Results for 'François Maurice'

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  1. Metascience. For a Scientific General Discourse.François Maurice - 2020 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 1:31-76.
    Human produce discourses on the world: mythologies, religions, mysticisms, philosophies, science. The majority of those discourses are transcendent in nature. Following a conceptual clarification based on the notions of reflection and general discourse, philosophy appears as a transcendent general discourse among others; hence the failure of the latter to account for the world and science; hence the need for a non-transcendent general discourse, a properly scientific general discourse, a metascience. In light of these redefined boundaries, it will be proposed to (...)
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  2. Métascience: Pour un discours général scientifique.François Maurice - 2020 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 1:31-77.
    L’humain produit des discours sur le monde : mythologies, religions, mysticismes, philosophies, science. La majorité de ses discours sont de nature transcendante. À la suite d’un clarification conceptuelle fondée sur les notions de réflexion et de discours général, la philosophie apparaît comme un dis- cours général transcendant parmi d’autres ; d’où l’échec de celle-ci à rendre compte du monde et de la science ; d’où la nécessité de disposer d’un discours général non transcendant, un discours général proprement scientifique, une métascience. (...)
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  3. Introduction: Mario Bunge’s Project.François Maurice - 2020 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 1:19-28.
    This is the introduction of issue 1 of Mɛtascience. -/- This first issue of Mεtascience is a posthumous tribute to Mario Bunge, who died in February 2020. This is not the first time, and certainly not the last, that thinkers pay homage to Mario Bunge or that his work is the subject of study, and rightly so, because the man is a humanist and the work worthy heiress of the Enlightenment. Bunge has made a significant contribution to a wide range (...)
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  4. Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse - No. 2 - Metascientific Ontology.François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 2:1-260.
    [[THIS IS THE COMPLETE SECOND ISSUE OF MΕTASCIENCE]] -/- This second issue of the journal Mεtascience continues the char acterization of this new branch of knowledge that is metasci ence. If it is new, it is not in a radical sense since Mario Bunge practiced it in an exemplary way, since logical positivists were accused of practicing only a mere metascience, since scientists have always practiced it implicitly, and since some philosophers no longer practice philosophy but rather metascience, but without (...)
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  5. Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse - No. 1 - Mario Bunge Thinker of Materiality.François Maurice - 2020 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 1:1-164.
    [[THIS IS THE COMPLETE FIRST ISSUE OF MΕTASCIENCE]] -/- This inaugural issue of the journal Mεtascience is also a special issue since it pays tribute to Mario Bunge (1919-2020) to high light his contribution to knowledge and our filiation with his thought. Mario Bunge's project is part of the humanist and scientific tradition of the Enlightenment. At the end of his intellectual journey, he wrote more than 150 books and 540 articles or chapters, including translations into several languages. The work (...)
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  6. Presentation: Mεtascience and the Bunge alternative.François Maurice - 2020 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 1:7-17.
    This is the presentation of issue 1 of Mɛtascience. -/- More than any other philosopher, Mario Bunge is unclassifiable. In 1982 John Wettersten wrote about the discomfort and frustration that one might feel when reading Bunge’s work. He was trying to understand why his work was not seen as an alternative to the work of other philosophers. Wettersten’s answer relates to the problem of knowledge acquisition. If knowledge is contextual, relative to a frame of thought, how can we then rationally (...)
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  7. What Is Metascientific Ontology?François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 2:22-44.
    Metascientific ontology differs from philosophical ontologies in its objectives, objects and methods. By an examination of the ontological theories of Mario Bunge, we will show their main objective is a unified representation of the world as known through the sciences, that their objects of study are scientific concepts, and that their methods do not differ from those that one expects to find in any rational activity. Metascientific ontology is therefore not transcendent because it does not seek to represent non-concrete objects (...)
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  8. When Philosophy is No Longer Philosophical.François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 2:242-249.
    We examine the idea that there is a sub-discipline in philosophy of science, phi-losophy in science, whose researchers use philosophical tools to advance solu-tions to scientific problems. Rather, we propose that these tools are standard epistemic, cognitive, or intellectual tools at work in all rational activity, and therefore these researchers engage in scientific or metascientific research.
