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  1. added 2019-02-22
    Model-Based Cognitive Neuroscience: Multifield Mechanistic Integration in Practice.Mark Povich - forthcoming - Theory & Psychology.
    Autonomist accounts of cognitive science suggest that cognitive model building and theory construction (can or should) proceed independently of findings in neuroscience. Common functionalist justifications of autonomy rely on there being relatively few constraints between neural structure and cognitive function (e.g., Weiskopf, 2011). In contrast, an integrative mechanistic perspective stresses the mutual constraining of structure and function (e.g., Piccinini & Craver, 2011; Povich, 2015). In this paper, I show how model-based cognitive neuroscience (MBCN) epitomizes the integrative mechanistic perspective and concentrates (...)
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  2. added 2019-01-26
    How Could a Rational Analysis Model Explain?Samuli Reijula - 2017 - COGSCI 2017: 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society,.
    Rational analysis is an influential but contested account of how probabilistic modeling can be used to construct non-mechanistic but self-standing explanatory models of the mind. In this paper, I disentangle and assess several possible explanatory contributions which could be attributed to rational analysis. Although existing models suffer from evidential problems that question their explanatory power, I argue that rational analysis modeling can complement mechanistic theorizing by providing models of environmental affordances.
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  3. added 2018-11-16
    Lost Feeling of Ownership of One’s Mental States: The Importance of Situating Patient R.B.'s Pathology in the Context of Contemporary Theory and Empiricism.Stan Klein - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):490-493.
    In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature (...)
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  4. added 2018-07-18
    The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self From the Personal Level.Robert Rupert - 2018 - Philosophic Exchange 2018.
    Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive science through the lens of this distinction. Facts about the personal level are given a priori, by introspection, or by common sense; the job of cognitive science is merely to investigate the mechanistic basis of these facts. I argue (...)
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  5. added 2018-07-01
    Interdyscyplinarne Perspektywy Rozwoju, Integracji I Zastosowań Ontologii Poznawczych.Joanna Hastings, Gwen A. Frishkoff, Barry Smith, Mark Jensen, Russell A. Poldrack, Jane Lomax, Anita Bandrowski, Fahim Imam, Jessica A. Turner & Maryann E. Martone - 2016 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 7 (3):101-117.
    We discuss recent progress in the development of cognitive ontologies and summarize three challenges in the coordinated development and application of these resources. Challenge 1 is to adopt a standardized definition for cognitive processes. We describe three possibilities and recommend one that is consistent with the standard view in cognitive and biomedical sciences. Challenge 2 is harmonization. Gaps and conflicts in representation must be resolved so that these resources can be combined for mark-up and interpretation of multi-modal data. Finally, Challenge (...)
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  6. added 2018-01-15
    Predictive Brains: Forethought and the Levels of Explanation.Giuseppe Boccignone & Roberto Cordeschi - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.
    Is any unified theory of brain function possible? Following a line of thought dat- ing back to the early cybernetics (see, e.g., Cordeschi, 2002), Clark (in press) has proposed the action-oriented Hierarchical Predictive Coding (HPC) as the account to be pursued in the effort of gain- ing the “Grand Unified Theory of the Mind”—or “painting the big picture,” as Edelman (2012) put it. Such line of thought is indeed appealing, but to be effectively pursued it should be confronted with experimental (...)
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  7. added 2017-10-31
    Neural Correlates Without Reduction: The Case of the Critical Period.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - forthcoming - Synthese:1-13.
    Researchers in the cognitive sciences often seek neural correlates of psychological constructs. In this paper, I argue that even when these correlates are discovered, they do not always lead to reductive outcomes. To this end, I examine the psychological construct of a critical period and briefly describe research identifying its neural correlates. Although the critical period is correlated with certain neural mechanisms, this does not imply that there is a reductionist relationship between this psychological construct and its neural correlates. Instead, (...)
