- Investigating Emotions as Functional States Distinct From Feelings.Ralph Adolphs & Daniel Andler - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (3):191-201.details
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Towards a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility.Benjamin Matheson - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):458-480.details
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Tolerant enactivist cognitive science.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):226-244.details
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Why think that the brain is not a computer?Marcin Miłkowski - 2016 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 16 (2):22-28.details
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Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.details
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Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.details
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Neo-sentimentalism and the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions.Chun Nam Chan - unknowndetails
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Ordinary Language, Conventionalism and a priori Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):315-325.details
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XII—Is There a Problem of Other Minds?Anil Gomes - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.details
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(1 other version)On Knowing Our Own Minds.Michael McKinsey - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107-116.details
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(1 other version)Causation in the Argument for Anomalous Monism.Steven Yalowitz - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):183-226.details
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The Primacy of Knowledge: A Critical Survey of Timothy Williamson's Views on Knowledge, Assertion and Scepticism.Heine A. Holmen - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Oslodetails
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Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):45-69.details
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Monsters Among Us.Timothy Schroeder - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):167-184.details
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Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.details
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Why broad content can’t influence behaviour.Cressida Gaukroger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3005–3020.details
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Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism.Uwe Peters - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):273–288.details
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Swamp Mary’s revenge: deviant phenomenal knowledge and physicalism.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):231-247.details
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Memory as acquaintance with the past: some Lessons from Russell, 1912-1914.Paulo Faria - 2010 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 51 (121):149-172.details
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Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):317-336.details
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Coordination, Triangulation, and Language Use.Josh Armstrong - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):80-112.details
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In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman.Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2987–3001.details
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Epistemological Problems of Perception.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Sensorimotor Theory and Enactivism.Jan Degenaar & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):393-407.details
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Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions.Robin Stenwall - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):59-76.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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Referenz und Fallibilismus: zu Hilary Putnams pragmatischem Kognitivismus.Axel Mueller - 2001 - New York: ISSN.details
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Naturalistic Theories of Life after Death.Eric Steinhart - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):145-158.details
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Warranted religion: answering objections to Alvin Plantinga's epistemology.Tyler Dalton Mcnabb - 2015 - Religious Studies 51 (4):477-495.details
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The idols of inner-sense.Chad Kidd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1759-1782.details
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If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.details
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Was evolution the only possible way for God to make autonomous creatures? Examination of an argument in evolutionary theodicy.Mats Wahlberg - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):37-51.details
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The creative aspect of language use and the implications for linguistic science.Eran Asoulin - 2013 - Biolinguistics 7:228-248.details
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Justification is potential knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.details
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Transcendental Arguments and Realism.Thomas Grundmann & Catrin Misselhorn - 2003 - In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 205--218.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Towards an ecology of mind.George Butterworth - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):31-32.details
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Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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Language equals mimesis plus speech.Aarre Laakso - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):765-766.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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The good of non-sentient entities: Organisms, artifacts, and synthetic biology.John Basl & Ronald Sandler - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):697-705.details
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Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
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(1 other version)Précis of Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture and cognition.Merlin Donald - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):737-748.details
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Do Composite Objects Have an Age in Relativistic Spacetime?Yuri Balashov - 2012 - Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):9-23.details
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Re-organizing organizational accounts of function.Marc Artiga - 2011 - Applied ontology 6 (2):105-124.details
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