- Empfindungen–Skizze eines nicht-reduktiven, holistischen Verständnisses.Jan Slaby - 2007 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 32 (3):207-225.details
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The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.details
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Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.details
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There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.details
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Emergence in Mind (Mind Association Occasional Series) . Edited by Cynthia and Macdonald. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 288 pages ISBN 13: 978-0-19-958362-1. [REVIEW]Elly Vintiadis - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (4):603-610.details
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Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.details
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The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings.Panu Raatikainen - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:1-13.details
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Identity, Asymmetry, and the Relevance of Meanings for Models of Reduction.Raphael van Riel - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):747-761.details
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What is the Problem of Non-Existence?Tim Crane - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.details
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Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.details
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Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.details
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Reply to Tanney.T. Crane - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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(1 other version)Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-110.details
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Consequences of schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.details
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(1 other version)Event concepts.Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi - 2008 - In Thomas F. Shipley & Jeff Zacks (eds.), Understanding Events: From Perception to Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 31�54.details
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In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.details
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Intentionality and the externalism versus internalism debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (S2):45-53.details
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Causation, exclusion, and the special sciences.Panu Raatikainen - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (3):349-363.details
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Sensory experience and intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.details
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Reply to Nes.Tim Crane - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):215–218.details
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Against propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.details
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The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.details
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Mental causation, interventions, and contrasts (2006).Panu Raatikainen - details
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Representation and constraints: The inverse problem and the structure of visual space.Gary Hatfield - 2003 - Acta Psychologica 114:355-378.details
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(1 other version)Disjunctivism about visual experience.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 112--143.details
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(1 other version)Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
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Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist.Pete Mandik - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.details
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(2 other versions)Intentionality and Emotion: Comment on Hutto.Tim Crane - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative : Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. John Benjamins. pp. 107-119.details
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(3 other versions)Is There a Perceptual Relation?Tim Crane - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 126-146.details
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Intentionality as intentional inexistence.Laura Gow - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1371-1385.details
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Deeper into Brentano’s mind: response to critics.Mark Textor - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1440-1462.details
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The Strange Case of Dr. Moloch and Mr. Snazzo (or the Parmenides’ Riddle Once Again).Alberto Voltolini - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (4):54.details
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Husserl, representationalism, and the theory of phenomenal intentionality.Chang Liu - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):67-84.details
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Lessons from Blur.Giulia Martina - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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The problem of presentations: how it is that one object is perceptually given in multiple ways.Konrad Werner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-25.details
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Crane and the mark of the mental.Andrea Raimondi - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):683-693.details
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An equivocation in the simple argument for downward causation.Matthew Rellihan - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):249-256.details
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Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski.Casey Woodling - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):312-324.details
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Is so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality?Elisabetta Sacchi - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (4):687-710.details
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Self-Esteem, Social Esteem, and Pride.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Emotion Review 12 (3):193-205.details
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Physicalism without supervenience.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1529-1544.details
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Ramsification and the Ramifications of Prior's Puzzle.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):935-961.details
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(1 other version)Sobre el aporte de la filosofía a las teorías de conceptos en ciencia cognitiva.Bernardo Aguilera & R. Bernardo Pino - 2019 - Revista de Filosofía 76:7-27.details
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Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (4):479-505.details
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Qualia.David Villena Saldaña - 2016 - Escritura y Pensamiento 39 (39):79-103.details
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Consciousness.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Heather Salazar (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind. Rebus Foundation Publishing. pp. 41-48.details
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Hylomorphism, Intentionality, and Prior's Puzzle.Andrew Younan - 2021 - New Blackfriars 102 (1098):174-188.details
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Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrew D. Thomas - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1197-1208.details
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