The phenomena of terrorism and other politically motivated violence have been assessed across different disciplines from political science and economics to theology and psychology. Whereas the definitions of the concepts of “terrorism” and “terrorist” are disputed and they rather reflect the perspectives of the defining entity, there is a common consensus that terrorism can be classified in terms of its type (such as state-sponsored, dissent, religious, pathological, narco-, cyber-, and bioterrorism), the scale (i.e. domestic vs. international), (...) motives, and objectives. By the same token, the roots and causes of terrorism can be enumerated as internal sources (such as social, economic, political, and cultural indicators) and external sources (such as colonialism and neocolonialism, regional conflicts and historical enmities, failed/failing states and lawless areas, and the penetration of foreign cultures and lifestyles). Although such grounds can be considered as the collective causes, they can merely address how one becomes a potential appropriate recruit for terrorist organizations. Hence, identifying the causes of terrorism is of paramount significance in order to both combat and most importantly prevent terrorism. Given that the first generation of psychological approaches to terrorist violence, chiefly drawing from psychoanalytic theory, has basically run its course, this study takes a systematic approach to evaluate the root causes of terrorism, particularly from social and behavioral perspectives, and attempts to address some key questions such as the progress of and reasons for individuals supporting, joining and leaving terrorist organizations, the relevance of psychopathology to comprehending and preventing terrorism, and the roles of ideology, identity, and belonging in terrorist behavior. (shrink)

This paper provides a Kantian interpretation of core issues involved in the trial following the terrorist attacks that struck Norway on July 22nd 2011. After a sketch of the controversies surrounding the trial itself, a Kantian theory of why the wrongdoer’s mind struck us as so endlessly disturbed is presented. This Kantian theory, I proceed by arguing, also helps us understand why it was so important to respond to the violence through the legal system and to treat the perpetrator, Anders (...) Behring Breivik, so respectfully before, during, and after the trial. I close by addressing the controversial issue now facing Norway: how capable is the Norwegian legal system to deal with cases involving extreme violence, including as committed by psychologically impaired mass murderers? (shrink)

The present study aims to build a thorough understanding and causes of terrorism. It discusses probable psychological and sociological factors for terrorist activities. Paper elaborates the presence of psychopathologies and cultural influences that harbor mindsets of terrorist individuals. It also highlights the relationship between religion and violence and elaborates the impact of media and its role for terrorism. The identification of psycho-social factors linked with terrorism and violence serve as a way to better understand the phenomenon. This (...) is likely to promote peace, harmony, and love in Nigerian societies. (shrink)

This is a critical examination of Zizek's concept of ideology in his work on the Sublime of Ideology. His account on this connotes that people are basing only in the conscious state without considering the unconscious "I." This framework in psychology has led Zizek to relate it in the process of economics which is greatly manifested in the contradictory poles of the oppressor and the oppressed and its relationship to the process of commodities. Looking into this orientation, this leaves (...) the author to incorporate the ideological character of Zizek through the lens of Anti-Terrorism Law which is not seen in the naked eye. (shrink)

Abstract: The study argues that there are four characteristic features of religious terrorism. Extremely high degree of fanaticism of these terrorists is the first feature. Pan-territorial activity of religious terrorists is the second one. The third feature expresses that religious terrorism activity is caused by the pathological psychological problems of those terrorists. Religious terrorists’ claim to the legitimacy of the violent acts is the fourth feature.

Why are some people capable of sympathizing with and/or committing acts of political violence, such as attacks aimed at innocent targets? Attempts to construct terrorist profiles based on individual and situational factors, such as clinical, psychological, ethnic, and socio-demographic variables, have largely failed. Although individual and situational factors must be at work, it is clear that they alone cannot explain how certain individuals are radicalized. In this paper, we propose that a comprehensive understanding of radicalization and of how it may (...) lead to political violence requires the integration of information across multiple levels of analysis and interdisciplinary perspectives from evolutionary theory, social, personality and cognitive psychology, political science and neuroscience. Characterization of the structural-functional relationships between neural mechanisms and the cognitive and affective psychological processes that underpin group dynamics, interpersonal processes, values and narratives, as well as micro-sociological processes may reveal latent drivers of radicalization and explain why some people turn to extreme political violence. These drivers may not be observable within a single individual level of scientific enquiry. The integrative, multilevel approach that characterizes social neuroscience has the potential to provide theoretical and empirical clarity regarding the antecedents of radicalization and support for extreme violence. (shrink)

Political realism remains a powerful theoretical framework for thinking about international relations, including the war on terrorism. For Morgenthau and other realists, foreign policy is a matter of national interest defined in terms of power. Some writers view this tenet as weakening, if not severing, realism's link with morality. I take up the contrary view that morality is embedded in realist thought, as well as the possibility of realism being thinly and thickly moralised depending on the moral psychology (...) of the agents. I argue that a prima facie case can be made within a thinly moralised realism for a relatively weak ally like Bosnia to enter the war on terrorism. An inflationary model of morality, however, explains how the moral horror of genocide in an ally's past may lead to a thickened moralised realism such that allied policy-makers question their country's entry into the war. (shrink)

A psychology-informed view of human rights has been taken into account by many scholars while examining the short-term and long-term effects of human rights violations on individuals and communities. In Trauma and Human Rights: Integrating Approaches to Address Human Suffering, for instance, the authors discuss the trauma-informed approach in the context of human rights violations, namely domestic violence, racial and other forms of discrimination, etc. In the paper on Trauma among children and legal implications, the authors advance a trauma-informed (...) approach to human rights. The approach considers the experiences of trauma associated with physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, psychological/emotional abuse, community violence, natural disasters, serious accidents, parental death/grief, medical procedures and conditions, and terrorism. In the case of violations including rape and torture, the paper Torture by means of Rape concerns the psychological suffering of victims of rape, abuse, and torture in light of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. As for the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies, the advancement of a psychology-informed view of human rights is noticeable. Take the example of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment on Biopsychosocial factors conducive to torture and ill-treatment. The Report explores the root causes of the current worldwide complacency concerning torture and ill-treatment and recommends the urgent and proactive incorporation of science-based conclusions into ongoing, policy-based global governance reform processes. Further, the report provides that the root cause of the systemic governance failure is attributed to the generic biopsychosocial factors that have shaped human decision-making throughout history, irrespective of national, cultural, religious, or other distinctive influences. Since the two fields are creating a landscape of new concepts and perspectives, one may study this interface broadly under three headings; (a) Psychology in Human Rights. (b) Rights-Based Approach to Psychological Science and Research. (c) Psychology and Human Rights in Law and Policy. (shrink)

