Political Views

This volume brings together diverse sets of standpoints on liberalism in an era of growing skepticism and distrust regarding liberal institutions. The essays in the volume: - Relate concerns for liberal institutions with classical themes in perfectionist politics, such as the priority of the common good in decision-making or the role of comprehensive doctrines. - Analyse how perfectionist intuitions about the political life affect our concepts of public reason or public justification. - Outline various moral duties we have toward other (...) persons that underlie the liberal institutions or notions of rights functioning across the contemporary political landscape. - Explore various aspects of pluralism from within influential religious or philosophical traditions, applying insights from those traditions to issues in contemporary politics. The comprehensive volume will be of great interest to scholars, students, and researchers of politics, especially those in political philosophy and political theory. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se abordarán los aportes realizados por Gramsci en la construcción de la figura del intelectual. Para ello, se caracterizarán los rasgos distintivos del determinismo histórico marxista, para luego enfocarnos en el pensamiento gramsciano. A partir de allí nos centraremos de manera expresa en los argumentos desplegados por Gramsci al procurarle una función activa a la figura del intelectual, en tanto intelectual colectivo que se va conformando encarnado en el partido revolucionario de la clase obrera. De esta (...) manera, plantearemos que esta disposición del intelectual colectivo se enlaza con los problemas de la vida social en la búsqueda de unificar teoría y praxis, y pretende crear así una nueva hegemonía, puesto que admite la indeterminabilidad de la historia según leyes. (shrink)

Several studies have lately revealed that social media conceal at least three dangerous pitfalls. Firstly, social media can negatively impact sociopolitical processes in advanced liberal democracies by becoming vehicles for the spread of false information that augments political polarization (Lee et al. 2017; Ostillio 2018). Secondly, as a result of the first point, social mediacan rapidly become a source of incorrect beliefs for those subjects with low digital literacy (Guess et al. 2019). Thirdly, because of the first and second points, (...) intentionally deceitful manipulations of social media content are potent generators of information cascades that increase group polarizations across groups of vulnerable social media users (Jang and Kim2018, Wang et al. 2018, Colliander 2019). These findings support the claim that the circulation of biased content on social media potentially threatens sociopolitical stability in liberal Western democracies (Duffy 2018; Sunstein 2018). Although this claim is far from being speculative, as shown by the FacebookFile investigations (Wall Street Journal 2019) and the center for humane technology’s recen tresearch, it introduces a thorny dilemma regarding the founding principles of liberal Western democracies. Namely, should Western legislators limit free speech by introducing severe penalties for those who spread fake news and the likes on social media? Or should they let the free market autonomously produce efficient technology allowing people to identify biased social media content?In other words, is a libertarian solution to the plight of online fake news and the like preferable to adequate legislation that punishes those who spread such content? Though appealing, it is unrealistic to believe that the free market can resolve this problem. On the other hand, it is realistic to suppose that Western governments should engage in a merciless battle against biased social media content. For instance, following the publication of the Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation in 2018, the European Union introduced new directives to limit the spread of fake news online in 2021, when the Covid19 pandemic started fading. Although initiatives as such might look like limitations of free speech, there is solid philosophical ground to defend such initiatives. To prove this contention, we resort to Hobbes’s (1651, Part II, §18 and §29) argument that humans can avoid falling back into the Hobbesian state of war only if they stipulate a covenant. Specifically, we appeal to Hobbes’s (1651) argument in favor of bestowing the sovereign the right to ban those seditious doctrines that might undermine peace and sociopolitical stability in the Hobbesian Commonwealth. In this regard, we show that the Hobbesian covenant resolves conflict among humans in the same way a correlated equilibrium limits noncooperation in game theory. Namely, like game theory players, citizens enjoy greater welfare whenever they observe rules that mitigate conflict (Slomp 2010). Accordingly, we argue that citizens would be better off only if Western governments introduced severe penalties for those who intentionally spread fake news. Notably, we argue that effective regulation would create disincentives for spreading biased content and incentives for spreading truthful content. Furthermore, we argue that effective regulation against online fake news would assuage the polarizing effects of online availability cascades on social networks. Importantly, we provide empirical evidence supporting these claims by showing that the lack of effective regulation led the American government to miserably fail to contain the devasting effects of the online infodemic (i.e., the epidemic of false online information)that took place during the first two waves of the Covid19 pandemic (Evanega et al. 2020, Milosh et al. 2020). (shrink)

