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  1. The inferential constraint and ⌜if φ, ought φ⌝ problem.Una Stojnić - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6).
    The standard semantics for modality, together with the influential restrictor analysis of conditionals (Kratzer, 1986, 2012) renders conditional ought claims like “If John’s stealing, he ought to be stealing” trivially true. While this might seem like a problem specifically for the restrictor analysis, the issue is far more general. Any account must predict that modals in the consequent of a conditional sometimes receive obligatorily unrestricted interpretation, as in the example above, but sometimes appear restricted, as in, e.g., “If John’s speeding, (...)
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  • Conditional and Unconditional Obligation.Kit Fine - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):377-399.
    I present a novel account of unconditional obligation and of its relationship to conditional obligation and bring this account to bear upon Chisholm's puzzle concerning contrary-to duty obligation.
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  • Do de re necessities express semantic rules?Jamie Dreier - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (8):2381-2399.
    Amie Thomasson's Norms and Necessity offers a non-factualist theory of the language of metaphysical necessity, centering on the idea that statements of necessity express semantic norms. This article identifies a potential problem for the view by distinguishing two kinds of conditional necessity, investigates a solution derived from a well-known parallel pair of conditional necessities in deontic logic, but finds it is not up to the job. The last part of the paper suggests a different route, largely in keeping with the (...)
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  • Internalism, Stored Beliefs, and Forgotten Evidence.David James Barnett - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg & Stephen Wright (eds.), Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology.
    An internalist slogan says that justification depends on internal factors. But which factors are those? This paper examines some common motivations favoring internalism over externalism, and says they are compatible with including dispositional and even past mental states in the internal.
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  • Contrastive Consent and Secondary Permissibility.Theron Pummer - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):677-691.
    Consider three cases: -/- Turn: A trolley is about to kill five innocent strangers. You can turn the trolley onto me, saving the five and killing me. -/- Hurl: A trolley is about to kill five innocent strangers. You can hurl me at the trolley, saving the five and paralyzing me. -/- TurnHurl: A trolley is about to kill five innocent strangers. You can turn the trolley onto me, saving the five and killing me. You can instead hurl me at (...)
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  • Imprecise Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Namjoong Kim - 2023 - Foundations of Science 28 (2):755-781.
    According to van Fraassen, inference to the best explanation (IBE) is incompatible with Bayesianism. To argue to the contrary, many philosophers have suggested hybrid models of scientific reasoning with both explanationist and probabilistic elements. This paper offers another such model with two novel features. First, its Bayesian component is imprecise. Second, the domain of credence functions can be extended.
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  • Dilemas deônticos e escolha: considerações pragmáticas.Rafael Testa - 2009 - Revista Brasileira de Filosofia 232:231-246.
    Neste artigo fazemos uma discussão conceitual acerca da ferramenta de escolha por nós apresentada no trabalho “Solving Normative Conflicts using Preference Relations”, isto é, explicitamos a racionalidade subjacente a tal ferramenta, bem como as consequências práticas de sua aceitação.
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  • Solving Normative Conflicts Using Preferences Relations.Rafael Testa - 2008 - CLE E-Prints.
    This article proposes a general strategy to overcome normative conflicts, namely, paradoxes represented in Standard Deontic Logic. This solution is based on preference relations between norms that circumvent situations of conflict. Pragmatic justifications of the proposed method are also given.
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  • Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality.Daniel W. Harris - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (4):1065-1090.
    Some arguments include imperative clauses. For example: ‘Buy me a drink; you can’t buy me that drink unless you go to the bar; so, go to the bar!’ How should we build a logic that predicts which of these arguments are good? Because imperatives aren’t truth apt and so don’t stand in relations of truth preservation, this technical question gives rise to a foundational one: What would be the subject matter of this logic? I argue that declaratives are used to (...)
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  • Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.
    There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a (...)
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  • A Decidable Multi-agent Logic for Reasoning About Actions, Instruments, and Norms.Kees van Berkel, Tim Lyon & Francesco Olivieri - 1996 - In Johan van Benthem (ed.), Logic and argumentation. New York: North-Holland. pp. 219 - 241.
