- In Defense of an End-Relational Account of Goodness.Brian Coffey - 2014 - Dissertation, University of California, Davisdetails
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Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):459-484.details
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Footing the Cost (of Normative Subjectivism).Jack Woods - 2018 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge.details
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Subjective Disagreement.Beddor Bob - 2018 - Noûs 53 (4):819-851.details
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Weak and Strong Necessity Modals: On Linguistic Means of Expressing "A Primitive Concept OUGHT".Alex Silk - 2021 - In Billy Dunaway & David Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes From the Work of Allan Gibbard. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Maize Books. pp. 203-245.details
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Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1263-1290.details
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Needing and Necessity.Guy Fletcher - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 170-192.details
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Neutralité scientifique.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2018 - Encyclopédie Philosophique.details
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The sense of incredibility in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):93-115.details
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'Must', 'Ought' and the Structure of Standards.Gunnar Björnsson & Robert Shanklin - 2016 - In Olivier Roy, Allard Tamminga & Malte Willer (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. London, UK: College Publications. pp. 33–48.details
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Moral Steadfastness and Meta-ethics.James Fritz & Tristram McPherson - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):43-56.details
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The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Disagreement Lost and Found.Stephen Finlay - 2017 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. Oxford University Press. pp. 187-205.details
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Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.details
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Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - 2018 - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-86.details
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Conceptual Analysis in Metaethics.N. G. Laskowski & Stephen Finlay - 2016 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 536-551.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):209-229.details
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Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Non-Naturalism and Reference.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-24.details
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Deflationary Pluralism about Motivating Reasons.Daniel Fogal - 2017 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2017 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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How to embed an epistemic modal: Attitude problems and other defects of character.Alex Silk - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1773-1799.details
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(1 other version)Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Kurt Sylvan - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.details
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Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.details
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Deontic Modals and Probability: One Theory to Rule Them All?Fabrizio Cariani - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons, Reason, and Context.Daniel Fogal - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Is Knowledge Normative?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):379-395.details
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Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk.Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 243-259.details
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In defence of good simpliciter.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1371-1391.details
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The Norm of Belief. [REVIEW]Allan Hazlett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):272-275.details
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Non-Analytical Naturalism and the Nature of Normative Thought: A Reply to Parfit.Nicholas Laskowski - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (1):1-5.details
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Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):419-436.details
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Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?Daan Evers & Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-9.details
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'Ought': OUT OF ORDER.Stephen Finlay - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement, correctness, and the evidence for metaethical absolutism.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Naturalism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2015 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 351-368.details
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Contrastive Reasons and Promotion.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):39-63,.details
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Contextualism in Ethics.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Debunking Debunked? : Challenges, Prospects, and the Threat of Self-Defeat.Conrad Bakka - 2023 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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The Duality of Moral Language : On Hybrid Theories in Metaethics.Stina Björkholm - 2022 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Attitude and Social Rules, or Why It's Okay to Slurp Your Soup.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (28).details
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Distinctively Political Normativity in Political Realism: Unattractive or Redundant.Eva Erman & Niklas Möller - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (3):433-447.details
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(1 other version)Desiring Under the Proper Guise.Michael Milona & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14. Oxford University Press. pp. 121-143.details
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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A User’s Guide to Hybrid Tools.Caleb Perl - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):129-158.details
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Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 488. $45.00 .Singer, Peter, ed. Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 288. $45.00. [REVIEW]Nicholas Laskowski - 2018 - Ethics 128 (2):496-505.details
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The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk.Gunnar Björnsson - 2016 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 275-291.details
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