In this thesis, I explore themes and concerns that have arisen in my art practice, namely the relationship between landscape, monstrosity, and subjectivity. The tropes scar and form refer to features analogous in the subject and in the land which take on different specific meanings throughout the project, but in general terms, I relate them to trauma as a defining force. I suggest that monsters can be understood as embodying attitudes to time (a cause of trauma): those being fixity, which (...) is resistant to temporality; and flux, which embraces temporality. Consequently, I define these categories and their opposition, presenting arguments for both monsters of fixity and flux monsters. I examine the construction of false universals of ‘England’ (categories of fixity) in representations of landscape and how they come to dominate the picturing of Britain more generally, alongside a mode I refer to as dynamic-fatalism, which examines the polemics and aesthetics of Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957). In this regard, I look at Lewis’s monstrous Tyro and its role in eliciting dehumanisation as a defining value in conceptions of a stratified society. Emphasis on creative practices and representations related to England serve to dissolve ‘proto-fascistic’ fantasies of a heroic, mono-cultural, and pure base for nation, dependent on categories of fixity. I suggest these values are instead understood as patrician, sexist, class-based, and racially biased. Given that landscape constructions are constitutive of our engagement with landscape, I conclude with a proposal for better ‘analogues’ of nature in the form of virescent space (a category of flux). I argue that virescent space is a phenomenon that sees the monster take on a specific role concerning the subject, one I define in relation to a wilderness destination in the poem Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (c.1370). (shrink)

في سنة 2015، ذهب قرابة عشرين شخصًا من سُكان بلدة «ياهابا» (وهي بلدة صغيرة تابعة لولاية «إيواتي» شمال شرق اليابان) إلى مبنى البلدية الخاص بهم للمشاركة في تجربة فريدة من نوعها. كان هدف التجربة هو تصميم سياسات من شأنها تشكيل مستقبل بلدتهم، ما يعني طرح الأسئلة المُخصصة للسياسيين ومحاولة الإجابة عنها: هل من الأفضل أن نستثمر في البنية التحتية أم في رعاية الأطفال؟ وهل يجب أن نُشجع الطاقة المُتجددة أم الزراعة الاصطناعية؟ وهل نعمل وفق خُطط قصيرة الأجل تُحقق مصالح الجيل (...) الحالي، أم وفق خُطط بعيدة الأجل تنظر بعين الاهتمام لحاجات الأجيال التالية؟ وللإجابة عن هذه التساؤلات وفق رؤية مستقبلية تم تقسيم المشاركين إلى مجموعتين؛ الأولى ظل أعضاؤها بملابسهم وهيئاتهم المعتادة كممثلين للجيل الحالي، والثانية ارتدى أعضاؤها معاطف احتفالية رمزية صفراء وطُلب منهم أن يتخيلوا أنهم يعيشون في سنة 2060، أي أنهم يُمثلون مصالح جيل من أجيال المستقبل خلال التجربة. (shrink)

Deskripsi pemikiran Adorno terhadap fenomena ekonomi memberi isyarat bahwa neoliberalisme bisa dibongkar. Neoliberalisme mempresentasikan diri dalam wujud rasional. Neoliberalisme sangat meyakinkan dan tampak alamiah berdasarkan klaim bahwa pasar dapat mengatur diri (self-regulating market). Klaim tersebut membuat neoliberalisme dalam perkembangannya dianggap sebagai koordinasi masyarakatyang memiliki rasionalitas. Bagi Adorno sejarah tentang sesuatu yang alamiah selalu berdasarkan pada mitos. Kapitalisme menurutnya adalah fakta sosial yang tidak natural. Penulis berkesimpulan bahwa neoliberalisme adalah fenomena yang tidak natural. Kapitalisme dan neoliberalisme hanya tampak alamiah. Mitoslah yang (...) membentuk kepercayaan bahwa sesuatu alamiah dan merupakan pokok dari sejarah. Adorno menolak pandangan tersebut dengan menyatakan bahwa sejarah mesti dimengerti secara kritis sebagai kemampuan manusia untuk mengonstitusikan bentuk sosial yang baru dalam relasinya dengan alam itu sendiri. Bagian berikutnya dari artikel ini membahas bagaimana neoliberalisme bekerja lewat distorsi komunikasi dalam sendi-sendi kehidupan sosial ekonomi, budaya dan politik. Demokrasi mengalami erosi pada substansinya. Rakyat kehilangan kemampuannya untuk berkomunikasi mengorganisir kehidupan bersamanya. Rakyat secara umum cenderung ikut terseret dalam arus neoliberalisasi. Kesadaran kritis melemah dan terdapat potensi hilangnya kedaulatan rakyat atas politik dan ekonomi. (shrink)

«Τι να κάνουμε;» [Что делать?], ήταν ο τίτλος ενός πολιτικού φυλλαδίου που έγραψε ο Β. Ι. Λένιν το 1901 και κυκλοφόρησε το 1902 στη Ρωσία. Παρόλο τον ερωτηματικό χαρακτήρα του τίτλου, η απάντηση του Λένιν που αναπτυσσόταν στις σελίδες του κειμένου, έμελλε να τεθεί προστακτικά στο επαναστατικό κίνημα.