Lankford’s (2013) essential empirical argument, which is based on evidence such as psychological autopsies, is that suicide attacks are caused by suicidality. By operationalizing this causal claim in a hypothetical experiment, I show the claim to be provable, and I contend that its truth is supported by Lankford’s data. However, I question the success of his follow-on arguments about beauty and goodness.

Although fairness is a key moral trait, limited research focuses on participants' observed fairness behavior because moral traits are generally measured through self-report. This experiment focused on day-to-day interpersonal fairness rather than impersonal justice, and fairness was assessed as observed behavior. The experiment investigated whether a self-reported fairness trait would moderate a situational influence on observed fairness behavior, such that individuals with a stronger fairness trait would be less affected by a situational influence than those with a weaker fairness trait. (...) We used an iterated resource game in which participants could withdraw resources as they chose, and we manipulated the number of resources bogus players withdrew. The number of resources participants withdrew was the behavioral measure of fairness. Results confirmed the expected moderation of the unfairness manipulation by a fairness trait on observed behavior. Those reporting a stronger fairness trait were unaffected by the manipulation, whereas those reporting a weaker fairness trait were more strongly influenced. (shrink)

Liberal democracies who perpetrate torture represent an apparent paradox: a flagrant violation of human rights by states supposedly dedicated to protecting human rights. In liberal democracies, the political, social, and legal narratives used to justify torture portray torture as an individual act motivated by important moral values. This individualized torture narrative then shapes the moral framework through which the public, policy-makers, and individual torturers view torture, and masks the institutional nature of torture perpetration. It is this interaction between an individualized (...) torture narrative and the moral framework of torture that distinguishes democratic perpetrators (Critchell et al. 2017, 9-10) from nondemocratic perpetrators of torture. Yet, the implementation of a torture program in a democratic state is remarkably similar to the implementation of a torture program in a nondemocratic state. In both cases, torture is an institutionalized practice given moral and political meaning through broad social and political narratives. This chapter uses the post-9/11 US torture program as a case study of a democratic perpetrator in order to explore the interaction between democratic narratives of torture, state implementation of torture, and the moral psychology of individual torturers. This permits a way of thinking about torture perpetration that goes beyond a myopic focus on torture as individual act to understand the interaction and mutual reinforcement of different forms of torture perpetration. This analysis also offers a starting point from which to consider how to resist and oppose torture narratives that sustain democratic tortue, a question I explore in the conclusion of this chapter. (shrink)

