Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically incongruent actions of their own. Previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be represented in relation to distinct, (...) incongruent proximal goals. Instead they can be represented in relation to a single proximal goal – especially if the movements are, or appear to be, mechanically linked to a more distal joint action goal. To test this, we implemented a paradigm in which participants produced finger movements that were either congruent or incongruent with those of a virtual partner, and either with or without a joint action goal (the joint flipping of a switch, which turned on two light bulbs). Our findings provide partial support for the hypothesis that visuomotor interference effects can be reduced when two physically incongruent actions are represented as mechanically interdependent contributions to a joint action goal. (shrink)

Previous claims to have resolved the two-envelope paradox have been premature. The paradoxical argument has been exposed as manifestly fallacious if there is an upper limit to the amount of money that may be put in an envelope; but the paradoxical cases which can be described if this limitation is removed do not involve mathematical error, nor can they be explained away in terms of the strangeness of infinity. Only by taking account of the partial sums of the infinite series (...) of expected gains can the paradox be resolved. (shrink)

In May 2010, philosophers, family and friends gathered at the University of Notre Dame to celebrate the career and retirement of Alvin Plantinga, widely recognized as one of the world's leading figures in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Plantinga has earned particular respect within the community of Christian philosophers for the pivotal role that he played in the recent renewal and development of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Each of the essays in this volume engages with some (...) particular aspect of Plantinga's views on metaphysics, epistemology, or philosophy of religion. Contributors include Michael Bergman, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Richard Otte, Peter VanInwagen, Thomas P. Flint, Eleonore Stump, Dean Zimmerman and Nicholas Wolterstorff. The volume also includes responses to each essay by Bas van Fraassen, Stephen Wykstra, David VanderLaan, Robin Collins, Raymond VanArragon, E. J. Coffman, Thomas Crisp, and Donald Smith. (shrink)

Nicholas Rescher claims that rational decision theory “may leave us in the lurch”, because there are two apparently acceptable ways of applying “the standard machinery of expected-value analysis” to his Dr. Psycho paradox which recommend contradictory actions. He detects a similar contradiction in Newcomb’s problem. We consider his claims from the point of view of both Bayesian decision theory and causal decision theory. In Dr. Psycho and in Newcomb’s Problem, Rescher has used premisses about probabilities which he assumes to be (...) independent. From the former point of view, we show that the probability premisses are not independent but inconsistent, and their inconsistency is provable within probability theory alone. From the latter point of view, we show that their consistency can be saved, but then the contradictory recommendations evaporate. Consequently, whether one subscribes to evidential or causal decision theory, rational decision theory is not in any way vitiated by Rescher’s arguments. (shrink)

1Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK. michael.clark@nottingham.ac.uk2Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK. [email protected].

This paper’s aim is to provide overview of the punishment of war crimes. It considers first the rationale of the law of war, the identification and scope of war crimes, and proceeds to consider the justification of punishing war crimes, arguing for a consequentialist view with side-constraints. It then considers the alternative of reconciliation.

Reasoning from a naturalistic perspective, viewing the mind as an evolved biological organ with a particular structure and function, a number of influential philosophers and cognitive scientists claim that science is constrained by human nature. How exactly our genetic constitution constrains scientific representations of the world remains unclear. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it often leads to the unwarranted conclusion that we are cognitively closed to certain aspects or properties of the world. Secondly, it stands in the way (...) of a nuanced account of the relationship between our cognitive and perceptual wiring and scientific theory. In response, I propose a typology or classification of the different kinds of biological constraints and their sources on science. Using Boden’s notion of a conceptual space, I distinguish between constraints relating to the ease with which we can reach representations within our conceptual space and constraints causing possible representations to fall outside of our conceptual space. This last kind of constraints does not entail that some aspects or properties of the world cannot be represented by us – as argued by advocates of ‘cognitive closure’ – merely that some ways of representing the world are inaccessible to us. It relates to what Clark and Rescher have framed as ‘the alien scientist hypothesis’. The purpose of this typology is to provide some much needed clarity and structure to the debate about biological constraints on science. (shrink)

Это отличный обзор генов / окружающей среды взаимодействия на поведение и, несмотря на то, немного от, это легко и стоит читать. Они начинаются с двойных исследований, которые показывают подавляющее влияние генетики на поведение. Они отмечают все более известные исследования Джудит Харрис, которые расширяют и обобщают факты, которые разделяют домашнюю среду, почти не влияет на поведение и что приемные дети вырастают такими же разными от своих сводных братьев и сестер, как люди, выбранные случайным образом. Один из основных моментов, что они (и (...) почти все, кто обсуждает поведенческой генетики) не отметить, что сотни (тысячи в зависимости от вашей точки зрения) человеческих поведенческих универсалий, в том числе все основы нашей личности, на 100% определяется нашими генами, без каких-либо изменений в нормах. Каждый видит дерево как дерево, а не камень, ищет и ест пищу, сердится и ревнует и т.д. Таким образом, то, что они в основном говорят о том, сколько окружающей среды (культура) может повлиять на степень, в которой различные черты показаны, а не их внешний вид. Наконец, они обсуждают евгеники в обычной политически корректной моды, не заметив, что мы и все организмы являются продуктами евгеники природы и что попытки победить естественный отбор с медициной, сельского хозяйства и цивилизации в целом, являются катастрофическими для любого общества, которое сохраняется в этом. До 50% всех зачатий, или около 100 миллионов/год, заканчиваются ранним спонтанным абортом, почти все без того, чтобы мать знала об этом. Это естественное выбраковка дефектных генов стимулирует эволюцию, сохраняет нас относительно генетически здоровыми и делает возможным общество. Дисгении достаточно, чтобы уничтожить цивилизацию, но перенаселенность будет do его впервую очередь. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл"2-й ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих работ могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - -Философия, Психология, Наука, Религия и Политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019) и другие. (shrink)