Ideologies, worldviews, or simply personal theories, often acquire a distorted and pathological character, and become a factor of alienation rather than an epistemic resource and an aid for personal existence. This paper attempts to better define the limits and characteristics of this experience, which we call distorted intellectual beliefs, or general conceptual beliefs (GB), while trying to highlight both its sometimes dramatic background and its personal and social consequences, which are no less potentially deleterious. We believe that such experiences should (...) not be confused tout court with a broader and more complex phenomenon, such as extremism and politico-religious radicalism, but are a specific typology of that broader and multifaceted fact that is self-deception. We hypothesize that the self-deception implicit in experiences of intellectual distortion produces a cognitive dissonance of which the subject is normally, though with varying intensity, aware (or may become aware through honest introspection). The phenomenon occurs in two extreme forms: one is normal (sporadic), the other is exceptional (systematic). The passage from one to the other is a complex process of escalation and de-escalation, on which multiple external and internal variables act. In its ascending path, it essentially coincides with a process of psychological polarization and cognitive "de-pluralization", while its descending phase marks a return to reality and a "re-pluralization", where the subject returns to being what he basically is, namely, an active and tireless meaning seeker. In the central part of the chapter, similarities and differences between processes of deradicalization and phenomena of religious deconversion are analyzed, with reference, among others, to the case of the Austro-Hungarian writer Arthur Koestler. -/- An abridged version of this text has been delivered for the Workshop "Explaining Extreme Belief and Extreme Behavior", September 15-16, 2022, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. I am grateful to David Konstan (NYU) for reading and commenting on a first version of this chapter and to Rik Peels (VUA) for his comments and questions during the Workshop. I would also like to thank my bachelor's and master's students at UDG, who discussed these topics at length with during semester 2022-B. (shrink)

Due to the scarcity of data from government sources, twisting facts and rewriting histories in order to warp out a belligerent present has become a rising tendency. Such a tendency brings with it a convenient inability to speak truth to power. The majority of the urban credo today has fallen victim to a system of what can be called a new-age urban ideology of 'perfective fakeness'.

The Community of Shared Future for Mankind (CSFM) concept is a comprehensive Chinese proposal for a better future of mankind. In this article, we provide a comprehensive analysis of this concept by focusing on its origin, evolution and philosophical foundation. This article deals with the origin and evolution of the CSFM concept. We show that the concept originated during the presidency of Hu Jintao, who initially used it for the domestic affairs of China. However, the usage of the concept was (...) later extended from domestic to international affairs. Though Hu Jintao conceived the CSFM concept, it is president Xi Jinping who became its greatest advocate. We explore the CSFM concept’s development and evolution into one of the most influential, diverse and dominant concepts of international relations under president Xi. Furthermore, the article explores the philosophical foundation of the CSFM concept. We argue that although CSFM concept is seen as a 21st century Chinese idea, the roots of the concept can be traced back to much earlier time in history. The concept is based on three major philosophical thoughts: Marxism, Confucianism and the philosophy of Mencius. We show that the CSFM concept is greatly influenced by Marx’s ideas such as the transformation of the world, the free association of producers, historical materialism and dialectics. We also point to a number of Confucian principles that are adopted by the CSFM concept. The CSFM concept not only adopts Confucian principles but also extends their scope from the individual level to international relations. Similarly, we also highlight that the CSFM concept is influenced by Mencius’ concepts such as universal brotherhood, responsibility towards the betterment of the world, humane governance, free trade, equal sharing of wealth and the conservation of natural resources. (shrink)

Neoliberalism is an approach to social policy, now globally influential, that applies market approaches to all aspects of social life, including education. Charter schools, privately operated but publicly funded, are its most prominent manifestation in the U.S. The neoliberal principles of competition, consumerism, and choice cannot serve as foundations of a sound and equitable public education system. Neoliberalism embraces socio-economic inequality overall and in doing so constricts any justice mission its adherents espouse in virtue of serving a relatively disadvantaged student (...) population, as charter schools often (by no means always) do. It constricts educational justice by (1) embracing a “human capital” approach as the primary good of education, (2) creating educational inequality through (unofficially) selecting a relatively advantaged segment of the disadvantaged demographic it serves, (3) denying the effect of poverty on educational performance, and (4) devaluing its students’ familial ethnic cultures. (shrink)

