Ethics and Justification of War

This paper argues that culture itself can be a weapon against the disentitled within cultures, and against members of other cultures; and when cultures are unjust and hegemonic, the theft of and destruction of elements of their culture can be a justifiable weapon of self-defense by the oppressed. This means that in at least some conflicts, those that are really insurgencies against oppression, such theft and destruction should not be seen as war crimes, but as legitimate military maneuvers. The paper (...) also argues that in general it is better for wars to be prosecuted by the theft and destruction of cultural property rather than by means of killing and debasing of lives, so that, again, these things should not be disincentivized by being classed as war crimes, but in fact should be the preferred methods of war. This makes it all the more problematic to have these things counted as war crimes when killing and rape are not. In the course of these arguments, the distinction is made between people and their culture; and the question is mooted whether the destruction of cultural artifacts is an evil, and if so, how great an evil. Finally, an argument is given against the view that it is wrong for art and culture experts to give assessments for the value of artifacts because this will be the enabling of the theft and destruction of artifacts and their cultures. If we do not place value on things, we cannot know what is most good and so most worth preserving in cultures and their artifacts. So we must carry on with judging, and then make sure we act to prevent the exploitation of the things we have rightly come to value. (shrink)

Academics working on military ethics and serving military personnel rarely have opportunities to talk to each other in ways that can inform and illuminate their respective experiences and approaches to the ethics of war. The workshop from which this paper evolved was a rare opportunity to remedy this problem. Our conversations about First Lieutenant (1LT) Portis’s experiences in combat provided a unique chance to explore questions about the relationship between oversight, accountability, and the idea of moral risk in military operations. (...) In this paper, we outline a particular experience of 1LT Portis’s that formed the basis of our discussions, before elucidating the ethical issues this experience raised. In particular, we see 1LT Portis’s experience as, first, illustrative of the problem of moral risk – when military personnel are placed in situations of moral temptation. The problem of moral risk, we propose, is best understood through the framework of the military’s duty of care. Second, we see his experience as highlighting tensions within the dominant moralized warrior model of the military profession. What we call a toxic warrior identity — a distorted form of the moralized warrior identity — can negatively affect the attitudes of military personnel toward rules, policies, procedures, and accountability mechanisms, particularly in relation to non-combat related roles and duties and when leaders must choose between competing bureaucratic demands. We see 1LT Portis’s experience as illustrative of these tensions, yet his experiences also highlight important concerns about the impact of increasing bureaucratic demands on military functioning. In the conclusion, we address the need to balance concerns about toxic warrior identity with legitimate criticisms of overly demanding bureaucracy and suggest avenues for further research on this issue. (shrink)

McMahan’s own example of a symmetrical defense case, namely his tactical bomber example, opens the door wide open for soldiers to defend their fellow-citizens (on grounds of their special obligations towards them) even if as part of this defense they target non-liable soldiers. So the soldiers on both sides would be permitted to kill each other and, given how McMahan defines “justification,” they would also be justified in doing so and hence not be liable. Thus, we arrive, against McMahan’s intentions, (...) at a moral equality of combatants. In addition, his own account of liability cannot deal adequately with symmetrical defense cases in the first place. This undermines his presupposition that justification defeats liability, which is central to his defense of the moral inequality of combatants. I shall argue that McMahan’s attempts to counter these objections fail and that therefore his general claim of the moral inequality of combatants remains unpersuasive. (shrink)

In dit hoofdstuk presenteer ik de belangrijkste bevindingen en uitspraken uit mijn diepte-interviews met de respondenten. Ik geef hiermee antwoord op de deelvragen ‘Wat voor beeld wordt er gevormd in Nederlandse kranten over geweldpleging door de Staat in Nederlands-Indië?’, ‘Welk beeld in Nederlandse kranten is exemplarisch voor positieve of negatieve berichtgeving over geweldpleging door de Staat in Nederlands-Indië?’, ‘Wat zijn de belangrijkste reacties geweest van media, Staat of andere betrokkenen op de berichtgeving in kranten over Nederlandse oorlogsmisdaden in Indië?’ en (...) ‘Hoe kijken representatoren voor media, Staat, betrokkenen en/of nabestaanden zelf aan tegen de beeldvorming over de misdragingen in Nederlands-Indië?’ De vijf geïnterviewde experts hebben zich uiteraard uitgelaten over beeldvorming in Nederlandse kranten over verschillende perioden. Ik heb de paragrafen daar voor het gemak tevens chronologisch naar ingedeeld. (shrink)

I argue that, if drones make waging war easier, the reason why they do so may not be the one commonly assumed within the philosophical debate – namely the promised reduction in casualties on either side – but a more complicated one which has little to do with concern for one’s own soldiers or, for that matter, the enemy; and a lot more to do with the political intricacies of international relations and domestic politics; I use the example of the (...) Obama Administration’s drone policies to illustrate this argument. My point is meant to have wider methodological significance: philosophy can make an important contribution to this and related applied debates; but it is not by artificially – and optimistically – simplifying realities on the ground that philosophers can be of help. (shrink)

Rights-based approaches and consequentialist approaches to ethics are often seen as being diametrically opposed to one another. In one sense, they are. In another sense, however, they can be reconciled: a ‘global’ form of consequentialism might supply consequentialist foundations for a derivative morality that is non-consequentialist, and perhaps rights-based, in content. By way of case study to illustrate how this might work, I survey what a global consequentialist should think about a recent dispute between Jeff McMahan and Henry Shue on (...) the morality and laws of war. (shrink)

Wars are large-scale conflicts between organized groups of belligerents, which involve suffering, devastation, and brutality unlike almost anything else in human experience. Whatever one’s other beliefs about morality, all should agree that the horrors of war are all but unconscionable, and that warfare can be justified only if we have some compel- ling account of what is worth fighting for, which can justify contributing, as individu- als and as groups, to this calamitous endeavour. Although this question should obviously be central (...) to both philosophical and politi- cal discussion about war, it is at the forefront of neither. In recent years, philosophical discussion of warfare has bloomed, but the debate has focused on whom we may kill, on the assumption that our aims are justified.1 Political debate, meanwhile, is more concerned with matters of prudence, international law, and public justification, than with reassessing what is worth fighting for. For wars of intervention to halt or prevent massive humanitarian crises, this gap is not so troubling. When warfare is the only means to prevent the mass killing or enslavement of the innocent, the purposes of military force are clear enough (though undoubtedly many other problems remain). The problem is more pressing, how- ever, for the justification of national defence.3 Although common-sense morality and international law view national defence as the paradigm case of justified warfare, grounding this consensus is surprisingly difficult.4 We typically believe that any state is justified in using lethal force to protect its territory against any form of uninvited military incursion by any other state. And yet we lack a good argument to explain why this should be so. In this chapter, I explain why one familiar and otherwise plausible approach to the justification of killing in war cannot adequately ground common-sense views of permissible national defence.5 Reductionists believe that justified warfare reduces to an aggregation of acts that are justified under ordinary principles of interpersonal morality.6 The standard form of reductionism focuses on the principles governing killing in ordinary life, specifically those that justify intentional killing in self- and other-defence, and unintended but foreseen (for short, collateral) killing as a lesser evil. Justified warfare, on this view, is no more than the coextension of multiple acts justified under these two principles. Reductionism is the default philosophical approach to thinking through the ethics of killing in war. It makes perfect sense to ask what principles govern permissible kill- ing in general, before applying them to the particular context of war. If it cannot deliver a plausible set of conclusions about when national defence is permitted, then we must either revise our beliefs about which conclusions count as plausible, or else face the significant challenge of developing a different theoretical model for justifying war- fare—an exceptionalist model, which views war as an exception to the regular moral landscape, to which principles apply which apply to nothing else but war.7 We must show, in other words, that there is something worth fighting for in wars of national defence, which is not engaged when we use force in any other context. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the argument against reduc- tionism.8 Section 2.3 considers and rebuts one common response to the argument, which has often been thought sufficient grounds to disregard its conclusion. Section 2.4 then asks whether a modified reductionism would survive unscathed by the argu- ment. Finally, section 2.5 sets out some desiderata on a plausible exceptionalist alterna- tive. Section 2.6 concludes. (shrink)