Questa è un'eccellente revisione delle interazioni gene/ambiente sul comportamento e, nonostante sia un po' datata, è una lettura facile e utile. Iniziano con studi gemelli che mostrano l'impatto travolgente della genetica sul comportamento. Notano gli studi sempre più noti di Judith Harris che estendono e riassumono i fatti che l'ambiente domestico condiviso non ha quasi alcun effetto sul comportamento e che i bambini adottati crescono fino ad essere diversi dai loro fratellastri e sorelle come le persone scelte a caso. Un (...) punto fondamentale che loro (e quasi tutti coloro che discutono di genetica comportamentale) non riescono a notare è che le centinaia (migliaia a seconda del tuo punto di vista) degli universali comportamentali umani, comprese tutte le basi delle nostre personalità, sono determinate al 100% dai nostri geni, senza variazioni nella normalità. Tutti vedono un albero come un albero e non come una pietra, cercano e mangiano cibo, si arrabbiano e geloso ecc. Quindi, quello di cui stanno parlando per lo più qui è quanto ambiente (cultura) può influenzare il grado in cui vengono mostrati i vari tratti, piuttosto che il loro aspetto. Infine, discutono di eugenetica nel solito modo politicamente corretto, non riuscendo a notare che noi e tutti gli organismi siamo i prodotti dell'eugenetica della natura e che i tentativi di sconfiggere la selezione naturale con la medicina, l'agricoltura e la civiltà nel suo complesso sono disastrosi per qualsiasi società che persiste nel farlo. Fino al 50% di tutte le concezioni, o circa 100 milioni/anno, finiscono in un aborto spontaneo precoce, quasi tutti senza che la madre ne sia a conoscenza. Questo abbattimento naturale dei geni difettosi guida l'evoluzione, ci mantiene relativamente geneticamente sani e rende possibile la società. La disgenica è sufficiente a distruggere la civiltà, ma la sovrappopolazione sarà doprima. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019). (shrink)

Esta é uma revisão excelente de interações do gene/ambiente no comportamento e, apesar de ser um bocado datado, é uma leitura fácil e de valor. Eles começam com estudos gêmeos que mostram o impacto esmagador da genética sobre o comportamento. Eles observam os estudos cada vez mais conhecidos de Judith Harris que estendem e resumem os fatos que o ambiente doméstico compartilhado quase não tem efeito sobre o comportamento e que as crianças adotadas crescem para ser tão diferente de seus (...) meio-irmão e irmãs como as pessoas escolhidas aleatoriamente. Um ponto básico que eles (e quase todos os que discutem a genética comportamental) não conseguem notar é que as centenas (milhares dependendo do seu ponto de vista) de universais comportamentais humanos, incluindo todos os fundamentos de nossas personalidades, são 100% determinados por nossos genes, com nenhuma variação em normais. Todo mundo vê uma árvore como uma árvore e não uma pedra, procura e come comida, fica irritado e ciumento, etc. Assim, o que estão falando na maior parte sobre aqui é quanto ambiente (cultura) pode afetar o grau a que as várias características são mostradas, um pouco do que sua aparência. Finalmente, eles discutem a eugenia da forma usual politicamente correta, deixando de notar que nós e todos os organismos são os produtos da eugenia da natureza e que as tentativas de derrotar a seleção natural com a medicina, a agricultura e a civilização como um todo, são desastroso para qualquer sociedade que persiste em fazer isso. Tanto quanto 50% de todas as concepções, ou cerca de 100 milhões/ano, terminam em aborto espontâneo precoce, quase todos sem que a mãe esteja consciente. Este abate natural de genes defeituosos impulsiona a evolução, mantém-nos relativamente geneticamente som e torna a sociedade possível. Disgenia é suficiente para destruir a civilização, mas superpopulação vai do primeiro. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y uotras. Esta é uma revisão excelente de interações do gene/ambiente no comportamento e, apesar de ser um bocado datado, é uma leitura fácil e de valor. (shrink)

Il s’agit d’un excellent examen des interactions génétiques / environnement sur le comportement et, en dépit d’être un peu daté, est une lecture facile et utile. Ils commencent par des études jumelles qui montrent l’impact écrasant de la génétique sur le comportement. Ils notent les études de plus en plus connues de Judith Harris qui étendent et résument les faits que l’environnement familial partagé n’a presque aucun effet sur le comportement et que les enfants adoptés grandissent pour être aussi différents (...) de leurs demi-frères et soeurs que les personnes choisies au hasard. Un point fondamental qu’ils (et presque tous ceux qui discutent de la génétique comportementale) ne parviennent pas à noter est que les centaines (des milliers selon votre point de vue) des universels comportementaux humains, y compris toutes les bases de nos personnalités, sont 100% déterminés par nos gènes, sans aucune variation dans les normales. Tout le monde voit un arbre comme un arbre et non une pierre, cherche et mange de la nourriture, se met en colère et jaloux, etc. Donc, ce dont ils parlent surtout ici, c’est de la quantité d’environnement (culture) qui peut influer sur la mesure dans laquelle les divers traits sont montrés, plutôt que leur apparence. Enfin, ils discutent de l’eugénisme de la manière politiquement correcte habituelle, à défaut de noter que nous et tous les organismes sommes les produits de l’eugénisme de la nature et que les tentatives de vaincre la sélection naturelle avec la médecine, l’agriculture, et la civilisation dans son ensemble, sont désastreuses pour toute société qui persiste à le faire. Jusqu’à 50% de toutes les conceptions, soit environ 100 millions par an, se terminent par un avortement spontané précoce, presque tous sans que la mère soit au courant. Cet abattage naturel de gènes défectueux stimule l’évolution, nous maintient relativement génétiquement sains et rend la société possible. Dysgenics est suffisant pour détruire la civilisation, mais la surpopulation sera do ild’abord. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein et John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

