A striking feature of post-modernism is its distrust of the subject. If the modern period, beginning with Descartes, sought in the subject a source of certainty, an Archimedian point from which all else could be derived, post- modernism has taken the opposite tack. Rather than taking the self as a foundation, it has seen it as founded, as dependent on the accidents which situate consciousness in the world. The same holds for the unity of the subject. Modernity, (...) in its search for a single foundation, held the subject to be an indissoluble unity. Post-modernism’s position, by contrast, is announced by Nietzsche: “The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? ...My hypotheses: The subject as multiplicity.” Given this, there is a natural correspondence between the success of post- modernism and the current interest in multiple personality disorder. In the latter, we actually have the experience of a “multiplicity of subjects” in their interaction and struggle. The subject stands there before us “as multiplicity.” It gives us a concrete case, one which raises some of the pressing questions associated with the post-modern denial of the subject. Confronting it, we ask: how real are the personalities composing the multiplicity of this disordered self? What, in fact, does this multiplicity tell us about the self? about its genesis and status? What does it reveal about “our thought and consciousness in general”? I plan, in the short compass of this paper, to sketch some answers to these questions. §1. A brief description of MPD. The American Psychiatric Association gives two criteria for (MPD) multiple personality disorder. First, and most obviously, there is “the existence within the person of two or more distinct personalities or personality states (each with its own relatively enduring pattern. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy, there is a widespread distinction between authenticity as self-discovery (which is an essentialist model, inspired by Rousseau, Herder and the Romantic tradition) and authenticity as self-creation (an existentialist model, inspired mainly by Kierkegaard and Sartre). In this paper, I would like to propose a threefold classification, which ads another model of authenticity, irreducible to any of the previous two. This third model is authenticity as self-reinvention, that could be reconstructed from Nietzsche’s philosophy. The self-reinvention model rests on (...) three different, yet interrelated, ideas: 1) Vitalism: The authentic individual wholeheartedly embraces every aspect of his existence, even pain and sufferings, thus proving he truly owns himself. 2) Perspectivism: The authentic individual is able to reinterpret his mental states in the utmost personal manner, through the transvaluation of values (Umwertung aller Werte) and the spiritualization (Vergeistingung) of his drives. 3) Experimentalism: Authenticity is an incessant play, a constant process of identity formation, which corresponds to Nietzsche’s hypothesis of “the subject as multiplicity” and to his ideal of existence as a work of art or of becoming the poet of your life. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze demonstrated the key role of flashback in dealing with the relationship between actual image and recollection-image when interpreting the temporality of images. He established two criteria for judging whether a flashback implies a recollection-image by stating that: (1) it serves as some kind of prompt in the narrative to make the viewer perceive that the scene has entered a flashback; (2) it relies on fate or forking time. But Deleuze also mentioned that, if the context or condition disappears, (...) the recollection-image represented by the flashback will lose its support, at which point, the pure recollection will also disappear. In this case, the actual image no longer forms a connection with the sensor-motor, but is suspended, which produces a fantasmatic effect. Bi Gan extends this suspension in his film “Long Day’s Journey into Night” by removing the character being referred to in the flashback, stripping it from figure and confining it in the voice-over. The film features an extreme use of several effects in the sensory-motor situations and the flashbacks, as described in Deleuze’s “Cinema 2: Time-Image,” namely recollection, dream, and falsification. Thus, the boundary between flashback and reality is completely broken. In addition, Bi Gan uses doppelgangers in the second part of the film to reconstruct the ambiguity of actual images and recollection-images in the first part, turning them into pure fantasies. This essay will analyze issues relating to the images and characters in “Long Day’s Journey into Night” and show how this film constitutes a typical case of recollection-images transformed into fantasies through the power of falsification. (shrink)

At the time of the disintegration of “actually existing socialism” in the 1990s, it appeared that the inexorable flux of globalization was going to consume the nation-state. However, recent years have witnessed the increasing role of the states in both the Global North and South. The relationship between the state and capital is a frequently traversed subject, but what needs further illumination is the persistence of “many states” and its relation to capitalism as both a national and global formation. (...) While globalization of capital suggests a movement from multiplicity toward a dehistoricized abstraction, a global state has never been actualized. This implies that, unlike capital, the state cannot be dehistoricized or dedifferentiated; therefore, the only way to think about the state is to observe concrete, multiple states. In view of this difference and drawing on Nicos Poulantzas’s and Kōjin Karatani’s inquiries into the states system, this article examines the multi-state system as an internal and external limit to Marxist thought. (shrink)

In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though gradually received, neurological damage. (...) Common objections and concerns are also discussed and rejected. 1 Introduction2 The GRP, Serial Lesion Effect, and Multiple Realizability2.1 A case study of the serial lesion effect2.2 Evaluating the case study’s evidence for multiple realizability3 The GRP More Generally4 Objections to the GRP as Evidence for Multiple Realizability4.1 Small plastic effects and neurological taxonomies4.2 But do neural regions and locations even matter at all?4.3 But are there not other options besides location?5 Conclusion. (shrink)

Human epistemic subjects cannot but employ imperfect and limited tools to gain knowledge. Even in the seemingly simple business of acquiring knowledge of the value of a physical quantity, what the instrument reads or perception tells more often that not does not correspond to real value. However, even though both our perceptual apparatus and measuring instruments are sensible to background noise, under certain conditions, collecting more information of the same quantity using the same tools leads to an improvement of the (...) subject's epistemic condition. The aim of this paper is to formalize this intuition employing a model which extends Williamson (2013) on the arising of Gettier cases in epistemic logic. From a model where each world is univocally represented by the pair r, a defined by the real value and the apparent one, I will be considering a scenario wherein the subject has collected n appearances of the real parameter, so that each world is identified by a n + 1-tuple. On the assumptions that the n data are all independent and regarded by the subject as equally reliable, a plausible model should be able to describe three phenomena. First of all, the more coherent and closer to represent the real value the set of n appearances is, the more knowledge of the real value is gained. Secondly, the more the subject goes on acquiring "good" data, the more she knows. Thirdly, the world where the n apparent values and the real one match is the best world for the subject. Following Williamson, I shall put forth a system for multiple appearances in epistemic logic that aims at modeling these phenomena by describing the interval within which the real value is known to lie. (shrink)