Is there is a moral obligation to militarily intervene in another state to stop a genocide from happening (if this can be done with proportionate force)? My answer is that under exceptional circumstances a state or even a non-state actor might have a duty to stop a genocide (for example if these actors have promised to do so), but under most circumstances there is no such obligation. To wit, “humanity,” states, collectives, and individuals do not have an obligation to make (...) such promises in the first place or to create institutions that would impose a legal obligation of intervention upon them. Nor do states or persons or humanity “collectively” have – originally, without specifically creating such duties by contracts or promises – any pro tanto or special duties to save strangers at considerable cost to themselves or their own citizens (including their soldiers). That is, these costs do not merely override a duty to intervene, but rather there is no such duty to begin with – as shown by the fact that in such cases of non-intervention agents would not owe those they let die any compensation: if I do not save someone’s life because saving him would have cost me my arm or would have come with a high risk of losing my own life or would have forced me to kill innocent bystanders, I do not owe this person compensation. Thus the point of this chapter is that there is no “natural” or “general” or “original” duty to militarily intervene (or to create a legal obligation) to stop a genocide. I will consider and refute a number of arguments to the contrary, for example by Lango, Tan, and Pattison. (shrink)

What one is ultimately interested in with regard to ‘just cause’ is whether a specific war, actual or potential, is justified. I call this ‘the applied question’. Answering this question requires knowing the empirical facts on the ground. However, an answer to the applied question regarding a specific war requires a prior answer to some more general questions, both descriptive and normative. These questions are: What kind of thing is a ‘just cause’ for war (an aim, an injury or wrong (...) suffered, or something different altogether)? I call this ‘the formal question’. Then there is what I call the ‘the general substantive question’. Depending on the previous answer to the formal question, the general substantive question can be formulated as: ‘Which causes are just?’ or as ‘Under what conditions is there a just cause?’ A final question, which has recently elicited increased interest, is what I call ‘the question of timing’: does the ‘just cause’ criterion only apply to the initiation of a war or also to the continuation of a war, that is, can a war that had a just cause at the beginning lose it at some point in its course (and vice versa)? I argue that a just cause is a state of affairs. Moreover, the criterion of just cause is not independent of proportionality and other valid jus ad bellum criteria. One cannot know whether there is a just cause without knowing whether the other (valid) criteria (apart from ‘right intention’) are satisfied; and this account has certain theoretical and practical advantages. As regards the general substantive question, I argue that all kinds of aims can, in principle, be legitimately pursued by means of war, even aims that might sound dubious at first, like vengeance or the search for glory. Thus, the pursuit of such aims does not make the war disproportionate or deprive it of just cause. As regards the question of timing, I argue that the criteria of jus ad bellum apply throughout the war, not only at the point of its initiation. While starting a war at t1 might be justified, continuing it at time t2 might be unjustified (and vice versa), and this insight does not require an addition to jus ad bellum but is already contained in it. (shrink)

La prima cosa che dobbiamo tenere a mente è che quando diciamo che la Cina dice questo o la Cina lo fa, non stiamo parlando del popolo cinese, ma dei Sociopatici che controllano il Partito Comunista Cinese CCP, cioè i Sette Killer Seriali Senile (SSSSK) del Comitato permanente del PCC o dei 25 membri del Politburo ecc. I piani del CCP per la terza guerra mondiale e il dominio totale sono strutturati abbastanza chiaramente nelle pubblicazioni e nei discorsi govt cinesi (...) e questo è il "sogno di Cina" di Xi Jinping. È un sogno solo per la piccola minoranza (forse da poche decine a poche centinaia) che governa la Cina e un incubo per tutti gli altri (tra cui 1,4 miliardi di cinesi). I 10 miliardi di dollari all'anno che si stima spendano in propaganda in tutto il mondo permette loro o i loro burattini di possedere o controllare giornali, riviste, canali televisivi e radiofonici e di inserire notizie false nella maggior parte dei principali media ovunque decine o centinaia di migliaia di volte ogni giorno. They hanno un esercito (forse milioni di persone) che oltre alla censura totale e immediata di tutti i media all'interno della Cina, troll tutti i media del mondo, mettendo più propaganda e annegando legittimo commento (l'esercito 50 centesimi). Oltre a spogliarerd il terzo mondo di risorse, una spinta importante della multi-trilionaria Belt and Road Initiative sta costruendo basi militari in tutto il mondo. Stanno costringendo il mondo libero in una massiccia corsa agli armamenti ad alta tecnologia che fa sembrare la guerra fredda con l'Unione Sovietica un picnic. Anche se la SSSSK, e il resto dell'esercito mondiale, stanno spendendo enormi somme su hardware avanzato, è altamente probabile che WW3 (o gli impegni più piccoli che portano ad esso) sarà software dominato. Non è fuori questione che la SSSSK, con probabilmente più hacker (programmatori) che lavorano per loro allora tutto il resto del mondo combinato, vincerà WW3 con minimo conflitto fisico, solo paralizzando i loro nemici tramite la rete. Niente satelliti, niente telefoni, niente comunicazioni, niente transazioni finanziarie, niente rete elettrica, niente internet, niente armi avanzate, niente veicoli, treni, navi o aerei. Ci sono solo due percorsi principali per rimuovere il PCC, liberare 1,4 miliardi di prigionieri cinesi e porre fine alla marcia folle per la terza guerra mondiale. Quello pacifico è quello di lanciare una guerra commerciale a tutto campo per devastare l'economia cinese fino a quando i militari si stancano e si avvia il PCC. Un'alternativa alla chiusura dell'economia cinese è una guerra limitata, come uno sciopero mirato di conlsi 50 droni termobarici sul 20congresso del PCC, quando tutti i membri migliori sono in un unico posto, ma che non avrà luogo fino al 2022 in modo da poter colpire la riunione plenaria annuale. I cinesi sarebbero stati informati, come è avvenuto l'attacco, che devono deporre le armi e prepararsi a tenere un'elezione democratica o essere inglobito nell'età della pietra. L'altra alternativa è un attacco nucleare a tutto campo. Il confronto militare è inevitabile, visto l'attuale corso del PCC. Accadrà probabilmente sulle isole del Mar Cinese Meridionale o Taiwan entro pochi decenni, ma man mano che stabiliscono basi militari in tutto il mondo potrebbe accadere ovunque (vedi il libro Tigre accovacciata ecc.). I futuri conflitti avranno aspetti hardkill e softkill con gli obiettivi dichiarati del PCC per enfatizzare la guerra informatica hackerando e paralizzando i sistemi di controllo di tutte le comunicazioni militari e industriali, attrezzature, centrali elettriche, satelliti, internet, banche e qualsiasi dispositivo o veicolo collegato alla rete. La SSSSK sta lentamente schierando una serie mondiale di sub o droni di superficie e subacquei con equipaggio e autonomi in grado di lanciare armi convenzionali o nucleari che possono rimanere domeggiati in attesa di un segnale dalla Cina o addirittura alla ricerca della firma di navi o aerei statunitensi. Mentre distruggevano i nostri satelliti, eliminando così la comunicazione tra gli Stati Uniti e le nostre forze in tutto il mondo, useranno i loro, insieme ai droni per colpire e distruggere le nostre forze navali attualmente superiori. Naturalmente, tutto questo è sempre più fatto automaticamente dall'IA. Di gran lunga il più grande alleato del PCC è il partito democratico degli Stati Uniti. La scelta è quella di fermare il PCC ora o guardare come estendere la prigione cinese su tutto il mondo. Naturalmente, la sorveglianza universale e la digitalizzazione delle nostre vite è inevitabile ovunque. Chi non la pensa così è profondamente fuori contatto. Naturalmente, è l'optinebbie che si aspettano che i sociopatici cinesi a governare il mondo, mentre i pessimisti (che si vedono come realisti) si aspettano AI (Intelligenza Artificiale, o come lo chiamo it Imbecility artificiale o Unalien follia) a prendere il sopravvento, forse non appena 2030. Coloro che sono interessati a ulteriori dettagli sul percorso folle della società moderna possono consultare le mie altre opere come Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 4th Edition 2020 e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2020) . (shrink)