I argue that political forgiveness is sometimes, but not always, compatible with public commemoration of politically motivated wrongdoing. I start by endorsing the claim that commemorating serious past wrongdoing has moral value and imposes moral demands on key actors within post-conflict societies. I am concerned with active commemoration, that is, the deliberate acts of bringing victims and the wrong done to them to public attention. The main issue is whether political forgiveness requires forgetting and conversely whether remembrance can be an (...) impediment to political forgiveness. The notion of political forgiveness, its definition, very possibility and desirability are contentious issues in the contemporary literature. I develop a multidimensional account of political forgiveness with a core element. The core element of political forgiveness involves taking a non-adversarial stance towards perpetrators in the sense of committing to stop holding their wrongdoing against them. The core element of forgiveness is usually combined with other attitudes and practices, which are appropriate depending on the circumstances. This is due to the fact that there are different ways of holding a wrong against an offender. I argue that forgiving perpetrators is not compatible with continue to punishing them, refusing to reconcile with them, and/or reminding them of their misdeed if perpetrators refuse to accept punishment, deny the importance of commemorating the past or wish to reconcile against the victim’s desires. I show that some forms of political forgiveness are not morally legitimate because they conflict with moral demands to punish perpetrators, commemorate atrocities and respect victims. This conclusion is less alarming than it might initially seem because the refusal to forgive politically motivated wrongdoing does not necessarily lead to the perpetuation of violence and conflict. I briefly draw on the example of Argentina in order to show how some forms of political un-forgiveness can be morally legitimate and effective ways for victims to uphold these demands. (shrink)

Bu bölümde karşılaştırmalı siyaset teorisinin, siyaset teorisinin hem bir alt alanı, hem de bir yöntemi olarak ortaya çıkış sürecini ele alacağım. Bu bağlamda öncelikle ‘karşılaştırmalı siyaset teorisinin’ (KST) ne zaman ortaya çıktığı sorusuyla ilgileneceğim. Ardından, KST’nin neden ortaya çıktığı, ne olduğu ve nasıl yapılması gerektiği ile ilgili tartışmalara değineceğim. Bu tartışmayı, son otuz yılda literatürde öne çıkan bazı çalışmalar ve isimler ve onların tartıştığı konular, meseleler, sorular ve sorunlar üzerinden (karşılaştırmada özne/nesne ilişkisi ve güç problemi, soruların ya da sorunların evrenselliği (...) meselesi, Batı/Avrupa merkezciliğini yeniden üretme riski) ve eleştirel bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutarak yürüteceğim. Son olarak, başlangıçta Amerika odaklı bir tartışma/gelişme olarak ve siyaset teorisinin belli sorunlarını (Avrupamerkezcilik, yanlış evrensellik, dar görüşlülük) aşma hedefiyle ortaya çıkan KST’nin aradan geçen otuz yılın ardından bugünkü durumu ile ilgili bazı değerlendirmelerde bulunacağım. (shrink)

Some artificial intelligence systems can display algorithmic bias, i.e. they may produce outputs that unfairly discriminate against people based on their social identity. Much research on this topic focuses on algorithmic bias that disadvantages people based on their gender or racial identity. The related ethical problems are significant and well known. Algorithmic bias against other aspects of people’s social identity, for instance, their political orientation, remains largely unexplored. This paper argues that algorithmic bias against people’s political orientation can arise in (...) some of the same ways in which algorithmic gender and racial biases emerge. However, it differs importantly from them because there are strong social norms against gender and racial biases. This does not hold to the same extent for political biases. Political biases can thus more powerfully influence people, which increases the chances that these biases become embedded in algorithms and makes algorithmic political biases harder to detect and eradicate than gender and racial biases even though they all can produce similar harm. Since some algorithms can now also easily identify people’s political orientations against their will, these problems are exacerbated. Algorithmic political bias thus raises substantial and distinctive risks that the AI community should be aware of and examine. (shrink)

Envases frente a contenido, imagen que no tiene a la base programas. Los medias y las redes sociales frente a la plaza ateniense del debate democrático. Populismos y liderazgos que abandonan la Ilustración como movimiento general filosófico. Este pequeño escrito es una reflexión sobre las tendencias que se observan en las sociedades democráticas, colocado en el marco de la discusión entre modernidad y posmodernismo. Se defiende en él la propuesta del debate racional y público.

I will argue that President Biden has not only the right to nominate an African American woman for SCOTUS, but, if he chooses a suitable candidate, he will be doing a great service to our country.

The word “populism” commonly elicits images of hordes of angry townspeople with pitchforks and torches. That is the classic picture of “the mob,” bolstered by countless movie and television productions, and it is clearly based on such historical events as the English civil wars, the sans-culottes’ terror, the Bolshevik revolution, and the recent genocides in Rwanda and Burundi. Many of the leaders involved in fostering such horrors are seen as radical democrats whose successors today should also be feared. In this (...) paper, I argue that any mob takeovers of the feared sort are actually antithetical to radical democracy. This is because an authentically democratic regime, even of the most extreme type, is necessarily inconsistent with “mobocracy” or any sort of “tyranny of the majority” given its essential procedural aspects. It is argued, in fact, that leaders of legitimately democratic movements have generally been quite vapid because of the fallibilistic, plebiscitary proceduralism inherent in any authentic attempt to require government policy to reflect the “general will.” And this vapidity is argued to inhere regardless of the extent of rhetorical powers of the advocate or advocacy. (shrink)