これは、行動に関する遺伝子/環境相互作用の優れたレビューであり、少し日付が付いているにもかかわらず、簡単で価値のある読み取りです。彼らは遺伝学が行動に与える圧倒的な影響を示す双子の研究から始まります。 彼らは、家庭環境を共有することは行動にほとんど影響を及ぼさないという事実を拡張し要約し、養子が無作為に選ばれた人々と同じくらい義理の兄弟や姉妹と同じように成長するという事実を拡張し、要約するジュディス ・ハリスのますますよく知られた研究に注意してください。彼ら(そして行動遺伝学について議論するほぼすべての人)が注意できない基本的なポイントの1つは、私たちの性格のすべての基本を含む人間の行動普遍的な何 百人(あなたの視点に応じて数千人)が、正常にばらつきのない私たちの遺伝子によって100%決定されるということです。誰もが木を木として見て、石ではなく、食べ物を求めて食べ、怒りと嫉妬などを求めます。だか ら、彼らがここで主に話しているのは、環境(文化)が外見ではなく、様々な形質が示される程度にどれだけ影響を与えるかです。 最後に、彼らは、私たちとすべての生物が自然の優生学の産物であり、医学、農業、文明全体で自然選択を打ち負かそうとする試みは、これを続ける社会にとって悲惨なことに注意せず、通常の政治的に正しい方法で優生学 について議論しています。すべての概念の50%、または約1億/年は、母親が気づかずに、ほぼすべての早期自然流産に終わる。この欠陥遺伝子の自然なカリングは進化を促進し、私たちを比較的遺伝的に健全に保ち、社 会を可能にします。異性原性は文明を破壊するのに十分であるが、人口過剰は最初にそれをdする。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの2ndnd edの哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多く興味がある人は、運命の惑星に関する「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治」を見ることができます - 記事とレビュー2006-2017' 3rded (2019) その他。 .

이것은 행동에 유전자/환경 상호 작용의 훌륭한 검토 이며, 조금 일자 임에도 불구 하 고, 쉽고 가치 있는 읽기. 그(것)들은 행동에 유전학의 압도적인 충격을 보여주는 쌍둥이 연구 결과로 시작합니다. 그들은 공유 가정 환경이 행동에 거의 영향을 미치지 않으며 입양 된 자녀가 무작위로 선택된 사람들처럼 의붓 형제 자매와 다르게 자라는 사실을 확장하고 요약하는 주디스 해리스 (Judith Harris)의 점점 더 잘 알려진 연구에 주목합니다. 그들 (그리고 행동 유전학을 토론하는 거의 모든 사람들이) 주의하지 못하는 한 가지 기본 포인트는 우리의 성격의 모든 기초를 포함하여 인간의 (...) 행동 보편적 인 수백 (수천)이 정상의 변화가없는 유전자에 의해 100 % 결정된다는 것입니다. 모든 사람은 나무를 돌이 아닌 나무로 보고, 음식을 찾고 먹고, 화가 나고 질투합니다. 그래서, 그들은 주로 여기에 대해 이야기하는 것은 얼마나 많은 환경 (문화)가 자신의 외모보다는 다양한 특성이 표시되는 정도에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 마지막으로, 그들은 우리와 모든 유기체가 자연의 우생학의 산물이며 의학, 농업 및 문명 전체와 자연 선택을 물리 치려는 시도가 이 일을계속하는 모든 사회에 재앙이라는 것을 주목하지 못하고, 일반적인 정치적으로 올바른 방식으로 우생학에 대해논의합니다. 모든 개념의 50%, 또는 약 1억 년 동안, 어머니가 인식하지 못하고 거의 모든 조기 자발적 낙태로 끝납니다. 결함이 있는 유전자의 이 자연적인 컬링은 진화를 유도하고, 상대적으로 유전적으로 건전하게 유지하고, 사회를 가능하게 합니다. 이형성은 문명을 파괴하기에 충분하지만 인구 과잉은먼저그것을 o것입니다. 현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의 언어' 그리고 언어 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다 -철학, 심리학, 과학, 운명 행성에 종교와 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019) 및 기타. (shrink)

这是一个对行为上基因/环境相互作用的极好的回顾,尽管有点过时,但却是一个简单而值得阅读的。他们从双胞胎研究开始,这些研究显示了遗传学对行为的压倒性影响。他们注意到朱迪思·哈里斯越来越广为人知的研究,这 些研究扩展并总结了共享家庭环境对行为几乎没有影响的事实,领养的孩子长大后与选择的继兄弟姐妹一样不同。随机。一个基本点,他们(和几乎所有谁讨论行为遗传学)没有注意到的是,数百(取决于你的观点)人类行为普 遍性,包括我们个性的所有基本,是由我们的基因100%决定,与法线没有变化。每个人都把树看成一棵树,而不是一块石头,寻找和吃食物,生气和嫉妒等等。因此,他们主要讨论的是,环境(文化)能在多大程度上影响各 种特征的显示程度,而不是它们的外观。 最后,他们以通常的政治正确方式讨论优生学,没有注意到我们和所有生物体是自然优生学的产物,并且试图用医学、农业和整个文明来击败自然选择,灾难性的任何社会,坚持这样做。多达50%的所有受孕,或大约1亿/年 ,以早期自然流产结束,几乎所有的母亲都没有意识到。这种对缺陷基因的自然剔除推动了进化,使我们相对地保持遗传健康,并使社会成为可能。基因足以破坏文明,但人口过剩会先破坏文明。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的二等奖(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-2017 年'3rd ed(2019)。.

This is an excellent review of gene/environment interactions on behavior and, in spite of being a bit dated, is an easy and worthwhile read. They start with twin studies which show the overwhelming impact of genetics on behavior. They note the increasingly well known studies of Judith Harris which extend and summarize the facts that shared home environment has almost no effect on behavior and that adopted children grow up to be as different from their stepbrothers and sisters as people (...) chosen at random. One basic point that they (and nearly all who discuss behavioral genetics) fail to note is that the hundreds (thousands depending on your viewpoint) of human behavioral universals, including all the basics of our personalities, are 100% determined by our genes, with no variation in normals. Everyone sees a tree as a tree and not a stone, seeks and eats food, gets angry and jealous etc. So, what they are mostly talking about here is how much environment (culture) can affect the degree to which various traits are shown, rather than their appearance. Finally, they discuss eugenics in the usual politically correct fashion, failing to note that we and all organisms are the products of nature’s eugenics and that attempts to defeat natural selection with medicine, agriculture, and civilization as a whole, are disastrous for any society that persists. As much as 50% of all conceptions, or some 100 million/year, end in early spontaneous abortion, nearly all without the mother being aware. This natural culling of defective genes drives evolution, keeps us relatively genetically sound and makes society possible. However, it is now clear that overpopulation will destroy the world before dysgenics has a chance. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