पहली बात हमें ध्यान में रखना चाहिए कि जब यह कहना है कि चीन यह कहता है या चीन ऐसा करता है, तो हम चीनी लोगों की बात नहीं कर रहे हैं, लेकिन उन सोशियोपैथों की जो सीसीपी (चीनी कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी, अर्थात सात सेनेले सोसोपैथिक सीरियल किलर (एसएसएसएसके) का नियंत्रण करते हैं। सीपी या पोलितब्यूरो के 25 सदस्यों की टंडिंग समिति। मैं हाल ही में कुछ ठेठ वामपंथी नकली समाचार कार्यक्रमों को देखा (सुंदर बहुत ही तरह एक ही तरह से (...) मीडिया में पा सकते हैं, यानी, लगभग सब कुछ अब - यानी, याहू, सीएनएन, न्यूयॉर्क टाइम्स, आदि) यूट्यूब पर, एक VICE द्वारा जो उल्लेख किया है कि 1000 अर्थशास्त्री (और 15 नोबेल पुरस्कार विजेताओं) ट्रम्प को एक पत्र भेजा जिसमें कहा गया है कि व्यापार युद्ध एक गलती थी, और एक अन्य जो एक अकादमिक अर्थशास्त्री का साक्षात्कार करता था जिसने कहा कि ट्रम्प का कदम 3 विश्व युद्ध शुरू करने के लिए एक उत्तेजना थी। वे वैश्विक व्यापार के विघटन के बारे में सही हैं, लेकिन बड़ी तस्वीर है, जो है कि सात Sociopaths कुल दुनिया प्रभुत्व है की कोई समझ नहीं है, हर जगह स्वतंत्रता के उन्मूलन के साथ, अपने लक्ष्य के रूप में, और है कि वहाँ केवल दो तरीके उन्हें रोकने के लिए कर रहे हैं-एक कुल व्यापार प्रतिबंध है कि चीनी अर्थव्यवस्था devastates और उनकी सेना की ओर जाता है सीसीपी बाहर बल और चुनाव, या WW3, जो सीमित किया जा सकता है (शायद कुछ परमाणु के साथ पारंपरिक हथियार) या कुल (एक ही बार में सभी परमाणु). दिन के रूप में स्पष्ट है, लेकिन इन सभी "शानदार" शिक्षाविदों यह नहीं देख सकते हैं. यदि Socipaths अब नहीं हटा रहे हैं, के रूप में छोटे रूप में 15 साल में यह बहुत देर हो जाएगी, और अपने वंशजों को धीरे धीरे लेकिन inexorably चीनी के रूप में एक ही भाग्य के अधीन हो जाएगा -अपहरण, यातना और किसी भी असहमति के हत्या के साथ कुल निगरानी. बेशक, सीसीपी WW3 बहुत पहले शुरू कर दिया (आप तिब्बत या कोरिया के अपने आक्रमण की शुरुआत के रूप में देख सकता है) और यह हर संभव तरीके से पीछा कर रहा है, गोलियों और बम के अलावा, और वे जल्द ही आ जाएगा. सीसीपी ने कोरिया में संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका से लड़ाई की, तिब्बत पर हमला किया और उसकी हत्या कर दी और रूस और भारत के साथ सीमा पर झड़पें लड़ीं। यह दुनिया भर में सभी औद्योगिक और सैन्य डेटाबेस के खिलाफ बड़े पैमाने पर हैकिंग आपरेशन आयोजित करता है और लगभग सभी वर्तमान अमेरिका और यूरोपीय सैन्य और अंतरिक्ष प्रणालियों पर वर्गीकृत डेटा चोरी हो गया है, उनकी कमजोरियों का विश्लेषण किया और भीतर सुधार संस्करण क्षेत्र कुछ साल. हजारों की दसियों, और शायद हजारों की सैकड़ों, सीसीपी कर्मचारियों की हैकिंग किया गया है सैन्य, औद्योगिक, वित्तीय और सामाजिक मीडिया डेटाबेस दुनिया भर में नेट के शुरुआती दिनों के बाद से और वहाँ अकेले संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका में ज्ञात हाल ही में हैक्स के सैकड़ों रहे हैं. के रूप में प्रमुख संस्थानों और सेना उनके फायरवॉल कठोर है, SSSSK छोटे संस्थानों के लिए चले गए हैं और रक्षा उपठेकेदारों और हमारे सहयोगी दलों, जो आसान लक्ष्य हैं. हालांकि यह लाखों लोगों के सैकड़ों की कुचल गरीबी और अपने लोगों के सीमांत अस्तित्व की अनदेखी, यह एक बड़े पैमाने पर सैन्य और अंतरिक्ष उपस्थिति है, जो हर साल बड़ा बढ़ता है, और जिसका अस्तित्व के लिए ही कारण स्वतंत्रता को खत्म करने के लिए युद्ध लड़ रहा है बनाया गया है हर जगह. संसाधनों के 3rd दुनिया अलग करना के अलावा, बहु खरब डॉलर बेल्ट और सड़क पहल का एक प्रमुख जोर दुनिया भर में सैन्य ठिकानों का निर्माण कर रहा है. वे एक बड़े पैमाने पर उच्च तकनीक हथियारों की दौड़ है कि सोवियत संघ के साथ शीत युद्ध एक पिकनिक की तरह लग रही है में मुक्त दुनिया मजबूर कर रहे हैं. रूसके लोग बेवकूफ नहीं हैं, और Socipaths के साथ दोस्ती का नाटक करने के बावजूद, वे निश्चित रूप से समझते हैं कि सीसीपी उन्हें जिंदा खाने जा रहा है, कि उनकी एकमात्र उम्मीद खुद को पश्चिम के साथ सहयोगी है, और ट्रम्प पुतिन से दोस्ती करने में पैसे पर सही है। बेशक, Neomarxist तीसरी दुनिया Supremacists (यानी, डेमोक्रेटिक पार्टी) की संभावना में संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका के कुल नियंत्रण ले जाएगा 2020 और कुछ भी नहीं सीसीपी की पसंद के लिए और अधिक हो सकता है. स्नोडेन (एक और सुराग बीस कुछ) SSSSK किसी भी अन्य एक व्यक्ति की तुलना में अधिक मदद की, WW2 के बाद से सभी अमेरिकी राष्ट्रपतियों के संभावित अपवाद के साथ, जो तुष्टीकरण की आत्महत्या की नीति का पीछा किया है. संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका के पास सभी संचारों की निगरानी करने और हर किसी पर एक डोजियर संकलित करने के अलावा कोई विकल्प नहीं है, क्योंकि यह न केवल अपराधियों और आतंकवादियों को नियंत्रित करने के लिए आवश्यक है, बल्कि एसएसएसएसके का मुकाबला करने के लिए, जो तेजी से एक ही काम कर रहे हैं, पूरी तरह से स्वतंत्रता को हटाने के इरादे से। हालांकि SSSSK, और दुनिया की सेना के बाकी, उन्नत हार्डवेयर पर भारी रकम खर्च कर रहे हैं, यह अत्यधिक संभावना है कि WW3 (या छोटे सगाई यह करने के लिए अग्रणी) सॉफ्टवेयर प्रभुत्व होगा. यह सवाल से बाहर नहीं है कि SSSSK, शायद अधिक हैकर्स के साथ (कोडर्स) उनके लिए काम कर रहे तो संयुक्त दुनिया के सभी बाकी, कम से कम शारीरिक संघर्ष के साथ भविष्य के युद्ध जीत जाएगा, बस नेट के माध्यम से अपने दुश्मनों को paralyzing द्वारा. कोई उपग्रहों, कोई फोन, कोई संचार, कोई वित्तीय लेनदेन, कोई पावर ग्रिड, कोई इंटरनेट, कोई उन्नत हथियार, कोई वाहन, गाड़ियों, जहाजों या विमानों. कुछ सवाल हो सकता है कि सीसीपी (और निश्चित रूप से पुलिस, सेना और 610 कार्यालय के शीर्ष स्तरों) वास्तव में मानसिक रूप से aberant हैं, तो यहाँ sociopaths के आम विशेषताओं में से कुछ हैं(पूर्व में कहा जाता है psychopaths) कि आप नेट पर पा सकते हैं. बेशक, इनमें से कुछ कई autistics और alexithymics द्वारा साझा कर रहे हैं, और socipaths केवल डिग्री में "सामान्य" लोगों से अलग हैं. (shrink)