Voltaire called fanaticism the "monster that pretends to be the child of religion". Philosophers, politicians, and cultural critics have decried fanaticism and attempted to define the distinctive qualities of the fanatic, whom Winston Churchill described as "someone who can't change his mind and won't change the subject". Yet despite fanaticism's role in the long history of social discord, human conflict, and political violence, it remains a relatively neglected topic in the history of philosophy. In this outstanding inquiry into the philosophical (...) history of fanaticism a team of international contributors examine the topic from antiquity to the present day. Organised into four sections, topics covered include: Fanaticism in ancient Greek, Indian and Chinese philosophy; Fanaticism and superstition from Hobbes to Hume, including chapters on Locke and Montesquieu, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson; Kant, Germaine de Stael, Hegel, Nietzsche, William James, and Jorge Portilla on fanaticism; Fanaticism and terrorism; and extremism and gender, including the philosophy and morality of the 'manosphere'; Closed-mindedness and political and epistemological fanaticism. Spanning themes from superstition, enthusiasm and misanthropy to the emotions, purity and the need for certainty, Fanaticism and the History of Philosophy is a landmark volume for anyone researching and teaching the history of philosophy, particularly ethics and moral philosophy. It is also a valuable resource for those studying fanaticism in related fields such as religion, the history of political thought, sociology, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Dies ist kein perfektes Buch, aber es ist einzigartig, und wenn Sie die ersten 400 oder so Seiten überspringen, sind die letzten 300 (von etwa 700) ein ziemlich guter Versuch, das, was über Verhalten bekannt ist, auf soziale Veränderungen in Gewalt und Manieren im Laufe der Zeit anzuwenden. Das Grundthema ist: Wie kontrolliert und begrenzt unsere Genetik den gesellschaftlichen Wandel? Überraschenderweise versäumt er es, die Natur der Verwandtseinsauswahl (inklusive Fitness) zu beschreiben, die einen Großteil des tierischen und menschlichen gesellschaftlichen Lebens (...) erklärt. Ihm fehlt (wie fast jeder) ein klarer Rahmen für die Beschreibung der logischen Struktur der Rationalität (LSR – John Searles bevorzugter Begriff), den ich lieber die Deskriptive Psychologie des Höheren Ordnungsdenkens (DPHOT) nenne. Er hätte etwas über die vielen anderen Arten des Missbrauchs und der Ausbeutung von Menschen und dem Planeten sagen sollen, da diese jetzt so viel schwerwiegender sind, dass andere Formen der Gewalt fast irrelevant werden. Die Ausweitung des Konzepts der Gewalt auf die globalen langfristigen-Folgen der Replikationvon Genen von jemandem und ein Verständnis dafür, wie Evolution funktioniert (d. h. die Auswahl von Verwandten), wird eine ganz andere Perspektive auf die Geschichte, die aktuellen Ereignisse und die Wahrscheinlichkeit bieten, wie die Dinge in den nächsten paar hundert Jahren ablaufen werden. Man könnte zunächst feststellen, dass der Rückgang der körperlichen Gewalt in der Geschichte durch die ständig wachsende gnadenlose Vergewaltigung des Planeten (d.h. durch die Zerstörung der Zukunft des eigenen Nachkommen) durch die Menschen ausgeglichen (und ermöglicht) wurde.’ Pinker (wie die meisten Menschen die meiste Zeit) wird oft durch die Oberflächlichkeiten der Kultur abgelenkt, wenn es auf die Biologie ankommt. Sehen Sie hier und im Netz meine aktuellen Rezensionen zu Wilsons 'The Social Conquest of Earth' und Nowak und Highfields 'SuperCooperators' hier und im Netz für eine kurze Zusammenfassung der Leere des 'wahren Altruismus'(Gruppenauswahl) und der Funktionsweise der Verwandtschaftsauswahl und der Nutzlosigkeit und Oberflächlichkeit der Beschreibung von Verhalten in kultureller Hinsicht. Dies ist die klassische Natur/Pflege-Frage und Die Natur übertrumpft die Pflege - unendlich. Was wirklich zählt, ist die Gewalt, die der Erde durch die unerbittliche Zunahme der Bevölkerungs- und Ressourcenvernichtung (aufgrund von Medizin und Technologie und Konfliktunterdrückung durch Polizei und Militär) zugefügt wird. Etwa 200.000 mehr Menschen pro Tag (ein anderes Las Vegas alle 10 Tage, ein anderes Los Angeles jeden Monat), die etwa 6 Tonnen Oberboden, die ins Meer/Person/Jahr gehen – etwa 1% der gesamten jährlichen Verschwinden der Welt, etc. bedeuten, dass, wenn nicht irgendein Wunder geschieht, die Biosphäre und Zivilisation in den nächsten zwei Jahrhunderten, weitgehend zusammenbrechen werden, und es wird Hunger, Elend und Gewalt jeder Art in einem schwindelerregenden Ausmaß geben. Die Manieren, Meinungen und Tendenzen der Menschen, Gewalttaten zu begehen, sind ohne ihre Möglichkeit, etwas zu tun, um diese Katastrophe zu vermeiden, von Bedeutung, und ich sehe nicht, wie das geschehen wird. Es gibt keinen Raum für Argumente, und auch keinen Sinn (ja, ich bin ein Fatalist), also werde ich nur ein paar Kommentare machen, als ob es Fakten wären. Stellen Sie sich nicht vor, dass ich ein persönliches Interesse daran habe, eine Gruppe auf Kosten anderer zu fördern. Ich bin 78, habe keine Nachkommen und keine nahen Verwandtenund identifiziere mich nicht mit einer politischen, nationalen oder religiösen Gruppe und betrachte die, zu der ich standardmäßig gehöre, als ebenso abstoßend wie alle anderen. Eltern sind die schlimmsten Feinde des Lebens auf der Erde, und wenn man den weiten Blick auf die Dinge nimmt, sind Frauen so gewalttätig wie Männer, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Gewalt von Frauen (wie die meisten von Männern) weitgehend in Zeitlupe, in zeitlicher und raumweiseer Entfernung erfolgt und meist durch Stellvertreter - von ihren Nachkommen und von Männern - ausgeübt wird. In zunehmendem Maße tragen Frauen Kinder, unabhängig davon, ob sie einen Partner haben, und die Wirkung, eine Frau von der Zucht abzuhalten, ist im Durchschnitt viel größer als das Stoppen eines Mannes, da sie der Fortpflanzungsengpass sind. Man kann der Ansicht sein, dass die Menschen und ihre Nachkommen das Elend, das ihnen zukommt, verdienen und (mit seltenen Ausnahmen) die Reichen und Berühmten die schlimmsten Übeltäter sind. Meryl Streep oder Bill Gates oder J.K Rowling und jedes ihrer Kinder kann 50 Tonnen Topsoil jedes Jahr für Generationen in die Zukunft zerstören, während ein indischer Bauer und seine 1 Tonne zerstören können. Wenn jemand das leugnet, ist das in Ordnung, und zu seinen Nachkommen sage ich "Willkommen in der Hölle auf Erden" (WTHOE). Heute liegt der Schwerpunkt immer auf den Menschenrechten, aber es ist klar, dass die menschliche Verantwortung die Menschenrechte ersetzen muss, wenn die Zivilisation eine Chance haben soll. Niemand bekommt Rechte, ohne ein verantwortungsvoller Bürger zu sein, und das erste, was dies bedeutet, istdie minmale Umweltzerstörung. Die grundlegendste Verantwortung sind keine Kinder, es sei denn, eure Gesellschaft bittet euch, sie zu produzieren. Eine Gesellschaft oder eine Welt, die Menschen nach dem Zufallsprinzip züchten lässt, wird immer von egoistischen Genen ausgebeutet, bis sie zusammenbricht (oder einen Punkt erreicht, an dem das Leben so schrecklich ist, dass es nicht lebenswert ist). Wenn, die Gesellschaft weiterhin die Menschenrechte als primäre, zu ihren Nachkommen, kann man mit Zuversicht sagen "WTHOE". Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Moral bioenhancement is the potential practice of manipulating individuals’ moral behaviors by biological means in order to help resolve pressing moral issues such as climate change and terrorism. This practice has obvious ethical implications, and these implications have been and continue to be discussed in the bioethics literature. What have not been discussed are the epistemological implications of moral bioenhancement. This article details some of these implications of engaging in moral bioenhancement. The argument begins by making the distinction between (...) moral bioenhancement that manipulates the contents of mental states and that which manipulates other, non-representational states. Either way, I argue, the enhanced moral psychology will fail to conform to epistemic norms, and the only way to resolve this failure and allow the moral bioenhancement to be effective in addressing the targeted moral issues is to make the moral bioenhancement covert. (shrink)

