including (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Metaphysics for Responsibility to Nature.Bo R. Meinertsen - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (2):187-197.
    On the notion of responsibility employed by John Passmore in his classic Man’s Responsibility for Nature, the relationship of responsibility can only hold between persons (human beings, subjects), or groups and communities of them, and other persons. And in this relationship the persons that are responsible 'to' other persons are responsible 'for' how their actions affect these other persons, not to the direct object of these actions (in this case: nature). If this is correct, we cannot be responsible to nature (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.
    Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as ‘that woman is probably an administrative assistant’—based on the evidence that most women employees (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
1 — 50 / 954