L'America e il mondo sono in procinto di collassare a causa dell'eccessiva crescita demografica, la maggior parte per il secolo scorso, e ora tutto questo, a causa della gente del terzo mondo. Il consumo di risorse e l'aggiunta di altri 4 miliardi di ca. 2100 crolleranno la civiltà industriale e porterà alla fame, alle malattie, alla violenza e alla guerra su scala impressionante. La terra perde almeno l'1% del suo suolo superiore ogni anno, così come si avvicina a 2100, la (...) maggior parte della sua capacità di coltivazione alimentare sarà andato. Miliardi moriranno e la guerra nucleare è tutt'altro che certa. In America, questo è stato enormemente accelerato dalla massiccia immigrazione e dalla riproduzione degli immigrati, unite agli abusi resi possibili dalla democrazia. La natura umana depravata trasforma inesorabilmente il sogno della democrazia e della diversità in un incubo di criminalità e povertà. La Cina continuerà a travolgere l'America e il mondo, finché manterrà la dittatura che limita l'egoismo. La causa principale del collasso è l'incapacità della nostra psicologia innata di adattarsi al mondo moderno, che porta le persone a trattare le persone non correlate come se avessero interessi comuni. L'idea dei diritti umani è una fantasia malvagia promossa dalla sinistra per distogliere l'attenzione dalla spietata distruzione della terra da parte della sfrenata maternità del terzo mondo. Questo, oltre all'ignoranza della biologia e della psicologia di base, porta alle illusioni di ingegneria sociale dei parzialmente istruiti che controllano le società democratiche. Pochi capiscono che se aiuti una persona che fai del male a qualcun altro, non c'è pranzo gratuito e ogni singolo oggetto che qualcuno consuma distrugge la terra in modo irreparabile. Di conseguenza, le politiche sociali ovunque sono insostenibili e una dopo l'altra tutte le società senza rigorosi controlli sull'egoismo crolleranno nell'anarchia o nella dittatura. I fatti più basilari, quasi mai menzionati, sono che non ci sono abbastanza risorse in America o nel mondo per sollevare una percentuale significativa dei poveri dalla povertà e tenerli lì. Il tentativo di farlo sta mandando in bancarotta l'America e distruggendo il mondo. La capacità della terra di produrre cibo diminuisce ogni giorno, così come la nostra qualità genetica. E ora, come sempre, di gran lunga il più grande nemico dei poveri sono gli altri poveri e non i ricchi. Senza cambiamenti drammatici e immediati, non c'è speranza di prevenire il crollo dell'America, o di qualsiasi paese che segua un sistema democratico. (shrink)

これは完璧な本ではありませんが、それはユニークであり、最初の400ページほどをスキミングすると、最後の300ページ(約700ページ)は、時間の経過とともに暴力やマナーの社会的変化に行動について知られて いるものを適用するかなり良い試みです。基本的なトピックは、私たちの遺伝学はどのように社会の変化を制御し、制限するかということです。驚くべきことに、彼は動物や人間の社会生活の多くを説明する親族の選択(包 括的なフィットネス)の性質を記述することができません。彼はまた、(ほぼすべての人と同様に)私が高次思考の記述心理学(DPHOT)と呼ぶのを好む合理性の論理的構造(LSR - John Searleの好ましい用語)を記述するための明確な枠組みを欠いている。彼は、人々や地球を虐待し、搾取する他の多くの方法について何かを言うべきでした nearly。暴力の概念を拡張して-、誰かの遺伝子の複製の世界的な長期的な結果を含め、進化がどのように機能するか(すなわち、親族の選択)の性質を把握することは、歴史、現在の出来事、そして物事が今後数百 年でどのように行われる可能性が高いかについて非常に異なる視点を提供します。歴史に対する身体的暴力の減少は、地球の絶え間なく増加する無慈悲な強姦(すなわち、人々が自分の子孫の将来を破壊することによって) 一致している(そして可能になった)ことを知るから始めるかもしれません’。ピンカー(ほとんどの人と同じように)は、重要なのは生物学であるときに、しばしば文化の表面性に気を取られます。ウィルソンの「地球の 社会的征服」とノワクとハイフィールドの「スーパーコオペレータ」の私の最近のレビューをここで、ネット上で「真の利他主義」(グループ選択)の空虚さ、そして親族選択の運営と文化的な言葉で行動を記述することの 無駄と表面性の簡単な要約を参照してください。 これは古典的な自然/育成の問題であり、自然の切り札は無限に育てます。本当に重要なのは、人口と資源破壊の容赦ない増加(医療と技術、警察と軍による紛争抑制による)によって地球に対して行われた暴力です。1日 に約20万人以上の人々(10日ごとに別のラスベガス、毎月別のロサンゼルス)、6海/人/年に入る6トンほどの表土-世界の全ての年間消えていく約1%などは、何らかの奇跡が起こらない限り、生物圏と文明が次の 2世紀の間に大部分が崩壊し、飢餓、悲惨、暴力が起こることを意味します。 暴力的な行為を行う人々のマナー、意見、傾向は、彼らがこの大惨事を避けるために何かを行うことができる限り、関連性はありませんし、私はそれがどのように起こるか分かりません。議論のためのスペースはなく、意味 もありません(はい、私は致命的です)ので、私は彼らが事実であるかのようにいくつかのコメントをします。私が他の人を犠牲にして1つのグループを宣伝することに個人的な利害関係があるとは想像しないでください。 私は78で、子孫も近親者もおらず、政治的、国家的、宗教的なグループと識別せず、デフォルトで属するものを他のすべてと同じように反発的なものと見なしません。 両親は地球上で最悪の生命の敵であり、物事の広い視野を持って、女性の暴力(男性が行うもののほとんどと同様に)は、主にスローモーションで行われ、時間と空間の距離で行われ、主に代理人によって行われているとい う事実を考えると、女性は男性と同じくらい暴力的です。ますます、女性は仲間を持っているかどうかに関係なく子供を産み、1人の女性の繁殖を止める効果は、生殖のボトルネックであるため、平均して1人の男性を止め るよりもはるかに大きい。人は、人々とその子孫が自分の道を来るどんな悲惨さにも豊かに値するという見解を取ることができ、(まれな例外を除いて)金持ちと有名人は最悪の犯罪者です。メリル・ストリープやビル・ゲ イツ、J.Kローリング、そして彼らの子供たちは、将来の世代のために毎年50トンの表土を破壊する可能性がありますが、インドの農家と彼は1トンを破壊する可能性があります。誰かがそれがうまくいくことを否定し 、その子孫に私は「地球上の地獄へようこそ」(WTHOE)と言います。 今日の重点は常に人権であるが、文明がチャンスに耐えるならば、人権に取って代わらなければならないことは明らかである。誰も責任ある市民でなく権利を得る、これは最初に意味するミニマル環境破壊です。あなたの社 会が彼らを作るように頼まなければ、最も基本的な責任は子供ではありません。人々が無作為に繁殖することを可能にする社会や世界は、それが崩壊するまで(または人生が生きる価値がないので恐ろしいポイントに達する )、常に利己的な遺伝子によって悪用されます。社会が人権を第一者として維持し続けるならば、その子孫に対して「WTHOE」は自信を持って言うことができる。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st 世紀 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