    We formally introduce a novel, yet ubiquitous, category of norms: norms of instrumentality. Norms of this category describe which actions are obligatory, or prohibited, as instruments for certain purposes. We propose the Logic of Agency and Norms (LAN) that enables reasoning about actions, instrumentality, and normative principles in a multi-agent setting. Leveraging LAN , we formalize norms of instrumentality and compare them to two prevalent norm categories: norms to be and norms to do. Last, we pose principles relating the three (...)
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  • Introduction to: Norms, Logics and Information Systems: New Studies on Deontic Logic and Computer Science.Paul McNamara & Henry Prakken - 1999 - In Henry Prakken & Paul McNamara (eds.), Norms, Logics and Information Systems: New Studies on Deontic Logic and Computer Science. Amsterdam/Oxford/Tokyo/Washington DC: IOS Press. pp. 1-14.
    (See also the separate entry for the volume itself.) This introduction has three parts. The first providing an overview of some main lines of research in deontic logic: the emergence of SDL, Chisholm's paradox and the development of dyadic deontic logics, various other puzzles/challenges and areas of development, along with philosophical applications. The second part focus on some actual and potential fruitful interactions between deontic logic, computer science and artificial intelligence. These include applications of deontic logic to AI knowledge representation (...)
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  • Evidential Probabilities and Credences.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1 -23.
    Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...)
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  • Options must be external.Justis Koon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1175-1189.
    Brian Hedden has proposed that any successful account of options for the subjective “ought” must satisfy two constraints: first, it must ensure that we are able to carry out each of the options available to us, and second, it should guarantee that the set of options available to us supervenes on our mental states. In this paper I show that, due to the ever-present possibility of Frankfurt-style cases, these two constraints jointly entail that no agent has any options at any (...)
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  • Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and Transmission Principles.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):98-115.
    Actualists hold that contrary-to-duty scenarios give rise to deontic dilemmas and provide counterexamples to the transmission principle, according to which we ought to take the necessary means to actions we ought to perform. In an earlier article, I have argued, contrary to actualism, that the notion of ‘ought’ that figures in conclusions of practical deliberation does not allow for deontic dilemmas and validates the transmission principle. Here I defend these claims, together with my possibilist account of contrary-to-duty scenarios, against Stephen (...)
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  • Paradoxos da lógica deôntica: Indícios de um equívoco.Ricardo Tavares da Silva - 2017 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 58 (138):673-690.
    RESUMO De acordo com a teoria das funções de verdade, a verdade/falsidade de uma proposição é computável a partir da verdade/falsidade das suas proposições “internas”: para cada proposição há uma função entre valores de verdade. Aplicada a proposições modais, origina a semântica dos mundos possíveis e, aplicada a proposições normativas, origina uma semântica que reduz os conceitos normativos aos conceitos modais, a semântica modal. Esta redução fica posta em questão com a existência dos chamados ‘paradoxos da lógica deôntica’. Estes não (...)
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  • ‘Ought implies Can’ and the law.Chris Fox & Guglielmo Feis - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):370-393.
    In this paper, we investigate the ‘ought implies can’ thesis, focusing on explanations and interpretations of OIC, with a view to clarifying its uses and relevance to legal philosophy. We first review various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of OIC; then we consider how OIC may be incorporated in Hartian and Kelsenian theories of the law. Along the way we also propose a taxonomy of OIC-related claims.
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  • Dynamic Expressivism about Deontic Modality.William B. Starr - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 355-394.
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  • Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations.Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (11):600-626.
    I argue that normative requirements should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known.
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  • Explosion and the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):385-419.
    Logic has traditionally been construed as a normative discipline; it sets forth standards of correct reasoning. Explosion is a valid principle of classical logic. It states that an inconsistent set of propositions entails any proposition whatsoever. However, ordinary agents presumably do — occasionally, at least — have inconsistent belief sets. Yet it is false that such agents may, let alone ought to, believe any proposition they please. Therefore, our logic should not recognize explosion as a logical law. Call this the (...)
