- What is it like to be the Metaphysical Subject? An Essay on Early Wittgenstein, our Epistemic Position, and Beyond.Konrad Werner - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):921-946.details
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A Short History of the Philosophy of Consciousness in the Twentieth Century.Tim Crane - 2017 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge.details
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Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability.Alexander Carruth - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):25–46.details
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Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.details
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The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.details
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(1 other version)Načelo vezanosti, Searle i nesvjesna intencionalnost.Tomislav Janovic & Davor Pecnjak - 2007 - Prolegomena 6 (1):29-43.details
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Metaphysically explanatory unification.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1659-1683.details
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Why phenomenal content is not intentional.Howard Robinson - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):79-93.details
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Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.details
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There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.details
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Emergence in Mind (Mind Association Occasional Series) . Edited by Cynthia and Macdonald. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 288 pages ISBN 13: 978-0-19-958362-1. [REVIEW]Elly Vintiadis - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (4):603-610.details
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The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings.Panu Raatikainen - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:1-13.details
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What is the Problem of Non-Existence?Tim Crane - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.details
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Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.details
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Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.details
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Uomini, topi e formiche: riflessioni sulla scienza cognitiva1 (bozza).Carlo Penco - 2005 - In Fondazione Devoto (ed.), Cultura umanistica e cultura scientifica.details
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On the what-it-is-like-Ness of experience.Paul Snowdon - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):8-27.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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(1 other version)Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-110.details
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Consequences of schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.details
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(1 other version)Event concepts.Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi - 2008 - In Thomas F. Shipley & Jeff Zacks (eds.), Understanding Events: From Perception to Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 31�54.details
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The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.details
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Mental causation, interventions, and contrasts (2006).Panu Raatikainen - details
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Two conceptions of conceptualism and nonconceptualism.T. M. Crowther - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.details
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(1 other version)Davidson's externalism and swampman's troublesome biography.Andre Leclerc - 2005 - Principia 9 (1-2):159-175.details
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(1 other version)Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):237-256.details
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Illusions in speech sound and voice perception.Anna Drożdżowicz - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Intentionality as intentional inexistence.Laura Gow - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1371-1385.details
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Husserl, representationalism, and the theory of phenomenal intentionality.Chang Liu - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):67-84.details
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Lessons from Blur.Giulia Martina - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Kwame Gyekye as a Pan-Psychist.Adá Agadá - 2022 - Philosophia Africana 21 (1):28-44.details
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The problem of presentations: how it is that one object is perceptually given in multiple ways.Konrad Werner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-25.details
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A Neo-Searlean Theory of Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (7):475-495.details
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Relationality of intentionality.Mohammad Saleh Zarepour - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-24.details
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I See Not Only a Madonna, but Also a Hole, in the Picture.Alberto Voltolini - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):224-239.details
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Ramsification and the Ramifications of Prior's Puzzle.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):935-961.details
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Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.Konrad Werner - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1725-1751.details
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(1 other version)Sobre el aporte de la filosofía a las teorías de conceptos en ciencia cognitiva.Bernardo Aguilera & R. Bernardo Pino - 2019 - Revista de Filosofía 76:7-27.details
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Hylomorphism, Intentionality, and Prior's Puzzle.Andrew Younan - 2021 - New Blackfriars 102 (1098):174-188.details
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Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrew D. Thomas - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1197-1208.details
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Patterns, Noise, and Beliefs.Lajos Ludovic Brons - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):19-51.details
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Are only mental phenomena intentional?Anders Nes - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):205-215.details
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The Little Word “as.” On Making Contexts and Aspects Explicit.Konrad Werner - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (1):69-90.details
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(1 other version)Kim on Causation and Mental Causation.Panu Raatikainen - 2018 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 25 (2):22–47.details
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Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.details
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How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):661-686.details
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The Knowledge Argument is an Argument about Knowledge.Tim Crane - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Architecture of Belief: An Essay on the Unbearable Automaticity of Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2010 - Dissertation, Unc-Chapel Hilldetails
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(2 other versions)The Nonconceptual in Concept Acquisition.Ángel García Rodríguez - 2009 - Theoria 22 (1):93-110.details
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What is Wrong with Self-Grounding?David Mark Kovacs - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1157-1180.details
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