가장 먼저 명심해야 할 점은 중국이 이것을 말한다면, 우리는 중국 인민에 대해 말하는 것이 아니라 중국 공산당을 통제하는 사회병리학자들, 즉 중국 공산당의 7대 노인사회병연쇄살인범(SSSSK)이나 공산당 상무위원 25명 등이다. 중국 정부의 제3차 세계대전과 총체적 지배에 대한 중국 공산당의 계획은 중국 정부의 출판물과 연설에서 아주 분명하게 드러나며 이는 시진핑의 '중국의 꿈'이다. 중국을 지배하는 소수 민족(아마도 수십~수백 명)과 다른 모든 사람들에게 는 악몽(14억 중국인 포함)의 꿈입니다. 매년 100억 달러를 통해 그들 또는 인형은 신문, 잡지, TV 및 라디오 채널을 소유하거나 제어하고 매일 대부분의 주요 (...) 미디어에 가짜 뉴스를 배치할 수 있습니다. 또한, 그들은 더 많은 선전을 배치하고 합법적 인 논평 (50 센트 군대)을 익사 모든 미디어를 트롤 군대 (어쩌면 수백만의 사람들)가있습니다. 자원의 3rd 세계를 제거하는 것 외에도, 수조 달러 벨트 와 도로 이니셔티브의 주요 추진력은 전 세계적으로 군사 기지를 구축하고있다. 그들은 소련과의 냉전을 피크닉처럼 보이게 하는 거대한 첨단 무기 경쟁으로 자유 세계를 강요하고 있습니다. SSSSK, 그리고 세계의 나머지 군대는 고급 하드웨어에 엄청난 금액을 지출하고 있지만, 그것은 WW3 (또는 그에 이르는 작은 계약)가 소프트웨어가 지배 될 가능성이 높습니다. 그것은 SSSSK, 아마 더 많은 해커와 함께 (코더) 다음 결합 세계의 모든 나머지, 단지 그물을 통해 적을 마비하여, 최소한의 물리적 충돌로 미래의 전쟁을 이길 것입니다. 위성, 전화, 통신, 금융 거래, 전력망, 인터넷, 고급 무기, 차량, 기차, 선박 또는 비행기가 없습니다. 중국 공산당을 제거하고 14억 명의 중국 포로를 석방하고 제3차 세계대전으로 의한 미치광이 행진을 끝내는 두 가지 주요 경로가 있습니다. 평화로운 것은 군대가 공급되고 중국 공산당을 퇴화할 때까지 중국 경제를 황폐화하기 위해 전격적인 무역 전쟁을 시작하는 것입니다. 중국 경제를 폐쇄하는 대안은 중국 의 20대의회에서50대의 열경화성 드론을 표적으로 삼는 것과 같은 제한된 전쟁이며, 최고 위원전원이 한 자리에 있지만 2022년까지는 연례 본회의를 열수 있을 것입니다. 중국은 공격이 일어났을 때 무기를 내려놓고 민주선거를 준비하거나 석기 시대로 들어갈 준비를 해야 한다는 통보를 받을 것이다. 다른 대안은 전지적 핵 공격입니다. 중국공산당의 현재 진로를 감안할 때 군사적 대결은 불가피하다. 수십 년 내에 남중국해 나 대만의 섬에서 일어날 가능성이 있지만 전 세계적으로 군사 기지를 세우면 어디서나 발생할 수 있습니다 (웅크리고있는 호랑이 등 참조). 미래의 갈등은 모든 군사 및 산업 통신, 장비, 발전소, 위성, 인터넷, 은행 및 인터넷에 연결된 모든 장치 또는 차량의 제어 시스템을 해킹하고 마비시켜 사이버 전쟁을 강조하는 CCP의 명시된 목표와 하드 킬 및 소프트 킬 측면을 가질 것입니다. SS는 중국의 신호를 기다리거나 미국 선박이나 비행기의 서명을 찾고 있을 수 있는 재래식 또는 핵무기를 발사할 수 있는 전 세계 유인 및 자율 표면 및 수중 잠수함 또는 드론을 서서히 수비하고 있습니다. 우리의 위성을 파괴하는 동안, 따라서 전 세계적으로 미국과 우리 군대 사이의 통신을 제거, 그들은 그들의 를 사용합니다, 대상과 현재 우수한 해군을 파괴하기 위해 드론과 함께. 물론 이 모든 작업은 AI에 의해 자동으로 수행됩니다. 지금까지 중국 공산당의 가장 큰 동맹국은 미국의민주당이다. 선택은 지금 중국 공산당을 중지하거나 전 세계에 걸쳐 중국 감옥을 확장으로 보는 것입니다. 현대 사회의 미치광이 경로에 대한 자세한 내용은 미국의 민주주의 - 부고와 세계 3rd Edition 2019 및 21st 세기의 자살 유토피아 망상:철학, 인간의 본성과 문명의 붕괴 th (2019)와 같은 내 다른 작품을 참조 할 수 있습니다. (shrink)

Первое, что мы должны иметь в виду, что, говоря, что Китай говорит это или Китай делает это, мы говорим не о китайском народе, но социопатов, которые контролируют КПК - Коммунистическая партия Китая, т.е. семь senile sociopathic серийных убийц (SSSSK) Из Постоянного комитета КПК или 25 членов Политбюро и т.д. Планы CCP для WW3 и полного доминирования lay out довольно ясно в китайских изданиях и речи правительства и это «мечта Кита» Си Цзиньпина. Это мечта только для крошечного меньшинства (возможно, от нескольких (...) десятков до нескольких сотен), которые правят Китаем и кошмар для всех остальных (в том числе 1,4 миллиарда китайцев). 10 миллиардов долларов ежегодно позволяет им или их марионеткам владеть или контролировать газеты, журналы, телевизионные и радиоканалы и размещать поддельные новости в большинстве крупных средств массовой информации во всем мире каждый день. Кроме того, у них есть армия (может быть, миллионы людей), которые троллят все средства массовой информации размещения больше пропаганды и заглушая законные комментарии (50 центов армии). В дополнение к зачистке3-й мир ресурсов, основной направленноймноготриллионной инициативы «Пояс и путь» является строительство военных баз по всему миру. Они вынуждают свободный мир врезаться в массовую гонку вооружений для высоких технологий, которая делает холодную войну с Советским Союзом похожей на пикник. Хотя SSSSK, и остальные военные мира, тратят огромные суммы на передовое оборудование, весьма вероятно, что WW3 (или меньше обязательств, ведущих к нему) будет доминировать программного обеспечения. Это не может быть и речи, что SSSSK, с, вероятно, больше хакеров (кодеров), работающих на них, то весь остальной мир вместе взятые, победит будущих войн с минимальным физическим конфликтом, просто парализовав своих врагов через сеть. Ни спутников, ни телефонов, ни связи, ни финансовых операций, ни электросети, ни интернета, ни современного оружия, ни транспортных средств, ни поездов, кораблей, ни самолетов. Есть только два основных пути к удалению КПК, освобождение 1,4 миллиарда китайских заключенных, и окончание сумасшедшего марша к WW3. Мирный одно начать тотаку торговую войну для того чтобы опустошить китайскую экономию до тех пор пока воискаа получает надоеденными вверх и загружает вне CCP. Альтернативой закрытию экономики Китая является ограниченная война, такая как целенаправленный удар, скажем, 50 термобарических дронов на 20-мth конгрессе КПК, когда все высшие члены находятся в одном месте, но это не состоится до 2022 года, чтобы можно было попасть на ежегодное пленарное заседание. Китайцы будут проинформированы, как нападение произошло, что они должны сложить оружие и подготовиться к проведению демократических выборов или быть nuked в каменном вене. Другой альтернативой является тотавлёневая ядерная атака. Военная конфронтация неизбежна, учитывая нынешний курс КПК. Это, скорее всего, произойдет над островами в южно-китайском море или Тайваня в течение нескольких десятилетий, но, как они создают военные базы по всему миру это может произойти в любом месте (см. Крадущийся тигр и т.д.). Будущие конфликты будут иметь hardkill и softkill аспекты с заявленными целями CcP, чтобы подчеркнуть кибервойны путем взлома и парализующих систем управления всех военных и промышленных коммуникаций, оборудования, электростанций, спутников, Интернет, банки, и любое устройство или транспортное средство, подключенное к сети. СС медленно высаживают во всем мире множество пилотируемых и автономных надводных и подводных подводных подводных подводных и подводных подводных подводных аппаратов или беспилотных летательных аппаратов, способных запускать обычное или ядерное оружие, которое может находиться в состоянии покоя в ожидании сигнала из Китая или даже искать подпись американских кораблей или самолетов. Уничтожая наши спутники, тем самым устраняя связь между США и нашими силами по всему миру, они будут использовать их, совместно с беспилотниками, чтобы нацелить и уничтожить наши в настоящее время превосходящие военно-морские силы. Конечно, все это все чаще делается автоматически ИИ. На сегодняшний день крупнейшим союзником КПК является Демократическая партия США. Выбор остановить CCP теперь или наблюдать по мере того как они расширяют китайскую тюрьму над всем миром. Те, кто заинтересован в более подробной информации о сумасшедшем пути современного общества могут проконсультироваться с другими моими работами, такими как Самоубийство демократии-некролог для Америки и мира 3-е издание 2019 и суицидальных утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке: Философия, человеческая природа и крах цивилизации 4-й ред (2019). (shrink)

The “right intention” requirement, in the form of a requirement that the agent must have a justified true belief that the mind-independent conditions of the justification to use force are fulfilled, is not an additional criterion, but one that constrains the interpretation of the other criteria. Without it, the only possible interpretation of the mind-independent criteria is purely objectivist, that is, purely fact-relative. Pure objectivism condemns self-defense and just war theory to irrelevance since it cannot provide proper action guidance: it (...) is impractically demanding. This means that “revisionist” just war theories which base their doctrine of the moral inequality of combatants on the idea that objective justification defeats liability are irrelevant for the real world, where objective justification is virtually inaccessible. Moreover, only the right intention requirement in the form of a knowledge requirement, as opposed to requiring “good intentions” or “acceptable motivations,” can solve this problem. (shrink)

