Results for 'truth by convention'

997 found
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  1. Words by Convention.Gail Leckie & Robert Williams - 2019 - In David Sosa & Ernie Lepore (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 1. Oxford, UK: OUP.
    Existing metasemantic projects presuppose that word- (or sentence-) types are part of the non-semantic base. We propose a new strategy: an endogenous account of word types, that is, one where word types are fixed as part of the metasemantics. On this view, it is the conventions of truthfulness and trust that ground not only the meaning of the words (meaning by convention) but also what the word type is of each particular token utterance (words by convention). The same (...)
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  2. Linguistic Convention and Worldly Fact: Prospects for a Naturalist Theory of the a Priori.Brett Topey - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1725-1752.
    Truth by convention, once thought to be the foundation of a uniquely promising approach to explaining our access to the truth in nonempirical domains, is nowadays widely considered an absurdity. Its fall from grace has been due largely to the influence of an argument that can be sketched as follows: our linguistic conventions have the power to make it the case that a sentence expresses a particular proposition, but they can’t by themselves generate truth; whether a (...)
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  3. Truth-Makers and Convention T.Jan Woleński - 2011 - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    This papers discuss the place, if any, of Convention T (the condition of material adequacy of the proper definition of truth formulated by Tarski) in the truth-makers account offered by Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith. It is argued that although Tarski’s requirement seems entirely acceptable in the frameworks of truth-makers theories for the first-sight, several doubts arise under a closer inspection. In particular, T-biconditionals have no clear meaning as sentences about truth-makers. Thus, (...)-makers theory cannot be considered as the semantic theory of truth enriched by metaphysical (ontological) data. The problem of truth-makers for sentences about future events is discussed at the end of the paper. (shrink)
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  4. Against Conventional Wisdom.Alexander W. Kocurek, Ethan Jerzak & Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (22):1-27.
    Conventional wisdom has it that truth is always evaluated using our actual linguistic conventions, even when considering counterfactual scenarios in which different conventions are adopted. This principle has been invoked in a number of philosophical arguments, including Kripke’s defense of the necessity of identity and Lewy’s objection to modal conventionalism. But it is false. It fails in the presence of what Einheuser (2006) calls c-monsters, or convention-shifting expressions (on analogy with Kaplan’s monsters, or context-shifting expressions). We show that (...)
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  5. The Conventional and the Analytic.Manuel García-Carpintero & Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):239-274.
    Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian (...)
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  6. Ordinary Truth in Tarski and Næss.Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - In Adrian Kuzniar & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (eds.), Uncovering Facts and Values. Brill. pp. 67-90.
    Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account (...)
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  7. The Merely Conventional Existence of the World.Jan Westerhoff - 2011 - In Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    A platitude questioned by many Buddhist thinkers in India and Tibet is the existence of the world. We might be tempted to insert some modifier here, such as “substantial,” “self-existent,” or “intrinsically existent,” for, one might argue, these thinkers did not want to question the existence of the world tout court but only that of a substantial, self-existent, or otherwise suitably qualified world. But perhaps these modifiers are not as important as is generally thought, for the understanding of the world (...)
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  8. Tarski’s Convention T: Condition Beta.John Corcoran - forthcoming - South American Journal of Logic 1 (1).
    Tarski’s Convention T—presenting his notion of adequate definition of truth (sic)—contains two conditions: alpha and beta. Alpha requires that all instances of a certain T Schema be provable. Beta requires in effect the provability of ‘every truth is a sentence’. Beta formally recognizes the fact, repeatedly emphasized by Tarski, that sentences (devoid of free variable occurrences)—as opposed to pre-sentences (having free occurrences of variables)—exhaust the range of significance of is true. In Tarski’s preferred usage, it is part (...)
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  9. Pure Versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature.Stephen Barker - 2014 - In Guy Fletcher & Mike Ridge (eds.), Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern
Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 199-222.
    Can hybridism about moral claims be made to work? I argue it can if we accept the conventional implicature approach developed in Barker (Analysis 2000). However, this kind of hybrid expressivism is only acceptable if we can make sense of conventional implicature, the kind of meaning carried by operators like ‘even’, ‘but’, etc. Conventional implictures are a form of pragmatic presupposition, which involves an unsaid mode of delivery of content. I argue that we can make sense of conventional implicatures, but (...)
