- Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):597-645.details
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More on 'A Liar Paradox'.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.details
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(1 other version)Significatividade e verdade.Celso R. Braida - 2002 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 43 (105):43-66.details
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Syntactic interpretations of truth and semantic underdetermination.Timothy McCarthy - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):37 – 50.details
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An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 33 (1):1--21.details
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Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic.Carl Jockusch - 1992 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1):352-365.details
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Self-reference and gödel's theorem: A Husserlian analysis. [REVIEW]Albert Johnstone - 2003 - Husserl Studies 19 (2):131-151.details
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The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.details
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Property theory: The Type-Free Approach v. the Church Approach.George Bealer - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (2):139 - 171.details
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(1 other version)Significatividade e verdade.Celso R. Braida - 2002 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 43 (105):43-66.details
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Complexity, Hypersets, and the Ecological Perspective on Perception-Action.Anthony Chemero & M. T. Turvey - 2007 - Biological Theory 2 (1):23-36.details
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A Contingent Russell's Paradox.Francesco Orilia - 1996 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):105-111.details
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(1 other version)A System Of Complete And Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (3):311-327.details
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(1 other version)A System of Complete and Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):311--27.details
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A theory of truth based on a medieval solution to the liar paradox.Richard L. Epstein - 1992 - History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):149-177.details
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(1 other version)The Liar Parody.Don S. Levi - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (243):43-62.details
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Procedural Semantics and its Relevance to Paradox.Elbert Booij - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-24.details
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How to Conquer the Liar and Enthrone the Logical Concept of Truth.Boris Culina - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):1-31.details
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An Introduction to Gupta's Acceptable Models.Ming Hsiung - manuscriptdetails
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Paradoxicality in Kripke’s theory of truth.Lucas Rosenblatt & Camila Gallovich - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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Supervaluations debugged.Nicholas Asher, Josh Dever & Chris Pappas - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):901-933.details
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Conjunctive paraconsistency.Franca D’Agostini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6845-6874.details
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Truth and Subjunctive Theories of Knwledge: No Luck?Johannes Stern - manuscriptdetails
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Self-reference and Chaos in Fuzzy Logic.Patrick Grim - 1993 - IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems 1:237-253.details
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An Observation about Truth.David Kashtan - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Jerusalemdetails
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Notes on Leitgeb’s What Truth Depends on.Edoardo Rivello - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (6):1235-1262.details
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Unity, truth and the liar: the modern relevance of medieval solutions to the liar paradox.Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo & Emmanuel Genot (eds.) - 2008 - New York: Springer.details
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Some Open Questions about Degrees of Paradoxes.Ming Hsiung - manuscriptdetails
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Does truth behave like a classical concept when there is no vicious reference?Philip Kremer - unknowndetails
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Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.details
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Truth and Generalized Quantification.Bruno Whittle - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):340-353.details
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The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.details
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What Paradoxes Depend on.Ming Hsiung - 2018 - Synthese:1-27.details
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Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite Verdicts.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):11-35.details
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Contraction and revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.details
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Jump Liars and Jourdain’s Card via the Relativized T-scheme.Ming Hsiung - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (2):239-271.details
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Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.details
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On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.details
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Paradoxos Semânticos.Ricardo Santos - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.details
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Periodicity and Reflexivity in Revision Sequences.Edoardo Rivello - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (6):1279-1302.details
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Reference, paradoxes and truth.Michał Walicki - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):195 - 226.details
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Gaps, Gluts, and Paradox.A. D. Irvine - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 18 (sup1):273-299.details
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New Grounds for Naive Truth Theory.Stephen Yablo - 2003 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 312-330.details
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The truth is sometimes simple.Philip Kremer - manuscriptdetails
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Notes on ω-inconsistent theories of truth in second-order languages.Eduardo Barrio & Lavinia Picollo - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):733-741.details
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The revision theory of truth.Philip Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Definitions, consistent and inconsistent.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):147 - 175.details
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Truth and Circular Definitions. [REVIEW]Francesco Orilia & Achille C. Varzi - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (1):124–129.details
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Truth and reduction.Volker Halbach - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (1-2):97-126.details
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Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox. [REVIEW]Hartry Field - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):713–720.details
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