- Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):665-672.details
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Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.details
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No-Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming.Neil Levy - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (4):487-502.details
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Om betydelsen av evidens av högre ordning.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 39 (1).details
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Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.details
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Third factor explanations and disagreement in metaethics.Michael Klenk - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):427-446.details
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Contagious Blindspots: Formal Ignorance Spreads to Peers.Roy Sorensen - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):335-344.details
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Should Reductive Physicalists Reject the Causal Argument?Bradford Saad - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):263-279.details
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Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.details
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Debunking Biased Thinkers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162.details
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Hierarchies of evidence in evidence-based medicine.Christopher Blunt - 2015 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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(2 other versions)Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 6. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-34.details
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The courage of conviction.Sarah K. Paul - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):1-23.details
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Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against.Andrew Reisner - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 95-114.details
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The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement.Georgi Gardiner - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):83-95.details
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Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
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Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.details
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Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder.Evan Taylor - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (1):73-93.details
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Evidence and Knowledge from Computer Simulation.Wendy S. Parker - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1521-1538.details
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Evidence and fallibility.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):39-55.details
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Discussion of James Pryor's “The Merits of Incoherence”.Ori Beck, Anil Gupta, Adrian Haddock, James Pryor & Declan Smithies - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):142-148.details
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Fallibility and Normativity.DiPaolo Joshua - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherstdetails
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(1 other version)On the supposed dilemma of conciliationism.Stefan Reining - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):305-328.details
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Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Scepticism.Nathan Ballantyne - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):752-765.details
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Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities.Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.details
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(1 other version)On the Supposed Dilemma of Conciliationism.Stefan Reining - 2015 - Episteme:1-24.details
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Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Arsenault & Zachary C. Irving - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):185-194.details
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(1 other version)Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account.Anna Boncompagni - 2024 - Episteme 21 (1):286-303.details
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Conservative Treatment of Evidence.Alireza Fatollahi - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):568-583.details
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Disagreement, the Independence Thesis, and the Value of Repeated Reasoning.Ethan Brauer - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3):494-510.details
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Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1753-1766.details
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Bayesianism and self-doubt.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2225-2243.details
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The epistemic significance of political disagreement.Bjørn G. Hallsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2187-2202.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
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Coherence, evidence, and legal proof.Amalia Amaya - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (1):1-43.details
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Undermining, circularity, and disagreement.Andrew Rotondo - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):563-584.details
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Following the argument where it leads.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):105-124.details
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Rationality and Higher-order Awareness.Scott Sturgeon - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (1):78-98.details
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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel.Claire Field - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):724-733.details
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(1 other version)Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. ix + 217. [REVIEW]Claire Field - 2021 - Mind 130.details
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The Right Side of History and Higher-Order Evidence.Adam Green - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):1-15.details
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A non-probabilist principle of higher-order reasoning.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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An optimality-argument for equal weighting.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1543-1563.details
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The Transmission of Understanding.Adam Green - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (1):43-61.details
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Imprecise probability in epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitatdetails
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Reply to Kriegel, Smithies, and Spener.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1195-1206.details
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Religious Belief, Occurrent Thought, and Reasonable Disagreement: A Response to Tim Crane.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 65 (4):438-446.details
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