- Solving Frege's puzzle.Richard Heck - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):728-732.details
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Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being?Chris Heathwood - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):664-688.details
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Reflections on knowledge and its limits.Gilbert Harman - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):417-428.details
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Reflections on Knowledge and its Limits.Gilbert Harman - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):417-428.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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The Explanatory Role of Propositions.Peter Hanks - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):370-379.details
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Practical imagination as enabling practical rationality.Pereira Gustavo - 2018 - Veritas: Revista de Filosofía y Teología 39:9-31.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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Putnam, Context, and Ontology.Steven Gross - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):507 - 553.details
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Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious.Steven Gross - 2010 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication.details
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Creer que p.: consideraciones en torno a la creencia.Tobies Grimaltos & Sergi Rosell - 2012 - Agora 31 (1):85-101.details
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Safety, Explanation, Iteration.Daniel Greco - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):187-208.details
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How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead.Alex Gregory - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241-249.details
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Mistakes About Conventions and Meanings.Cosmo Grant - 2019 - Topoi 40 (1):71-85.details
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Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
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Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
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Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.details
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On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
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Propositions, representation, and truth.Geoff Georgi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1019-1043.details
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On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit.Kim Frost - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):429-484.details
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Stakes sensitivity and transformative experience.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):34-39.details
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Actualism Doesn’t Have Control Issues: A Reply to Cohen and Timmerman.Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):271-277.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
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Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
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El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Ángeles Eraña & Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 51:9-36.details
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Trust and the doxastic family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.details
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De modalibus non disputat asinus.Pascal Engel - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (1):157-.details
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Believing, holding true, and accepting.Pascal Engel - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.details
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Impossible worlds and partial belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3433-3458.details
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Randomness Is Unpredictability.Antony Eagle - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):749-790.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Counterfactuals, the Discrimination Problem and the Limit Assumption.José Díez - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):85-110.details
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The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 9.Emar Maier, Corien Bary & Janneke Huitink (eds.) - 2005 - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics.details
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Abilities.John Maier - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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On thinking of kinds: A neuroscientific perspective.Dan Ryder - 2006 - In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 115-145.details
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Towards a Fictionalist Philosophy of Mathematics.Robert Knowles - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Manchesterdetails
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Knowledge and Conditionals of (Dis)connection.Danilo Šuster - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):267-294.details
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Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference.Daihyun Chung - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Ideas (Seoul National University):3-33.details
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Lewis's Philosophical Method.Daniel Nolan - 2015 - In B. Loewer & J. Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to Lewis. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 25-39.details
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Too close for comfort? Psychosemantics and the distal.Dan Ryder - unknowndetails
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Problems of representation II: naturalizing content.Dan Ryder - 2009 - In Francisco Garzon & John Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.details
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Real Knowledge. The problem of content in neural epistemics.J. J. M. Sleutels - unknowndetails
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Probability and Danger.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy.details
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