- Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
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No Being Sure of Myself.Derek Lam - manuscriptdetails
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Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency.Cory Davia - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):179-196.details
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Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).details
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Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Complacency.Garrett Cullity - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.details
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Epistemic akrasia: No apology required.David Christensen - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):54-76.details
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Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
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Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):343-363.details
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Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
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Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.details
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The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2415-2431.details
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Demographic statistics in defensive decisions.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4833-4850.details
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A deference model of epistemic authority.Sofia Ellinor Bokros - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12041-12069.details
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Lying, hedging, and the norms of assertion.Noah Betz-Richman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Evil and the god of indifference.László Bernáth & Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (3):259-272.details
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What should we believe about the future?Miloud Belkoniene - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2375-2386.details
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The rational dimension of understanding.Miloud Belkoniene - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-16.details
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Normalcy, Understanding and the Problem of Statistical Evidence.Miloud Belkoniene - 2019 - Theoria 85 (3):202-218.details
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Acting Upon Uncertain Beliefs.Miloud Belkoniene & Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (2):253-271.details
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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Epistemology and the law: why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases.Marvin Backes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2759-2778.details
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A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Synthese 196:3773-3787.details
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Moral Encroachment, Wokeness, and the Epistemology of Holding.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):86-100.details
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Defining Wokeness.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (3):321-338.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - unknown - Cambridge University Press | Under Contract.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Mark Walker & Sanford Goldberg (eds.), Philosophy with Attitude. OUP.details
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Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
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Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.details
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact.Paul Silva Jr & Eyal Tal - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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The Puzzle of Plausible Deniability.Andrew Peet - forthcoming - Synthese.details
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Pluralism and Perspectivism in the American Pragmatist Tradition.Matthew Brown - 2019 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag.details
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The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?Rima Basu - 2020 - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 191-210.details
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Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):306-328.details
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Knowledge, Evidence, and Naked Statistics.Sherrilyn Roush - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Legal evidence and knowledge.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
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Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Implicit Bias.Alex Madva - 2020 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (5th Edition). Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 6: The Pattern Stops Here?Guy Axtell - 2019 - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement. Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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n-1 Guilty Men.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In The Future of Normativity. Oxford University Press.details
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