The Gathas, a corpus of seventeen poems in Old Avestan composed by the ancient Iranian poet-priest Zarathushtra (Zoroaster) ca. 1200 B.C.E., is the foundation document of Zoroastrian religion. Even though the dualistic axiology of the Gathas has been widely noted, it has proved very difficult to understand the meaning and genre of the corpus or the position of Zarathushtra’s ideas with regard to other religious philosophies. Relying on recent advances in translation and decryptions of Gathic poetry, I shall here develop (...) a philosophical interpretation of the Gathas, including, as shall be discussed here in detail, explication of the revelation he reports in the poem known as Yasna 30. I argue that, similarly to Marx, Henry, and Schutz, Zarathushtra connects social criticism with an original philosophy of (inter)subjectivity and existential reflection, placing his account in the context of a fully developed metaphysics which includes the human-divine sharing of mental properties. I show that in order to accommodate this complicated problematic, Zarathushtra uses the vehicle of multiple realities. Reflecting the spontaneity of life, the dynamics of various ontological modes in the text create a reference to subjectivity. A description of the dream in Yasna 30 is sufficiently within the limits of possibility for a dream experience, and thereby delivers three original phenomenological reductions. The reductions initiate a genetic account of the phenomenalization of invisible impulses which give rise to moral choices, and define the human-divine relationship. The opposing moral choices open into a reverse axiological intentionality in the sphere of intersubjectivity, and are said to plot life for the rightful and lifelessness for the wrongful. It can be concluded that Zarathushtra’s theism and views of the social world are “the first philosophy”, with a unique and original phenomenological ontology of intersubjectivity at its core. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In previous work I explored how Integral Theory can be applied as a metatheoretical and transdisciplinary framework, in an attempt to arrive at an integrally informed metatheory of addiction. There was an overemphasis on Integral Methodological Pluralism in that thread of research, without clarifying the ontological pluralism of addiction as a multiple object enacted by various methodologies. To arrive at a comprehensive integral metatheory and integral ontology of addiction, I believe it is necessary to include the conception of Integral (...) Pluralism and Integral Enactment Theory as posited by Sean Esbjörn-Hargens. Integral Enactment Theory highlights the phenomenon of addiction as a multiple and dynamic object arising along a continuum of ontological complexity; it adeptly points out how etiological models “co-arise” in relation to methodology (methodological pluralism) to enact a particular reality of addiction (ontological pluralism) while being mediated by the worldview of the subject (epistemological pluralism) applying the method. This article briefly explores the significance of including Integral Pluralism and Integral Enactment Theory in the quest of an integral metatheory and integral ontology of addiction. (shrink)

A similar framing of inarticulable formations, of pure multiplicities, marks the respective projects of Deleuze and Laplanche. The absolute exteriority of a disjunctive multiplicity is re-inscribed as a relativised, interiorised trace. This trace-logic of Deleuze and Laplanche has definitive implications where the psychoanalytic subject and the unconscious is concerned. However, there is a difficulty in this logic of accounting for the unconscious formations enumerated by Freud (slips of the tongue, jokes, symptoms etc.). In turning to Lacan, however, the (...) positions of Deleuze and Laplanche can be illuminated (despite their attempt to ‘move beyond’ him). We see the trace in its material, unconscious substantiality upheld by the function of the big Other as an absent centre to which discourse is referred and through which the speaking subject is revealed as being in a discrepant relation to itself. The big Other, in his function as intimate, yet lacking, alterity, seems to help to resolve the problematic of multiplicity for Deleuze and Laplanche. (shrink)

A strange dialectical reversal characterizes the oppositions which psychoanalysis posits against philosophy and neuroscience: what psychoanalysis intervenes with as a unique and missing quality of these subjects, reveals itself upon enquiry as already having been a feature of said subjects. This article first discusses the failed intervention of psychoanalysis within the perceived totalities and absolutes of German idealism. Psychoanalysis, founded on an ontological division and internal inconsistency with a retroactive logic, finds this internal contradiction already reflected within the supposed totalities (...) of Schelling and Hegel. Schelling’s “blind act,” a decision with no prior foundation that grounds an abstract identity-in-itself, appears as the counterpart to what Badiou calls the strictly “analytic act.” Hegel’s Science of Logic, in which the inconclusive interpenetration of being and nothing presupposes its own conclusion in the transitions to essence, and in which an internal incompleteness and contradiction are retroactively constitutive of the concept, similarly nullifies the intervention of psychoanalysis. Finally, precisely such a reversal is presented in neuroscience, where the constitutive contradiction of contingently functional neuronal formations in the adaptive “multiple demand” model of executive functioning repeats the contingent and self-contradicting psychoanalytic subject as being its own deference within linguistic, discursive formations. (shrink)