Esta es una excelente revisión de las interacciones gen/ambiente en el comportamiento y, a pesar de ser un poco anticuado, es una lectura fácil y valiosa. Empiezan con estudios gemelos que muestran el impacto abrumador de la genética en el comportamiento. Señalan los estudios cada vez más conocidos de Judith Harris, que amplían y resumen los hechos de que el ambiente doméstico compartido casi no tiene efecto sobre el comportamiento y que los niños adoptados crecen para ser tan diferentes de (...) sus hermanastros y hermanas como las personas elegidas al azar. Un punto básico que ellos (y casi todos los que discuten sobre la genética conductual) no se dan cuenta es que los cientos (miles dependiendo de su punto de vista) de los universales de comportamiento humano, incluyendo todos los fundamentos de nuestras personalidades, son 100% determinado por nuestros genes, con no hay variación en las normales. Todo el mundo ve un árbol como un árbol y no una piedra, busca y come comida, se enfada y celosa, etc. Por lo tanto, lo que están hablando sobre todo aquí es cuánto ambiente (cultura) puede afectar al grado en que se muestran varios rasgos, en lugar de su apariencia. Por último, discuten la eugenesia en la costumbre políticamente correcta, al no notar que nosotros y todos los organismos somos los productos de la eugenesia de la naturaleza y que los intentos de derrotar la selección natural con la medicina, la agricultura y la civilización en su conjunto, son desastroso para cualquier sociedad que persiste en hacer esto. Tanto como el 50% de todas las concepciones, o unos 100 millones/año, terminan en abortos espontáneos tempranos, casi todos sin que la madre sea consciente. Este sacrificio natural de genes defectuosos impulsa la evolución, nos mantiene relativamente genéticamente sólidas y hace posible la sociedad. La disgenesia es suficiente para destruir la civilización pero sobrepoblación se do primero. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo y actualizado para el comportamiento humano desde la vista moderna de dos sistemas pueden consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio por Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La estructura Lógica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), La Estructura Lógica de la Conciencia (2019, Comprender las Conexiones entre la Ciencia, la Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política , Economía, Historia y Literatura (2019), Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo XXI 5ª ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

Dies ist eine ausgezeichnete Überprüfung der Gen-/Umgebungsinteraktionen auf das Verhalten und ist, obwohl sie etwas veraltet ist, eine einfache und lohnende Lektüre. Sie beginnen mit Zwillingsstudien, die den überwältigenden Einfluss der Genetik auf das Verhalten zeigen. Sie stellen die immer bekannter werdenden Studien von Judith Harris fest, die die Fakten erweitern und zusammenfassen, dass die gemeinsame häusliche Umgebung fast keinen Einfluss auf das Verhalten hat und dass adoptierte Kinder so anders wachsen als ihre Stiefbrüder und -schwestern wie zufällig ausgewählte Menschen. (...) Ein grundlegender Punkt, den sie (und fast alle, die über Verhaltensgenetik diskutieren) nicht zur Kenntnis nehmen, ist, dass die Hunderte (Tausende je nach Standpunkt) menschlicher Verhaltensuniversalen, einschließlich aller Grundlagen unserer Persönlichkeiten, zu 100% von unseren Genen bestimmt werden, ohne Variation in normalen Werten. Jeder sieht einen Baum als Baum und nicht als Stein, sucht und isst Nahrung, wird wütend und eifersüchtig usw. Worüber sie hier also meistens sprechen, ist, wie viel Umwelt (Kultur) das Ausmaß beeinflussen kann, in dem verschiedene Merkmale gezeigt werden, und nicht ihr Aussehen. Schließlich diskutieren sie die Eugenik in der üblichen politisch korrekten Weise, ohne festzustellen, dass wir und alle Organismen die Produkte der Eugenik der Natur sind und dass Versuche, die natürliche Selektion mit Medizin, Landwirtschaft und Zivilisation als Ganzes zu besiegen, für jede Gesellschaft, die dies weiterhin tut,katastrophalsind. Bis zu 50 % aller Empfängnisse oder etwa 100 Millionen pro Jahr enden in einer frühen spontanen Abtreibung, fast alle ohne Dassmund die Mutter. Diese natürliche Keulung defekter Gene treibt die Evolution an, hält uns relativ genetisch gesund und macht die Gesellschaft möglich. Dysgenös ist ausreichend, um die Zivilisation zu zerstören, aber Überbevölkerung wirdd o eszuerst. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

यह व्यवहार पर जीन/पर्यावरण बातचीत की एक उत्कृष्ट समीक्षा है और, थोड़ा दिनांकित होने के बावजूद, एक आसान और सार्थक पढ़ा है. वे जुड़वां अध्ययन जो व्यवहार पर आनुवंशिकी के भारी प्रभाव दिखाने के साथ शुरू करते हैं. वे जूडिथ हैरिस के तेजी से अच्छी तरह से ज्ञात अध्ययन जो विस्तार और तथ्यों है कि साझा घर के माहौल व्यवहार पर लगभग कोई प्रभाव नहीं है संक्षेप में ध्यान दें और कहा कि गोद लिया बच्चों को अपने सौतेले भाई और (...) बहनों से अलग होने के रूप में लोगों को चुना के रूप में बड़े होते हैं यादृच्छिक पर. एक बुनियादी बात यह है कि वे (और लगभग सभी जो व्यवहार आनुवंशिकी पर चर्चा) ध्यान दें करने में विफल है कि सैकड़ों (हजारों अपने दृष्टिकोण के आधार पर) मानव व्यवहार सार्वभौमिक, हमारे व्यक्तित्व के सभी मूल बातें सहित, 100% हमारे जीन द्वारा निर्धारित कर रहे हैं, के साथ सामान्य में कोई भिन्नता नहीं है. हर कोई एक पेड़ के रूप में एक पेड़ देखता है और एक पत्थर नहीं, चाहता है और खाना खाता है, गुस्सा और ईर्ष्या आदि हो जाता है तो, क्या वे ज्यादातर यहाँ के बारे में बात कर रहे हैं कितना पर्यावरण (संस्कृति) डिग्री जो करने के लिए विभिन्न लक्षण दिखाए जाते हैं, बजाय उनकी उपस्थिति को प्रभावित कर सकते हैं. अंत में, वे हमेशा की तरह राजनीतिक रूप से सही फैशन में eugenics पर चर्चा, ध्यान दें कि हम और सभी जीवप्रकृति के eugenics के उत्पादों रहे हैं और है कि एक पूरे के रूप में दवा, कृषि, और सभ्यता के साथ प्राकृतिक चयन को हराने के प्रयास में विफल रहा है, कर रहे हैं ऐसा करने मेंबनी रहने वाले किसी भी समाज के लिए विनाशकारी. सभी धारणाओं, या कुछ 100 मिलियन /वर्ष के 50% के रूप में ज्यादा के रूप में, जल्दी सहज गर्भपात में अंत, लगभग सभी माँ के बारे में पता किया जा रहा बिना. दोषपूर्ण जीन के इस प्राकृतिक culling विकास ड्राइव, हमें अपेक्षाकृत आनुवंशिक रूप से ध्वनि रहता है और समाज संभव बनाता है. Dysgenics सभ्यता को नष्ट करने के लिए पर्याप्त है , लेकिन overpopulation dयहपहलेहोगा. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2एन डी एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकतेहैं ' बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक Doomed ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019). (shrink)