We examined the relationship between moral foundations, empathic traits, and moral identity using an online survey via Mechanical Turk. In order to determine how moral foundations contribute to empathic traits and moral identity, we performed classical correlation analysis as well as Bayesian correlation analysis, Bayesian ANCOVA, and Bayesian regression analysis. Results showed that individualizing foundations (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity) and binding foundations (ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity) had various different relationships with empathic traits. In addition, the individualizing versus binding foundations showed somewhat reverse relationships (...) with internalization and symbolization of moral identity. This suggests that moral foundations can contribute to further understanding of empathic traits and moral identity and how they relate to moral behavior in reality. We discuss the implications of these results for moral educators when starting to teach students about moral issues. (shrink)

Freedom of speech has traditionally been a cause championed by the left and liberal side of the political spectrum, against conservatives who have tried to limit the expression of radical ideas. Here are three examples from the United States: 1) When I was appointed to Princeton University in 1999, Steve Forbes, whose father had endowed the university’s Forbes College, called for my appointment to be rescinded, and pledged that he would not donate to the university as long as I was (...) on the faculty. Forbes was, at the time, running for the Republican nomination for president. (shrink)

[Comment] I am sympathetic to Avner de Shalit’s position that a political philosophy should incorporate public values, but I see their role differently. Philosophers of science standardly distinguish between values being introduced in the context of discovery (inputs into the investigation or arguments) and in the context of justification (acceptance or rejection of substantive claims in light of the arguments or investigation). I argue that de Shalit is wrong to put the public values in the context of discovery; with respect (...) to normative theories (such as political theories), the values should be introduced in the context of justification. [Open access]. (shrink)

En un formato de texto reconcentrado y ensayı́stico, llega hasta nosotros el nuevo libro del sociólogo Carlos Ruiz Encina, Octubre chileno. La irrupción de un nuevo pueblo (Santiago, Taurus, 2020). El libro arranca con una detallada bitácora de los dı́as previos al 18 de octubre de 2019, del estallido social mismo y de los acontecimientos inmediatamente posteriores. Queda la impresión de esos raros momentos cuando la historia se acelera y libera energı́as largamente acumuladas. Si bien los hechos por su masividad (...) y fuerza son inéditos, Ruiz Encina toma distancia de esa afirmación que se instala sobre lo sucedido hasta el dı́a de hoy en el mundo polı́tico y en parte de la intelectualidad: no lo vimos venir. (shrink)

Populism has become one of the most intensely discussed topics in both public debate and academic research. So far there has been no systematic argumentation theoretic analysis of populism, however. This paper is intended to provide first steps towards such an analysis by giving a full argumentation theoretic reconstruction of the political manifesto of the German right-wing populist party “Alternative for Germany” (AfD). This allows to draw preliminary conclusions about the AfD’s argumentative strategy as exemplary for right-wing populism.

O objetivo deste livro é propor uma reflexão sobre o ideário de centro, se perguntando se ele seria possível e como. Preferi chamar de “Uma Ideologia de Centro” em vez de “Ideário”, pois o termo “Ideologia” é instigante para um título. Entretanto tenho a noção de que essa palavra é bastante carregada de significados teóricos. No modelo marxista, grosso modo, a ideologia é um conjunto de crenças, construído pela parcela dominante da sociedade, para naturalizar a dominação. Não é nesse sentido (...) que utilizo o termo “ideologia”. Gostaria de um significado mais neutro para ele, tal como um conjunto de crenças, valores e/ou ações que respeita um conjunto de princípios. Nesse sentido, podemos pensar em uma ideologia para a direita política, para a esquerda política e para o centro político. Normalmente dividimos o espectro político de acordo com esses princípios; entretanto outras divisões são possíveis, ou ainda pode ser o caso que nenhuma divisão seja realmente objetiva. Como devemos, então, pensar essa divisão? Quais princípios subjazem as ações de diferentes atores políticos? Numa época de polarização política entre esquerda e direita, faz sentido refletirmos sobre posições mais moderadas? Qual conjunto de crenças, valores e ações poderia constituir moderação no cenário atual? Nosso livro tenta trazer uma reflexão sobre o ideário de centro, apresentando pensadores que refletem sobre a possibilidade de estabelecermos um centro, sobre a relação entre a ciência e o centro, sobre reformas centristas, entre outras coisas. Nossa intenção é que este livro promova uma reflexão inicial estimulante, e não a palavra final sobre as ideias apresentadas. Nesse sentido, este livro é ensaístico e tenta produzir algo original, ainda que incompleto. Nosso livro não têm uma unidade de visão; e acreditamos que isso é um mérito, pois não tenta estabelecer, em definitivo, se há e o que é o centro, mas nos leva a pensar sobre o conceito. A reflexão filosófica tem a característica de nos aprofundar nas questões investigadas. Podemos não chegar numa resposta final, mas nosso conhecimento sobre o problema e sobre as respostas para ele aprimoram nossa capacidade reflexiva. Pode-se acabar não concordando com nada do que aqui foi escrito. Maravilha! Se esse é o caso, o mais importante é saber por que não concordamos e construirmos nossa própria crítica argumentativa. Mas não paremos na crítica; construamos também uma teoria positiva, uma visão de mundo. É a partir do processo de criação, crítica, destruição e reconstrução, que tornamos mais fortes as nossas visões de mundo. Parafraseando a maior celebridade filosófica de todos os tempos, Sócrates: a vida só vale realmente a pena, se refletida. (shrink)

