View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

67 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 67
Material to categorize
  1. Review Of: Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections, and New Perspectives. [REVIEW]Lane Timothy - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Review 16:1-6.
    If we already had a periodic table of mental illness in hand, there would be less need for a book of this type. Although some psychiatrists do think of themselves as chemists, the analogy is without warrant. Not only does psychiatry lack an analogue of the periodic table, its principal tool -- the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) -- is a contentious document. Even subsequent to the publication of DSM-III in 1980, which was intended to serve as (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.) - 2015 - MIT Press.
    In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Blindsight
  1. Naïve Realism and Unconscious Perception: A Reply to Berger and Nanay.Alfonso Anaya & Sam Clarke - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):267-273.
    In a recent paper, Berger and Nanay consider, and reject, three ways of addressing the phenomenon of unconscious perception within a naïve realist framework. Since these three approaches seem to exhaust the options open to naïve realists, and since there is said to be excellent evidence that perception of the same fundamental kind can occur, both consciously and unconsciously, this is seen to present a problem for the view. We take this opportunity to show that all three approaches considered remain (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2. Blindsight in Monkeys: Lost and (Perhaps) Found.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2): 47-71.
    Stoerig and Cowey’s work is widely regarded as showing that monkeys with lesions in the primary visual cortex have blindsight. However, Mole and Kelly persuasively argue that the experimental results are compatible with an alternative hypothesis positing only a deficit in attention and perceptual working memory. I describe a revised procedure which can distinguish these hypotheses, and offer reasons for thinking that the blindsight hypothesis provides a superior explanation. The study of blindsight might contribute towards a general investigation into animal (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies?Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (8): 389-415.
    This paper explores the idea that many “simple minded” invertebrates are “natural zombies” in that they utilize their senses in intelligent ways, but without phenomenal awareness. The discussion considers how “first-order” representationalist theories of consciousness meet the explanatory challenge posed by blindsight. It would be an advantage of first-order representationalism, over higher-order versions, if it does not rule out consciousness in most non-human animals. However, it is argued that a first-order representationalism which adequately accounts for blindsight also implies that most (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. A Re-Evaluation of Blindsight and the Role of Striate Cortex (V1) in Visual Awareness.Juha Silvanto - 2008 - Neuropsychologia.
    Some patients with a lesion to the striate cortex (V1), when assessed through forced-choice paradigms, are able to detect stimuli presented in the blind field, despite reporting a complete lack of visual experience. This phenomenon, known as blindsight, strongly implicates V1 in visual awareness. However, the view that V1 is indispensable for conscious visual perception is challenged by a recent finding that the blindsight subject GY can be aware of visual qualia in his blind field, implying that V1may not be (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
Neglect and Extinction
  1. Neural Correlates of Visuospatial Consciousness in 3D Default Space: Insights From Contralateral Neglect Syndrome.Ravinder Jerath & Molly W. Crawford - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 28:81-93.
    One of the most compelling questions still unanswered in neuroscience is how consciousness arises. In this article, we examine visual processing, the parietal lobe, and contralateral neglect syndrome as a window into consciousness and how the brain functions as the mind and we introduce a mechanism for the processing of visual information and its role in consciousness. We propose that consciousness arises from integration of information from throughout the body and brain by the thalamus and that the thalamus reimages visual (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
Schizophrenia
  1. Watsuji's Concept of Intentionality and its Relevance to Psychopathology.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West.
    Despite increasing interest in the work of Tetsuro Watsuji, his discussion of intentionality remains underexplored. I here develop an interpretation and application of his view. First, I unpack Watsuji’s arguments for the inherently social character of intentionality, consider how it connects with his more general discussion of embodiment and betweenness, and then situate his view alongside phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Next, I argue that Watsuji’s characterization of the social character of intentionality is relevant to current discussions in phenomenological (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The Modus Vivendi of Persons with Schizophrenia: Valueception Impairment and Phenomenological Reduction.Guido Cusinato - 2018 - Thaumàzein – Rivista di Filosofia 6:78-92.
    So far, the value dimension underlying affectivity disorders has remained out of focus in phenomenological psychopathology. As early as at the beginning of the 20th century, however, German phenomenologist Max Scheler examined in depth the relationship between affectivity and value dimension through the concept of valueception (Wertnehmung). In this sense, a recent noteworthy contribution has been provided by John Cutting, who has drawn attention to the importance of Scheler’s analyses for psychiatry. In this work I take into consideration only two (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Enactivism, Other Minds, and Mental Disorders.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called "direct social perception" (DSP): the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and Thought. [REVIEW]Laura Matthews - 2018 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 22 (19).