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  10. Normativity and Instrumentalism in David Lewis' Convention.S. M. Amadae - 2011 - History of European Ideas 37 (3):325-335.
    David Lewis presented Convention as an alternative to the conventionalism characteristic of early-twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Rudolf Carnap is well known for suggesting the arbitrariness of any particular linguistic convention for engaging in scientific inquiry. Analytic truths are self-consistent, and are not checked against empirical facts to ascertain their veracity. In keeping with the logical positivists before him, Lewis concludes that linguistic communication is conventional. However, despite his firm allegiance to conventions underlying not just languages but also social customs, (...)
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  11. Ontological Pluralism, Abhidharma Metaphysics, and the Two Truths: A Response to Kris McDaniel.Andrew Brenner - 2020 - Philosophy East and West 70 (2):543-557.
    Kris McDaniel has recently proposed an interpretation of the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth, as that distinction is made within Abhidharma metaphysics. According to McDaniel's proposal, the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth is closely connected with a similar distinction between conventional existence and ultimate existence. What is more, the distinction between conventional existence and ultimate existence should be interpreted along ontological pluralist lines: the difference between things that ultimately exist and things that (...)
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  12.  23
    Knowing Linguistic Conventions.Carin Robinson - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):167-176.
    A linguistic convention is a principle or norm that has been adopted by a person or linguistic community about how to use, and therefore what the meaning is of, a specific term. Examples of such norms or principles are those expressed by propositions that express the laws of logic or those that express implicit definitions. Arguments about the epistemic status of linguistic conventions, very broadly, fall into two camps: the one holds that the basis of linguistic conventions is objective (...)
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  13.  4
    Against the a Priori Knowledge of Non-Trivial Truths.Carin Robinson - 2016 - Dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal
    This is a thesis in support of the conceptual yoking of analytic truth to a priori knowledge. My approach is a semantic one; the primary subject matter throughout the thesis is linguistic objects, such as propositions or sentences. I evaluate arguments, and also forward my own, about how such linguistic objects’ truth is determined, how their meaning is fixed and how we, respectively, know the conditions under which their truth and meaning are obtained. The strategy is to (...)
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  14. Categoricity by convention.Julien Murzi & Brett Topey - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3391-3420.
    On a widespread naturalist view, the meanings of mathematical terms are determined, and can only be determined, by the way we use mathematical language—in particular, by the basic mathematical principles we’re disposed to accept. But it’s mysterious how this can be so, since, as is well known, minimally strong first-order theories are non-categorical and so are compatible with countless non-isomorphic interpretations. As for second-order theories: though they typically enjoy categoricity results—for instance, Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for second-order PA and Zermelo’s quasi-categoricity (...)
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  15.  28
    Conceptual Schemes and Truth, by J*Seph R*Z.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper pays tribute to the distinguished legal and political philosopher Joseph Raz, who recently passed away. I present a response to Donald Davidson on conceptual schemes which tries to imitate Raz’s writing style, which attracts me despite the difficulties it poses. The response includes a definition.
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  16. Do Rights Exist by Convention or by Nature?Katharina Nieswandt - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):313-325.
    I argue that all rights exist by convention. According to my definition, a right exists by convention just in case its justification appeals to the rules of a socially shared pattern of acting. I show that our usual justifications for rights are circular, that a right fulfills my criterion if all possible justifications for it are circular, and that all existing philosophical justifications for rights are circular or fail. We find three non-circular alternatives in the literature, viz. justifications (...)
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  17. "Truth" by John D. Caputo. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2014 - The Times Literary Supplement 1.
    John D. Caputo’s book is one in a new series from Penguin called “Philosophy in Transit”. The “transit” theme has a number of dimensions: the publisher announces that the authors use “various modes of transportation as their starting point”, and the books will use this idea to represent some aspect of the current state of philosophy itself (a leading metaphor of Caputo’s book is that truth is perpetually “on the go”). Furthermore, the publisher’s description of these books as “commute-length” (...)