-/- Esta es una excelente revisión de las interacciones gen/ambiente en el comportamiento y, a pesar de ser un poco anticuado, es una lectura fácil y valiosa. Empiezan con estudios gemelos que muestran el impacto abrumador de la genética en el comportamiento. Señalan los estudios cada vez más conocidos de Judith Harris, que amplían y resumen los hechos de que el ambiente doméstico compartido casi no tiene efecto sobre el comportamiento y que los niños adoptados crecen para ser tan diferentes (...) de sus hermanastros y hermanas como las personas elegidas al azar. Un punto básico que ellos (y casi todos los que discuten sobre la genética conductual) no se dan cuenta es que los cientos (miles dependiendo de su punto de vista) de los universales de comportamiento humano, incluyendo todos los fundamentos de nuestras personalidades, son 100% determinado por nuestros genes, con no hay variación en las normales. Todo el mundo ve un árbol como un árbol y no una piedra, busca y come comida, se enfada y celosa, etc. Por lo tanto, lo que están hablando sobre todo aquí es cuánto ambiente (cultura) puede afectar al grado en que se muestran varios rasgos, en lugar de su apariencia. -/- Por último, discuten la eugenesia en la costumbre políticamente correcta, al no notar que nosotros y todos los organismos somos los productos de la eugenesia de la naturaleza y que los intentos de derrotar la selección natural con la medicina, la agricultura y la civilización en su conjunto, son desastroso para cualquier sociedad que persiste en hacer esto. Tanto como el 50% de todas las concepciones, o unos 100 millones/año, terminan en abortos espontáneos tempranos, casi todos sin que la madre sea consciente. Este sacrificio natural de genes defectuosos impulsa la evolución, nos mantiene relativamente genéticamente sólidas y hace posible la sociedad. La disgenesia es suficiente para destruir la civilización pero sobrepoblación se do primero. -/- Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna Dos Sistemas Punto de Vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje En Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2Nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2017' 3Rd Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

Esta é uma revisão excelente de interações do gene/ambiente no comportamento e, apesar de ser um bocado datado, é uma leitura fácil e de valor. Eles começam com estudos gêmeos que mostram o impacto esmagador da genética sobre o comportamento. Eles observam os estudos cada vez mais conhecidos de Judith Harris que estendem e resumem os fatos que o ambiente doméstico compartilhado quase não tem efeito sobre o comportamento e que as crianças adotadas crescem para ser tão diferente de seus (...) meio-irmão e irmãs como as pessoas escolhidas aleatoriamente. Um ponto básico que eles (e quase todos os que discutem a genética comportamental) não conseguem notar é que as centenas (milhares dependendo do seu ponto de vista) de universais comportamentais humanos, incluindo todos os fundamentos de nossas personalidades, são 100% determinados por nossos genes, com nenhuma variação em normals. Todo mundo vê uma árvore como uma árvore e não uma pedra, procura e come comida, fica irritado e ciumento, etc. Assim, o que estão falando na maior parte sobre aqui é quanto ambiente (cultura) pode afetar o grau a que as várias características são mostradas, um pouco do que sua aparência. Finalmente, eles discutem a eugenia da forma usual politicamente correta, deixando de notar que nós e todos os organismos são os produtos da eugenia da natureza e que as tentativas de derrotar a seleção natural com a medicina, a agricultura e a civilização como um todo, são desastroso para qualquer sociedade que persiste em fazer isso. Tanto quanto 50% de todas as concepções, ou cerca de 100 milhões/ano, terminam em aborto espontâneo precoce, quase todos sem que a mãe esteja consciente. Este abate natural de genes defeituosos impulsiona a evolução, mantém-nos relativamente geneticamente som e torna a sociedade possível. Disgenia é suficiente para destruir a civilização, mas superpopulação vai do primeiro. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y otras. (shrink)

Ini adalah review yang sangat baik gen/lingkungan interaksi pada perilaku dan, meskipun menjadi sedikit tanggal, adalah mudah dan bermanfaat dibaca. Mereka mulai dengan kembar studi yang menunjukkan dampak luar biasa genetika pada perilaku. Mereka mencatat semakin terkenal studi Judith Harris yang memperluas dan meringkas fakta bahwa lingkungan rumah bersama hampir tidak berpengaruh pada perilaku dan bahwa anak angkat tumbuh menjadi berbeda dari stepbrothers dan saudari mereka sebagai orang yang dipilih secara acak. Salah satu titik dasar bahwa mereka (dan hampir semua (...) orang yang membahas genetika perilaku) gagal untuk dicatat adalah bahwa ratusan (ribuan tergantung pada sudut pandang Anda) dari univeryang perilaku manusia, termasuk semua dasar dari kepribadian kita, adalah 100% ditentukan oleh gen kita, dengan tidak ada variasi dalam normals. Semua orang melihat pohon sebagai pohon dan bukan batu, mencari dan makan makanan, menjadi marah dan cemburu dll. Jadi, apa yang kebanyakan mereka bicarakan di sini adalah berapa banyak lingkungan (budaya) dapat mempengaruhi tingkat yang berbagai sifat ditampilkan, daripada penampilan mereka. -/- Akhirnya, mereka mendiskusikan egenetika dalam cara politik yang benar biasa, gagal untuk dicatat bahwa kita dan semua organisme adalah produk dari egenetika alam dan bahwa upaya untuk mengalahkan seleksi alam dengan obat-obatan, pertanian, dan peradaban secara keseluruhan, adalah bencana bagi setiap masyarakat yang tetap dalam melakukan hal ini. Sebanyak 50% dari semua konsepsi, atau beberapa 100 juta/tahun, berakhir di awal aborsi spontan, hampir semua tanpa ibu yang sadar. Pemusnahan alami ini gen yang rusak mendorong evolusi, membuat kita relatif suara genetik dan membuat masyarakat mungkin. Dysgenics cukup untuk menghancurkan peradaban tetapi kelebihan penduduk akan do pertama. -/- Mereka yang berharap komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systEMS Lihat modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa di Ludwig Wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet Doomed--artikel dan ulasan 2006-2017' 3Rd Ed (2019). (shrink)

