- Debunking Debunked? : Challenges, Prospects, and the Threat of Self-Defeat.Conrad Bakka - 2023 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Moral Relativism, Metalinguistic Negotiation, and the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Katharina Anna Sodoma - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1621-1641.details
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The Reasons Aggregation Theorem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 12:127-148.details
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A Plea for Prudence.James L. D. Brown - 2023 - Analysis 83 (2):394-404.details
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Pleasure is goodness; morality is universal.Neil Sinhababu - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
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A defence of the evolutionary debunking argument.Man Him Ip - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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The Duality of Moral Language : On Hybrid Theories in Metaethics.Stina Björkholm - 2022 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
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Attributivism.Casey Sean Elliott - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Metalinguistic negotiations in moral disagreement.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):352-380.details
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Debunking What?Hallvard Lillehammer - 2023 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Conceptual Ethics and The Methodology of Normative Inquiry.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 274-303.details
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Robust Normativity, Morality, and Legal Positivism.David Plunkett - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 105-136.details
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Value, Fittingness and Partiality : On the Partiality Problem for Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value.Nils Sylvan - 2021 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Attitude and Social Rules, or Why It's Okay to Slurp Your Soup.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (28).details
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Rules of Use.Indrek Reiland - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):566-583.details
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Quasi-Naturalism and the Problem of Alternative Normative Concepts.Camil Golub - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (5):474-500.details
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Empirical Conceptual Analysis: An Exposition.Hristo Valchev - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):757-776.details
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Linguistic Mistakes.Indrek Reiland - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2191-2206.details
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Explaining Normative Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.details
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Consequences of Comparability.Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel & Jake Zuehl - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):70-98.details
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Representation, Deflationism, and the Question of Realism.Camil Golub - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7.details
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Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse.Pekka Vayrynen - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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Distinctively Political Normativity in Political Realism: Unattractive or Redundant.Eva Erman & Niklas Möller - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (3):433-447.details
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All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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Naturalizing the contributory.Philip Fox - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6275-6298.details
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De Dicto Cognitive Reason Contextualism.Saleh Afroogh - unknowndetails
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Reasons As Evidence Against Ought-Nots.Kok Yong Lee - 2021 - Philosophical Papers 49 (3):431-455.details
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Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts).Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30):1-16.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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What might but must not be.Stephen Finlay & Benjamin Lennertz - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):647-656.details
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Which Reasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.details
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Probabilistic promotion and ability.Luke Elson - unknowndetails
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Indeterminacy and Normativity.Giulia Pravato - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2119-2141.details
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The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.details
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Compositional Semantics and Normative ‘Ought’.Joanna Klimczyk - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):381-399.details
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Are There Moral Truths?Bart Streumer - manuscriptdetails
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Ought, Agents and Ambiguity that Matters.Joanna Klimczyk - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne 31 (2):113-138.details
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Protest and Speech Act Theory.Matthew Chrisman & Graham Hubbs - 2021 - In Rebecca Mason (ed.), Hermeneutical Injustice. Routledge. pp. 179-192.details
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A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
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Socratic reductionism in ethics.Nicholas Smyth - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):970-985.details
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Normative metaphysics for accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):363-384.details
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Naturalism and normative cognition.Matthew S. Bedke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):147-167.details
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Der Metaethische Konativismus: Versuch einer Neubelebung.Stefan Fischer - 2018 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 1 (1):27-56.details
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Desiring Under the Proper Guise.Michael Milona & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14. Oxford University Press. pp. 121-143.details
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Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist.Alex Murphy - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):53-69.details
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Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language By Stephen Finlay.Stephen Finlay - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):99-101.details
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Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases.Michael Milona & Hichem Naar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3071-3096.details
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Communities of Judgment : Towards a Teleosemantic Theory of Moral Thought and Discourse.Karl Bergman - 2019 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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