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  18. Emotional Truth. By Ronald de Sousa. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. Xviii + 391. Price £38.00.).Adam Morton - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):220-222.
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  19. What Is Said by Metaphor.Hsiu-lin Ku - 2014 - Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies 30:35-53.
    ‘What is said’ by an utterance, from a traditional truth-conditional view of language, is the uttered sentence’s conventionally encoded semantic meaning, and is distinguished from ‘what is implicated’, such as metaphor, which is understood as a type of speech in which a speaker says one thing but means another. Contextualists challenge this view of metaphor by offering three reasons to maintain that metaphor is classified within ‘what is said’: first, metaphor involves loose use; second, metaphor is assertoric; and, third, (...)
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  20. ‘‘Quine’s Evolution From ‘Carnap’s Disciple’ to the Author of “Two Dogmas.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):291-316.
    Recent scholarship indicates that Quine’s “Truth by Convention” does not present the radical critiques of analytic truth found fifteen years later in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” This prompts a historical question: what caused Quine’s radicalization? I argue that two crucial components of Quine’s development can be traced to the academic year 1940–1941, when he, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, Hempel, and Goodman were all at Harvard together. First, during those meetings, Quine recognizes that Carnap has abandoned the extensional, syntactic (...)
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  21. Book Review of The Metaphysics of Truth by Douglas Edwards. [REVIEW]Ragnar van der Merwe - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (4):555-574.
    Book Review The Metaphysics of Truth by Douglas Edwards Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 210. ISBN 9780198758693. £45.00 ($56.00) (hardcover).
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  22. Book Review Truth by Alexis G Burgess and John P Burgess. [REVIEW]Swami Narasimhananda - 2015 - Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 120 (3):295-6.
    Professors of philosophy, the authors have done a succinct and critical analysis of some theories of truth: deflationism, indeterminacy, insolubility, realism, and antirealism.
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  23. Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Russell Gillian - 2014 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W.V.O. Quine. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 181-202.
    A critical survey of Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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  24. Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity.Anders Öberg - 2011 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
    In this dissertation on Hilary Putnam's philosophy, I investigate his development regarding meaning and necessity, in particular mathematical necessity. Putnam has been a leading American philosopher since the end of the 1950s, becoming famous in the 1960s within the school of analytic philosophy, associated in particular with the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. Under the influence of W.V. Quine, Putnam challenged the logical positivism/empiricism that had become strong in America after World War II, with influential exponents such (...)
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  25. Vagueness and Degrees of Truth, by Nicholas J. J. Smith. [REVIEW]Robert Williams - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):1297-1305.
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  26.  66
    Is Truth Made, and If So, What Do We Mean by That? Redefining Truthmaker Realism.Catherine Legg - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):587-606.
    Philosophical discussion of truthmaking has flourished in recent times, but what exactly does it mean to ‘make’ a truth-bearer true? I argue that ‘making’ is a concept with modal force, and this renders it a problematic deployment for truthmaker theorists with nominalist sympathies, which characterises most current theories. I sketch the outlines of what I argue is a more genuinely realist truthmaker theory, which is capable of answering the explanatory question: In virtue of what does each particular truthmaker make (...)
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  27. Plato's Hypothetical Inquiry in the Meno.Naoya Iwata - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (2):194-214.
    This paper argues that the hypothesis proposed in the Meno is the proposition ‘virtue is good’ alone, and that its epistemic nature is essentially insecure. It has been an object of huge scholarly debate which other hypothesis Socrates posited with regard to the relationship between virtue and knowledge. This debate is, however, misleading in the sense of making us believe that the hypothesis that virtue is good is regarded as a truism in the light of the process of positing a (...)
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  28. An Ontological Basis for Truth From Falsity (To Reduce Nothingness Into a Reference by Falsity).Hazhir Roshangar - manuscript
    I provide an ontological basis for any formal system that works with truth-values. To get to such a basis, I start with the notion of absolute nothingness, from which I construct a nothingness which is akin to the notion of an empty set in mathematics. Then I provide a formal system that its ability to produce symbols is an integral property and an inseparable part of its metaphysics.
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  29. Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic, by John Woods, Springer, 2018. [REVIEW]Andrew Aberdein - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (2):873-881.