In an attempt to curtail examination malpractice, the Joint Admission and Matriculation Board (JAMB) has been generating different paper types with a different order of test items in the Unified Tertiary Matriculation Examination (UTME). However, the permutation of test items may compromise students’ performance unintentionally because constructive suggestions in theory and practice recommend that test items be sequenced in ascending order of difficulty. This study used data collected from a random sample of 1,226 SSIII students to ascertain whether the permutation (...) of test items has any effect on the performance of students in two different subjects (Use of English and Mathematics). The study adopted the Equivalent Groups Quasi-Experimental Research Design with three independent groups. Findings emerged, amongst others, that there is a significant difference in the performance scores of prospective university students' in use of English and Mathematics examintaions arranged in three different orders (ED, DE, R). There are no significant gender differences in the performance of students in Use of English and Mathematics based on test item permutation. However female students perform better than male students when test items are arranged in ascending order of difficulty while males perform better when test items are arranged in descending order of difficulty. It was concluded that the permutation of test items in UTME examination tends to affect the performance of students in Use of English and Mathematics. This finding has implications for the future conduct of UTME examinations and enrolment into higher education as the randomization of UTME test items changes the difficulty order of different paper types. It was recommended that other measures of curtailing examination malpractices that would not affect students’ academic performance should be adopted. (shrink)

examine the dominant conversations on cultural appropriation. The first part of the essay will examine the ideological configuration of what constitutes cultural appropriation (hereafter as CA) first, as the politics of the diaspora and second, within a normative understanding of culture and its diachronic contradictions. This will be followed by a critical reevaluation of our subject theme as primarily a discourse of power with multiple implications. Framed as a discourse of power, CA is equally exposed to ideological distortions, and (...) its critics becoming afflicted with the same virus they set out to cure in the first place. I am interested in the aspect of culture as a constant location of tensions and rupture, yet constitutive of core credential in the making of modern identity. I argue that the failure of dominant criticisms of cultural appropriation is precisely because they do not leave epistemic space for prior commitments: the internal variation of culture. If as critics have argued that CA enables cultural violence, we need to understand the epistemic space where cultural violence occurs in order to make a meaningful proposal for identity discourse and conversation. I will make a case for what may be termed multiple humanity (ies) as a way of transcending the homogenous claims imposed upon cultural memories. (shrink)

Philosophy is a cognitive enterprise. In multiple senses, it is continuous with other sciences (including natural sciences, social sciences, and Humanities). (1) As far as its subject matter is concerned, like other sciences, philosophy is also a part of the overall efforts of human beings to understand the world in which we live. (2) In terms of their methodologies, there is no substantive difference between philosophy, common sense, and science. Just as scientific methodology is the refinement of common-sense methodology, (...) philosophical methodology is also the refinement and summary of common sense and scientific methodologies. (3) In terms of their utilities, philosophy and science are both designed to help people live better in the world, and to lead a decent and dignified life, especially a meaningful and valuable life. (4) It is the correct attitude and practice of dealing with the relationship between philosophy and the history of philosophy to study and enter philosophy through the history of philosophy, to critically reflect on the previous philosophical theories, to open up new fields, to use new methods, and to put forward new theories to develop philosophy. (5) The following two assertions about philosophy and science are just taken for granted, and specious: science relies on observation and experiment, and philosophy resorts to interpretation and understanding, while science focuses on "what is" and philosophy focuses on "what it should be". (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the senses and what differentiates them that is compatible with richly multisensory perception and consciousness. According to this proposal, senses are ways of perceiving. Each sense is a subfaculty that comprises a collection of perceptual capacities. What each sense shares and what differentiates one sense from another is the manner in which those capacities are exercised. Each way of perceiving involves a distinct type of information gathering, individuated by the information it functions to extract (...) and the medium from which it does so. This approach distinguishes the project of characterizing and differentiating senses from that of attributing experiences to sensory modalities. Perceptual experiences are episodes in which perceptual capacities are exer- cised. Conscious perceptual episodes may be ascribed to distinct sensory modalities, according to the manners in which perceptual capacities are deployed on an occasion. According to this account, senses are not exclusive. First, their capacities may overlap. Second, perceptual episodes, including conscious experiences, may belong to multiple senses. Indeed, some episodes require the joint use of several senses. In this account, subjects have only limited first-person knowledge of the senses they employ. (shrink)

The change in the organization of science education over the past fifty years is quickly recalled. Being its cultural bound the lack of a conception of the foundation of science, the multiple innovations have resulted as temporary improvements without a clear direction, apart from the technocratic goal of an automation of learning processes. The discovery of two dichotomies as the foundations of science suggests a pluralist conception of science, and hence the need to entirely renew science education, in particular by (...) introducing the notions of incommensurability and radical variations in meaning of the basic notions. This change was already anticipated by several proposals within each subject-matter. (shrink)

The present paper aims to validate our research on human–humanoid interaction (HHI) using the minimalist humanoid robot Telenoid. We conducted the human–robot interaction test with 142 young people who had no prior interaction experience with this robot. The main goal is the analysis of the two social dimensions (‘‘Perception’’ and ‘‘Believability’’) useful for increasing the natural behaviour between users and Telenoid.Weadministered our custom questionnaire to human subjects in association with a well defined experimental setting (‘‘ordinary and goal-guided task’’). A thorough (...) analysis of the questionnaires has been carried out and reliability and internal consistency in correlation between the multiple items has been calculated. Our experimental results show that the perceptual behaviour and believability, as implicit social competences, could improve the meaningfulness and the natural-like sense of human–humanoid interaction in everyday life task-driven activities. Telenoid is perceived as an autonomous cooperative agent for a shared environment by human beings. (shrink)

Current radical democratic politics is characterized by new participatory spaces for citizens’ engagement, which aim at facilitating the democratic ideals of freedom and equality. These spaces are, however, situated in the context of deep societal inequalities. Modes of discrimination are carried over into participatory interaction. The democratic subject is judged by its physically embodied appearance, which replicates external hierarchies and impedes the freedom of self-expression. To tackle this problem, this article seeks to identify ways to increase the freedom of (...) the subject to explore its multiple self. Understanding the self as inherently fugitive, the article investigates participatory, deliberative and agonistic concepts of self-transformation. As all of them appear limited, it introduces a transformative perspective in democratic thought. Enriching the transformative perspective with queer and gender theory, the article generates the concept of a politics of becoming, which, through radical democratic practices of disidentification, advances the freedom of the subject to change. (shrink)