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  8. added 2017-10-29
    Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Development, Integration and Application of Cognitive Ontologies.Janna Hastings, Gwen Alexandra Frishkoff, Barry Smith, Mark Jensen, Russell Poldrack, Jessica Turner, Jane Lomax, Anita Bandrowski, Fahim Imam, Jessica A. Turner & Maryann E. Martone - 2014 - Frontiers in Neuroinformatics 8 (62):1-7.
    We discuss recent progress in the development of cognitive ontologies and summarize three challenges in the coordinated development and application of these resources. Challenge 1 is to adopt a standardized definition for cognitive processes. We describe three possibilities and recommend one that is consistent with the standard view in cognitive and biomedical sciences. Challenge 2 is harmonization. Gaps and conflicts in representation must be resolved so that these resources can be combined for mark-up and interpretation of multi-modal data. Finally, Challenge (...)
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  9. added 2017-07-17
    Evaluating Methods of Correcting for Multiple Comparisons Implemented in SPM12 in Social Neuroscience fMRI Studies: An Example From Moral Psychology.Hyemin Han & Andrea L. Glenn - 2018 - Social Neuroscience 13 (3):257-267.
    In fMRI research, the goal of correcting for multiple comparisons is to identify areas of activity that reflect true effects, and thus would be expected to replicate in future studies. Finding an appropriate balance between trying to minimize false positives (Type I error) while not being too stringent and omitting true effects (Type II error) can be challenging. Furthermore, the advantages and disadvantages of these types of errors may differ for different areas of study. In many areas of social neuroscience (...)
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  10. added 2017-03-15
    (March 2017) Gabriel Vacariu, "Similarities Between Adam Frank’s Ideas (2016 or 2017?) (“Minding Matter - The Closer You Look, the More the Materialist Position in Physics Appears to Rest on Shaky Metaphysical Ground” ) and My Ideas (2005, 2008)".Gabriel Vacariu - March 2017 - Dissertation, Bucharest University
    A friend of my sent me the address where this paper has been posted by Adam Frank. Reading it, I realized that more than 90% of the main ideas of this paper (about the mind-brain problem, quantum mechanics (microparticles-wave relationship, Schrodinger equation, probabilities, “perceiving subject in physics”, the idea about consciousness and Nagel, etc. etc.) are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas from my paper 2005 or my book 2008!!!
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  11. added 2017-01-03
    Unbelievable Similarities Between Georg Northoff's Ideas (Canada, 2011-2014) and Gabriel Vacariu's Ideas (2005-2008).Gabriel Vacariu - manuscript
    Many ideas from Georg Nortoff’s works (published one paper in 2010, mainly his book in 2011, other papers in 2012, 2103, 2014, especially those related to Kant’s philosophy and the notion of the “observer”, the mind-brain problem, default mode network, the self, the mental states and their “correspondence” to the brain) are surprisingly very similar to my ideas published in my article from 2002, 2005 and my book from 2008. In two papers from 2002 (also my paper from 2005 and (...)
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  12. added 2016-12-08
    How Do Narratives and Brains Mutually Influence Each Other? Taking Both the ‘Neuroscientific Turn’ and the ‘Narrative Turn’ in Explaining Bio-Political Orders.Machiel Keestra - manuscript
    Introduction: the neuroscientific turn in political science The observation that brains and political orders are interdependent is almost trivial. Obviously, political orders require brain processes in order to emerge and to remain in place, as these processes enable action and cognition. Conversely, every since Aristotle coined man as “by nature a political animal” (Aristotle, Pol.: 1252a 3; cf. Eth. Nic.: 1097b 11), this also suggests that the political engagements of this animal has likely consequences for its natural development, including the (...)
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  13. added 2016-10-09
    The Innocent Eye: Why Vision Is Not a Cognitive Process By Nico Orlandi. [REVIEW]Thomas Polger - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):343-345.
    In The Innocent Eye, Nico Orlandi argues that vision is not a cognitive process. In particular, she argues that forming subject-level visual representations that are available for reasoning should not itself be understood as a process of inference. This comes to the claim that vision (properly so-called) is a process that produces representations but is not best understood as a process that uses representations.