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  9. Presentation: Metascientific Ontology.François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 2:10-18.
    Debates about the links between science and ontology are very active in contemporary philosophy, and, in fact, they have always been present. Despite the various philosophical positions on the subject, they all admit the existence of a metaphysical reality. In contrast, metascience holds that such a reality does not exist. This second issue of Mɛtascience presents seven out of twelve articles that have as a common thread either the metascientific ontology or the Bungean ontology.
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  10. Présentation: L’ontologie métascientifique.François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 2:7-15.
    Les débats sur les liens qui uniraient la science à l’ontologie sont très actifs en philosophie contemporaine, et, en fait, ils ont toujours été présents. Malgré les diverses positions philosophiques sur le sujet, elles admettent toutes l’existence d’une réalité métaphysique. À l’opposé, la métascience soutient qu’une telle réalité n’existe pas. Ce second numéro de Mɛtascience présente sept articles sur douze qui ont comme fil conducteur soit l’ontologie métascientifique soit l’ontologie bungéenne.
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  11. Bunge’s Metascience and the Naturalization of the General Discourse.François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 2:74-93.
    We will explain why the Treatise on Basic Philosophy is a metascientific work and not a philosophical one. We will then argue that this meta-science is part of a long process of naturalization of thought that begins at the end of the Middle Ages to give birth to the scientific thought of the study of the world. For Bunge, naturalization takes the form of the naturalization of the general thought which makes it possible to replace philosophical general discourse with scientific (...)
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  12. Qu'est-ce que l'ontologie métascientifique?François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 2:19-43.
    L’ontologie métascientifique se distingue des ontologies philosophiques par ses objectifs, ses objets et ses méthodes. Par un examen des théories ontologiques de Mario Bunge, nous montrerons que leur principal objectif est l’élaboration d’une représentation unifiée du monde tel que connu via les sciences, que leurs objets d’étude sont les concepts scientifiques, et que leurs méthodes ne diffèrent pas de celles qu’on s’attend à trouver dans toute activité rationnelle. L’ontologie métascientifique n’est donc pas transcendante parce qu’elle ne cherche pas à représenter (...)
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  13. Introduction. Le projet de Mario Bunge.François Maurice - 2020 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 1:15-27.
    Ce premier numéro de Mεtascience rend un hommage posthume à Mario Bunge, décédé en février 2020. Ce n’est pas la première fois, et certainement pas la dernière, que des penseurs rendent hommage à Mario Bunge ou que son oeuvre fait l’objet d’une étude, à juste titre d’ailleurs, car l’homme est un humaniste et l’oeuvre digne héritière des Lumières. Bunge a contribué de façon significative à un très grand nombre de disciplines : physique, philosophie, sociologie, psychologie, sciences cognitives. Ce numéro est (...)
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  14. Quand la philosophie n’est plus philosophique.François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 2:285-292.
    Nous examinons l’idée selon laquelle il existerait une sous-discipline en phi-losophie des sciences, la philosophie dans les sciences, dont les chercheurs utili-seraient des outils philosophiques pour avancer des solutions à des problèmes scientifiques. Nous proposons plutôt l’idée que ces outils sont des outils épisté-miques, cognitifs ou intellectuels standards, à l’œuvre dans toute activité ration-nelle, et, par conséquent, ces chercheurs se consacrent à la recherche scienti-fique ou métascientifique.
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  15. Métascience chez Mario Bunge et naturalisation du discours général.François Maurice - 2022 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 2:103-122.
    Nous expliquerons pourquoi le Treatise on Basic Philosophy est une œuvre mé-tascientifique et non pas philosophique. On soutiendra ensuite que cette métas-cience s’inscrit dans un long processus de naturalisation de la pensée qui débute à la fin du Moyen Âge pour donner naissance à la pensée scientifique de l’étude du monde. La naturalisation prend la forme chez Bunge d’une naturalisation de la pensée générale qui permet de remplacer le discours général philosophique par le discours général scientifique. Finalement, cette naturalisation du (...)
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  16. Présentation. Mεtascience et l’alternative Bunge.François Maurice - 2020 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 1:5-14.
