- Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(1 other version)Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Practical reason as theoretical reason.William Ratoff - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Are there subintentional actions?William Hornett - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
|
|
The Priority of Intentional Action: From Developmental to Conceptual Priority.Yair Levy - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
|
|
Autonomy as Practical Understanding.Reza Hadisi - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Collective Communicative Intentions in Context.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10:211-236.details
|
|
A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention.Bob Beddor & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):346-378.details
|
|
How to Contradict an Expression of Intention.John Schwenkler - forthcoming - In Christopher Frey & Jennifer Frey (eds.), Practical Truth. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Agency and Evidence.Berislav Marusic & John Schwenkler - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 244-252.details
|
|
Shape of Agency, by Joshua Shepherd. [REVIEW]Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Mind 132 (526):586-594.details
|
|
Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
|
|
Intention as Belief.John Schwenkler - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):318-334.details
|
|
The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
|
|
The shape of agency: Control, action, skill, knowledge.Joshua Shepherd - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):95-115.details
|
|
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
|
|
Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
|
|
The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.details
|
|
How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating.William Ratoff - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1245-1265.details
|
|
Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.details
|
|
Is there a confidence condition in the concept of intention?John McGuire - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):705-730.details
|
|
Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):763-777.details
|
|
A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.details
|
|
Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
|
|
Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
|
|
Representation in action.Alec Hinshelwood - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Freedom in Uncertainty.Filippos Stamatiou - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Copenhagendetails
|
|
How can there be reasoning to action?John Schwenkler - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (2):184-194.details
|
|
The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):326-345.details
|
|
The Subjective Authority of Intention.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):354-373.details
|
|
Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences.Devlin Russell - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):481-499.details
|
|
Creative Imagining as Practical Knowing: an Akbariyya Account.Reza Hadisi - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (2):181-204.details
|
|
Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1757-1768.details
|
|
Plan B.Sarah K. Paul - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):550-564.details
|
|
Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal.Alec Hinshelwood - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):739-755.details
|
|
Strong cognitivist weaknesses.Nathan Hauthaler - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (2):161-176.details
|
|
Rational Norms for Degreed Intention (and the Discrepancy between Theoretical and Practical Reason).Jay Jian - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):360-374.details
|
|
(1 other version)Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):95-115.details
|
|