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  14. added 2016-09-23
    From Human to Artificial Cognition and Back: New Perspectives on Cognitively Inspired AI Systems.Antonio Lieto & Daniele Radicioni - 2016 - Cognitive Systems Research 39 (c):1-3.
    We overview the main historical and technological elements characterising the rise, the fall and the recent renaissance of the cognitive approaches to Artificial Intelligence and provide some insights and suggestions about the future directions and challenges that, in our opinion, this discipline needs to face in the next years.
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  15. added 2015-02-10
    Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning draws on Bayesian formal frameworks, and some advocates of the new paradigm think of these formal frameworks as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference. I argue that Bayesian theories should not be seen as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference, where by “Bayesian theories” I mean theories that claim that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that rational adjustments of degrees of belief in the light of (...)
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  16. added 2014-11-10
    On the Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates.Carrie Figdor - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4289-4310.
    One question of the bounds of cognition is that of which things have it. A scientifically relevant debate on this question must explain the persistent and selective use of psychological predicates to report findings throughout biology: for example, that neurons prefer, fruit flies and plants decide, and bacteria communicate linguistically. This paper argues that these claims should enjoy default literal interpretation. An epistemic consequence is that these findings can contribute directly to understanding the nature of psychological capacities.
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  17. added 2014-09-25
    RUTHLESS REDUCTIONISM AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES: APPARENTLY, NOT SO RUTHLESS.Ao Ramírez - 2014 - Kinesis 6 (11):1-16.
    John Bickle recently proposed a metascientific reading of certain neuroscientific practices related to phenomena traditionally studied by psychology. According to this view, the dominant explanatory proceeding in neuroscience is to apply empirical reductions to explain psychological phenomena in cellular and molecular terms, relegating the role of psychology to a mere heuristic, without explanatory power. Thus, according to the strength of the conclusions reached by this method, it puts in check the value of psychological functional explanations. In this work, we seek (...)
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  18. added 2014-03-16
    Empirical Perspectives From the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples.Thomas Metzinger - 2008 - In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.
    In Rahul Banerjee and Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Progress in Brain Research, 168: 215-246. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Electronic offprint available upon request.
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  19. added 2014-03-06
    The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  20. added 2013-08-25
    Cognitive Sciences (Translation From French. 2003. "Processus Cognitifs" by Daniel Andler).Francois-Igor Pris - unknown
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  21. added 2013-06-29
    The Mind-Brain Problem in Cognitive Neuroscience (Only Content).Gabriel Vacariu & Vacariu - 2013
    (June 2013) “The mind-body problem in cognitive neuroscience”, Philosophia Scientiae 17/2, Gabriel Vacariu and Mihai Vacariu (eds.): 1. William Bechtel (Philosophy, Center for Chronobiology, and Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science University of California, San Diego) “The endogenously active brain: the need for an alternative cognitive architecture” 2. Rolls T. Edmund (Oxford Centre for Computational Neuroscience, Oxford, UK) “On the relation between the mind and the brain: a neuroscience perspective” 3. Cees van Leeuwen (University of Leuven, Belgium; Riken Brain Science Institute, (...)
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  22. added 2012-08-15
    Intractability and the Use of Heuristics in Psychological Explanations.Iris Rooij, Cory Wright & Todd Wareham - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):471-487.
    Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity φ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five possible objections. We then propose computational-level theory revision as a principled and workable alternative.
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  23. added 2012-03-15
    On Some Unwarranted Tacit Assumptions in Cognitive Neuroscience.Rainer Mausfeld - 2012 - Frontiers in Cognition 3 (67):1-13.
    The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons or neural networks constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. This paper brings to mind several arguments to the effect that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. It then scrutinizes the question why such conceptions are nevertheless currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. The paper argues that corresponding (...)
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  24. added 2011-01-25
    Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation.Cory Wright & William Bechtel - 2007 - In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge levels rather than (...)
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