    Madness and Modernism is undoubtedly one of the most profound and perspicacious treatments of an illness that is utterly baffling to most laypersons and academics alike. Sass artfully brings together two obscure, complex, and unnerving realms -- the schizophrenic and the modern and postmodern aesthetic -- into mutual enlightenment. The comparisons between schizophrenic symptoms such as loss of ego boundaries, perspectival switching, and world catastrophe with modern literature and art is so adroit that it is almost eerie. The reader finds (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Logical Model of Personality and Cognition with Possible Applications.Miro Brada - 2016 - In Woosuk Park (ed.), KAIST/KSBS International Workshop. Daejeon: KAIST. pp. 89-100.
    Although the cognition is significant in strategic reasoning, its role has been weakly analyzed, because only the average intelligence is usually considered. For example, prisoner's dilemma in game theory, would have different outcomes for persons with different intelligence. I show how various levels of intelligence influence the quality of reasoning, decision, or the probability of psychosis. I explain my original methodology developed for my MA thesis in clinical psychology in 1998, and grant research in 1999, demonstrating the bias of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Watsuji's Phenomenology of Aidagara: An Interpretation and Application to Psychopathology.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Tetsugaku Companion to Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy. Springer.
    I discuss Watsuji’s characterization of aidagara or “betweenness”. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied subjectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indicate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational role (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Lalumera, E. 2017 (in Press) Understanding Schizophrenia Through Wittgenstein: Empathy, Explanation, and Philosophical Clarification, in Schizophrenia and Common Sense, Hipólito, I., Gonçalves, J., Pereira, J. (Eds.). SpringerNature, Mind-Brain Studies.E. Lalumera - forthcoming - In I. Hipolito, J. Goncalves & J. Pereira (eds.), Schizophrenia and Common Sense, Hipólito, I., Gonçalves, J., Pereira, J. (eds.). SpringerNature, Mind-Brain Studies. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Wittgenstein’s concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts―Campbell’s idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass’ proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a Rhodes’ and Gipp’s account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Cerebral Blood Flow Autoregulation is Impaired in Schizophrenia.Hsiao-Lun Ku, Timothy Lane & et al - 2017 - Schizophrenia Research:xx-yy.
    Patients with schizophrenia have a higher risk of cardiovascular diseases and higher mortality from them than does the general population; however, the underlying mechanism remains unclear. Impaired cerebral autoregulation is associated with cerebrovascular diseases and their mortality. Increased or decreased cerebral blood flow in different brain regions has been reported in patients with schizophrenia, which implies impaired cerebral autoregulation. This study investigated the cerebral autoregulation in 21 patients with schizophrenia and 23 age- and sex-matched healthy controls. None of the participants (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Explaining Schizophrenia: Auditory Verbal Hallucination and Self‐Monitoring.Wayne Wu - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (1):86-107.
    Do self‐monitoring accounts, a dominant account of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, explain auditory verbal hallucination? In this essay, I argue that the account fails to answer crucial questions any explanation of auditory verbal hallucination must address. Where the account provides a plausible answer, I make the case for an alternative explanation: auditory verbal hallucination is not the result of a failed control mechanism, namely failed self‐monitoring, but, rather, of the persistent automaticity of auditory experience of a voice. My argument (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  10. Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Phenomenology of the Social Self in the Prodrome of Psychosis: From Perceived Negative Attitude of Others to Heightened Interpersonal Sensitivity.Andrea Raballo & Joel Krueger - 2011 - European Psychiatry 26 (8):532-533.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Stop, Look, Listen: The Need for Philosophical Phenomenological Perspectives on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations.Simon McCarthy-Jones, Joel Krueger, Matthew Broome & Charles Fernyhough - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-9.
    One of the leading cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) proposes such experiences result from a disturbance in the process by which inner speech is attributed to the self. Research in this area has, however, proceeded in the absence of thorough cognitive and phenomenological investigations of the nature of inner speech, against which AVHs are implicitly or explicitly defined. In this paper we begin by introducing philosophical phenomenology and highlighting its relevance to AVHs, before briefly examining the evolving literature (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. Losing Social Space: Phenomenological Disruptions of Spatiality and Embodiment in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia.Joel Krueger & Amanda Taylor Aiken - forthcoming - In Jack Reynolds & Ricky Sebold (eds.), Phenomenology and Science. Palgracve Macmillan.