    En 1982, John Wettersten, dans un texte à propos du malaise et de la frustration qu’on peut ressentir à la lecture de l’oeuvre de Bunge, tentait de comprendre pourquoi son oeuvre n’est pas consi- dérée comme une alternative aux travaux d’autres philosophes. La réponse proposée par Wettersten a trait au problème d’acquisition de la connaissance. Si la connaissance est contextuelle, relative à un cadre de pensée, comment pouvons- nous alors évaluer rationnellement ce cadre de pensée lui-même ? Wettersten identifie deux (...)
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  17. Pierre Duhem avait-il «quelque théologien derrière lui» lors de l’élaboration de son articulation de la physique et de la métaphysique ? Le cas de Maurice Blondel.Jean-François Stoffel - 2008 - Recherches Philosophiques (Toulouse) 4:89-116.
    S'étonnant qu'un simple physicien sache traiter des rapports de la physique et de la métaphysique, Edmond Domet de Vorges s'était demandé si Pierre Duhem n'avait pas bénéficié de l'aide de quelque théologien dans l'élaboration de son articulation de ces deux disci­plines. Faisant suite à cette question très perti­nente, cet article liste d'abord les intellectuels catholiques qui étaient en relation avec Duhem avant la publication, en 1893, de son article Physique et métaphysique et qui auraient effec­tivement pu l'aider à concevoir une (...)
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  18. Le phénoménalisme problématique de Pierre Duhem.Jean-François Stoffel - 2002 - Bruxelles, Belgique: Académie Royale de Belgique.
    Physicien théoricien, philosophe de la physique et historien des théo­ries physiques, le savant catholique français Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) a profondément marqué la pensée du vingtième siècle. Chacun connaît le Système du monde, dont les dix volu­mes ont contribué à la redécouverte de la science médiévale, et La théorie physique, qui a notamment donné lieu à la célèbre «thèse Duhem-Quine». Si Clio a donc gardé de Duhem le sou­venir d’un grand historien des sciences et d’un philosophe perspicace de la physique, lui-même (...)
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  19. Concepts as shared regulative ideals.Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - manuscript
    What is it to share the same concept? The question is an important one since sharing the same concept explains our ability to non-accidentally coordinate on the same topic over time and between individuals. Moreover, concept identity grounds key logical relations among thought contents such as samesaying, contradiction, validity, and entailment. Finally, an account of concept identity is crucial to explaining and justifying epistemic efforts to better understand the precise contents of our thoughts. The key question, then, is what psychological (...)
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  20. On Defining Communicative Intentions.François Recanati - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (3):213-41.
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  21. How narrow is narrow content?François Recanati - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):209-29.
    SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and radical externalism respectively, I show that there (...)
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  22. The illusion of conscious experience.François Kammerer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):845-866.
    Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on (...)
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  23. What’s Wrong with Speciesism.François Jaquet - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (3):395-408.
    The prevalent view in animal ethics is that speciesism is wrong: we should weigh the interests of humans and non-humans equally. Shelly Kagan has recently questioned this claim, defending speciesism against Peter Singer’s seminal argument based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. This critique is most charitably construed as a dilemma. The principle of equal consideration can be interpreted in either of two ways. While it faces counterexamples on the first reading, it makes Singer’s argument question-begging on the (...)
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  24. Speciesism and tribalism: Embarrassing origins.François Jaquet - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):933-954.
    Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. The primary source of evidence for this position is our intuition that humans’ interests matter more than the similar interests of other animals. And it must be acknowledged that this intuition is both powerful and widespread. But should we trust it for all that? The present (...)
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  25. Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 29 (3-4):180-204.
    Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethic without sentience.
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  26. Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.
    Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...)
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  27. Sorting Out Solutions to the Now-What Problem.François Jaquet - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (3).
    Moral error theorists face the so-called “now-what problem”: what should we do with our moral judgments from a prudential point of view if these judgments are uniformly false? On top of abolitionism and conservationism, which respectively advise us to get rid of our moral judgments and to keep them, three revisionary solutions have been proposed in the literature: expressivism, naturalism, and fictionalism. In this paper, I argue that expressivism and naturalism do not constitute genuine alternatives to abolitionism, of which they (...)