    A review of John Woods, Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic. Cham: Springer, 2018.
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  30. Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems About Saying What You Think is False.Jessica Pepp - 2018 - In Eliot Michaelson Andreas Stokke (ed.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter investigates the conflict between thought and speech that is inherent in lying. This is the conflict of saying what you think is false. The chapter shows how stubbornly saying what you think is false resists analysis. In traditional analyses of lying, saying what you think is false is analyzed in terms of saying something and believing that it is false. But standard cases of unconscious or divided belief challenge these analyses. Classic puzzles about belief from Gottlob Frege and (...)
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  31. Situations, Truth and Knowability: A Situation-Theoretic Analysis of a Paradox by Fitch.Sten Lindström - 1997 - In Eva Ejerhed & Sten Lindström (eds.), Logic, Action and Cognition: Essays in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  32.  43
    Truth and the Limits of Ethical Thought: Reading Wittgenstein with Diamond.Gilad Nir - forthcoming - In Jens Pier (ed.), Limits of Intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein. Routledge.
    This chapter investigates how a reading of Wittgenstein along the lines laid out by Cora Diamond makes room for a novel approach to ethical truth. Following Diamond, I develop the connection between the kinds of elucidatory propositions by means of which we spell out and maintain the shape of our theoretical thinking, such as “‘someone’ is not the name of someone” and “five plus seven equals twelve,” and the kind of propositions by means of which we spell out and (...)
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  33. Guided by Guided by the Truth: Objectivism and Perspectivism in Ethics and Epistemology.Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - In A. K. Flowerree & Baron Reed (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.
    According to ethical objectivism, what a person should do depends on the facts, as opposed to their perspective on the facts. A long-standing challenge to this view is that it fails to accommodate the role that norms play in guiding a person’s action. Roughly, if the facts that determine what a person should do lie beyond their ken, they cannot inform a person’s deliberations. This paper explores two recent developments of this line of thought. Both focus on the epistemic counterpart (...)
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  34.  44
    Truth and Meaning / Istina i značenje (Bosnian translation by Nijaz Ibrulj).Nijaz Ibrulj & Donald Davidson - 1998 - Dijalog 1 (2):79-94.
    The text "Truth and Meaning" is translated here from Donald Davidson's book: Donald Davidson - Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Philosophical Essays of Donald Davidson) (1984), pp. 17-37.
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  35.  28
    Truth / Istina (Bosnian translation by Nijaz Ibrulj).Nijaz Ibrulj & John L. Austin - 2019 - Sophos 1 (12):173-187.
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  36.  33
    Logical Truth / Logička istina (Bosnian translation by Nijaz Ibrulj).Nijaz Ibrulj & Willard Van Orman Quine - 2018 - Sophos 1 (11):115-128.
    Translated from: W.V.O.Quine, W. H. O. (1986): Philosophy of Logic. Second Edition. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 47-61.
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  37. Cancellation, Negation, and Rejection.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Peter Collins, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Ulrike Hahn & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2019 - Cognitive Psychology 108:42-71.
    In this paper, new evidence is presented for the assumption that the reason-relation reading of indicative conditionals ('if A, then C') reflects a conventional implicature. In four experiments, it is investigated whether relevance effects found for the probability assessment of indicative conditionals (Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer, 2016a) can be classified as being produced by a) a conversational implicature, b) a (probabilistic) presupposition failure, or c) a conventional implicature. After considering several alternative hypotheses and the accumulating evidence from other studies as (...)
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  38. Truth and Existence.Jan Heylen & Leon Horsten - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):106-114.
    Halbach has argued that Tarski biconditionals are not ontologically conservative over classical logic, but his argument is undermined by the fact that he cannot include a theory of arithmetic, which functions as a theory of syntax. This article is an improvement on Halbach's argument. By adding the Tarski biconditionals to inclusive negative free logic and the universal closure of minimal arithmetic, which is by itself an ontologically neutral combination, one can prove that at least one thing exists. The result can (...)
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  39. Truth and Ontology, by Trenton Merricks. [REVIEW]Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):542-552.
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  40. Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision.Francesco Berto & Christopher Badura - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):178-193.