    We argue that a phenomenological approach to social space, as well as its relation to embodiment and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how the social world shows up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different forms of sharing, connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two cases where social space is experientially disrupted: Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We show how this altered sense of social space emerges from subtle disruptions of embodiment and affectivity characteristic of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Embodiment and Affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Analysis.Joel Krueger & Mads Gram Henriksen - forthcoming - In J. Aaron Simmons & James Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the 21st Century. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal relatedness (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  15. Schizophrenia and Yogic Concepts.Hitesh C. Sheth - 2014 - International Journal of Yoga - Philosophy, Psychology and Parapsychology 2 (1).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Consideraciones críticas sobre la propuesta de Thomas Szasz. Entre filosofía de la mente, fenomenología y psiquiatría.Pablo López-Silva - 2014 - Revista Latinoamericana de Psicopatología Fundamental 17 (2).
    El siguiente artículo discute algunos aspectos básicos de la crítica al concepto de ‘enfermedad mental’ elaborada por Thomas Szasz. El breve análisis incluye elementos provenientes desde la psiquiatría, fenomeno- logía y filosofía de la mente. Junto con ofrecer conclusiones respecto del aporte de la propuesta de Szasz para los actuales desarrollos críticos de las comprensiones de la psicopatología, también concluimos con algunas no- tas clasificatorias respecto de la naturaleza interdisciplinaria de la relación entre psiquiatría, fenomenología y filosofía de la mente.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Phenomenology of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations.Angela Woods, Nev Jones, Marco Bernini, Felicity Callard, Ben Alderson-Day, Johanna Badcock, Vaughn Bell, Chris Cook, Thomas Csordas, Clara Humpston, Joel Krueger, Frank Laroi, Simon McCarthy-Jones, Peter Moseley, Hilary Powell & Andrea Raballo - 2014 - Schizophrenia Bulletin 40:S246-S254.
    Despite the recent proliferation of scientific, clinical, and narrative accounts of auditory verbal hallucinations, the phenomenology of voice hearing remains opaque and undertheorized. In this article, we outline an interdisciplinary approach to understanding hallucinatory experiences which seeks to demonstrate the value of the humanities and social sciences to advancing knowledge in clinical research and practice. We argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH utilizes rigorous and context-appropriate methodologies to analyze a wider range of first-person accounts of AVH (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  18. A Metacognitive Model of the Feeling of Agency Over Bodily Actions.Glenn Carruthers - forthcoming - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research and Practice.
    I offer a new metacognitive account of the feeling of agency over bodily actions. On this model the feeling of agency is the metacognitive monitoring of two cues: i) smoothness of action: done via monitoring the output of the comparison between actual and predicted sensory consequences of action and ii) action outcome: done via monitoring the outcome of action and its success relative to a prior intention. Previous research has shown that the comparator model offers a powerful explanation of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.) - 2015 - MIT Press.
    In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Is Inner Speech the Basis of Auditory Verbal Hallucination in Schizophrenia?Wayne Wu & Raymond Cho - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychiatry 14:1-3.
    We respond to Moseley and Wilkinson's defense of inner speech models of AVH.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.
    According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  22. The Case for the Comparator Model as an Explanation of the Sense of Agency and its Breakdowns.Glenn Carruthers - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  23. Stabilizing Mental Disorders: Prospects and Problems.Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2014 - In Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Sullivan (eds.), Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. MIT Press. pp. 257-281.
    In this chapter I investigate the kinds of changes that psychiatric kinds undergo when they become explanatory targets of areas of sciences that are not “mature” and are in the early stages of discovering mechanisms. The two areas of science that are the targets of my analysis are cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neurobiology.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24. Jaspers on Explaining and Understanding in Psychiatry.Christoph Hoerl - 2013 - In Thomas Fuchs & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), One Hundred Years of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 107-120.
    This chapter offers an interpretation of Jaspers’ distinction between explaining and understanding, which relates this distinction to that between general and singular causal claims. Put briefly, I suggest that when Jaspers talks about (mere) explanation, what he has in mind are general causal claims linking types of events. Understanding, by contrast, is concerned with singular causation in the psychological domain. Furthermore, I also suggest that Jaspers thinks that only understanding makes manifest what causation between one element of a person’s mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Intervention, Causal Reasoning, and the Neurobiology of Mental Disorders: Pharmacological Drugs as Experimental Instruments.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (2):542-551.