One of the questions raised by this important and thought-provoking collection of essays on torture is how and why the consensus that torture is wrong - a consensus enshrined in international law for decade - has become so fragile. As Scott Anderson writes in the introduction to this volume, "how did abusing and torturing prisoners suddenly become so popular?” The chapters in this volume offer insights into this question from the perspectives of history, psychology, law, philosophy, and sociology. This (...) interdisciplinary approach highlights important and often overlooked aspects of the torture debate. Yet, the questions that the authors take to be important (for example, about whether the justification of torture should even be contemplated) reflect different and sometimes incompatible normative assumptions about what torture is and about what matters in the torture debate. These assumptions, I shall argue, are shaped by, and play a role in shaping, the moral, political, and social narratives that contribute to or resist the toleration of torture in the US and elsewhere. Thus, while the disparate nature of the contributions (perhaps inevitably) undermine the cohesiveness of the volume as a whole, it illuminates, even if it does not resolve, larger questions about the place and function of academic debate in the history and use of torture. (shrink)

Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne have written a piece, forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology, called “Disbelief in Belief,” in which they criticize my recent paper “Religious credence is not factual belief” (2014, Cognition 133). Here I respond to their criticisms, the thrust of which is that we shouldn’t distinguish religious credence from factual belief, contrary to what I say. I respond that their picture of religious psychology undermines our ability to distinguish common religious people from fanatics. My response will (...) appear in the same issue as their paper. (shrink)

Hailed as "a feast" (Washington Post) and "a modern-day bestiary" (The New Yorker), Stephen Asma's On Monsters is a wide-ranging cultural and conceptual history of monsters--how they have evolved over time, what functions they have served for us, and what shapes they are likely to take in the future. Beginning at the time of Alexander the Great, the monsters come fast and furious--Behemoth and Leviathan, Gog and Magog, Satan and his demons, Grendel and Frankenstein, circus freaks and headless children, right (...) up to the serial killers and terrorists of today and the post-human cyborgs of tomorrow. Monsters embody our deepest anxieties and vulnerabilities, Asma argues, but they also symbolize the mysterious and incoherent territory beyond the safe enclosures of rational thought. Exploring sources as diverse as philosophical treatises, scientific notebooks, and novels, Asma unravels traditional monster stories for the clues they offer about the inner logic of an era's fears and fascinations. In doing so, he illuminates the many ways monsters have become repositories for those human qualities that must be repudiated, externalized, and defeated. (shrink)

This review aimed at exploring the psychosocial disorders of Nigeria as a nation, its effect on the citizens and the remedy. Psychosocial disorder is a mental illness induced by life experiences, stress, as well as maladaptive cognitive and behavioural processes. The prevalence of these disorders include depression, schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, substance use disorder, personality disorder and autism spectrum disorders have rapidly increase over the past years in Nigeria with its negative impact on the socioeconomic status, psychological well-being; peaceful coexistence and (...) mental health of the entire society. These have precipitated some social anomalies such as bribery and corruption, antisocial behaviour, religious fanaticism, terrorism and so on. The study therefore recommends the need for government to implement effective mental health interventions program that would facilitate easy access to mental healthcare services in Nigeria. There is also an urgent need to improve the mental health awareness of Nigerians through education and public mental health campaign. (shrink)

This is a discussion of the moral psychology of monstrous evil. It suggests that deliberate monstrously evil acts committed in the name of the good by moral agents arises from a peculiar vice which blinds them to the humanity of others. It also examines an opposing virtue, generosity.

As many scholars have written about the Vietnam War, this thesis, Forgotten Memories: Re-Constructing the Vietnam War in Films, explores a different approach to this topic by examining films. Historical films are becoming increasingly important in shaping the way the past is understood and remembered. After the war ended, many Hollywood films have continued to capture the atrocities of the war that affected the war narrative of the Vietnam War. American politics and the public suffered from the Vietnam Syndrome, and (...) they lost confidence in the military and government structures. These emotions are translated into Hollywood films about the Vietnam War. The victory of the Gulf War in 1991 finally helped them to get out of the shadow of that psychological fear in foreign intervention. The Vietnam War films have made its comeback after the September 11th attacks. Many scholars have compared the war against terrorism is similar to the war against communism in the 1950s. Over the years, Hollywood has produced many films that are either directly about or set against the backdrop of the Vietnam War. The different representations of the Vietnam War presenting in both American and Vietnamese films produced between 1979 and 2005 explain how the film war narrative reconstruct the memory of history. By examining both American and Vietnamese films about the Vietnam War, this study calls attention to the importance of the Vietnamese experience in our understanding of the Vietnam War and brings an international perspective to the study of this subject in cultural and film studies. By identifying trends and discussing similarities and differences in film-narrative tropes across both American and Vietnamese films about the Vietnam War, this research argues that the film industry has shaped the collective memory of the Vietnam War. In doing so, Hollywood has highlighted the memorable and traumatic events that occurred during the war to construct the film narrative and generate a widespread perception of v the war. Vietnam’s government, due to the war’s destruction, made it a top priority to rebuild the economy and used films to deliver only social propaganda, expressing its gratitude and sympathy to families who lost their loved ones in the war. (shrink)