The first thing we must keep in mind is that when saying that China says this or China does that, we are not speaking of the Chinese people, but of the Sociopaths who control the CCP -- Chinese Communist Party, i.e., the Seven Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers (SSSSK) of the Standing Committee of the CCP or the 25 members of the Politburo etc.. -/- The CCP’s plans for WW3 and total domination are laid out quite clearly in Chinese govt publications (...) and speeches and this is Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. It is a dream only for the tiny minority (perhaps a few dozen to a few hundred) who rule China and a nightmare for everyone else (including 1.4 billion Chinese). The 10 billion dollars yearly enables them or their puppets to own or control newspapers, magazines, TV and radio channels and place fake news in most major media everywhere every day. In addition, they have an army (maybe millions of people) who troll all the media placing more propaganda and drowning out legitimate commentary (the 50 cent army). -/- In addition to stripping the 3rd world of resources, a major thrust of the multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative is building military bases worldwide. They are forcing the free world into a massive high-tech arms race that makes the cold war with the Soviet Union look like a picnic. -/- Though the SSSSK, and the rest of the world’s military, are spending huge sums on advanced hardware, it is highly likely that WW3 (or the smaller engagements leading up to it) will be software dominated. It is not out of the question that the SSSSK, with probably more hackers (coders) working for them then all the rest of the world combined, will win future wars with minimal physical conflict, just by paralyzing their enemies via the net. No satellites, no phones, no communications, no financial transactions, no power grid, no internet, no advanced weapons, no vehicles, trains, ships or planes. -/- There are only two main paths to removing the CCP, freeing 1.4 billion Chinese prisoners, and ending the lunatic march to WW3. The peaceful one is to launch an all-out trade war to devastate the Chinese economy until the military gets fed up and boots out the CCP. -/- An alternative to shutting down China’s economy is a limited war, such as a targeted strike by say 50 thermobaric drones on the 20th Congress of the CCP, when all the top members are in one place, but that won’t take place until 2022 so one could hit the annual plenary meeting. The Chinese would be informed, as the attack happened, that they must lay down their arms and prepare to hold a democratic election or be nuked into the stone age. The other alternative is an all-out nuclear attack. Military confrontation is unavoidable given the CCP’s present course. It will likely happen over the islands in the South China Sea or Taiwan within a few decades, but as they establish military bases worldwide it could happen anywhere (see Crouching Tiger etc.). Future conflicts will have hardkill and softkill aspects with the stated objectives of the CCP to emphasize cyberwar by hacking and paralyzing control systems of all military and industrial communications, equipment, power plants, satellites, internet, banks, and any device or vehicle connected to the net. The SS are slowly fielding a worldwide array of manned and autonomous surface and underwater subs or drones capable of launching conventional or nuclear weapons that may lie dormant awaiting a signal from China or even looking for the signature of US ships or planes. While destroying our satellites, thus eliminating communication between the USA and our forces worldwide, they will use theirs, in conjunction with drones to target and destroy our currently superior naval forces. Of course, all of this is increasingly done automatically by AI. -/- By far the biggest ally of the CCP is the Democratic party of the USA. The choice is to stop the CCP now or watch as they extend the Chinese prison over the whole world. -/- Of course, universal surveillance and digitizing of our lives is inevitable everywhere. Anyone who does not think so is profoundly out of touch. -/- Of course it is the optomists who expect the Chinese sociopaths to rule the world while the pessimists (who view themselves as realists) expect AI sociopathy (or AS as I call it – i.e., Artificial Stupidity or Artificial Sociopathy) to take over, perhaps by 2030 Those interested in further details on the lunatic path of modern society may consult my other works such as Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 3rd Edition 2019 and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2019) -/- . (shrink)

Estados Unidos y el mundo están en el proceso de colapso de un crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayoría de ella para el siglo pasado, y ahora todo ello, debido a la 3ª gente del mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de 4 mil millones más CA. 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y traerán hambre, enfermedad, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su suelo vegetal cada año, por lo (...) que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos se habrá ido. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es segura. En Estados Unidos, esto está siendo enormemente acelerado por la inmigración masiva y la reproducción de inmigrantes, combinada con los abusos hechos posible por la democracia. La naturaleza humana depravada convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla de delincuencia y pobreza. China seguirá abrumar a América y al mundo, siempre y cuando mantenga la dictadura que limita el egoísmo. La causa raíz del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a las personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes. La idea de los derechos humanos es una fantasía malvada promovida por los izquierdistas para atraer la atención de la destrucción despiadada de la tierra por una maternidad sin restricciones del tercer mundo. Esto, además de la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a los delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si usted ayuda a una persona a lastimar a alguien más, no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. En consecuencia, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y, una por una, todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en la anarquía o la dictadura. Los hechos más básicos, casi nunca mencionados, son que no hay suficientes recursos en Estados Unidos o en el mundo para levantar un porcentaje significativo de los pobres de la pobreza y mantenerlos allí. El intento de hacer esto es la quiebra de Estados Unidos y la destrucción del mundo. La capacidad de la tierra para producir alimentos disminuye diariamente, al igual que nuestra calidad genética. Y ahora, como siempre, de lejos el mayor enemigo de los pobres es el de otros pobres y no los ricos. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanzas de evitar el colapso de América, o cualquier país que siga un sistema democrático. (shrink)

In the United States, all military personnel swear to obey “the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me.” Military personnel must obey orders promptly in order to facilitate effective military functioning. Yet, obedience to orders has been associated with the commission of war crimes. Military personnel of all ranks have committed torture, rape, genocide, and murder under orders. “I was just following orders” (respondaet superior) is no longer accepted as a (...) complete defense to a charge of war crimes. In the words of the Nuremberg court: “The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent”. This means that military personnel cannot evade responsibility for their actions under orders. But when and under what conditions should military personnel disobey orders? If obedience is sometimes morally wrong, how can obedience be a military virtue? In this chapter I argue that the only plausible conception of military obedience as a virtue is reflective obedience: obedience governed and constrained by the ends of the military profession serving a legitimate state and by the laws of armed conflict. Section 1 explains the concept of obedience and outlines the idea of virtuous obedience. Section 2 explores when the military has legitimate authority to compel obedience. Section 3 concludes by exploring the limits on obedience that derive from the military’s status as a profession and the legitimacy of the military’s authority to issue orders. (shrink)

I argue that the lives of domestic and enemy civilians should not receive equal weight in our proportionality calculations. Rather, the lives of enemy civilians ought to be “partially discounted” relative to the lives of domestic civilians. We ought to partially discount the lives of enemy civilians for the following reason (or so I argue). When our military wages a just war, we as civilians vest our right to self-defense in our military. This permits our military to weigh our lives (...) more heavily. Before arguing for this view I first explain why recent accounts attempting to show the opposite – that enemy civilians ought to be weighed more heavily – are mistaken. (shrink)

У статті здійснено спробу простежити генеалогію російського пропагандистського сюжету про «поїзд дружби» від інформаційного приводу до фейкової новини та від фейкової новини до сталої частини канону, послуговуючись яким, російська пропаганда говорить про анексію Криму. За допомогою понять інтеграційної та агітаційної пропаганди Жака Еллюля проаналізовано, у чому саме полягає пропагандистський потенціал цього сюжету. Досліджено, яким чином кінематограф перетворив фейкову новину, покликану налякати та мобілізувати населення, на стійкий пропагандистський сюжет зі сталим набором елементів. Оцінено перспективи його подальшого використання російською владою при спробах (...) розповісти тим чи тим способом про окупацію Криму. (shrink)

Why do we consider killing and letting someone die to be two different things? Why do we believe that a doctor who refuses to treat a terminally ill patient is doing anything less than administering a lethal substance? After all, the consequences are the same, and perhaps the moral status of these acts should be judged accordingly. -/- Reviewed: Jonathan Glover, Questions de vie ou de mort (Causing Death and Saving Lives), translated into French and introduced by Benoît Basse, Genève, (...) Labor et Fides, 2017, 386 pp. (shrink)

The principle of noncombatant immunity prohibits warring parties from intentionally targeting noncombatants. I explicate the moral version of this view and its criticisms by reductive individualists; they argue that certain civilians on the unjust side are morally liable to be lethally targeted to forestall substantial contributions to that war. I then argue that reductivists are mistaken in thinking that causally contributing to an unjust war is a necessary condition for moral liability. Certain noncontributing civilians—notably, war-profiteers—can be morally liable to be (...) lethally targeted. Thus, the principle of noncombatant immunity is mistaken as a moral (though not necessarily as a legal) doctrine, not just because some civilians contribute substantially, but because some unjustly enriched civilians culpably fail to discharge their restitutionary duties to those whose victimization made the unjust enrichment possible. Consequently, the moral criterion for lethal liability in war is even broader than reductive individualists have argued. (shrink)

In Chapter 7, “Dignity, Self-Respect, and Bloodless Invasions”, Saba Bazargan-Forward asks How much violence can we impose on those attempting to politically subjugate us? According to Bazargan-Forward, “reductive individualism” answers this question by determining how much violence one can impose on an individual wrongly attempting to prevent one from political participation. Some have argued that the amount of violence one can permissibly impose in such situations is decidedly sub-lethal. Accordingly, this counterintuitive response has cast doubt on the reductive individualist project. (...) Bazargan-Forward argues, however, that political subjugation involves an institutionally embodied form of disrespect that has been altogether missed. A proper appreciation of this sort of disrespect, he contends, morally permits much greater defensive violence against those attempting to politically subjugate us or others. (shrink)