In 2003, biophysicist and Nobel Laureate Maurice Wilkins published his autobiography entitled The Third Man. In the preface, he diffidently points out that the title was chosen by his publisher, as a reference to the famous 1949 movie no doubt, featuring Orson Welles in his classical role as penicillin racketeer Harry Lime. In this paper I intend to show that there is much more to this title than merely its familiar ring. If subjected to a comparative analysis, multiple correspondences between (...) movie and memoirs can be brought to the fore. Taken together, these documents shed an intriguing light on the vicissitudes of budding life sciences research during the post-war era. I will focus my comparative analysis on issues still relevant today, such as dual use, the handling of sensitive scientific information and, finally, on the interwovenness of science and warfare. Thus, I will explain how science autobiographies on the one hand and genres of the imagination on the other may deepen our comprehension of tensions and dilemmas of life sciences research then and now. For that reason, science autobiographies can provide valuable input for teaching philosophy and history of science to science students. (shrink)

Metaphors allow us to come to terms with abstract and complex information, by comparing it to something which is structured, familiar and concrete. Although modern science is “iconoclastic”, as Gaston Bachelard phrases it, scientists are at the same time prolific producers of metaphoric images themselves. Synthetic biology is an outstanding example of a technoscientific discourse replete with metaphors, including textual metaphors such as the “Morse code” of life, the “barcode” of life and the “book” of life. This paper focuses on (...) a different type of metaphor, however, namely on the archetypal metaphor of the mandala as a symbol of restored unity and wholeness. Notably, mandala images emerge in textual materials related to one of the new “frontiers” of contemporary technoscience, namely the building of a synthetic cell: a laboratory artefact that functions like a cell and is even able to replicate itself. The mandala symbol suggests that, after living systems have been successfully reduced to the elementary building blocks and barcodes of life, the time has now come to put these fragments together again. We can only claim to understand life, synthetic cell experts argue, if we are able to technically reproduce a fully functioning cell. This holistic turn towards the cell as a meaningful whole also requires convergence at the “subject pole”: the building of a synthetic cell as a practice of the self, representing a turn towards integration, of multiple perspectives and various forms of expertise. (shrink)

A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated in analogy to the continuum of time points; both “time” and “world” are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of (...) Everett’s many-worlds interpretation; it has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Probability as given by the Born rule emerges as a consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett’s approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no splitting of worlds, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains (1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, (2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, and (3) the apparently random “collapse of the wavefunction” caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory. (shrink)

What does it mean to be media literate in today’s world? How are we transformed by the many media infrastructures around us? We are immersed in a world mediated by information and communication technologies (ICTs). From hardware like smartphones, smartwatches, and home assistants to software like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Snapchat, our lives have become a complex, interconnected network of relations. Scholarship on media literacy has tended to focus on developing the skills to access, analyze, evaluate, and create media messages (...) without considering or weighing the impact of the technological medium—how it enables and constrains both messages and media users. Additionally, there is often little attention paid to the broader context of interrelations which affect our engagement with media technologies. -/- This book addresses these issues by providing a transdisciplinary method that allows for both practical and theoretical analyses of media investigations. Informed by postphenomenology, media ecology, philosophical posthumanism, and complexity theory the author proposes both a framework and a pragmatic instrument for understanding the multiplicity of relations that all contribute to how we affect—and are affected by—our relations with media technology. The author argues persuasively that the increased awareness provided by this posthuman approach affords us a greater chance for reclaiming some of our agency and provides a sound foundation upon which we can then judge our media relations. This book will be an indispensable tool for educators in media literacy and media studies, as well as academics in philosophy of technology, media and communication studies, and the post-humanities. (shrink)

This article is a preliminary draft for initiating and commencing a new pioneer dimension of expression. To deal with higher-dimensional data or information flowing in this modern era of information technology and artificial intelligence, some innovative super algebraic structures are essential to be formulated. In this paper, we have introduced such matrices that have multiple layers and clusters of layers to portray multi-dimensional data or massively dispersed information of the plithogenic universe made up of numerous subjects their attributes, and sub-attributes. (...) For grasping that field of parallel information, events, and realities flowing from the micro to the macro level of universes, we have constructed hypersoft and hyper-super-soft matrices in a Plithogenic Fuzzy environment. These Matrices classify the non-physical attributes by accumulating the physical subjects and further sort the physical subjects by accumulating their non-physical attributes. We presented themasPlithogenicAttributiveSubjectivelyWholeHyper-Super-Soft-Matrix(PASWHSS-Matrix)andPlithogenic Subjective Attributively Whole-Hyper-Super-Soft-Matrix (PSAWHSS-Matrix). Several types of views and level-layers of these matrices are described. In addition, some local aggregation operators for Plithogenic Fuzzy Hypersoft Set (PPFHS-Set) are developed. Finally, few applications of these matrices and operators are used as numerical examples of COVID-19 data structures. (shrink)

Although the differences between Spinoza and Nietzsche are crucial, there are several aspects on which one can trace a relevant set of similarities between the two authors. The refutation of teleology, transcendence and free will, together with the consequent embracement of fatality, the pursuit of joy, and the particular emphasis on affectivity are just a few of the resemblances that can be drawn between Spinoza and Nietzsche. This paper is focused only on the last aspect mentioned above. Both Spinoza and (...) Nietzsche developed an account of immanent pursuit of joy, which can be derived from a particular understanding of affects. The two philosophers tried to create a peculiar bridge between knowledge and affectivity, which meant a significant departure from their previous philosophical tradition, and which gave them an idiosyncratic place in the entire picture of modern thought. (shrink)