In his précis of a recent book, Richard Joyce writes, “My contention…is that…any epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended to moral beliefs…will be neutralized by the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere…presupposes their truth.” Such reasoning – falling under the heading “Genealogical Debunking Arguments” – is now commonplace. But how might “the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere… presupposes” the truth of our moral beliefs “neutralize” whatever “epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended (...) to” them? In this article, I argue that there appears to be no satisfactory answer to this question. The problem is quite general, applying to all arguments with the structure of Genealogical Debunking Arguments aimed at realism about a domain meeting two conditions. The Benacerraf-Field Challenge for mathematical realism affords an important special case. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the nature and value of political disagreement, with reference to contemporary work in political philosophy. I will attempt to answer the following questions: Why do we disagree? Is political disagreement a good thing? Do we have a duty to disagree? Should we expect consensus or mere compromise in politics? When is civil disobedience a justified way to express disagreement with the law? Is consensus a threat to democracy?

It is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non-rigid designators.2 But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest real notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every real sense. If there were nothing otherwise “uniquely metaphysically significant” about (...) metaphysical necessity, then paradigmatic metaphysical necessities would be necessary in one sense of “necessary”, not necessary in another, and that would be it. The question of whether they were necessary simpliciter would be like the question of whether the Parallel Postulate is true simpliciter – understood as a pure mathematical conjecture, rather than as a hypothesis about physical spacetime. In a sense, the latter question has no objective answer. In this article, I argue that paradigmatic questions of modal metaphysics are like the Parallel Postulate question. I then discuss the deflationary ramifications of this argument. I conclude with an alternative conception of the space of possibility. According to this conception, there is no objective boundary between possibility and impossibility. Along the way, I sketch an analogy between modal metaphysics and set theory. (shrink)

The distinction between perception and cognition frames countless debates in philosophy and cognitive science. But what, if anything, does this distinction actually amount to? In this introductory article, we summarize recent work on this question. We first briefly consider the possibility that a perception-cognition border should be eliminated from our scientific ontology, and then introduce and critically examine five positive approaches to marking a perception–cognition border, framed in terms of phenomenology, revisability, modularity, format, and stimulus-dependence.

I this article, I introduce the notion of pluralism about an area, and use it to argue that the questions at the center of our normative lives are not settled by the facts -- even the normative facts. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the concept of objectivity, not realism, should take center stage.

The motivating question of this paper is: ‘How are our beliefs in the theorems of mathematics justified?’ This is distinguished from the question ‘How are our mathematical beliefs reliably true?’ We examine an influential answer, outlined by Russell, championed by Gödel, and developed by those searching for new axioms to settle undecidables, that our mathematical beliefs are justified by ‘intuitions’, as our scientific beliefs are justified by observations. On this view, axioms are analogous to laws of nature. They are postulated (...) to best systematize the data to be explained. We argue that there is a decisive difference between the cases. There is agreement on the data to be systematized in the scientific case that has no analog in the mathematical one. There is virtual consensus over observations, but conspicuous dispute over intuitions. In this respect, mathematics more closely resembles stereotypical philosophy. We conclude by distinguishing two ideas that have long been associated -- realism (the idea that there is an independent reality) and objectivity (the idea that in a disagreement, only one of us can be right). We argue that, while realism is true of mathematics and philosophy, these domains fail to be objective. One upshot of the discussion is that even questions of fundamental physics may fail to be objective in roughly the sense that the question, ‘Is the Parallel Postulate is true?’, understood as one of pure mathematics, fails to be. Another is a kind of pragmatism. Factual questions in mathematics, modality, logic, and evaluative areas go proxy for non-factual practical ones. -/- . (shrink)

A comprehensive theory of agency will encompass not just acting but also omitting to act and refraining from acting. Some theorists maintain that a causal theory can be applied to acting, omitting, and refraining in a perfectly uniform manner, for each omission or instance of refraining can be identified with some garden-variety action. Here it is argued that in plenty of cases this strategy fails. Sufficient conditions for omitting or refraining are offered that do not require there to be, in (...) every case, anything that is an omission or act of refraining. Disjoining these with a causal theory of action would leave us with a view of agency that is less uniform than what might have been preferred; but diversity in the subject matter, it is suggested, might preclude any more uniform theory. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics offers the most authoritative and compelling guide to this diverse and fertile field of philosophy. Twenty-four of the world's most distinguished specialists provide brand-new essays about 'what there is': what kinds of things there are, and what relations hold among entities falling under various categories. They give the latest word on such topics as identity, modality, time, causation, persons and minds, freedom, and vagueness. The Handbook's unrivaled breadth and depth make it the definitive reference work (...) for students and academics across the philosophical spectrum. (shrink)

According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like access (...) to normative properties. We argue that underlying this objection are several specific problems, rooted in the different types of mental states to which emotions may respond, that the sentimental perceptualist must tackle for her view to be successful. We argue, moreover, that the problems can be answered by filling out the theory with several independently motivated yet highly controversial commitments, which we carefully catalogue. The plausibility of sentimental perceptualism, as a result, hinges on further claims sentimental perceptualists should not ignore. (shrink)

It is often assumed that adaptation — a temporary change in sensitivity to a perceptual dimension following exposure to that dimension — is a litmus test for what is and is not a “primary visual attribute”. Thus, papers purporting to find evidence of number adaptation motivate a claim of great philosophical significance: That number is something that can be seen in much the way that canonical visual features, like color, contrast, size, and speed, can. Fifteen years after its reported discovery, (...) number adaptation’s existence seems to be nearly undisputed, with dozens of papers documenting support for the phenomenon. The aim of this paper is to offer a counterweight — to critically assess the evidence for and against number adaptation. After surveying the many reasons for thinking that number adaptation exists, we introduce several lesser-known reasons to be skeptical. We then advance an alternative account — the old news hypothesis — which can accommodate previously published findings while explaining various (otherwise unexplained) anomalies in the existing literature. Next, we describe the results of eight pre-registered experiments which pit our novel old news hypothesis against the received number adaptation hypothesis. Collectively, the results of these experiments undermine the number adaptation hypothesis on several fronts, whilst consistently supporting the old news hypothesis. More broadly our work raises questions about the status of adaptation itself as a means of discerning what is and is not a visual attribute. (shrink)

What role does the imagination play in scientific progress? After examining several studies in cognitive science, I argue that one thing the imagination does is help to increase scientific understanding, which is itself indispensable for scientific progress. Then, I sketch a transcendental justification of the role of imagination in this process.

