- Representationalism, Inversion and Color Constancy.Renée Smith - 2007 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):1-15.details
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Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.Paul Skokowski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):287-299.details
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Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain?Paul Skokowski - 2007 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):58-71.details
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I, zombie.Paul Skokowski - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):1-9.details
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What feelings can't do.Laura Sizer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.details
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Maximality and microphysical supervenience.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.details
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The unity of moral attitudes: recipe semantics and credal exaptation.Derek Shiller - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):425-446.details
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Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael K. Shim - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.details
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What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846.details
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Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation?Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Marc Artiga - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):81-94.details
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Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism.William Seager - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:217-237.details
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Distinguishing the senses.Michael Scott - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.details
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Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis.Richard Schantz - 2015 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 18 (1):129-159.details
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The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.details
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The represented object of color experience.Elizabeth Schier - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):1 – 27.details
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The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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Reticence of visual phenomenal character: A spatial interpretation of transparency.Robert Schroer - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):393-414.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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Propositional attitudes.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.details
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On the content of experience.Timothy Schroeder & Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590–611.details
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Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.details
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Knowing Your Own Beliefs.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):41-62.details
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If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.details
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Environmental representationalists on afterimages and phosphenes: Putting our best foot forward.Robert Schroer - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):531-546.details
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Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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The hybrid contents of memory.André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1263-1290.details
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Perception Pragmatized: a Pragmatic Reconciliation of Representationalism and Relationalism.André Sant’Anna - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):411-432.details
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Episodic Memory as a Propositional Attitude: A Critical Perspective.André Sant'Anna - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):210-232.details
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Spatial experience, spatial reality, and two paths to primitivism.Bradford Saad - 2019 - Synthese 199 (2):469-491.details
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SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation.Dan Ryder - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):211-240.details
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Representation and mental representation.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225.details
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Qualia and the Senses.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.details
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The location problem for color subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.details
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The Genealogy of Content or the Future of an Illusion.Alex Rosenberg - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):537-547.details
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Fitting color into the physical world.Peter W. Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599.details
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Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.details
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Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):206-223.details
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Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1071-1087.details
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The ins and outs of introspection.Philip Robbins - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.details
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Red is the Hardest Problem.William S. Robinson - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):5-16.details
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Hidden Nature Physicalism.William S. Robinson - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):71-89.details
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Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.details
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We Are Not All ‘Self-Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism.Georges Rey - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.details
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What is an altered state of consciousness?Antti Revonsuo, Sakari Kallio & Pilleriin Sikka - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):187 – 204.details
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Inverted Earth Revisited.Huiming Ren - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1093-1107.details
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Content, Consciousness, and Cambridge Change.Matthew Rellihan - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):325-345.details
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A Kantian stance on the intentional stance.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.details
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