La idea detrás del presente trabajo es intentar demostrar que el logocentrismo occidental se hegemoniza en el mismo proceso de individuación. Analizar el devenir del cuerpo a través de los textos sería hacer una deconstrucción del sistema capitalista y de la sociedad de mercado actual. Sin duda, este sistema es la consagración de la idea de individuo que fue gestándose a lo largo de múltiples acontecimientos y que nos permite no solo rever la aparición del sujeto como tal sino del (...) individualismo como corriente cultural. Nos permite también observar cómo se fueron dando los distintos procesos de individuación y algunos factores adquirieron mayores jerarquías, se impusieron sobre otros, los cuales quedaron relegados, ocultos, negados. -/- Abstract: The idea behind this work is to demonstrate that Western logocentrism hegemonizes in the same process of individuation. Analyze the evolution of the body through the texts would be to make a deconstruction of the capitalist system and the current market society. Undoubtedly, this system is the consecration of the idea of individual that was increasing along multiple events and allows us, not only review the appearance of the subject as such, but also as appearance of the individualism as cultural current. Also it allows us to observe how they were giving various processes of individuation and like some factors have become higher hierarchies were imposed on others, which were relegated, hidden, denied. -/- . (shrink)

Proposition and sentence are two separate entities indicating their specific purposes, definitions and problems. A proposition is a logical entity. A proposition asserts that something is or not the case, any proposition may be affirmed or denied, all proportions are either true (1’s) or false (0’s). All proportions are sentences but all sentences are not propositions. Propositions are factual contains three terms: subject, predicate and copula and are always in indicative or declarative mood. While sentence is a grammatical entity, (...) a unit of language that expresses a complete thought; a sentence may express a proposition, but is distinct from the proposition it may be used to express: categories, declarative sentences, exclamatory, imperative and interrogative sentences. Not all sentences are propositions, propositions express sentence. Sentence is a proposition only in condition when it bears truth values i.e. true or false. We use English sentences governed by imprecise rule to state the precise rules of proposition. In logic we use sentence as logical entity having propositional function but grammatical sentences are different from logical sentences while the former are having only two divisions namely subject and predicate and may express wishes, orders, surprise or facts and also have multiple subjects and predicates and the latter must be in a propositional form which states quantity of the subject and the quality of the proposition and multiple subjects and multiple predicate make the proposition multiple. (shrink)

The idea behind this work is to demonstrate that Western logocentrism hegemonizes in the same process of individuation. Analyze the evolution of the body through the texts would be to make a deconstruction of the capitalist system and the current market society. Undoubtedly, this system is the consecration of the idea of individual that was increasing along multiple events and allows us, not only review the appearance of the subject as such, but also as appearance of the individualism as (...) cultural current. Also it allows us to observe how they were giving various processes of individuation and like some factors have become higher hierarchies were imposed on others, which were relegated, hidden, denied. (shrink)

In his lectures on neoliberalism, Michel Foucault argues that neoliberalism produces subjects as ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’. He bases this claim on Gary Becker’s conception of the utility-maximizing agent who solely acts upon cost/benefit-calculations. Not all neoliberalized subjects, however, are encouraged to maximize their utility through mere calculation. This article argues that Foucault’s description of neoliberal subjectivity obscures a non-calculative, more audacious side to neoliberal subjectivity. Precarious workers in the creative industries, for example, are encouraged not merely to rationally manage their (...) human capital, but also to take a leap of faith to acquire unpredictable successes. It is this latter risk-loving, extra-calculative side to neoliberal subjectivity that economists usually designate as ‘entrepreneurial’. By confronting Foucault with the theories of entrepreneurship of the Austrian School of Economics, Frank Knight, and Joseph Schumpeter, the Foucauldian analytical framework is enriched. Neoliberal subjectivation is not the monolithic promotion of utility-maximizing agents, but the generation of a multiplicity of modes for entrepreneurs to relate to oneself and the market. (shrink)

Recent studies tend to explain the importance of communication in the organisation as well as prescribing the most commonly practised techniques adopted by school managers. Studies on financial management are quite limited with the available ones suggesting that poor financial management is a source of conflict between school leaders and host communities. Little seems to be known on the connection between principals’ communication patterns and funds’ management as predictors of school-community relationship. This study builds on existing studies and appears to (...) be the first to assess the linkages between principals’ communication patterns, fund management practices and school- community relationship based on empirical rather than subjective data. A structural modelling approach was adopted to examine the nexus using quantitative primary data obtained from a random sample of 2108 respondents. A questionnaire which was designed and validated by the researchers served as the data collection device. Collected data were subjected to Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses, as well as Multiple Regression Analysis. Findings revealed various significant communication, funds management and school-community relationship practices that are available for adoption. However, it was found that the extent to which principals utilised such practices were below expected minimum standards. It was also found that there were no significant partial and composite effects of principals’ communication and funds management practices on school-community relationship (SCR). Based on these results, relevant theoretical, policy and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

The condition of precariousness not only provides insights into a segment of the world of work or of a particular subject group, but is also a privileged standpoint for an overview of the condition of the social on a global scale. Because precariousness is multidimensional and polysemantic, it traverses contemporary society and multiple contexts, from industrial to class, gender, family relations as well as political participation, citizenship and migration. This book maps the differences and similarities in the ways precariousness (...) and insecurity in employment unfold and are subjectively experienced in regions and sectors that are confronted with different labour histories, legislations and economic priorities. Establishing a constructive dialogue amongst different global regions and across disciplines, the chapters explore the shift from precariousness to precariat and collective subjects as it is being articulated in the current global crisis. This edited collection aims to continue a process of mapping experiences by means of ethnographies, fieldwork, interviews, content analysis, where the precarious define their condition and explain how they try to withdraw from, cope with or embrace it. (shrink)

According to the Ontology of Knowledge the Universe is representation: we will show in this article that : - The nature of meaning "animates" the subject's representation and imposes time on it. - "Becoming oneself", condition of possibility of any representation, imposes on the subject the aesthetic intuition of space. - The objects of my representation come to exist by separation of my own existence following the preprint of a multiplicity of meaning-attractors in my Individuation.