According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains (...) guilt about mere causal responsibility, according to which guilt represents part of the self as bound up with what is bad. (shrink)

This paper defends a theory of hope according to which hopes are composed of a desire and a belief that the object of the desire is possible. Although belief plus desire theories of hope are now widely rejected, this is due to important oversights. One is a failure to recognize the relation that hope-constituting desires and beliefs must stand in to constitute a hope. A second is an oversimplification of the explanatory power of hope-constituting desires. The final portion of the (...) paper uses an enhanced understanding of the psychology of hope to make progress on normative questions about hoping well. (shrink)

This paper offers a qualified defense of a historically popular view that I call sentimental perceptualism. At a first pass, sentimental perceptualism says that emotions play a role in grounding evaluative knowledge analogous to the role perceptions play in grounding empirical knowledge. Recently, András Szigeti and Michael Brady have independently developed an important set of objections to this theory. The objections have a common structure: they begin by conceding that emotions have some important epistemic role to play, but then (...) go on to argue that understanding how emotions play that role means that there must be some alternative, emotion-independent route to obtaining knowledge of value. If there has to be such an emotion-independent route, then the perceptual analogy breaks down in a significant way. In this paper, I argue that the right ways for sentimental perceptualists to respond to each of these objections are revealed by thinking through how analogous objections applied to perception and the empirical domain would be answered. Although Szigeti's and Brady's objections should not persuade sentimental perceptualists to give up their view, the objections do put important constraints on what a form of the view has to be like in order to do exciting metaethical work. (shrink)

A prevalent political narrative is that we are facing an epistemological crisis, where many citizens no longer care about truth and facts. Yet the view that we are living in a post-truth era relies on some implicit questionable empirical and normative assumptions. The post-truth rhetoric converts epistemic issues into motivational issues, treating people with whom we disagree as if they no longer believe in or care about truth. This narrative is also dubious on epistemic, moral, and political grounds. It is (...) epistemically dubious in being largely insensitive to the problem of complexity in politics; it is morally dubious because “post-truth” is often a derogatory label for individuals or groups that are deemed stupid, irrational, or morally compromised; and it is a politically toxic neologism because it purports to use the language of ‘truth’ as a weapon against power, yet these truth-claims are often themselves attempts to exert power over others by delegitimizing their perspectives. While it may seem as if truth and democracy are on especially bad terms lately, politics and truth have long had a vexed relationship, and moral panics about the value of truthfulness in politics are as old as politics itself. (shrink)

The ‘Big 3’ theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfactionism, and objective list theory—attempt to explain why certain things are good for people by appealing to prudentially good-making properties. But they don’t attempt to explain why the properties they advert to make something good for a person. Perfectionism, the view that well-being consists in nature-fulfilment, is often considered a competitor to these views (or else a version of the objective list theory). However, I argue that perfectionism is best understood as explaining why certain (...) properties are prudentially good-making. This version of perfectionism is compatible with each of the Big 3, and, I argue, quite attractive. (shrink)

The visual system adapts to a wide range of visual features, from lower-level features like color and motion to higher-level features like causality and, perhaps, number. According to some, adaptation is a strictly perceptual phenomenon, such that the presence of adaptation licenses the claim that a feature is truly perceptual in nature. Given the theoretical importance of claims about adaptation, then, it is important to understand exactly when the visual system does and does not exhibit adaptation. Here, we take as (...) a case study one specific kind of adaptation: visual adaptation to size. Supported by evidence from four experiments, we argue that, despite robust effects of size adaptation in the lab, (1) size adaptation effects are phenomenologically underwhelming (in some cases, hardly appreciable at all), (2) some effects of size adaptation appear contradictory, and difficult to explain given current theories of size adaptation, and (3) prior studies on size adaptation may have failed to isolate size as the adapted dimension. Ultimately, we argue that while there is evidence to license the claim that size adaptation is genuine, size adaptation is a puzzling and poorly understood phenomenon. (shrink)

The philosophy of hope centers on two interlocking sets of questions. The first concerns the nature of hope. Specific questions here include how to analyze hope, how hope motivates us, and whether there is only one type of hope. The second set concerns the value of hope. Key questions here include whether and when it is good to hope and whether there is a virtue of hope. Philosophers of hope tend to proceed from the first set of questions to the (...) second. This is a natural approach, for one might expect that you must develop a basic understanding of what hope is before you can determine its value. The structure of this chapter thus follows this approach. But readers should not be misled: there is in fact a good deal of feedback between the two sets of questions. A theory of hope is more plausible to the extent that it fits well with plausible ideas about the value of hope. So the movement from hope’s nature to its value is one of emphasis rather than a strict, step-wise process. (shrink)

Epistemic decision theory produces arguments with both normative and mathematical premises. I begin by arguing that philosophers should care about whether the mathematical premises (1) are true, (2) are strong, and (3) admit simple proofs. I then discuss a theorem that Briggs and Pettigrew (2020) use as a premise in a novel accuracy-dominance argument for conditionalization. I argue that the theorem and its proof can be improved in a number of ways. First, I present a counterexample that shows that one (...) of the theorem’s claims is false. As a result of this, Briggs and Pettigrew’s argument for conditionalization is unsound. I go on to explore how a sound accuracy-dominance argument for conditionalization might be recovered. In the course of doing this, I prove two new theorems that correct and strengthen the result reported by Briggs and Pettigrew. I show how my results can be combined with various normative premises to produce sound arguments for conditionalization. I also show that my results can be used to support normative conclusions that are stronger than the one that Briggs and Pettigrew’s argument supports. Finally, I show that Briggs and Pettigrew’s proofs can be simplified considerably. (shrink)