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  • New Foundations for Imperative Logic: Pure Imperative Inference.P. B. M. Vranas - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):369-446.
    Imperatives cannot be true, but they can be obeyed or binding: `Surrender!' is obeyed if you surrender and is binding if you have a reason to surrender. A pure declarative argument — whose premisses and conclusion are declaratives — is valid exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is true if the conjunction of its premisses is true; similarly, I suggest, a pure imperative argument — whose premisses and conclusion are imperatives — is obedience-valid (alternatively: bindingness-valid) exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is (...)
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  • Amorality.Dale Dorsey - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):329-342.
    Actions are usually grouped into one of several moral categories. Familiar ones include the morally required, the morally permitted, and the morally prohibited. These categories have been expanded and/or refined to include the supererogatory and the “suberogatory”. Some eschew deontic categories such as the above, but nevertheless allow the existence of two comparative moral categories, i.e., the morally better or morally worse. At the risk of adding to the clutter, I want to explore the possibility of yet a further category, (...)
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  • Dynamic Thoughts on Ifs and Oughts.Malte Willer - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-30.
    A dynamic semantics for iffy oughts offers an attractive alternative to the folklore that Chisholm's paradox enforces an unhappy choice between the intuitive inference rules of factual and deontic detachment. The first part of the story told here shows how a dynamic theory about ifs and oughts gives rise to a nonmonotonic perspective on deontic discourse and reasoning that elegantly removes the air of paradox from Chisholm's puzzle without sacrificing any of the two detachment principles. The second part of the (...)
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  • The Meaning of Imperatives.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):540-555.
    This article surveys a range of current views on the semantics of imperatives, presenting them as more or less conservative with respect to the Truth-Conditional Paradigm in semantics. It describes and critiques views at either extreme of this spectrum: accounts on which the meaning of an imperative is a modal truth-condition, as well as various accounts that attempt to explain imperative meaning without making use of truth-conditions. It briefly describes and encourages further work on a family of views lying somewhere (...)
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  • (1 other version)Deontic Logic.Paul McNamara - 2006 - In Dov Gabbay & John Woods (eds.), The Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 7: Logic and the Modalities in the Twentieth Century. Elsevier Press. pp. 197-288.
    Overview of fundamental work in deontic logic.
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  • The meaning of 'ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 127-160.
    In this paper, I apply the "conceptual role semantics" approach that I have proposed elsewhere (according to which the meaning of normative terms is given by their role in practical reasoning or deliberation) to the meaning of the term 'ought'. I argue that this approach can do three things: It can give an adequate explanation of the special connection that normative judgments have to practical reasoning and motivation for action. It can give an adequate account of why the central principles (...)
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  • Intentions and potential intentions revisited.Xiaocong Fan & John Yen - 2012 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (3):203-230.
    The importance of potential intentions has been demonstrated both in the construction of agent systems and in the formalisation of teamwork behaviour. However, there still lacks an adequate semantics for the notion of potential intentions as introduced by Grosz and Kraus in their SharedPlans framework. In this paper, we give a formal semantics to intentions and potential intentions, drawing upon both the representationalist approach and the accessibility-based approach. The model captures the dynamic relationship among intentions and potential intentions by providing (...)
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  • You Don't Have to Do What's Best! (A problem for consequentialists and other teleologists).S. Andrew Schroeder - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Define teleology as the view that requirements hold in virtue of facts about value or goodness. Teleological views are quite popular, and in fact some philosophers (e.g. Dreier, Smith) argue that all (plausible) moral theories can be understood teleologically. I argue, however, that certain well-known cases show that the teleologist must at minimum assume that there are certain facts that an agent ought to know, and that this means that requirements can't, in general, hold in virtue of facts about value (...)
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  • The Necessity of Metaphysics.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2008 - Dissertation, Durham University
    The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that metaphysics is a necessary discipline -- necessary in the sense that all areas of philosophy, all areas of science, and in fact any type of rational activity at all would be impossible without a metaphysical background or metaphysical presuppositions. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put forward a very simple argument, although I will attempt to construct one. A crucial issue here is what (...)