これは完璧な本ではありませんが、それはユニークであり、最初の400ページほどをスキミングすると、最後の300ページ(約700ページ)は、時間の経過とともに暴力やマナーの社会的変化に行動について知られて いるものを適用するかなり良い試みです。基本的なトピックは、私たちの遺伝学はどのように社会の変化を制御し、制限するかということです。驚くべきことに、彼は動物や人間の社会生活の多くを説明する親族の選択(包 括的なフィットネス)の性質を記述することができません。彼はまた、(ほぼすべての人と同様に)私が高次思考の記述心理学(DPHOT)と呼ぶのを好む合理性の論理的構造(LSR - John Searleの好ましい用語)を記述するための明確な枠組みを欠いている。彼は、人々や地球を虐待し、搾取する他の多くの方法について何かを言うべきでした nearly。暴力の概念を拡張して-、誰かの遺伝子の複製の世界的な長期的な結果を含め、進化がどのように機能するか(すなわち、親族の選択)の性質を把握することは、歴史、現在の出来事、そして物事が今後数百 年でどのように行われる可能性が高いかについて非常に異なる視点を提供します。歴史に対する身体的暴力の減少は、地球の絶え間なく増加する無慈悲な強姦(すなわち、人々が自分の子孫の将来を破壊することによって) 一致している(そして可能になった)ことを知るから始めるかもしれません’。ピンカー(ほとんどの人と同じように)は、重要なのは生物学であるときに、しばしば文化の表面性に気を取られます。ウィルソンの「地球の 社会的征服」とノワクとハイフィールドの「スーパーコオペレータ」の私の最近のレビューをここで、ネット上で「真の利他主義」(グループ選択)の空虚さ、そして親族選択の運営と文化的な言葉で行動を記述することの 無駄と表面性の簡単な要約を参照してください。 これは古典的な自然/育成の問題であり、自然の切り札は無限に育てます。本当に重要なのは、人口と資源破壊の容赦ない増加(医療と技術、警察と軍による紛争抑制による)によって地球に対して行われた暴力です。1日 に約20万人以上の人々(10日ごとに別のラスベガス、毎月別のロサンゼルス)、6海/人/年に入る6トンほどの表土-世界の全ての年間消えていく約1%などは、何らかの奇跡が起こらない限り、生物圏と文明が次の 2世紀の間に大部分が崩壊し、飢餓、悲惨、暴力が起こることを意味します。 暴力的な行為を行う人々のマナー、意見、傾向は、彼らがこの大惨事を避けるために何かを行うことができる限り、関連性はありませんし、私はそれがどのように起こるか分かりません。議論のためのスペースはなく、意味 もありません(はい、私は致命的です)ので、私は彼らが事実であるかのようにいくつかのコメントをします。私が他の人を犠牲にして1つのグループを宣伝することに個人的な利害関係があるとは想像しないでください。 私は78で、子孫も近親者もおらず、政治的、国家的、宗教的なグループと識別せず、デフォルトで属するものを他のすべてと同じように反発的なものと見なしません。 両親は地球上で最悪の生命の敵であり、物事の広い視野を持って、女性の暴力(男性が行うもののほとんどと同様に)は、主にスローモーションで行われ、時間と空間の距離で行われ、主に代理人によって行われているとい う事実を考えると、女性は男性と同じくらい暴力的です。ますます、女性は仲間を持っているかどうかに関係なく子供を産み、1人の女性の繁殖を止める効果は、生殖のボトルネックであるため、平均して1人の男性を止め るよりもはるかに大きい。人は、人々とその子孫が自分の道を来るどんな悲惨さにも豊かに値するという見解を取ることができ、(まれな例外を除いて)金持ちと有名人は最悪の犯罪者です。メリル・ストリープやビル・ゲ イツ、J.Kローリング、そして彼らの子供たちは、将来の世代のために毎年50トンの表土を破壊する可能性がありますが、インドの農家と彼は1トンを破壊する可能性があります。誰かがそれがうまくいくことを否定し 、その子孫に私は「地球上の地獄へようこそ」(WTHOE)と言います。 今日の重点は常に人権であるが、文明がチャンスに耐えるならば、人権に取って代わらなければならないことは明らかである。誰も責任ある市民でなく権利を得る、これは最初に意味するミニマル環境破壊です。あなたの社 会が彼らを作るように頼まなければ、最も基本的な責任は子供ではありません。人々が無作為に繁殖することを可能にする社会や世界は、それが崩壊するまで(または人生が生きる価値がないので恐ろしいポイントに達する )、常に利己的な遺伝子によって悪用されます。社会が人権を第一者として維持し続けるならば、その子孫に対して「WTHOE」は自信を持って言うことができる。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st 世紀 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Understanding Terrorism in the context of Global Security -/- Author / Authors : Shreyasi Ghosh Page no. 89-106 Discipline : Political Science/Polity/ Democratic studies Script/language : Roman/English Category : Research paper Keywords: Terrorism, Violence, Threat, Global Security, Globalization.

This chapter conceptually analyzes the post-traumatic stress injuries called moral injury, moral fatigue or exhaustion, and broken spirit. It then identifies two puzzles. First, soldiers sometimes sustain moral injury even from doing right actions. Second, they experience moral exhaustion from making decisions even where the morally right choice is so obvious that it shouldn’t be stressful to make it; and even where rightness of decision is so murky that no decision could be morally faulted. The injuries result of mistaken moral (...) self-evaluation. Methods of preventing and treating these injuries are defended, including training in self-forgiveness, moral off-loading of actions and decisions to persons and devices less likely to feel inappropriate guilt, and the use of drugs to prevent such guilt. The foregoing has been about moral injury erroneously resulting from the non-violation of a correct moral code. But the chapter then introduces the concept of moral pseudo-injury—felt moral injury that has in reality resulted from violation of a false moral code, so that no one has really been morally injured. This can be used as a method in warfighting. And since the injuries it produces are illusory, this would be morally superior to physical violence. For it causes less injury to its victims, and should cause less guilt in those who must inflict it. Historical precedents are considered. Finally, our enemies often use moral pseudo-injury against us, in the form of terrorist violence against civilians. Terrorism causes comparatively few harms, yet we mistakenly see it as more morally horrific than conventional combat that causes much worse loss of life among armed forces members. Here we need the nuancing and clarifying power of philosophy to restore a sense of proportion, thence to prevent or therapize the moral pseudo-injury we may experience from these sorts of attacks. (This is a pre-penultimate version of the published version, available from OUP at the external link, which contains minor variances. The paper was earlier known as "PTSD Weaponized: A Theory of Moral Injury"; that now superseded version is archived under "past conferences" on the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law website.). (shrink)

This book engages with the most urgent philosophical questions pertaining to the problem of terrorism. What is terrorism? Could it ever be justified? Assuming that terrorism is just one of many kinds of political violence, the book denies that it is necessarily wrong and worse than war. In fact, it may be justifiable under certain circumstances.

