- Nozick's experience machine is dead, long live the experience machine!Dan Weijers - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):513-535.details
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Desire Satisfactionism and the Problem of Irrelevant Desires.Mark Lukas - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (2):1-25.details
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Subjectivists Should Say Pain Is Bad Because of How It Feels.Jennifer Hawkins - 2022 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46:137-164.details
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Effort and Achievement.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (1):27-51.details
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Well-being.Roger Crisp - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Defense of Basic Prudential Hedonism.Joe Nelson - 2020 - Dissertation, Duke Universitydetails
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Well-Being as Harmony.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2020 - In David Kaspar (ed.), Explorations in Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 117-140.details
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A Socratic Essentialist Defense of Non-Verbal Definitional Disputes.Kathrin Koslicki & Olivier Massin - 2023 - Ratio (4):1-15.details
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The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies & Alexander Dietz - 2023 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Folk Concept of the Good Life: Neither Happiness nor Well-Being.Markus Kneer & Dan Haybron - manuscriptdetails
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Do Good Lives Make Good Stories?Amy Berg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):637-659.details
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Emotional Experience and the Senses.Lorenza D'Angelo - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (20).details
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Classifying theories of welfare.Christopher Woodard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):787-803.details
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Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism: Action Guidance and Moral intuitions.Simon Rosenqvist - 2020 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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The unpleasantness of pain.Abraham Sapien - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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The Normative Significance of Temporal Well-Being.Connie S. Rosati - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):125-139.details
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On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.details
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La explicación evolutiva: Los límites de las teorías del deseo cerca de lo desagradable.Abraham Sapién - 2018 - Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 23 (3).details
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What is Good for Spock? A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism.Isaac Shur - 2019 - Ephemeris 19:46-57.details
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Virtual Consumption, Sustainability & Human Well-Being.Kenneth R. Pike & C. Tyler Desroches - 2020 - Environmental Values 29 (3):361-378.details
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Lopsided Lives.Theron Pummer - 2017 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296.details
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Hybrid Theories.Christopher Woodard - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 161-174.details
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Can Parfit’s Appeal to Incommensurabilities Block the Continuum Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion?Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2019 - In Paul Bowman & Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (eds.), Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations, Vol. 1. Institute for Futures Studies.details
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Fitting Inconsistency and Reasonable Irresolution.Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2018 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge. pp. 27-59.details
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Emotions and Their Correctness Conditions: A Defense of Attitudinalism.Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Taking Pleasure in the Good and Well-Being: the Harmless Pleasures Objection.James J. Delaney - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):281-294.details
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Is pleasure all that is good about experience?Willem Deijl - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1-19.details
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Is it wrong to impose the Harms of human life? A reply to Benatar.David DeGrazia - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):317-331.details
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Hedonism reconsidered.Roger Crisp - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.details
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Narrative, Self-Realization, and the Shape of a Life.Samuel Clark - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):371-385.details
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Experienced Utility or Decision Utility for QALY Calculation? Both.Paige A. Clayton & Douglas P. MacKay - 2018 - Public Health Ethics 11 (1):82-89.details
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Prudential well-being in the ethics of Epicurus.Carlos Carrasco Meza - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (167):57-80.details
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Bienestar prudencial en la ética de Epicuro.Carlos Gustavo Carrasco Meza - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (167):57-80.details
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When the Shape of a Life Matters.Stephen M. Campbell - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3): 565-75.details
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Well-Being and the Good Death.Stephen M. Campbell - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3):607-623.details
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Is Epistemic Anxiety an Intellectual Virtue?Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-25.details
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Unknown pleasures.Ben Bramble - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1333-1344.details
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The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.details
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Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111-130.details
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Constructivist experimental philosophy on well-being and virtue.Matthew Braddock - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):295-323.details
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A paradox for some theories of welfare.Ben Bradley - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):45 - 53.details
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Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure.Thomas A. Blackson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):277-291.details
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The psychologically rich life.Lorraine L. Besser & Shigehiro Oishi - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1053-1071.details
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The Possibility of Modified Hedonism.Sandy Berkovski - 2012 - Theoria 78 (3):186-212.details
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What's Wrong with the Experience Machine?Christopher Belshaw - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):573-592.details
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Machines as Moral Patients We Shouldn’t Care About : The Interests and Welfare of Current Machines.John Basl - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):79-96.details
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Nozick’s Experience Machine and palliative care: revisiting hedonism. [REVIEW]Y. Michael Barilan - 2009 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (4):399-407.details
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How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.details
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Are subjective measures of well-being ‘direct’?Erik Angner - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):115-130.details
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