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  • A New Conventionalist Theory of Promising.Erin Taylor - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):667-682.
    Conventionalists about promising believe that it is wrong to break a promise because the promisor takes advantage of a useful social convention only to fail to do his part in maintaining it. Anti-conventionalists claim that the wrong of breaking a promise has nothing essentially to do with a social convention. Anti-conventionalists are right that the social convention is not necessary to explain the wrong of breaking most promises. But conventionalists are right that the convention plays an essential role in any (...)
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  • A history of AI and Law in 50 papers: 25 years of the international conference on AI and Law. [REVIEW]Trevor Bench-Capon, Michał Araszkiewicz, Kevin Ashley, Katie Atkinson, Floris Bex, Filipe Borges, Daniele Bourcier, Paul Bourgine, Jack G. Conrad, Enrico Francesconi, Thomas F. Gordon, Guido Governatori, Jochen L. Leidner, David D. Lewis, Ronald P. Loui, L. Thorne McCarty, Henry Prakken, Frank Schilder, Erich Schweighofer, Paul Thompson, Alex Tyrrell, Bart Verheij, Douglas N. Walton & Adam Z. Wyner - 2012 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (3):215-319.
    We provide a retrospective of 25 years of the International Conference on AI and Law, which was first held in 1987. Fifty papers have been selected from the thirteen conferences and each of them is described in a short subsection individually written by one of the 24 authors. These subsections attempt to place the paper discussed in the context of the development of AI and Law, while often offering some personal reactions and reflections. As a whole, the subsections build into (...)
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  • Hypothetical imperatives: Scope and jurisdiction.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes From the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    The last few decades have given rise to the study of practical reason as a legitimate subfield of philosophy in its own right, concerned with the nature of practical rationality, its relationship to theoretical rationality, and the explanatory relationship between reasons, rationality, and agency in general. Among the most central of the topics whose blossoming study has shaped this field, is the nature and structure of instrumental rationality, the topic to which Kant has to date made perhaps the largest contribution, (...)
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  • Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
    This paper argues for contrastivism about the deontic modals, 'ought', 'must', and 'may'. A simple contrastivist semantics that predicts the desired entailment relations among these modals is offered.
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  • Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics.Terrance C. McConnell - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):269 - 287.
    A moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent ought to do each of two actions, Both of which he cannot do. If there are genuine moral dilemmas, The ethical theorist is presented with a problem: he must reject several very plausible principles of standard deontic logic. The main reasons usually given to show that there are moral dilemmas are examined, And it is argued that they are not sufficient. Several positive arguments are then presented, Arguments which try to (...)
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  • Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.
    Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and it might not be raining, … ’ sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and I don’t know it, … ’. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals as expressing propositions about the knowledge of some contextually specified individual or group. This paper (...)
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  • Taking Ross's Paradox Seriously A note on the original problems of deontic logic.Sven Danielsson - 2005 - Theoria 71 (1):20-28.
    It is argued that Ross's Paradox in deontic logic is a problem which should be taken seriously, and which can be given a solution which also solves some other wellknown paradoxes and the traditional problems with conditional obligation.
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  • The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic: Alive and Kicking.Jörg Hansen - 2006 - Theoria 72 (3):221-232.
    In a recent paper, Sven Danielsson argued that the ‘original paradoxes' of deontic logic, in particular Ross's paradox and Prior's paradox of derived obligation, can be solved by restricting the modal inheritance rule. I argue that this does not solve the paradoxes.
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  • A Paraconsistentist Approach to Chisholm's Paradox.Marcelo Esteban Coniglio & Newton Marques Peron - 2009 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (3):299-326.
    The Logics of Deontic (In)Consistency (LDI's) can be considered as the deontic counterpart of the paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal (In)Consistency. This paper introduces and studies new LDI's and other paraconsistent deontic logics with different properties: systems tolerant to contradictory obligations; systems in which contradictory obligations trivialize; and a bimodal paraconsistent deontic logic combining the features of previous systems. These logics are used to analyze the well-known Chisholm's paradox, taking profit of the fact that, besides contradictory obligations do (...)