Without doubt, terrorism is one of the most vehemently debated subjects in current political affairs as well as in academic discourse. Yet, although it constitutes an issue of general socio-political interest, neither in everyday language nor in professional (political, legal, or academic) contexts does there exist a generally accepted definition of terrorism. The question of how it should be defined has been answered countless times, with as much variety as quantity in the answers. In academic discourse, it is (...) difficult to find two scholars who use the term ‘terrorism’ in the same way. -/- While it is impossible to formulate a definition which satisfies everyone, discussing the definition question is indispensable. The necessity to review existing definitions with a view to improving them is especially obvious in legal and political contexts. How terrorism is defined in these contexts has serious consequences, and if we lack clear definitions we run into problems. How can we have laws or take political measures against something we have not clearly defined? Without doubt, there exists a practical necessity for a definition in these fields. It is important to have clear standards for defining terrorism. -/- In my view, the definition should meet three basic criteria: first, it should cover those cases that we concurrently consider to be instances of terrorism (such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in September 2001 or those on commuting trains in Madrid Atocha in March 2004). That is, ideally, our definition of terrorism remains close to uncontroversial usages of the term. Second, the definition should abstain from morally judging the act in question. Later I will say more about so called “moral” definitions of terrorism. For now, it suffices to say that defining an action and evaluating it are distinct tasks and should remain so. Third, the definition must identify characteristics that are specific to terrorism alone, characteristics which clearly distinguish it from other phenomena. (shrink)

Tough anti-terrorism policies are often defended by focusing on a fixed minority of the population who prefer violent outcomes, and arguing that toughness reduces the risk of terrorism from this group. This reasoning implicitly assumes that tough policies do not increase the group of 'potential terrorists', i.e., of people with violent preferences. Preferences and their level of violence are treated as stable, exogenously fixed features. To avoid this unrealis- tic assumption, I formulate a model in which policies can (...) 'brutalise' or 'appease' someone's personality, i.e., his preferences. This follows the endogenous prefer- ences approach, popular elsewhere in political science and economics. I formally decompose the effect of toughness into a (desirable) deterrence effect and an (un- desirable) provocation effect. Whether toughness is overall effi cient depends on which effect overweighs. I show that neglecting provocation typically leads to toughness exaggeration. This suggests that some tough anti-terrorism policies observable in the present and past can be explained by a neglect of provocation. (shrink)

Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line of argument. First, one may doubt that terrorism is necessarily directed against innocents or non-combatants. However, I will focus on the second objection, according to which there may be exceptions from the prohibition against killing the innocent. In my article I will elaborate whether lethal terrorism against innocents can be justified in a supreme emergency. Starting from a critique of Michael Walzer’s (...) account of supreme emergency, I will argue that the supreme emergency exemption justifies the resort to terrorism against innocents to avert moral disasters such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, provided that the criteria of last resort, proportionality and public declaration are satisfied. (shrink)

It is facile and factually incorrect to represent suicide terrorists as simply seeking mass destruction, as demented or believing that they will be rewarded by "seventy-two virgins in paradise". In my book The Myth of the Closed Mind: Understanding How and Why People are Rational I felt it was important to deal with the issue of terrorism by consulting explanatory theories of human behaviour and the substantial research on the strategic pattern of terrorist incidents over the decades, led principally (...) by Professor Robert Pape of Chicago University. -/- To defeat your enemy, you must first understand him. Strangely, we must first grant that, though morally depraved, terrorists are rational: they concoct and execute detailed plans with definite strategic goals in mind. Only once we have granted the terrorist a rational mind can we, in the end, create peace. My argument is that while religion may have a small role in terrorism, it is principally politics, or the logic of territorial control, that is the key to understanding the threat we face. -/- This extract from my book is principally about Al Qaeda, but a similar analysis applies to ISIS, the current greatest threat to our peace in the west. -/- The strategic goal of Al Qaeda was simply to repulse what they saw as foreign intervention. ISIS has the same goal, but in order to continue its growth as a state in the sense of a monopoly of coercion over a given geographical area. -/- ISIS, a rogue state that arose in ungoverned space created unintentionally by foreign intervention in Iraq, is now lashing out at foreign governments that have severely shrunk the territory ISIS occupies. Before October 2015, ISIS confined its terrorism to the goal of extending its territory in Iraq and Syria, and there were no significant ISIS-led or inspired suicide terrorist attacks outside Iraq and Syria. But now, as their territory collapses, they are attacking the countries that have strangled their control of territory in Iraq and Syria: the coalition of western governments – Britain, Belgium, Canada, France, Morocco, Turkey, Russia, the U.S.A. and others – exactly the countries that have recently seen an explosion of suicide terrorism. (shrink)

First, I argue that the contestability of the term “terrorism” is insufficient to justify the targeting of those who are innocent noncombatants beyond reasonable doubt; second, that states could be as vicious, if not even more so, than nonstate actors could be in perpetrating acts that might be described as terrorism, and, third, that an adequate definition of international terrorism must focus on the actual victims of such despicable acts.

In contemporary academic, political, and media discourse, terrorism is typically portrayed as an existential threat to lives and states, a threat driven by religious extremists who seek the destruction of Western civilization and who are immune to reason and negotiation. In many countries, including the US, the UK, and Australia, this existential threat narrative of terrorism has been used to justify sweeping counterterrorism legislation, as well as military operations and even the use of tactics such as torture and (...) indefinite detention. In this chapter I outline the components of the existential threat narrative, and explain how critical terrorism scholars have critiqued this narrative on two main grounds: that it is based on false empirical claims about the nature, scale, and motivations of modern non-state terrorism, and that counterterrorism policies and practices based on this narrative have had extremely destructive consequences for individuals, communities, and states—in some cases, causing far more destruction than terrorism itself. In the final section I offer some suggestions for the direction of future terrorism research in light of these critiques of the existential threat narrative. (shrink)