    In psychiatry, pharmacological drugs play an important experimental role in attempts to identify the neurobiological causes of mental disorders. Besides being developed in applied contexts as potential treatments for patients with mental disorders, pharmacological drugs play a crucial role in research contexts as experimental instruments that facilitate the formulation and revision of neurobiological theories of psychopathology. This paper examines the various epistemic functions that pharmacological drugs serve in the discovery, refinement, testing, and elaboration of neurobiological theories of mental disorders. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  26. Schizophrenia, Experience and Culture.Octavio D. de Serpa Jr - 2010 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 3 (2):50-51.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Raising Awareness of Values in the Recognition of Negative Symptoms of Schizophrenia.Clarissa De Rosalmeida Dantas & Claudio E. M. Banzato - 2010 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 3 (2):35-41.
    What we call today negative symptoms are thought to descend from the very deficits that the earliest scholars of schizophrenia (such as Kraepelin and Bleuler) considered to be the key, fundamental symptoms of the disorder. In the latter half of the 20th century, delusions and hallucinations received greater prominence, which eventually changed both the concept of schizophrenia and its diagnostic criteria by placing positive symptoms at the forefront. The first decade of the 21st century witnessed a resurgence of interest in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. The Threshold of Wakefulness, the Experience of Control, and Theory Development.Timothy Lane & Chien-Ming Yang - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1095-1096.
    Reinterpretation of our data concerning sleep onset, motivated by the desire to pay close attention to “intra-individual regularities,” suggests that the experience of control might be a key factor in determining the subjective sense that sleep has begun. This loss of control seems akin to what Frith and others have described as “passivity experiences,” which also occur in schizophrenia. Although clearly sleep onset is not a schizophrenic episode, this similarity might help to explain other features of sleep onset. We further (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Theory of Mind and Schizophrenia☆.Rajendra D. Badgaiyan - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):320-322.
    A number of cognitive and behavioral variables influence the performance in tasks of theory of mind (ToM). Since two of the most important variables, memory and explicit expression, are impaired in schizophrenic patients, the ToM appears inconsistent in these patients. An ideal instrument of ToM should therefore account for deficient memory and impaired ability of these patients to explicitly express intentions. If such an instrument is developed, it should provide information that can be used not only to understand the pathophysiology (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. Introduction: Understanding, Explaining, and Intersubjectivity in Schizophrenia.Christoph Hoerl - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):83-88.
    This article provides an introduction to a special issue of the journal Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, On Understanding and Explaining Schizophrenia. The article identifies a common thread running through the different contributions to this special issue, inspired by Jaspers's (1963) suggestion that a profound impairment in the ability to engage in interpersonal and social relations is a key factor in psychiatric disorders. It is argued that this suggestion can help solve a central dilemma in psychopathology, which is to make intelligible (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
Anosognosia
  1. Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.
    Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Can Anosognosia Vindicate Traditionalism About Self-Deception?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 44 (2):206-217.
    The traditional conception of self-deception takes it for an intrapersonal form of interpersonal deception. However, since the same subject is at the same time deceiver and deceived, this means attributing the agent a pair of contradictory beliefs. In the course of defending a deflationary conception of self-deception, Mele [1997] has challenged traditionalists to present convincing evidence that there are cases of self-deception in which what he calls the dual belief-requirement is satisfied. Levy [2009] has responded to this challenge affirming that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Introduction: What is Confabulation?William Hirstein - 2009 - In Confabulation: Views From Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
The Minimally Conscious State
  1. Moral Conflict in the Minimally Conscious State.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Finding Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law of Severe Brain Damage. Oxford University Press. pp. 160-179.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. GABAA Receptor Deficits Predict Recovery in Patients With Disorders of Consciousness: A Preliminary Multimodal [11C]Flumazenil PET and fMRI Study.Pengmin Qin, Georg Northoff, Timothy Lane & et al - 2015 - Human Brain Mapping:DOI: 10.1002/hbm.22883.
    Disorders of consciousness (DoC)—that is, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state and minimally conscious state—are debilitating conditions for which no reliable markers of consciousness recovery have yet been identified. Evidence points to the GABAergic system being altered in DoC, making it a potential target as such a marker.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Conscious States: Where Are They in the Brain and What Are Their Necessary Ingredients?William Hirstein - 2013 - Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):230-238.