Bringing a unique perspective to the burgeoning ethical and legal issues surrounding the presence of artificial intelligence in our daily lives, the book uses theory and practice on animal rights and the rights of nature to assess the status of robots. -/- Through extensive philosophical and legal analyses, the book explores how rights can be applied to nonhuman entities. This task is completed by developing a framework useful for determining the kinds of personhood for which a nonhuman entity might be (...) eligible, and a critical environmental ethic that extends moral and legal consideration to nonhumans. The framework and ethic are then applied to two hypothetical situations involving real-world technology—animal-like robot companions and humanoid sex robots. Additionally, the book approaches the subject from multiple perspectives, providing a comparative study of legal cases on animal rights and the rights of nature from around the world and insights from structured interviews with leading experts in the field of robotics. Ending with a call to rethink the concept of rights in the Anthropocene, suggestions for further research are made. -/- An essential read for scholars and students interested in robot, animal and environmental law, as well as those interested in technology more generally, the book is a ground-breaking study of an increasingly relevant topic, as robots become ubiquitous in modern society. (shrink)

Neil Gorsuch lauds judges who purport to “apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward, and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would have understood the law to be . . . .” It’s hard to see how such a form of Originalism withstands scrutiny. -/- First, using “reasonable reader” understandings rather than speaker meaning turns language and law on their heads. Audiences effectively become (...) the speakers in ordinary speech (since reader or audience meaning prevails), and audiences (and thus the ruled) effectively become the rulers when interpreting law (since audiences’ meaning prevails). -/- Second, since laws look forward to govern conduct, how can best legal practices keep such a backward focus? -/- Third, words (however understood by others at the time “originally” uttered) may or may not (depending on speaker and not reader meaning) signify concepts whose meanings embrace change over time. For example, the word “planet” used by a speaker before the discovery of Uranus and Neptune may or may not include further planets depending upon what the speaker meant by “planet.” (The same applies to the inclusion or exclusion of Pluto had the speaker used the word “planet” after the discovery of Pluto but before its exclusion by current science.) Unlike the “reasonable” reader of Gorsuch’s Originalism as phrased above, speakers run the gamut from reasonable to unreasonable, from informed to uninformed, and from thoughtful to thoughtless. -/- Fourth, to the extent a judge is principally “constrained” by a text or texts (as he may determine), by dictionaries that he chooses, and by “history” as the judge understands it, isn’t judicial activism encouraged rather than restrained? Talk of a “reasonable” reader masks the fact that there can be multiple “reasonable” conclusions of what a reasonable or unreasonable speaker meant. Is a judge not therefore left to pick definitions and applications of terms that accord with the judge’s understandings of history, understandings that may well be colored by the judge’s politics and judicial philosophy? This applies to principles as well as labels for things. Principles are also subject to multiple frames, and their terms are subject to multiple definitions therefore raising the very same questions just raised above. -/- Finally, such Originalism doesn’t merely fail with legal texts. It also fails when applied to other texts (including sacred texts such as the Ten Commandments) and when used to interpret art (such as “Landscape with the Fall of Icarus” often attributed to Bruegel and which inspired such great ekphrasis as Auden’s “Musée Des Beaux Arts”). These further failures underscore the dysfunction of Originalism in Gorsuch's form noted above. -/- Keywords: Originalism, Neil Gorsuch, Text, Textualism, Scalia, Interpretation, Pragmatics, Speaker Meaning, Art, Painting, Bruegel, Auden, Ekphrasis, Icarus, Bible, Ten Commandments, Herod, Declaration of Independence, Abraham Lincoln. (shrink)

In this article, I distinguish two models of personal integrity. The first, wholeheartedness, regards harmonious unity of the self as psychologically healthy and volitional consistency as ethically ideal. I argue that it does so at the substantial cost of framing ambivalence and conflict as defects of character and action. To avoid these consequences, I propose an alternate ideal of humility that construes the self as multiple and precarious and celebrates experiences of loss and transformation through which learning, growth, innovation, and (...) dynamic relationship become possible. This ideal not only sustains prospects for integrity but is more suitable than wholeheartedness for recognizing practices of contestation, such as those involving potentially destabilizing encounters with difference that is common within pluralistic societies, as vital for rich, well-lived lives. (shrink)

This paper describes subjectivity as the manifestation of the primordial awareness field.

Subjectivity is that feature of consciousness whereby there is something it is like for a subject to undergo an experience. One persistent challenge in the study of consciousness is to explain how subjectivity relates to, or arises from, purely physical brain processes. But, in order to address this challenge, it seems we must have a clear explanation of what subjectivity is in the first place. This has proven challenging in its own right. For the nature of subjectivity itself seems (...) to resist straightforward characterization. In this paper, I won't address how subjectivity relates to the physical. Instead, I'll address subjectivity itself. I'll do this by introducing and defending a model of subjectivity based on self-acquaintance. My model does not purport to reduce, eliminate, or naturalize subjectivity, but it does make subjectivity more tractable, less paradoxical, and perhaps less dubious to those averse to obscurity. (shrink)