Maxima lui Samuel Gompers, parafrazară adesea ca "Premiază prietenii și pedepsește dușmanii", se referă la două din cele cinci tipuri de putere recunoscute de psihologii sociali: puterea stimulativă (puterea de a premia) și puterea coercitivă (puterea de a pedepsi). Celelalte trei puteri derivă din acestea. Puterea legitimității, puterea unui polițist sau a celui care ia decizii, este puterea dată de unei persoane de o autoritate recunoscută pentru a impune standarde comportamentale. Puterea legitimității este similară puterii coercitive prin aceea că o (...) comportare inacceptabilă este pedepsită mai mult sau mai puțin direct. (shrink)

A striking feature of political discourse is how prone we are to disagree. Political opponents will even give different answers to factual questions, which suggests that opposing parties cannot agree on facts any more than they can on values. This impression is widespread and supported by survey data. I will argue, however, that the extent and depth of political disagreement is largely overstated. Many political disagreements are merely illusory. This claim has several important upshots. I will explore the implications of (...) this idea for theories about voter misinformation, motivated reasoning, public reason liberalism, deliberative democracy, and a number of other issues. (shrink)

The article develops the concept of "political judgement" - a new, affirmative understanding of the phenomena which are criticized as "political correctness" by both right-wing and liberal commentators. To that end, it takes the right's claims, that "political correctness" is slave morality in Nietzsche's sense seriously and proposes a systematic reading of a right-nietzschean position. Connecting current "political-correctness"-critique and Nietzsche in this way allows for a deeper understanding of the right-wing rationality and the affective energy underlying the critique. Through contrasting (...) this right-nietzschean reading with its systematic opposite, a left-nietzschean position, the article shows that the essence of politics is to redesign norms which distribute privilege. What is critically labelled "political correctness" is, thus, better captured by the notion of "political judgment", because - given an interest in emancipation - such politics should not be demonized when they limit the freedom provided by undeserved privileges. (shrink)

In his recent book, Andrea Sangiovanni raises various objections against what he calls the “aristocratic” conception of dignity – the idea that dignity represents a kind of high- ranking social status. In this short article, I suggest that Sangiovanni gives the aristocrats less credit than they deserve. Not only do his objections target an uncharitably narrow version of the view, Sangiovanni surreptitiously incorporates aspects of the aristocratic conception of dignity into his own (supposedly non-dignitarian) theory of moral equality.

​This article considers the place of moral concerns about hospitality and welcoming in the politics of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation, or EZLN). I argue that the EZLN’s political model exemplifies some of what I think to be characteristic of the ideal relationship between politics, concerned with sameness and collective identities, and ethics, concerned with hospitality to those who are genuinely different.

Ein Gespräch mit Cornelia Ulbert zur Governance von Risiken zwischen wissenschaftlicher Analyse und politischer Aushandlung. Die Fragen stellte Karsten Schubert.

This article provides a framework for understanding the dynamics between the disenchanting effects of a uniquely modern existential meaning crisis and a countervailing reenchantment facilitated by the techno-cultural movement of transhumanism. This movement constructs a post-secular techno-theology grounded in a transhumanist ontology that corresponds to a shift away from anthropocentric meaning systems. To shed light on this dynamic, I take a phenomenological approach to the human-technology relationship, highlighting the role of technology in ontology formation and religious imagination. I refer to (...) examples of transhumanist religious movements to illustrate a new posthumanist ontological grounding of meaning corresponding to a contemporary meaning-crisis that scholars are calling ‘neuroexistentialism.’ I then use the language of Charles Taylor and his work on secularization to frame these ontological developments. Ultimately, this article argues that transhumanist religious expression represents a zeitgeist of post-secular re-enchantment. (shrink)

How Propaganda Became Public Relations pulls back the curtain on propaganda: how it was born, how it works, and how it has masked the bulk of its operations by rebranding itself as public relations. Cory Wimberly uses archival materials and wide variety of sources — Foucault’s work on governmentality, political economy, liberalism, mass psychology, and history — to mount a genealogical challenge to two commonplaces about propaganda. First, modern propaganda did not originate in the state and was never primarily located (...) in the state; instead, it began and flourished as a for-profit service for businesses. Further, propaganda is not focused on public beliefs and does not operate mainly through lies and deceit; propaganda is an apparatus of government that aims to create the publics that will freely undertake the conduct its clients’ desire. Businesses have used propaganda since the early twentieth century to construct the laboring, consuming, and voting publics that they needed to secure and grow their operations. Over that time, corporations have become the most numerous and well-funded apparatuses of government in the West, operating privately and without democratic accountability. Wimberly explains why liberal strategies of resistance have failed and a new focus on creating mass subjectivity through democratic means is essential to countering propaganda. This book offers a sophisticated analysis that will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in social and political philosophy, Continental philosophy, political communication, the history of capitalism, and the history of public relations. (shrink)