Even in just wars we infringe the rights of countless civilians whose ruination enables us to protect our own rights. These civilians are owed compensation, even in cases where the collateral harms they suffer satisfy the proportionality constraint. I argue that those who authorize or commit the infringements and who also benefit from those harms will bear that compensatory duty, even if the unjust aggressor cannot or will not discharge that duty. I argue further that if we suspect antecedently that (...) we will culpably refrain from compensating those victims post bellum, then this makes satisfying the war’s proportionality constraint substantially more difficult at the outset of the war. The lesson here is that failing to take duties of compensation in war seriously constrains our moral permission to protect ourselves. (shrink)

Though the duties of care owed toward innocents in war and in civil life are at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical principles, Bazargan-Forward argues that those very principles will yield in these two contexts different “in-practice” duties. Furthermore, the duty of care we owe toward our own innocents is less stringent than the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in war. This is because risks associated with civil life but not war (a) often increase the (...) expected welfare of the individuals upon whom the risk is imposed, (b) are often imposed with consent, and (c) are often imposed reciprocally. The conclusion—that we have a pro tanto reason for adopting a more stringent standard of risk imposition toward foreign innocents in war—has implications for not only what standards of risk we should adopt in war, but also how we should weigh domestic versus foreign civilian lives. (shrink)

The doctrine of the moral equality of combatants holds that combatants on either side of a war have equal moral status, even if one side is fighting a just war while the other is not. This chapter examines arguments that have been offered for and against this doctrine, including the collectivist position famously articulated by Walzer and McMahan’s influential individualist critique. We also explore collectivist positions that have rejected the moral equality doctrine and arguments that some individualists have offered in (...) its favor. We defend a non-categorical version of the moral equality doctrine, according to which combatants on either side of a just war sometimes (but not always) have equal moral status. On our view, some degree of culpability is necessary for liability, and non-culpable combatants may therefore sometimes remain non-liable even when they fight for an unjust cause. (shrink)

Analytic just war theorists often attempt to construct ideal theories of military justice on the basis of intuitions about imaginary and sometimes outlandish examples, often taken from non-military contexts. This article argues for a sharp curtailment of this method and defends, instead, an empirically and historically informed approach to the ethical scrutiny of armed conflicts. After critically reviewing general philosophical reasons for being sceptical of the moral-theoretic value of imaginary hypotheticals, the article turns to some of the special problems that (...) this method raises for appraisals of warfare. It examines some of the hypothetical examples employed in the construction of Jeff McMahan’s revisionist just war theory, and finds that they sometimes stipulate incompre- hensible conditions, lead to argumentative impasses of diverging yet uncertain intuitions, and distract attention away from the real problems of war as we empirically know it. In contrast, empirical and historical studies of warfare rein- force the deep connections between facts and values, and compel theorists to face uncomfortable moral ambiguities. Perhaps most importantly, the analytic method of focusing on imaginary hypothetical examples can not only be distracting, but it can also be genuinely dangerous. Hence, the article pays special attention to the way in which a seemingly innocuous fiction like the famous Ticking Time Bomb scenario can come to frame a new paradigm of inhumanity in the treatment of prisoners of war. (shrink)

The origins and consequences of warfare or largescale intergroup violence have been subject of long debate. Based on exhaustive surveys of skeletal remains for prehistoric hunter-gatherers and agriculturists in Japan, the present study examines levels of inferred violence and their implications for two different evolutionary models, i.e., parochial altruism model and subsistence model. The former assumes that frequent warfare played an important role in the evolution of altruism and the latter sees warfare as promoted by social changes induced by agriculture. (...) Our results are inconsistent with the parochial altruism model but consistent with the subsistence model, although the mortality values attributable to violence between hunter-gatherers and agriculturists were comparable. (shrink)

Just war scholars are increasingly focusing on the importance of jus post bellum – justice after war – for the legitimacy of military campaigns. Should something akin to jus post bellum standards apply to terrorist campaigns? Assuming that at least some terrorist actors pursue legitimate goals or just causes, do such actors have greater difficulty satisfying the prospect-of-success criterion of Just War Theory than military actors? Further, may the use of the terrorist method as such – state or non-state – (...) jeopardize lasting peace in a way that other violent, for instance military, strategies do not? I will argue that there appears to be little reason to believe that terrorist campaigns are in principle less able to secure or at least contribute to a lasting peace than military campaigns; quite to the contrary. Or, put differently, if terrorism is an unlikely method for securing peace, then war is an even more unlikely one. (shrink)

In international law and just war theory, war is treated as normatively and legally unique. In the context of international law, war’s special status gives rise to a specific set of belligerent rights and duties, as well as a complex set of laws related to, among other things, the status of civilians, prisoners of war, trade and economic relationships, and humanitarian aid. In particular, belligerents are permitted to derogate from certain human rights obligations and to use lethal force in a (...) far more permissive manner than is the case in other kinds of conflicts and in domestic law enforcement operations. Given war’s unique status, the task of defining war requires not just identifying the empirical features that are characteristic of war but explaining and justifying war’s special legal and moral status. In this chapter, I propose a definition of war that captures war’s unique features and can offer insights into when and how some forms of unarmed conflict could count as wars. (shrink)

A book review of Steve Clark's The Justification of Religious Violence.

This paper is a part-review analysis into the modern conception of both the word and Jihād and the violent nature of Islam. In order to develop an overarching modern theory of Jihād, current opinions and general argumtations in the literature are examined. Two theories have emerged in defining Islam and the role of Jihād in Islam. The first is that of the so-called Muslim apologists; scholars who define Jihād as mainly a personal struggle, and whose physical application (warfare) is only (...) in self-defence of the Islamic community. The second sponsors the concept of ‘offensive’ Jihād: that Islam is imperialistic and has a vision of global domination. The stark contrast in the divisions that the scholarship have are indicative of two opposing parties, likely each basing their respective policy positions on beliefs on the nature of Islam as a violent of peaceful ‘religion’. (shrink)

I shall argue that in some wars both sides are (as a collective) justified, that is, they can both satisfy valid jus ad bellum requirements. Moreover, in some wars – but not in all – the individual soldiers on the unjustified side (that is, on the side without jus ad bellum) may nevertheless kill soldiers (and also civilians as a side-effect) on the justified side, even if the enemy soldiers always abide by jus in bello constraints. Traditional just war theory (...) and self-proclaimed “revisionist” just war theory think otherwise since the former focuses on the law enforcement or public authority justification for inflicting harm and the latter on the self-defense justification. These are both intrinsically asymmetrical justifications: there is no justified self-defense (properly understood) against justified self-defense, nor is there justified law-enforcement against justified law-enforcement. However, there can, as I will show, be justified self-defense against force that is justified by a necessity justification, and there can be force justified by a necessity justification being used against force that is also justified by a necessity justification. The necessity justification is not intrinsically asymmetrical, and it is an indispensable justification in the context of war. Moreover, with regard to some forms of inflicting harm on others one may give special weight to one’s own interests and the interests of those to whom one has special responsibilities when assessing the proportionality of those acts. That is, the proportionality calculation may be agent-relative. This is in particular so in the case of foreseeably preventing innocent and non-threatening people from being saved (for instance, by shooting down a tactical bomber who would have saved them by destroying an ammunitions factory) but less so in the case of the intentional or foreseeable direct harming of innocent and non-threatening people (dropping bombs on people standing near an ammunitions factory). In the light of these considerations, I will then answer the question as to when soldiers may justifiably participate in war (and when not). (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to draw attention to an issue which has been largely overlooked in contemporary just war theory – namely the impact that the conditions under which an army is assembled are liable to have on the judgments that are made with respect to traditional principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I argue that the way in which an army is assembled can significantly alter judgments regarding the justice of a war. In doing (...) so, I present and defend a principle of ‘just assembly’ and argue that satisfying this principle is an essential part of any deliberation regarding the justice of a particular conflict. (shrink)