Multiple concepts of nature are at play in environmental theory and practice. One that has gripped several theorists is the idea of nature as referring to that which is independent of humans and human activity. This concept has been subject to forceful criticism, notably in the recent work of Steven Vogel. After clarifying problematic and promising ways of charac­terizing independent nature, I engage Vogel’s critique. While the critique is compelling in certain respects, I argue that it fails to appreciate (...) what I take to be an important motivating concern of those drawn to the concept of independent nature, or something like it. I offer a characterization of that concern—a worry about problematic instrumentalization of the nonhuman world—and suggest why this concern, and the idea of independent nature which helps to make it intelligible, should continue to inform environmental theory and practice. In offering a qualified defense of the concept of independent nature, and of its value, I assume that such a concept is only one possible tool in a multi-pronged approach to environmental theorizing, deliberation, action, and policy. (shrink)

It is well-known that in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl puts forth a theory of intersubjectivity. Most commentators of Husserl have read his Cartesian Meditations as presenting a theory of intersubjectivity whose basis is empathy, in the form of a process of constituting the sense of “other” in one’s own experience, as the primary origin of the intersubjective layer of experience. In this paper, I claim that the structure of intersubjectivity as Husserl presents it in the Cartesian Meditations (...) is articulated as being governed by a logic of parts and wholes rather than that of a phenomenology of empathy, and that the articulation of this logic demonstrates that the transcendental ego is intrinsically intersubjective. My main philosophical claim in this regard is that the way Husserl’s account of transcendental empathy unfolds in the Cartesian Meditations implies a prior fundamental mereological structure of which the individual transcendental ego is only a part. That is, the transcendental ego has an eidetic a-priori intersubjective structure, in the sense of being a moment of an intersubjectively structured transcendental whole. In this sense, rather than being a singulare tantum, it is more fitting to say that transcendental subjectivity is actually a plurale tantum. (shrink)

How is experience possible if the one who experiences is ‘forgotten’ and transcended? In his book Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher Reiner Schürmann explores two lines of thought in Eckhart’s philosophy of mind—Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic. The first of these, he observes, leads to the idea that being is revealed in the “birth of the Son”—that is, in God acting in place of the active intellect. The second leads to the idea that being is revealed in an unrepresentable Unity. These two (...) lines of thought are, on their face, inconsistent. While the idea of the “birth of the Son” permits a division between ‘illuminator’ (universal) and ‘illuminated’ (particular), and so preserves the possibility of experience, the idea of an unrepresentable Unity does not. The resulting aporia, Schürmann argues, is resolved through Eckhart’s concept of detachment. But if, as Eckhart suggests, detachment is fundamentally atemporal, then it is not clear how, when one ‘lives in detachment,’ the process of becoming, through which an object appears to a subject, can be sustained. Hence, Schürmann’s resolution is problematic. In his Defense to charges of heresy, however, Eckhart takes positive steps towards explaining how something can simultaneously be a Unity and a multiplicity. In so doing, he offers us a window into both the nature of detachment and the nature of mind. (shrink)

These PhD Dissertation published as a book is a research on Metaphysics about the problem of Multiplicity explained by its principles on the grounds of Aristotle's Metaphysics focused on substance and metaphysical thought of Aquinas. According to Aquinas the multitude of forms are the cause of multiplicity of beings. Super Boethium De Trinitate has an importan treatment of matter and form as causes of substantial identity, of substance's non-being and something else and be a this. Therefore the (...) class='Hi'>multiplicity of beings is not explained only by virtue of the diversity of matter or by virtue of the susceptive subject. The main cause is the division of forms. (shrink)

This paper describes the contemporary phenomenological understanding of subjectivity as non dual awareness.

The conception of subjectivity developed by the German philosopher Hermann Schmitz (1927-) is especially suitable for cross-cultural investigations because its foundations lie in human experiences that are basic and universal. The paper has two aims. Firstly, to give an outline of Schmitz’s theory. Secondly, to show its usefulness (and its limits) by interpreting some Greek and Indian philosophers which, at the same time, represent certain main approaches to the problem of subjectivity.

The U.S. review system for human subjects research has been widely criticized in recent years for requirements that delay research without improving human subjects protections. Any major reformulation of regulations may take some time to implement. In the meantime, current regulations often allow for streamlined ethics review without jeopardizing—and possibly improving—protections for research participants. We discuss underutilized options, including research that need not be classified as “human subjects research,” categories of studies that can be exempt from ethical review, and studies (...) that need only undergo expedited review by one IRB member. In addition, we consider ways to simplify review of multi-center research using one institution’s IRB. We speculate on multiple reasons for the underuse of these mechanisms, and exhort IRBs and researchers to take advantage of these important opportunities to improve the review process. (shrink)

Multiple inherent biases related to different citation practices (for e.g., self-citations, negative citations, wrong citations, multi-authorship-biased citations, honorary citations, circumstantial citations, discriminatory citations, selective and arbitrary citations, etc.) make citation-based bibliometrics strongly flawed and defective measures. A paper can be highly cited for a while (for e.g., under circumstantial or transitional knowledge), but years later it may appear that its findings, paradigms, or theories were untrue or invalid anymore. By contrast, a paper may remain shelved or overlooked for years or (...) decades, but new studies or discoveries may actualize its subject at any moment. As citation-based metrics are transformed into "commercial activities," the "citation credit" should be considered on a commercial basis too, in the sense that "citation credit" should be shared out as a "citation dividend" by shareholders (coauthors) averagely or proportionally to their contributions but not fully appropriated by each of them. At equal numbers of citations, the greater number of authors, the lower "citation credit" should be and vice versa. Overlooking the presence of distorted and subjective citation practices makes many people and administrators "obsessed" with the number of citations to such an extent to run after "highly cited" authors and to create specialized citation databases for commercial purposes. Citation-based bibliometrics, however, are unreliable and unscientific measures; citation counts do not mean that a more cited work is of a higher quality or accuracy than a less cited work because citations do not measure the quality or accuracy. Citations do not mean that a highly cited author or journal is more commendable than a less cited author or journal. Citations are not more than countable numbers: no more, no less. (shrink)