Cualquiera que sea la opinión que uno tenga sobre la participación de la Iglesia católica en los debates políticos del Ecuador, nadie negará que ha sido y sigue siendo un actor importante de estos debates. Conocer sus ideas políticas contribuye a entender mejor este rol y a juzgarlo con más fundamento y menos apasionamiento. Por esto, el actual volumen reúne textos selectos de cinco pensadores católicos ecuatorianos representativos, desde fines del siglo XIX hasta las últimas décadas del siglo XX. Hablamos (...) de: • Monseñor Federico González Suárez (1844 – 1917). Historiador, arqueólogo, Obispo de Ibarra (1895 – 1905) y Arzobispo de Quito (1906 – 1917). • Cardenal Carlos María de la Torre (1873 – 1968). Arzobispo de Quito (1933-1967) y Cardenal desde 1953. • Julio Tobar Donoso (1894 – 1981). Jurista, diplomático, historiador. • Cardenal Pablo Muñoz Vega (1903 – 1994). Arzobispo de Quito (1967- 1985) y Cardenal desde 1969. • Monseñor Leonidas Proaño (1910 – 1988). Obispo de Riobamba (1954-1985) y candidato al Premio Nobel de la Paz en 1986. El objetivo de esta publicación es ofrecer una síntesis coherente del pensamiento político de estos autores, a pesar de las diferencias que entre ellos existen. No ofrecemos una compilación sobre “el” pensamiento político católico, así dicho en general, porque sería exhaustivo y pretencioso. Nos limitaremos a presentar una síntesis que nos introduzca a las principales cuestiones sociales y políticas que han preocupado a estas cinco figuras. Este trabajo tiene naturalmente sus límites debidos al amplio espacio de tiempo considerado, las múltiples cuestiones políticas implicadas y la productividad de los autores, todos ellos pensadores a la vez que personas de acción. (shrink)

Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it’s standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by epistemically rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. Using an agent-based model of group deliberation, we show that groups of deliberating agents using coherence-based strategies for managing their limited resources tend (...) to polarize into different subgroups. We argue that using that strategy is epistemically rational for limited agents. So even though group polarization looks like it must be the product of human irrationality, polarization can be the result of fully rational deliberation with natural human limitations. (shrink)

Nonism refers to the attitude of whoever is neither pro nor cons a given issue. Midway between affirmation and denial, or truth and falsity, the nonist says neither “yes” nor “no” and intrigues by his lack of clear answer to any related question. What does (s)he say, if any, and what is the sense of such an attitude? Through the special case of politics, three sorts of nonists are depicted in the following: the nonist by default, the nonist by interest, (...) and the nonist by absurdity. The first cannot say anything else and the second does not want to, whilst the third paves a new way towards a refoundation of political discourse. The conditions of possibility of such a refoundation rely upon the dialectical relationship between two distinctive rationales, namely: the world of theoretical ideas, and the world of events. The resulting contradiction witnesses the crisis of political activity, and some output solutions will be exposed accordingly. -/- Le ninisme désigne l’attitude de celui qui n’est ni pour, ni contre un thème donné. A mi- chemin entre l’affirmation et la négation, ou la vérité et la fausseté, le niniste ne dit ni « oui » ni « non » et intrigue par son absence de réponse claire à une question posée. Que dit-il au juste, et quel est le sens de son attitude ? A travers le cas précis du domaine politique, trois types de ninistes seront décrits dans ce qui suit : le niniste par défaut, le niniste par intérêt, et le niniste par l’absurde. Le premier ne peut se prononcer autrement et le deuxième ne le souhaite pas, tandis que le troisième ouvre la voie en vue d’une refondation du discours politique. Les conditions de possibilité de cette refondation dépendent du rapport dialectique entre deux logiques distinctes : le monde des idées théoriques et le monde réel des événements. La contradiction qui en résulte est à l’image d’une activité politique en crise, et quelques solutions de sortie seront envisagées. (shrink)

This book examines the artistic policies of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) during the early post-war years (1944-1951), after the defeat of Fascism in Europe and the outbreak of the Cold War. It brings together theoretical debates on artists’ political engagement and an extensive critical apparatus, providing the reader with an historical framework for wider reflections on the relationship between art and politics.