This paper asks whether there is a moral virtue of hope, and if so, what it is. The enterprise is motivated by a historical asymmetry, namely that while Christian thinkers have long classed hope as a theological virtue, it has not traditionally been classed as a moral one. But this is puzzling, for hoping well is not confined to the sphere of religion; and consequently we might expect that if the theological virtue is structurally sound, there will be a secular, (...) moral analogue. This paper proposes that there is such an analogue, and that it is closely linked to the everyday notion of “having your priorities straight,” a phenomenon which is naturally understood in terms of the attitude of hope. It turns out that the priorities model provides an abstract way of characterizing a central but underexplored virtue, one which can be developed in secular or theological ways. (shrink)

This paper argues that Kant’s concept of ‘respect’ for the moral law has roots in Adam Smith’s concept of ‘regard’ for the general rules of conduct, which was translated as Achtung in the first German translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. After illustrating that Kant’s technical understanding of respect appeared relatively late in his intellectual development, I argue that Kant’s concept of respect and Smith’s concept of regard share a basic similarity: they are both a single complex phenomenon with (...) two core aspects, namely an attitude and a feeling. I then suggest that the concept of regard offered Kant a way to deal a problem concerning moral motivation that he was trying to solve at the time he likely first read Smith. I conclude by drawing some implications from the account I have offered for our understanding of Kant’s relation to Smith more generally. (shrink)

We might think that thought experiments are at their most powerful or most interesting when they produce new knowledge. This would be a mistake; thought experiments that seek understanding are just as powerful and interesting, and perhaps even more so. A growing number of epistemologists are emphasizing the importance of understanding for epistemology, arguing that it should supplant knowledge as the central notion. In this chapter, I bring the literature on understanding in epistemology to bear on explicating the different ways (...) that thought experiments increase three important kinds of understanding: explanatory, objectual and practical. (shrink)

We seem to be able to acquire evaluative knowledge by mere reflection, or “from the armchair.” But how? This question is especially pressing for proponents of sentimental perceptualism, which is the view that our evaluative knowledge is rooted in affective experiences in much the way that everyday empirical knowledge is rooted in perception. While such empirical knowledge seems partially explained by causal relations between perceptions and properties in the world, in armchair evaluative inquiry, the relevant evaluative properties are typically not (...) even present. The paper shows how sentimental perceptualists can ultimately provide a broadly causal explanation of our reflective evaluative knowledge. (shrink)

The fact that Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin seem to disagree about the ordinary use of words such as ‘voluntary’, ‘involuntary’, ‘voluntarily’, and ‘involuntarily’ has been taken to cast doubt on the methods of ordinary language philosophy. As Benson Mates puts the worry, ‘if agreement about usage cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as the class of Oxford Professors of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the sample is enlarged?’ (Mates, Inquiry 1:161–171, 1958, p. 165). In this chapter, (...) we evaluate Mates’s criticism alongside Ryle’s and Austin’s specific claims about the ordinary use of these words, assessing these claims against actual examples of ordinary use drawn from the British National Corpus (BNC). Our evaluation consists in applying a combination of methods: first aggregating judgments about a large set of samples drawn from the corpus, and then using a clustering algorithm to uncover connections between different types of use. In applying these methods, we show where and to what extent Ryle’s and Austin’s accounts of the use of the target terms are accurate as well as where they miss important aspects of ordinary use, and we demonstrate the usefulness of this new combination of methods. At the heart of our approach is a commitment to the idea that systematically looking at actual uses of expressions is an essential component of any approach to ordinary language philosophy. (shrink)

In his interesting and provocative article ‘Being Good in a World of Need’, Larry Temkin argues for the possibility of a type of Each-We Dilemma in which, if we each produce the most good we can individually, we produce a worse outcome collectively. Such situations would ostensibly be troubling from the standpoint of effective altruism, the project of finding out how to do the most good and doing it, subject to not violating side-constraints. We here show that Temkin’s argument is (...) more controversial than it may appear initially regarding both impartiality and goodness. This is because it is both inconsistent with (i) a plausible conception of impartiality (Anonymity) and inconsistent with (ii) the standard view of goodness (the Internal Aspects View). Moreover, because (i) and (ii) are entailed by the sense of ‘impartial goodness’ that effective altruism tentatively adopts, Temkin’s argument is less relevant to effective altruism than he suggests. (shrink)

I argue for the usefulness of the evolutionary kind of biological individual.

The first argument that Hume offers against believing in miracle stories in Part 2 of his essay on miracles relies on social context in a way that makes it difficult to follow. Hume says that there’s never been a miracle story that’s well enough attested with respect to certain criteria of testimonial strength. A little later in the essay, he cites recent miracle stories coming from that Saint Médard cemetery as meeting the criteria to an exceptionally high degree, but even (...) so, he claims that we can dismiss the stories out of hand. The hidden background assumption is that his Protestant readers wouldn’t have been tempted to believe in miracle stories coming from an oppressed Catholic sect. Other examples in Part 2 of the essay work in the same way. Hume praises to the skies the quality of the evidence for an earlier Jansenist miracle, for a miracle involving the restoration of a leg through holy water at a Catholic cathedral, and a miracle at a temple of Serapis knowing that his readers won’t be inclined to believe in any of them. The point is that these miracles are better attested than the miracle stories in the Bible, and if we shouldn’t believe in the better attested stories, then we shouldn’t believe in the worse. This can seem like an appeal to prejudice, but really Hume is doing something subtler. He knows that it’s easier to criticize the irrational beliefs of others, but sees that once we turn the same standards that we use on others on our own beliefs, epistemic progress is possible. (shrink)

The article explains my third argument for panpsychism, based on disolving all properties, including dispositional physical properties like mass, energy, and force, into phenomenal properties. I thus reject a dual-property version of panpsychism. I seek to show, contrary to Paul Churchland, that the general panpsychist hypothesis has some explanatory value, and makes a cosmology consisting in comparative psychology possible. The mental life even of so-called physical particles in physics is hypothesized to help explain their behavior.