I address a foundational problem with accounts of the morality of war that are derived from the Just War Tradition. Such accounts problematically focus on ‘the moment of crisis’: i.e. when a state is considering a resort to war. This is problematic because sometimes the state considering the resort to war is partly responsible for wrongly creating the conditions in which the resort to war becomes necessary. By ignoring this possibility, JWT effectively ignores, in its moral evaluation of wars, certain (...) types of past wrongdoing. I argue that we can address this problem by incorporating an account of compensatory liability into an account of the morality of war. Doing so yields the view that, if we have culpably failed to compensate victims for past wrongs, we might be morally required to weigh the well-being of those victims more heavily in our calculation of proportionality when determining the permissibility of a defensive act that harms the victim as a side-effect. This, in turn, makes satisfying t. (shrink)

Different societies came to consider certain behaviors as morally wrong, and, in time, due to a more or less general practice, those behaviors have also become legally prohibited. While, nowadays, the existence of legal responsibility of states and individuals for certain reprehensible acts committed during an armed conflict, international or non-international, is hard to be disputed, an inquiry into the manner in which the behavior of the belligerents has come to be considered reveals long discussions in the field of morals (...) and theory of morality, and, especially, regarding the different manner of establishing the elements to whom obedience is rather owed (the divinity, the sovereign, the law) and the relations between these. Hence, the present paper aims at analyzing the connections between moral responsibility and legal responsibility for wrongful behaviur during war in a diachronic approach, along with the major shifts in paradigm (codification and individual liability). Understanding morality as practice, convention, custom, we are arguing that the nowadays requirement of liability for war crimes appeared due to an assumed intention and practice of the decision-making entities (the sovereign, the state) and, ultimately, to a decision-making process of the most influential states. (shrink)

While current doctrines try to separate conflicts within two distinct categories – conventional versus irregular, there are, however, a series of contemporary conflicts that challenge this western view on war showing that the disjunctive manner of classification in ‘big and conventional’ versus ‘small and irregular’ is limited and simplistic. The military strategists as well as the academics used a series of concepts in order to describe the main shifts in the character of war – from the Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) (...) and ‘new wars’ to hybrid wars. This article aims to identify these mutations in war evolution in the new, post-Cold War international context. The traditional image we have on this well-known ‘labor division’ within the military field no longer reflects reality. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is the analysis of both legal and ethical ways of justifying targeted killings. I compare two legal models: the law enforcement model vs the rules of armed conflicts; and two ethical ones: retribution vs the right of self-defence. I argue that, if the targeted killing is to be either legally or ethically justified, it would be so due to fulfilling of some criteria common for all acceptable forms of killing, and not because terrorist activity is (...) somehow distinguished and gives special privileges to a state that fights it. The practical implication of my analysis is that one of the most spectacular targeted killings, which was the targeting and killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, was not justified, because it was only supposed to be a retribution for the September 11th terrorist attacks. (shrink)

The destruction wrought by even just wars lends undeniable appeal to radical pacifism, according to which all wars are unjust. Yet radical pacifism is fundamentally flawed. In the past decade, a moderate and more defensible form of pacifism has emerged. According to what has been called ‘contingent pacifism’, it is very unlikely that it is morally permissible to wage any given war. This chapter develops the doctrine of contingent pacifism by distinguishing and developing various versions of it, and by assessing (...) the merits and drawbacks of each. According to ‘proportionality-based’ contingent pacifism, almost all wars with just causes are unjust ‘tout court’ because the in bello harms such wars impose on the innocent are too great relative to the relevant evils averted by achieving the war’s aims. After arguing against this view, the chapter introduces a novel, more defensible form of contingent pacifism, called ‘epistemic-based’ contingent pacifism, according to which the prevalence of mistaken judgements regarding the justness of wars, combined with the devastating harmfulness of unjust wars, requires imposing prohibitions against waging war, where the strength of the prohibition varies according to whether the government has a history of mistakes or deception regarding the justness of wars. (shrink)

Nations are understood to have a right to go to war, not only in defense of individual rights, but in defense of their own political standing in a given territory. This paper argues that the political defensive privilege cannot be satisfactorily explained, either on liberal cosmopolitan grounds or on pluralistic grounds. In particular, it is argued that pluralistic accounts require giving implausibly strong weight to the value of political communities, overwhelming the standing of individuals. Liberal cosmopolitans, it is argued, underestimate (...) the difficulties in disentangling a state’s role in upholding or threatening individual interests from its role in providing the social context that shapes and determines those very interests. The paper proposes an alternative theory, “prosaic statism”, which shares the individualistic assumptions of liberal cosmopolitanism, but avoids a form of fundamentalism about human rights, and is therefore less likely to recommend humanitarian intervention in non-liberal states. (shrink)

This paper discusses the relation between the human security paradigm and the cosmopolitan democracy scenario as models for humanizing and changing the current international system and transforming it in a global security and development system centered on the individual rather than on the nation state. The main idea for which I argue is that the human security paradigm and the changes it determined in international relations (especially through the responsibility to protect principle) are compatible with the cosmopolitan democracy scenario for (...) changing and transforming the current international system. (shrink)

The principle of non-combatant immunity protects non-combatants against intentional attacks in war. It is the most widely endorsed and deeply held moral constraint on the conduct of war. And yet it is difficult to justify. Recent developments in just war theory have undermined the canonical argument in its favour – Michael Walzer's, in Just and Unjust Wars. Some now deny that non-combatant immunity has principled foundations, arguing instead that it is entirely explained by a different principle: that of necessity. In (...) war, as in ordinary life, harms to others can be justified only if they are necessary. Attacking non-combatants, the argument goes, is never necessary, so never justified. Although often repeated, this argument has never been explored in depth. In this article, I evaluate the necessity-based argument for non-combatant immunity, drawing together theoretical analysis and empirical research on anti-civilian tactics in interstate warfare, counterinsurgency, and terrorism. (shrink)

Disputes over territory are a major contributing factor to the disruption of international relations. We believe that a cumulative, integrated, and continuously updated resource providing information about such disputes in an easily accessible form would be of benefit to intelligence analysts, military strategists, political scientists, and also to historians and others concerned with international disputes. We propose an ontology-based strategy for creating such a resource. The resource will contain information about territorial disputes, arguments for and against claims pertaining to sovereignty, (...) proffered evidence for such claims, political and military motives (overt or hidden), and associated conflicts. Our approach is designed to address several issues surrounding the representation of geopolitical conflict, including the tracking and individuation of disputes and the validation of disseminated information. (shrink)

This article focuses on the ethical implications of so-called ‘collateral damage’. It develops a moral typology of collateral harm to innocents, which occurs as a side effect of military or quasi-military action. Distinguishing between accidental and incidental collateral damage, it introduces four categories of such damage: negligent, oblivious, knowing and reckless collateral damage. Objecting mainstream versions of the doctrine of double effect, the article argues that in order for any collateral damage to be morally permissible, violent agents must comply with (...) high standards of care. In order for incidental harm to be permissible, an agent must take pains to avoid such harm even at higher cost to him- or herself. It is argued that accidentally but negligently caused collateral damage may be just as difficult to excuse as incidental harm. Only if high precautionary standards of care are met, can unintended harm to innocents – incidental or accidental – be permissible. In practice, such a strong commitment to avoiding harm to civilians may well lead us to question more generally and rethink more radically how violent conflicts ought to be fought, how military violence ought to be used and whether there are better ways of achieving those aims that we think are legitimate than those we are currently using. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest analiza prawnych i etycznych sposobów uzasadnienia dopuszczalności stosowania polityki namierzania i zabijania. Pojawiły się próby usprawiedliwienia tego typu działań poprzez odwołanie do egzekwowania prawa, reguł rządzących konfliktami zbrojnymi, sprawiedliwej odpłaty, prawa do obrony własnej. W artykule dokonuję analizy tych sposobów usprawiedliwiania polityki namierzania i zabijania, a następnie rozważam, które z nich faktycznie mogą uzasadniać tego typu politykę. Rozważania prowadzę w świetle głównej hipotezy projektu badawczego, który obecnie prowadzę, zakładającej, że normy regulujące dopuszczalność i sposoby toczenia konfliktów zbrojnych (...) i używania przemocy w stosunkach międzynarodowych powinny być spójne z moralnymi intuicjami dotyczącymi stosowania przemocy w przypadkach indywidualnych. (shrink)

Przemocy jest coraz mniej – zarówno w czasie pokoju, jak i podczas wojen. Na przykładzie trzech konfliktów zbrojnych z ostatnich lat zastanawiam się, czy decydenci powinni prowadzić działania zbrojne w taki sposób, by zminimalizować całkowitą liczbę ofiar. Pokazuję, że ani obowiązujące obecnie normy prawa międzynarodowego, ani osądy moralne na temat dopuszczalności stosowania przemocy nie wymagają od decydentów ograniczania całkowitej liczby ofiar konfliktów zbrojnych w każdym przypadku.