- Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):259-279.details
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(1 other version)Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism about Rationality.Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Testimonien, epistemische Gemeinschaften und praktische Risiken.Felix Bräuer - 2017 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 65 (5):851-871.details
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Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.details
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Rape Culture and Epistemology.Bianca Crewe & Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 253–282.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
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Social Knowledge and Supervenience Revisited.Mark Povich - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):1033-1043.details
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(1 other version)Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.Jessica Brown - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):179-192.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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(1 other version)Pluralism about Knowledge.Robin McKenna - 2017 - In Coliva Annalisa & Pedersen Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 171-198.details
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Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.Brian Kim - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12415.details
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Testing What’s at Stake: Defending Stakes Effects for Testimony.Michel Croce & Paul Poenicke - 2017 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):163-183.details
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Lost in transmission: Testimonial justification and practical reason.Andrew Peet & Eli Pitcovski - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):336-344.details
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Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3597-3620.details
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'More Likely Than Not' - Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - In Carter Adam, Gordon Emma & Jarvis Benjamin (eds.), Knowledge First,. Oxford University Press. pp. 278-292.details
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Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail.Harvey Lederman - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):921-945.details
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The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
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Pragmatic encroachment: It's not just about knowledge.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):27-42.details
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Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):1-532.details
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Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?Sinan Dogramaci - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):61-96.details
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Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right.Davide Fassio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):265-289.details
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No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):231-238.details
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Internalism, Factivity, and Sufficient Reason.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
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Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions.James R. Beebe - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 359-367.details
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Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.details
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Epistemological Implications of Relativism.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 292-301.details
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What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.details
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(1 other version)How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Knowledge and normativity.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.details
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Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):110-133.details
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Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.details
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Knowledge across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Peter Baumann - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (2):363-380.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):378-410.details
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No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.details
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Asserting as Commitment to Knowing. An Essay on the Normativity of Assertion.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Barcelonadetails
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Knowledge, certainty, and assertion.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):293-299.details
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Evidence and armchair access.Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):479-500.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa).Jie Gao - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1901-1917.details
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