    We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
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  41. Chomskyan Arguments Against Truth-Conditional Semantics Based on Variability and Co-predication.Agustín Vicente - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):919-940.
    In this paper I try to show that semantics can explain word-to-world relations and that sentences can have meanings that determine truth-conditions. Critics like Chomsky typically maintain that only speakers denote, i.e., only speakers, by using words in one way or another, represent entities or events in the world. However, according to their view, individual acts of denotations are not explained just by virtue of speakers’ semantic knowledge. Against this view, I will hold that, in the typical cases considered, (...)
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  42. Truth: Studies of a Robust Presence by Kurt Pritzl, O.P. [REVIEW]Mathew D. Walz - 2011 - Quaestiones Disputatae 2 (1-2):288-301.
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  43. Truth-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287-321.
    A realist theory of truth for a class of sentences holds that there are entities in virtue of which these sentences are true or false. We call such entities ‘truthmakers’ and contend that those for a wide range of sentences about the real world are moments (dependent particulars). Since moments are unfamiliar, we provide a definition and a brief philosophical history, anchoring them in our ontology by showing that they are objects of perception. The core of our theory is (...)
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  44. How Mathematics Isn’T Logic.Roger Wertheimer - 1999 - Ratio 12 (3):279–295.
    If logical truth is necessitated by sheer syntax, mathematics is categorially unlike logic even if all mathematics derives from definitions and logical principles. This contrast gets obscured by the plausibility of the Synonym Substitution Principle implicit in conceptions of analyticity: synonym substitution cannot alter sentence sense. The Principle obviously fails with intercepting: nonuniform term substitution in logical sentences. 'Televisions are televisions' and 'TVs are televisions' neither sound alike nor are used interchangeably. Interception synonymy gets assumed because logical sentences and (...)
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  45. Comparing Conventions.Rachel Etta Rudolph & Alexander W. Kocurek - 2020 - Semantics and Linguistic Theory 30:294-313.
    We offer a novel account of metalinguistic comparatives, such as 'Al is more wise than clever'. On our view, metalinguistic comparatives express comparative commitments to conventions. Thus, 'Al is more wise than clever' expresses that the speaker has a stronger commitment to a convention on which Al is wise than to a convention on which she is clever. This view avoids problems facing previous approaches to metalinguistic comparatives. It also fits within a broader framework—independently motivated by metalinguistic negotiations (...)
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  46. Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.
    In section 1, I develop epistemic communism, my view of the function of epistemically evaluative terms such as ‘rational’. The function is to support the coordination of our belief-forming rules, which in turn supports the reliable acquisition of beliefs through testimony. This view is motivated by the existence of valid inferences that we hesitate to call rational. I defend the view against the worry that it fails to account for a function of evaluations within first-personal deliberation. In the rest of (...)
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  47.  70
    Book Review The Truth Will Set You Free by Swami Purna. [REVIEW]Swami Narasimhananda - 2010 - Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 115 (1):162.
    Book review of the book 'The Truth Will Set You Free' by Swami Purna.
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  48. Truth and Assertion: Rules Vs Aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
    There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. Puzzlingly, both views are supported by equally plausible (but apparently incompatible) linguistic data. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion, and pair this view with a non-factive rule. The resulting account is able to explain all the relevant linguistic (...)
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  49. Truth : a concept unlike any other.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Supplement issue 2):S605-S630.
    This paper explores the nature of the concept of truth. It does not offer an analysis or definition of truth, or an account of how it relates to other concepts. Instead, it explores what sort of concept truth is by considering what sorts of thoughts it enables us to think. My conclusion is that truth is a part of each and every propositional thought. The concept of truth is therefore best thought of as the ability (...)
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  50.  7
    The Argument From Accidental Truth Against Deflationism.Masaharu Mizumoto - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, we present what we call the argument from accidental truth, according to which some instances of deflationist schemata, even those carefully reformulated and adjusted by Field and Horwich to accommodate the truth of utterances, are falsified due to accidental truths. Since the folk concept of truth allows for accidental truths, the deflationary theory of truth will face a serious problem. In particular, it follows that the deflationist schema fails to capture the proper extension (...)
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