In my replies to some of my critics I argue that while the practice of terrorism is never justified, I concede that it is rarely but sometimes excused. As result, those who engage in excusable terrorism has a substantial burden of proof. They need to offer a compelling argument to show that the harm caused by their terrorist violence is actually excused by the extenuating circumstances and the goal that they are trying to achieve, so they will not (...) be morally or legally blameworthy for bringing about such harm. I am assuming that they will need to demonstrate that the alleged harm is excusable because it is necessary to accomplish a worthy goal and there is no other reasonable way to obtain such a worthy goal without deliberately harming those who can be reasonably conceived of as impeccably or objectively innocent. That is, those who are innocent beyond reasonable doubt. (shrink)

The adage, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter,” is offered as a plausible example of evoking moral relativism. Moral relativists recognize no transcultural moral facts. So, for them, even the concept of harm would be subjective or context-sensitive. Yet one can appeal to cogent transcultural moral reasons to distinguish between deliberately and unjustifiably harming impeccably innocent people and those who might engage in justifiably harming those guilty of grave crimes. In the face of the preventable evil acts that (...) terrorists frequently perpetrate against impeccably innocent people, it is argued that moral relativists have a substantive burden of proof to demonstrate that no cogent transcultural moral reasons exist against the practice of terrorism. In the absence of such a demonstration, it is reasonable to believe that the practice of terrorism, while not totally defeating moral relativism, seems to undermine its credibility. (shrink)

Just war scholars are increasingly focusing on the importance of jus post bellum – justice after war – for the legitimacy of military campaigns. Should something akin to jus post bellum standards apply to terrorist campaigns? Assuming that at least some terrorist actors pursue legitimate goals or just causes, do such actors have greater difficulty satisfying the prospect-of-success criterion of Just War Theory than military actors? Further, may the use of the terrorist method as such – state or non-state – (...) jeopardize lasting peace in a way that other violent, for instance military, strategies do not? I will argue that there appears to be little reason to believe that terrorist campaigns are in principle less able to secure or at least contribute to a lasting peace than military campaigns; quite to the contrary. Or, put differently, if terrorism is an unlikely method for securing peace, then war is an even more unlikely one. (shrink)

The range of the aesthetic has expanded to cover not only a wider range of objects and situations of daily life but also to encompass the negative. This includes terrorism, whose aesthetic impact is central to its use as a political tactic. The complex of positive and negative aesthetic values in terrorism are explored, introducing the concept of the sublime as a negative category to illuminate the analysis and the distinctive aesthetic of terrorism.

“Terrorism” is a polysemic, emotionally laden term. Belligerent groups could be labeled “terrorist” by some and “freedom” or “guerrilla” fighters by others. Similarly, the same organization or group could be labeled “terrorist” by some and “humanitarian organization” by others. Hence, depending on which perspective people take in a given conflict, and how the international community reacts to the conflict in question, members of different organizations or groups might end up being classified in a negative sense as terrorists or in (...) a positive sense as freedom fighters. Such perspectivism partly explains why so much disagreement exists on the meaning, justification, or excuse of terrorism. (shrink)

Since terrorism has been a predominant news item it has been interchangeably linked with Islam in most cases. Terrorism itself and the processes involved that lead to terrorism is referred to as radicalization. These are complex and do not fit with a standard profile nor group.

Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we argue that the implicit aim of the (...) central moral motives and emotions is to hold people - whether oneself or others - accountable for compliance with the demands of morality. Moral condemnation is based in a motive to get perpetrators to hold themselves accountable for their wrongdoing, not, as is commonly supposed, a mere retributive motive to make perpetrators suffer (�2). And moral conscience is based in a genuine motive to hold oneself accountable for behaving in accordance with moral demands, not, as is commonly supposed, a mere egoistic motive to appear moral to others (�3). The accountability-based theory of the moral motives and emotions we offer provides better explanations of the extant empirical data than any of the major alternative theories of moral motivation. Moreover, conceiving of moral psychology in this way gives us a new and illuminating perspective on what makes morality distinctive: its essential connection to our practice of holding one another accountable (�4). (shrink)

My concern today is with the last of these questions. But, it is virtually impossible to say anything intelligent about this matter unless some effort is made to delineate the phenomenon under scrutiny. So I will begin by addressing the first question, and this requires that something be said about the semantics and pragmatics of the terms, ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’.

Debates about terrorism and technology often focus on the potential uses of technology by non-state terrorist actors and by states as forms of counterterrorism. Yet, little has been written about how technology shapes how we think about terrorism. In this chapter I argue that technology, and the language we use to talk about technology, constrains and shapes our understanding of the nature, scope, and impact of terrorism, particularly in relation to state terrorism. After exploring the ways (...) in which technology shapes moral thinking, I use two case studies to demonstrate how technology simultaneously hides and enables terroristic forms of state violence: police control technologies and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones. In both these cases, I argue that features of these technologies, combined with a narrative of precision and efficiency, serves to mask the terroristic nature of the violence that these practices inflict and reinforces the moral exclusion of those against whom these technologies are deployed. In conclusion, I propose that identifying acts of terrorism requires a focus on the impact of technologies of violence (whether they are “high tech” or not) on those most affected, regardless of whether users of these technologies conceive of their actions as terroristic. (shrink)

James Olson, author of the book Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying (p.15), questions “What actions by a state are permissible in pursuing the state’s interests? Are lying, cheating, manipulation, deception, coercion and other techniques of espionage and covert action justifiable in national self-defense?” To expand his thought, to that end, I say, “Can different moral and ethical theories co-exist during war or conflict?” Can we extend our range of options in dealing with terrorism globally in an effort (...) to satisfy our national security objectives using principles outlined in the many moral and ethical theories? In short answer, yes. This paper will address moral and ethical theories that I believe justify the use of a range of options or extended options to combat terrorism to meet our national security objectives without severely corrupting our universal morals or ethics. -/- Strictly speaking from a theory basis, and a common sense approach-with no religious affirmations-I ascribe to a combination of principles of the Just War theory and Moral Absolutism philosophy. It is my belief that we cannot engage terrorists’ Realpolitik and normative ethical relativist frame-of- mind to justify the use of force based on one moral or ethical theory or philosophy. A combination of principles from the Just War theory and Moral Absolutism philosophy can morally and ethically justify engagement in combating terrorism. (shrink)