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  28. What Forms Could Introspective Systems Take? A Research Programme.François Kammerer & Keith Frankish - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (9):13-48.
    We propose a new approach to the study of introspection. Instead of asking what form introspection actually takes in humans or other animals, we ask what forms it could take, in natural or artificial minds. What are the dimensions along which forms of introspection could vary? This is a relatively unexplored question, but it is one that has the potential to open new avenues of study and reveal new connections between existing ones. It may, for example, focus attention on possible (...)
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  29. The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness.Francois Kammerer - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link between phenomenality and value. For example, some situations seem good or bad in virtue of the conscious experiences they feature. Illusionist views of phenomenal consciousness then face what I call the normative challenge. They have to say where they stand regarding the idea that there is a link between (...)
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  30. Moral Beliefs for the Error Theorist?François Jaquet & Hichem Naar - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):193-207.
    The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to (...)
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  31. Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist.François Jaquet - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):39-55.
    The moral error theory has become increasingly popular in recent decades. So much so indeed that a new issue emerged, the so-called “now-what problem”: if all our moral beliefs are false, then what should we do with them? So far, philosophers who are interested in this problem have focused their attention on the mode of the attitudes we should have with respect to moral propositions. Some have argued that we should keep holding proper moral beliefs; others that we should replace (...)
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  32. Against Moorean Defences of Speciesism.François Jaquet - 2023 - In Hugo Viciana, Antonio Gaitán & Fernando Aguiar (eds.), Experiments in Moral and Political Philosophy. Routledge.
    Common sense has it that animals matter considerably less than humans; the welfare and suffering of a cow, a chicken or a fish are important but not as much as the welfare and suffering of a human being. Most animal ethicists reject this “speciesist” view as mere prejudice. In their opinion, there is no difference between humans and other animals that could justify such unequal consideration. In the opposite camp, advocates of speciesism have long tried to identify a difference that (...)
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  33. A debunking argument against speciesism.François Jaquet - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1011-1027.
    Many people believe that human interests matter much more than the like interests of non-human animals, and this “speciesist belief” plays a crucial role in the philosophical debate over the moral status of animals. In this paper, I develop a debunking argument against it. My contention is that this belief is unjustified because it is largely due to an off-track process: our attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance generated by the “meat paradox”. Most meat-eaters believe that it is wrong to (...)
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  34. How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2845-2867.
    Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be obviously false. They think that they can reject illusionism, even if they conceded that it is coherent and supported by strong arguments. David Chalmers has articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a “Moorean” argument against illusionism. This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have phenomenal experiences. I argue (...)
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  35. The Pragmatics of What is Said.François Recanati - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (4):295-329.
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  36. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach.François Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135.
    I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence.
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  37. Is Speciesism Wrong by Definition?François Jaquet - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (3):447-458.
    Oscar Horta has argued that speciesism is wrong by definition. In his view, there can be no more substantive debate about the justification of speciesism than there can be about the legality of murder, for it stems from the definition of “speciesism” that speciesism is unjustified just as it stems from the definition of “murder” that murder is illegal. The present paper is a case against this conception. I distinguish two issues: one is descriptive and the other normative. Relying on (...)
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  38. Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.
    Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the alleged “explanatory gap” between phenomenal states and physical states as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion. In this paper, I argue that the explanatory gap does not rest on a fallacy or a cognitive illusion. This does not imply the falsity of physicalism, but it has consequences (...)
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  39. Sentientism Still Under Threat: Reply to Dung.François Kammerer - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (3):103-119.
    In 'Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness' (Kammerer, 2022), I argued that phenomenal consciousness is probably normatively insignificant, and does not play a significant normative role. In 'Preserving the Normative Significance of Sentience' (Dung, 2024), Leonard Dung challenges my reasoning and defends sentientism about value and moral status against my arguments. Here I respond to Dung's criticism, pointing out three flaws in his reply. My conclusion is that the view that phenomenal consciousness is distinctively (...)
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  40. Community and Terror (The Lesson of All Sorrow).Maurice F. Stanley - 2005 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 11 (2):27-40.
