- Ontology of Divinity.Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.) - 2024 - De Gruyter.details
|
|
Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):523-539.details
|
|
Groups that fly blind.Jared Peterson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-24.details
|
|
Mental Imagery and the Epistemology of Testimony.Daniel Munro - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):428-449.details
|
|
An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3831-3863.details
|
|
Dualism all the way down: why there is no paradox of phenomenal judgment.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
|
|
Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
|
|
Animalism is Either False of Uninteresting (Perhaps Both).Matt Duncan - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):187-200.details
|
|
Introspection of Emotions.Bertille De Vlieger & Anna Giustina - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3):551-580.details
|
|
The Limits of the Doxastic.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. OUP. pp. 36-57.details
|
|
Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.details
|
|
Critical Reasoning and the Inferential Transparency Method.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):23-42.details
|
|
Being Familiar with What One Wants.Uku Tooming - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):690-710.details
|
|
The value of privileged access.Jared Peterson - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):365-378.details
|
|
Remembering the Past and Imagining the Actual.Daniel Munro - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2).details
|
|
Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
|
|
Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
|
|
Respuesta a Sebastián: en defensa de la naturaleza de las creencias de primera persona.Javier Vidal - 2018 - Critica 50 (150):65-89.details
|
|
Confabulation does not undermine introspection for propositional attitudes.Adam J. Andreotta - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4851-4872.details
|
|
A new argument for the phenomenal approach to personal persistence.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2031-2049.details
|
|
Kant, the transcendental designation of I, and the direct reference theory.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1): 31-49.details
|
|
The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):916-935.details
|
|
Knowledge exclusion and the rationality of belief.Sean Donahue - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):402-410.details
|
|
Interpretivism and norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930.details
|
|
A New Understanding of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives.Alla Choifer - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (3):333-371.details
|
|
Knowledge of things.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3559-3592.details
|
|
Assertion and transparent self-knowledge.Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):873-889.details
|
|
Unendorsed Beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):49-68.details
|
|
(1 other version)Reasoning and Self-Knowledge.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (1):33-55.details
|
|
Modes of Introspective Access: a Pluralist Approach.Adriana Renero - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):823-844.details
|
|
If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
|
|
Reasoning, rational requirements, and occurrent attitudes.Wooram Lee - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1343-1357.details
|
|
Just Another Article on Moore’s Paradox, But We Don’t Believe That.Iskra Fileva & Linda A. W. Brakel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5153-5167.details
|
|
Remembering with and without Memory: A Theory of Memory and Aspects of Mind that Enable its Experience.Stan Klein - 2018 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 5:117-130.details
|
|
Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264.details
|
|
Transparency and Partial Beliefs.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):153-166.details
|
|
The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.details
|
|
Knowing Things in Themselves.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):332-358.details
|
|
Occurrent states.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):1-17.details
|
|
Basic self-knowledge and transparency.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):679-696.details
|
|
Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.details
|
|
Knowing our degrees of belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.details
|
|
Infallibility, Acquaintance, and Phenomenal Concepts.Wolfgang Barz - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):139-168.details
|
|
Revelation and physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.details
|
|
Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism.Brie Gertler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):91-109.details
|
|
How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.details
|
|
Why implicit attitudes are (probably) not beliefs.Alex Madva - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).details
|
|