Infusing contemporary critical terrorism studies (CTS) with concepts and methodologies from philosophy and critical theory via a Baradian posthumanist agential realist perspective and (counter)terrorist cases and vignettes, this chapter argues for a retheorisation of (counter)terrorism. It does so, firstly, by reconceptualising terrorism and counterterrorism as complex assemblages consisting not only of discursive-material components – an entanglement now largely accepted within CTS and critical security studies (CSS) – but also of affective layers and more-than-human phenomena. Secondly, by analysing (...) European urban (counter)terrorist cases from the UK, Germany, France, and Spain, together with these cases’ surprising spacetime-jumping interlinkages underwriting what we here conceptualise as queer(ing) spacetimematterings, this chapter zooms in on the intra-actions taking place between human and more-than-human agential phenomena and their risk-managed urban environments. Lastly, extra analytical attention is paid to how, in this neoliberal day and age – here rephrased as control society-driven ‘situationscaping times’ – very specific macro- and micropolitical violence-preventing measures and efforts are employed in the fight against various manifestations of urban terror and terrorism. (shrink)

The thought of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) helps to place Islamist terrorism within a certain tradition of warfare and political theory. In fact, this form of violence can be clarified by Schmitt’s theoretical endowment, as this brief paper attempts to do. The end of the legal framework of the jus publicum europaeum and the emergence of non-state actors have put into question centuries-old certainties. Schmitt’s theory could help to put order in political concepts today ideologically misused. And his opposition to (...) any universalistic tendencies questions not only Jihadi ideology but also Western anti-terroristic rhetoric, which is equally part of the ongoing global war of annihilation feared by Schmitt during his entire life. (shrink)

In combating international terrorism, it is important to observe some basic principles, such as that international law must be complied with, care should be taken that one does not proceed in such a way that future terrorists are recruited, and one does not oneself become a terrorist. Unfortunately, the war on terrorism.

The lottery paradox involves a set of judgments that are individually easy, when we think intuitively, but ultimately hard to reconcile with each other, when we think reflectively. Empirical work on the natural representation of probability shows that a range of interestingly different intuitive and reflective processes are deployed when we think about possible outcomes in different contexts. Understanding the shifts in our natural ways of thinking can reduce the sense that the lottery paradox reveals something problematic about our concept (...) of knowledge. However, examining these shifts also raises interesting questions about how we ought to be thinking about possible outcomes in the first place. (shrink)

This paper examines the responses to advanced and transformative technologies in military literature, attenuates the conclusions of earlier work suggesting that there is an “ignorance of transhumanism” in the military, and updates the current layout of transhuman concerns in military thought. The military is not ignorant of transhuman issues and implications, though there was evidence for this in the past; militaries and non-state actors (including terrorists) increasingly use disruptive technologies with what we may call transhuman provenance.

On September 11, 2001, Americans were painfully reminded of a truth that for years had been easy to overlook, namely, that terrorism can affect every person in the world – regardless of location, nationality, political conviction, or occupation – and that, in principle, nobody is beyond terrorism’s reach. However, our renewed awareness of the ubiquity of the terrorist threat has been accompanied by wide disagreement and confusion about the moral status of terrorism and how terrorism ought (...) to be confronted. Much of the disagreement and confusion, I contend, is rooted in an inadequate understanding of just what it is that constitutes terrorism. In this paper, I offer the beginnings of a response to the challenge of terrorism by providing an account of what terrorism is and of some of the philosophical issues involved. My account is divided into two sections. In the first section I examine some of the difficulties involved in defining terrorism, and show that some of the most common “ordinary” understandings of terrorism are inadequate. In the second section I offer a working definition of terrorism that overcomes many of the difficulties outlined in the first section. I argue that terrorism consists in the use of “systematically unsystematic” violence (whether directed at combatants or noncombatants), and that the random or indiscriminate character of terroristic violence points us in the direction of seeing what is distinctively wrong with it. The fundamental problem is that terrorism is not committed to any rules of armed conflict or any principles that would facilitate the eventual containment or termination of the conflict. (shrink)

This articles exposes the methodological errors involved in attempting to operationalize or value-neutralize the concept of 'terrorism.' It defends, instead, an effects-based approach to the taxonomy of 'terrorism' that builds out from a central conceptual connection between the term's negative connotation and a widely shared moral presumption against the killing of innocent non-combatants. Although this approach to the core meaning of 'terrorism' is far from value-neutral, it has a number of virtues to recommend it. First, it has (...) the political virtue of even-handedness in the way it enables competing appraisals of asymmetric conflicts. Second, it is has the ethical virtue of being flexible enough to accommodate nuanced appraisals of various modes and degrees of terrorist violence. And third, it has the empirical virtue of being useful for purposes of rigorous social scientific research. (shrink)

In industrial societies where civil law and state institutions have become well established secular vehicles for governing the populace, it is widely assumed that the state no longer has an interest in fortifying the religious sector as a complementary source of social control. Thus, a distinction is drawn between the Islamic state that is ruled by religious law and the secular state of Western industrial societies in which religion is deemed to have lost its influence in the public sphere. This (...) dissertation argues that civil law is not religiously neutral and thus challenges a central premise of secularization theory. Introducing a new theoretical model that classifies civil law on the basis of its purpose-to protect religious liberty, engage or fortify the religious sector, or to advance universal norms-the author examines the impact of the three different types of legislation upon religious freedom and the individual autonomy of religious minorities in Sweden, an aggressively secularized industrial society. The author concludes that, viewed from the standpoint of a religious nonconformist, there is no discernible difference between living in a society that is overtly ruled by religious law (e.g., an Islamic state) and living in a "secular” society that is ruled by civil law either embedded with religious norms or designed to facilitate state appropriation of the religious sector as a complementary means of social control. In either environment, the author argues, the religious nonconformist will be forced to conform to the religious norms of the predominant religious group. (shrink)