Michael Rose’s Zukünftige Generationen in der heutigen Demokratie: Theorie und Praxis der Proxy-Repräsentation (Future Generations in Today’s Democracy: Theory and Practice of Proxy Representation) is an ambitious and fascinating work. It provides a new conceptualisation of the representation of future generations and it also delivers the most extensive empirical study of institutions for the representation of future generations available to date. The book is based on Rose’s PhD thesis at the Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany, and is 516 pages long (...) (excluding an extensive bibliography, list of sources and appendices). A third of the thesis is devoted to short case studies of a total of 29 institutions which are presented in a catalogue format, allowing this section to be used as an encyclopaedia. The book is written concisely and is well documented throughout. (shrink)

Interview with Kai Nielsen conducted by David Rondel and Alex Sager.

I submit that epistemic progress in key areas of contemporary academic philosophy has been compromised by politically correct ideology. First, guided by an evolutionary account of ideology, results from social and cognitive psychology and formal philosophical methods, I expose evidence for political bias in contemporary Western academia and sketch a formalization for the contents of beliefs from the PC worldview taken to be of core importance, the theory of social oppression and the thesis of anthropological mental egalitarianism. Then, aided by (...) discussions from contemporary epistemology on epistemic values, I model the problem of epistemic appraisal using the frameworks of multi-objective optimization theory and multi-criteria decision analysis and apply it to politically correct philosophy. I conclude that philosophy guided by politically correct values is bound to produce constructs that are less truth-conducive and that spurious values which are ideologically motivated should be abandoned. Objections to my framework stemming from contextual empiricism, the feminine voice in ethics and political philosophy are considered. I conclude by prescribing the epistemic value of empirical adequacy, the contextual value of political diversity and the moral virtue of moral courage to reverse unwarranted trends in academic philosophy due to PC ideology. (shrink)

In moving into the Roman world, the first Christians encountered a secular culture whose social, political and cultural characteristics bore a striking resemblance to the contemporary period. Yet these Christians did not feel constrained to present only those aspects of their message that would be acceptable. For most of its history, the presentation of a Christian message in the “public square” has entailed both theological and philosophical perspectives. Today, Catholics seem “self-limited” by an unspoken demand that they argue solely from (...) philosophical and scientific positions in public debates. This approach often fails to present a distinctively Christian viewpoint. As early as 1946, Henri de Lubac pointed out that this side-lining of the Christian view was not solely the result of secularist agitation. Since the sixteenth century, the generally accepted notion that human reality is composed of two separate dimensions – natural and a supernatural – has given the impression that one can speak of a discrete natural order which is unaffected by grace. While this approach still has its defenders, many Catholic intellectuals have pointed to its shortcomings, both theologically and philosophically. When Catholics confine themselves to naturalistic arguments, they deceive no one. Secularists – who argue from their own perspective of “belief ” – are able to accuse their Catholic opponents of having a hidden agenda, and of lacking the courage of their convictions by concealing what really motivates them. Any movement away from this situation is likely to be met with derision. Nevertheless, while neither Christians nor Secularists should impose their political views on others, Catholics should feel free to mount the full range of their arguments in public and should reject the notion that they are bound by rules of engagement set by their intellectual opponents. (shrink)

This article argues that the contemporary acceptability of abortion is not solely due to the Liberal imperative to exercise individual choice. Rather, abortion's acceptability needs to be explained with reference to the techniques of consumer culture. This article will begin by explaining how practices in general predispose one to gravitate towards one form of practices rather than another. It will then look at how consumer practices generate a biopolitics of economic efficiency and corporeal commodification which culminates in a politics of (...) visibility. Under such conditions, even basic categories like mere existence is dependent on its ability to be displayed for public view. This article will conclude by reflecting on the necessity of forging the Church not as a subsection of a public framed by consumerism, but as an alternative public in its own right. (shrink)

In the first part of this series it was argued that there is an inextricable bond between economic and cultural liberalism such that when Catholics identify the faith with the defence of neoliberal economics, even though they may oppose abortion, they end up promoting exactly that which they oppose. In this the second part this point is expanded upon and the argument made more explicit and that by reference to Pope Francis’ recent Apostolic Exhortation, Gaudium Evangelii. The Exhortation evidences a (...) view of matters economic that sits ill with capitalism, a point understood by Catholic commentators who champion Neoliberalism. This essay argues that Francis’ comments are nothing new, especially when compared to what John Paul II and Benedict XVI have written on the subject; indeed, that Francis’ Exhortation can be seen as a tempering of their critique of economic liberalism. The essay attempts to tease out what it is that informs the critique of the popes and shows that it has to do with what flows out from the rejection of metaphysics proper, a rejection that defines Modernity, and which ends in the deracination of all things such that even the very concept of ‘substance’ is dissolved and, thereby, all is made plastic and malleable, including human life. The important point the essay wishes to make is this: the popes are quite clear that the form a culture’s economy takes can both ground and exacerbate this anti-essentialist logic, what’s more the economy above all others that does this is the one they identify with neoliberal capitalism. As a consequence, Catholics who champion this form of economic theory must think seriously as to whether or not they or the popes are wrong on this matter. (shrink)