This thesis articulates an analytic version of the ontology of idealism, according to which universal phenomenal consciousness is all there ultimately is, everything else in nature being reducible to patterns of excitation of this consciousness. The thesis’ key challenge is to explain how the seemingly distinct conscious inner lives of different subjects—such as you and me—can arise within this fundamentally unitary phenomenal field. Along the way, a variety of other challenges are addressed, such as: how we can reconcile idealism with (...) the fact that we all inhabit a common external world; why this world unfolds independently of our personal volition or imagination; why there are such tight correlations between measured patterns of brain activity and reports of experience; etc. The core idea of this thesis can be summarized thus: we, as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of universal phenomenal consciousness, analogously to how a person with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) manifests multiple disjoint centers of subjectivity also called ‘alters.’ We, and all other living organisms, are surrounded by the transpersonal phenomenal activity of universal consciousness, which unfolds beyond the dissociative boundary of our respective alter. The inanimate world we perceive around us is the extrinsic appearance—i.e. the phenomenal image imprinted from across our dissociative boundary—of this activity. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other alters. (shrink)

This paper reexamines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [Fordoblelse], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. I further show how these points (...) shed much-needed light on the relationship between objective and subjective truth, conceived not as different kinds or species of truth but as different ways in which truth manifests itself as a standard of success across different contexts of inquiry. (shrink)

Husserlian phenomenology, as the study of conscious experience, has often been accused of solipsism. Husserl’s method, it is argued, does not have the resources to provide an account of consciousness of other minds. This chapter will address this issue by providing a brief overview of the multiple angles from which Husserl approached the theme of intersubjectivity, with specific focus on the details of his account of the concrete interpersonal encounter – “empathy.” Husserl understood empathy as a direct, quasi-perceptual form of (...) intentionality through which the sense of the Other is constituted. Furthermore, his account of empathy is holistically integrated with his overall theory of intersubjectivity, including his discussions of the objectivity of nature, and the social, historical, and communal aspects of subjectivity. Husserl’s theory of empathy continues to cast a long shadow, influencing both the analytic and continental approaches to the problem of other minds, as well as contemporary account of social cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

I will first discuss a peculiarity of the realism-antirealism debate. Some authors defending antirealist positions in a philosophical discussion seem to be inconsistent with what they do when treating scientific subjects. In the latter situation, they behave as realists. This tension can be dissolved by distinguishing different discourses belonging to different levels of philosophical radicality. Depending on the respective level, certain presuppositions are either granted or questioned. I will then turn to a discussion of the miracle argument by discussing a (...) simple example of curve fitting. In the example, multiple use-novel predictions are possible without indicating the truth of the fitting curve. Because this situation has similarities with real scientific cases, it sheds serious doubt upon the miracle argument. Next, I discuss the strategy of selective realism, especially its additional crucial component, the continuity argument. The continuity of some X in a series of theories, with X being responsible for the theories’ use-novel predictions, is taken to be a reliable indicator for the reality of X. However, the continuity of X could as well be due to the similarity of the theories in the series with an empirically very successful theory embodying X, without X being real. Thus, the two main arguments for scientific realism show severe weaknesses. (shrink)

In Consciousness Studies it is common to distinguish between subjective character and qualitative character. It is also non unusual to maintain that both can be analyzed independently. This is called the “division of conceptual labor”. This idea, however, does not match with our intuitive insight that subjective character is multiple. Here I identify the idea of the division of conceptual labor as a version of the myth of the self, and I push forward two arguments against it. After that, I (...) will propose an alternative characterization of subjectivity on conscious experience. My main conclusion is that, in order to define the subjective character, we do need the qualitative character. The self needs the other. (shrink)

The physical sciences, as generally understood, are disciplines concerned with the characteristics and behavior of physical objects and states. What is evident about the current condition of consciousness is that: 1) It has no identified physical states; 2) There is no generally accepted vocabulary of its functioning, or its participant entities; and 3) No ‘normal science’ operative structure upon which a community of scientists agree. The reasons are that consciousness is a prescientific concept persisting because there is no adequate physicalist (...) theory to replace it, and because biology operates in a way ‘invisible’ to assumed mental processes and vocabulary. What is required is a plausible theory built on a biophysical base. A theory is being developed: it is termed the _theory of brain-sign_. Brain-sign replaces consciousness as an evolved neural operation in which brains communicate with each other in the collective action of organisms, so addressing the limitations of being an isolated individual. It depends upon neural signification, in this case of the organisms’ immediate _causal orientation_ towards the world. Thus, multiple organisms are linked as one biophysical operation. Signs are biologically ubiquitous and inherently physical. Organisms are not subjective agents with transcendent powers acting in a perceivable world, but evolved organic objects with the ability to cooperate as one overarching biological process. It is anticipated this theoretical operation and vocabulary will explain brain function, which mind fails to do. It accounts for science from both its neural origins and its communal nature. ER -. (shrink)

This paper presents a deductive proof for the necessary existence of objective truth and reality, addressing core philosophical challenges across multiple frameworks, including modernism, postmodernism, relativism, and radical skepticism. By starting with the undeniable fact of subjective experience, the argument demonstrates that rationality presupposes subjectivity, which in turn relies on the classical laws of logic. These laws cannot be grounded within subjectivity or rationality without falling into circular reasoning. Therefore, the proof establishes that objective reality must serve as the ground (...) for these logical laws, while objective truth provides their validation. This foundational framework resolves key philosophical problems, including infinite regress and self-justification, allowing for coherent philosophical thought. Furthermore, the paper explores conceptual parallels between this proof and elements of mysticism, pragmatism, and religious notions of divinity, suggesting a unified foundation that can empower individual contributions to the collective pursuit of truth. (shrink)