    One of the final obstacles to understanding consciousness in physical terms concerns the question of whether conscious states can exist in posterior regions of the brain without active connections to the brain's prefrontal lobes. If they can, difficult issues concerning our knowledge of our conscious states can be resolved. This paper contains a list of types of conscious states that may meet this criterion, including states of coma, states in which subjects are absorbed in a perceptual task, states in brains (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. A Case for Increased Caution in End of Life Decisions for Disorders of Consciousness.Jakob Hohwy & David Reutens - 2009 - Monash Bioethics 28 (2):13.1-13.13.
    Disorders of consciousness include coma, the vegetative state and the minimally conscious state. Such patients are often regarded as unconscious. This has consequences for end of life decisions for these patients: it is much easier to justify withdrawing life support for unconscious than conscious patients. Recent brain imaging research has however suggested that some patients may in fact be conscious.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Moral Significance of Phenomenal Consciousness.Neil Levy & Julian Savulescu - 2009 - Progress in Brain Research.
    Recent work in neuroimaging suggests that some patients diagnosed as being in the persistent vegetative state are actually conscious. In this paper, we critically examine this new evidence. We argue that though it remains open to alternative interpretations, it strongly suggests the presence of consciousness in some patients. However, we argue that its ethical significance is less than many people seem to think. There are several different kinds of consciousness, and though all kinds of consciousness have some ethical significance, different (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
Vegetative State and Coma
  1. Alla fine della vita: bioetica e medicina alla ricerca di un confine [At the end of life: bioethics and medicine looking for a boundary].Rosangela Barcaro - 2015 - Laboratorio Dell’ISPF.
    Bioethics, neuroscience, medicine are contributing to a debate on the definition and criteria of death. This topic is very controversial, and it demonstrates clashing views on the meaning of human life and death. Official medical and legal positions agree upon a biological definition of death as irreversible cessation of integrated functioning of the organism as a whole, and whole-brain criterion to ascertain death. These positions have to face many criticisms: some scholars speak of logical and practical inconsistency, some others of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Ethical Considerations in Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Research in Acutely Comatose Patients.Charles Weijer, Tommaso Bruni, Teneille Gofton, G. Bryan Young, Loretta Norton, Andrew Peterson & Adrian M. Owen - 2015 - Brain:0-0.
    After severe brain injury, one of the key challenges for medical doctors is to determine the patient’s prognosis. Who will do well? Who will not do well? Physicians need to know this, and families need to do this too, to address choices regarding the continuation of life supporting therapies. However, current prognostication methods are insufficient to provide a reliable prognosis. -/- Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) holds considerable promise for improving the accuracy of prognosis in acute brain injury patients. Nonetheless, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. GABAA Receptor Deficits Predict Recovery in Patients With Disorders of Consciousness: A Preliminary Multimodal [11C]Flumazenil PET and fMRI Study.Pengmin Qin, Georg Northoff, Timothy Lane & et al - 2015 - Human Brain Mapping:DOI: 10.1002/hbm.22883.
    Disorders of consciousness (DoC)—that is, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state and minimally conscious state—are debilitating conditions for which no reliable markers of consciousness recovery have yet been identified. Evidence points to the GABAergic system being altered in DoC, making it a potential target as such a marker.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Rola świadomości w decyzjach dotyczących zaprzestania podtrzymywania funkcji życiowych.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2011 - Rocznik Kognitywistyczny 5:191-198.
    Badania przy użyciu rezonansu magnetycznego sugerują, że przynajmniej niektórzy pacjenci w tzw. stanie wegetatywnym mogą być bardziej „świadomi”, niż to się do tej pory wydawało. W artykule zamierzam omówić te badania; następnie rozważę, o jakie rozumienie pojęcia świadomości może w nich chodzić; a wreszcie zastanowię się nad etycznymi implikacjami tych odkryć. Zamierzam też rozważyć, czy posiadanie wyższych form świadomości zawsze ma być dodatkową racją przemawiającą przeciwko zaprzestaniu podtrzymywaniu funkcji życiowych. Tym samym, w artykule chciałbym wskazać istotność badań z zakresu kognitywistyki (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. A Case for Increased Caution in End of Life Decisions for Disorders of Consciousness.Jakob Hohwy & David Reutens - 2009 - Monash Bioethics 28 (2):13.1-13.13.
    Disorders of consciousness include coma, the vegetative state and the minimally conscious state. Such patients are often regarded as unconscious. This has consequences for end of life decisions for these patients: it is much easier to justify withdrawing life support for unconscious than conscious patients. Recent brain imaging research has however suggested that some patients may in fact be conscious.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 67