- Conservatism and Uniqueness.Jaemin Jung - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2233-2248.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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Religious disagreements and epistemic rationality.David M. Holley - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):33-48.details
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Is it Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.details
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Epistemological depth in a GM crops controversy.Daniel Hicks - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 50:1-12.details
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Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus.Leah Henderson - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (3):359-382.details
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Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaz Potrc & Hannah Tierney - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):194-225.details
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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.details
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Entitlement and mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Episteme (1):1-25.details
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Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):1-21.details
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Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - forthcoming - Synthese 197:1-18.details
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Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8289-8306.details
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The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement.Georgi Gardiner - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):83-95.details
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Toleration as the Balance Between Liberty and Security.Anna Elisabetta Galeotti & Federica Liveriero - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (2):161-179.details
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The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.details
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Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?Bryan Frances - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):325-345.details
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What is the “Equal Weight View'?Branden Fitelson & David Jehle - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):280-293.details
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Evidence of evidence is not (necessarily) evidence.Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):85-88.details
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When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):142-156.details
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Can Religious and Secular Belief be Rationally Combined?Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82 (3):299-319.details
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An optimality-argument for equal weighting.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1543-1563.details
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Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements.Dunja Šešelja - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6143-6158.details
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Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.details
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Simulating peer disagreements.Igor Douven - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):148-157.details
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The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - Religious Studies 56 (3):390-408.details
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Resolving Religious Disagreements.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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The Scope and Limits of Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Shang Long Yeo - 2020 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Optimizing Political Influence: A Jury Theorem with Dynamic Competence and Dependence.Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.details
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Ethics and Epistemic Hopelessness.James Fritz - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):977–1005.details
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A Bayesian Solution to Hallsson's Puzzle.Thomas Mulligan - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):1914-1927.details
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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A Hybrid Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Connecticutdetails
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Religious Disagreement and Rational Demotion.Michael Bergmann - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 6:21-57.details
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Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The epistemology of religion.Peter Forrest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Pluralism and Deliberation.Matteo Bianchin - 2020 - In Volker Kaul & Ingrid Salvatore (eds.), What is Pluralism? London: Routledge. pp. 31-47.details
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The Problems with the Burdens of Judgment.Gozde Hussain - 2018 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 8 (1):155-192.details
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Editor's Introduction.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge.details
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Is it OK to Make Mistakes? Appraisal and False Normative Belief.Claire Field - 2019 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia.details
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When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds for Withholding.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Angles, New Arguments. Routledge.details
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Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 15-54.details
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Overcoming Expert Disagreement In A Delphi Process. An Exercise In Reverse Epistemology.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (28).details
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