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  • Ewing's Problem.Christian Piller - 2007 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (1):0-0.
    Two plausible claims seem to be inconsistent with each other. One is the idea that if one reasonably believes that one ought to fi, then indeed, on pain of acting irrationally, one ought to fi. The other is the view that we are fallible with respect to our beliefs about what we ought to do. Ewing’s Problem is how to react to this apparent inconsistency. I reject two easy ways out. One is Ewing’s own solution to his problem, which is (...)
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  • The Metaphysical Status of Logic.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2008 - In Michal Peliš (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2007. Filosofia.
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of logic from a metaphysical point of view – what is logic grounded in and what is its relationship with metaphysics. There are three general lines that we can take. 1) Logic and metaphysics are not continuous, neither discipline has no bearing on the other one. This seems to be a rather popular approach, at least implicitly, as philosophers often skip the question altogether and go about their business, be it (...)
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  • Moral dilemmas.Terrance McConnell - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • (1 other version)Deontic logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Against conditional obligation.Daniel Bonevac - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):37-53.
    The crucial feature of obligation sentences to which the puzzles point is that such sentences, and evaluative sentences more generally, are defeasible. They may be warranted, given some information, only to be defeated by further information. A theory that recognizes this no longer needs to see conditional obligation as anything more than a simple combination of unary obligation and the conditional.
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  • Designing normative theories for ethical and legal reasoning: LogiKEy framework, methodology, and tool support.Christoph Benzmüller, Xavier Parent & Leendert van der Torre - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence 287 (C):103348.
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  • Précis of Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency.Christian Barry - 2019 - Ethics and Global Politics 12 (1):5-7.
    In this article I respond to the eight critical essays in this issue that evaluate the claims in my book with Gerhard Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency.
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  • Obligation as Optimal Goal Satisfaction.Robert Kowalski & Ken Satoh - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):579-609.
    Formalising deontic concepts, such as obligation, prohibition and permission, is normally carried out in a modal logic with a possible world semantics, in which some worlds are better than others. The main focus in these logics is on inferring logical consequences, for example inferring that the obligation O q is a logical consequence of the obligations O p and O. In this paper we propose a non-modal approach in which obligations are preferred ways of satisfying goals expressed in first-order logic. (...)
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  • Dynamic Deontic Logic and its Paradoxes.Albert J. J. Anglberger - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (3):427-435.
    In Meyer’s promising account [7] deontic logic is reduced to a dynamic logic. Meyer claims that with his account “we get rid of most (if not all) of the nasty paradoxes that have plagued traditional deontic logic.” But as was shown by van der Meyden in [4], Meyer’s logic also contains a paradoxical formula. In this paper we will show that another paradox can be proven, one which also effects Meyer’s “solution” to contrary to duty obligations and his logic in (...)
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  • Two-phase deontic logic.Leendert Van der Torre & Yao-Hua Tan - 2000 - Logique Et Analyse 43 (171–172):411-456.
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  • Detaching if-clauses from should.Ana Arregui - 2010 - Natural Language Semantics 18 (3):241-293.
    This paper investigates some aspects of the semantics of deontic should-conditionals. The main objective is to understand which actual world facts make deontic statements true. The starting point for the investigation is a famous puzzle known as Chisholm’s Paradox. It is important because making sense of the data in Chisholm-style examples involves arriving at some conclusion regarding the interaction between what we consider ideal and what is actually true. I give an account of how facts affect the evaluation of should (...)
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  • Dyadic deontic logic and semantic tableaux.Daniel Rönnedal - 2009 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 18 (3-4):221-252.
    The purpose of this paper is to develop a class of semantic tableau systems for some dyadic deontic logics. We will consider 16 different pure dyadic deontic tableau systems and 32 different alethic dyadic deontic tableau systems. Possible world semantics is used to interpret our formal languages. Some relationships between our systems and well known dyadic deontic logics in the literature are pointed out and soundness results are obtained for every tableau system. Completeness results are obtained for all 16 pure (...)
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