    Every idealist believes himself to have rational grounds for the faith that somewhere, and in some world, and at some time, the ideal will triumph, so that a survey, a divine synopsis of all time, somehow reveals the lesson of all sorrow, the meaning of all tragedy, the triumph of the spirit. But it is not ours to say, in the world in which we at present have to live from one day to another, and to follow the fortunes of (...)
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  41. François Hemsterhuis, Sophyle ya da Felsefe Üzerine.Arif Yildiz & François Hemsterhuis - 2022 - ViraVerita International Interdisciplinary Encounters 15 (1):292-320.
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  42. Referential/attributive: A contextualist proposal.Francois Recanati - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (3):217 - 249.
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  43. How a Materialist Can Deny That the United States is Probably Conscious – Response to Schwitzgebel.François Kammerer - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1047-1057.
    In a recent paper, Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if materialism about consciousness is true, then the United States is likely to have its own stream of phenomenal consciousness, distinct from the streams of conscious experience of the people who compose it. Indeed, most plausible forms of materialism have to grant that a certain degree of functional and behavioral complexity constitutes a sufficient condition for the ascription of phenomenal consciousness – and Schwitzgebel makes a case to show that the United States (...)
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  44. Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory.François Jaquet - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 24 (1).
    According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theorists were local error theorists; they targeted moral judgments specifically and were less skeptical of other normative areas. These error theorists now face so-called “prudential parity objections”, according to which whatever evidence there is in favor of the moral error theory is also evidence for a prudential error theory. The present paper rejects three prudential parity objections: one based on the alleged irreducible normativity of prudential (...)
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  45. Self-building technologies.François Kammerer - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (4):901-915.
    On the basis of two thought experiments, I argue that self-building technologies are possible given our current level of technological progress. We could already use technology to make us instantiate selfhood in a more perfect, complete manner. I then examine possible extensions of this thesis, regarding more radical self-building technologies which might become available in a distant future. I also discuss objections and reservations one might have about this view.
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  46. How Rich is the Illusion of Consciousness?François Kammerer - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):499-515.
    Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true—whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what kind of illusion is the illusion of phenomenality? Is it a “rich” illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incorrect representation—or a “sparse” illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incomplete representation, which leads to drawing incorrect judgments? I (...)
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  47. The Limits of Metalinguistic Negotiation: The Role of Shared Meanings in Normative Debate.François Schroeter, Laura Schroeter & Kevin Toh - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):180-196.
    According to philosophical orthodoxy, the parties to moral or legal disputes genuinely disagree only if their uses of key normative terms in the dispute express the same meaning. Recently, however, this orthodoxy has been challenged. According to an influential alternative view, genuine moral and legal disagreements should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations over which meaning a given term should have. In this paper, we argue that the shared meaning view is motivated by much deeper considerations than its recent critics recognize, (...)
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  48. Utilitarianism and the Moral Status of Animals: A Psychological Perspective.François Jaquet, Manon Delphine Gouiran & Florian Cova - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-19.
    Recent years have seen a growing interest among psychologists for debates in moral philosophy. Moral psychologists have investigated the causal origins of the opposition between utilitarian and deontological judgments and the psychological underpinnings of people’s beliefs about the moral status of animals. One issue that remains underexplored in this research area is the relationship between people’s disposition to engage in utilitarian thinking and their attitudes towards animals. This gap is unfortunate considering the tight philosophical connection between utilitarianism and the claim (...)
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  49. Philosophers and pamphleteers: political theorists of the Enlightenment.Maurice William Cranston - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This volume discusses the ideas of six leading thinkers of the French Enlightenment: Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Holbach, and Condorcet. A general introduction surveys the political theories of the Enlightenment, setting them in the context of the political realities of 18th-century France. The first book of its kind on the subject, Philosophers and Pamphleteers brings a welcome, new perspective to the study of French political thought during a fascinating historical era.
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  50. Contextual Dependence and Definite Descriptions.François Recanati - 1987 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:57-73.
    François Recanati; IV*—Contextual Dependence and Definite Descriptions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 57–74, h.
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