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Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Grounding: necessary or contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.details
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Conceivability and Coherence: A Skeptical View of Zombies.Heimir Geirsson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):211-225.details
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David Chalmers on Mind and Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of mind: the key thinkers. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 283-292.details
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Hypothetical identities: Explanatory problems for the explanatory argument.Markus I. Eronen - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):571-582.details
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Thinking about phenomenal concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2011 - Synthesis Philosophica 26 (2):391-402.details
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Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3053-3074.details
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Undefeated dualism.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.details
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Metaphilosophy.Yuri Cath - 2011 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.details
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Against Normative Naturalism.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.details
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Frege's Principle.Richard Heck - 1995 - In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind to Gödel: Essays on the Development of the Foundations of Mathematics. Kluwer Academic Publishers.details
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Why Do Colours Look the Way They Do?Nicholas Unwin - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (3):405-424.details
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What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?David Papineau - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.details
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"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknowndetails
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The Scientific Explanation of Colour Qualia.Jeff Foss - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):479.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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Conscious experience, reduction and identity: many explanatory gaps, one solution.Liam P. Dempsey - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245.details
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Are sensations still brain processes.Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.details
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Reductive explanation, concepts, and a priori entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.details
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Metaphysical emergence: Weak and Strong.Jessica Wilson - 2013 - In Stephen Mumford & Matthew Tugby (eds.), Metaphysics and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 251-306.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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Why Panpsychism Doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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The Rise and Fall of the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - forthcoming - In Corine Besson, Anandi Hattiangadi & Romina Padro (eds.), Meaning, Modality and Mind: Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.details
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Zombies and Epiphenomenalism.Andrew Bailey - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):129.details
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Dynamical agents: Consciousness, causation, and two specters of epiphenomenalism.Liam Dempsey & Itay Shani - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):225-243.details
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Analysis, schmanalysis.Steve Petersen - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):pp. 289-299.details
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Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals.Anil K. Seth, Bernard J. Baars & David B. Edelman - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):119-39.details
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Neural darwinism and consciousness.Anil K. Seth & Bernard J. Baars - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):140-168.details
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Why the exclusion problem seems intractable and how, just maybe, to tract it.Karen Bennett - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):471-97.details
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On the causal completeness of physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.details
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On ensuring that physicalism is not a dual attribute theory in sheep's clothing.Frank Jackson - 2006 - Philsophical Studies 131 (1):227-249.details
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The limits of conceptual analysis.Laura Schroeter - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):425-453.details
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Concepts and conceptual analysis.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):253-282.details
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Two-dimensionalism and natural kind terms.Christian Nimtz - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):125-48.details
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The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 55-140.details
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Two-dimensional semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Ernest LePore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Semantic internalism and externalism.Katalin Farkas - 2005 - In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 323.details
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Qualia that it is right to Quine.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.details
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Wilfrid Sellars, perceptual consciousness, and theory of attention.Paul Coates - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-25.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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The property dualism argument against physicalism.Andrew Botterell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.details
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Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The evidential status of philosophical intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.details
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Let’s be Realistic about Serious Metaphysics.Paul Bloomfield - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):69-90.details
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