- Briggs on antirealist accounts of scientific law.John Halpin - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3439–3449.details
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The Principal Principle and Theories of Chance: Another Bug?Joshua Haddock - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):854-863.details
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Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.details
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Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):485-501.details
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No one can serve two epistemic masters.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2389-2398.details
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Local and global deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2753-2770.details
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Decision and foreknowledge.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):77-105.details
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Naturalizing Deontic Logic: Indeterminacy, Diagonalization, and Self‐Affirmation.Melissa Fusco - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):165-187.details
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Re-thinking local causality.Simon Friederich - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):221-240.details
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Humean Supervenience Rebugged.Suki Finn - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):959-970.details
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Explaining (One Aspect of) the Principal Principle without (Much) Metaphysics.Katrina Elliott - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (4):480-499.details
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The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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The Metaphysical Possibility of Time Travel Fictions.Nikk Effingham - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1309-1329.details
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Justifying Lewis’s Kinematics of Chance.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):439-463.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006).Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) - 2010 - Springer.details
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Expert Deference De Se.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscriptdetails
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"Undermined" Undermined.Carl Hoefer - manuscriptdetails
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Confirmation and Induction.Franz Huber - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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From Nomic Humeanism to Normative Relativism.Veronica Gomez Sanchez - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):118-139.details
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David Lewis.Brian Weatherson - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Chance versus Randomness.Antony Eagle - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Autonomous Chances and the Conflicts Problem.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2014 - In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Asymmetries in Chance and Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 45-67.details
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Chance and Context.Toby Handfield & Alastair Wilson - 2014 - In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford University Press.details
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Causation, Coherence and Concepts : a Collection of Essays.Wolfgang Spohn - unknowndetails
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Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011details
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The Relation between Credence and Chance: Lewis' "Principal Principle" Is a Theorem of Quantum Probability Theory.John Earman - unknowndetails
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An Imaginative Person’s Guide to Objective Modality.Derek Lam - forthcoming - In Amy Kind & Christopher Badura (eds.), Epistemic Uses of Imagination. Routledge.details
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The old principal principle reconciled with the new.Peter B. M. Vranas - unknowndetails
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Philosophy of Quantum Probability - An empiricist study of its formalism and logic.Ronnie Hermens - unknowndetails
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Principled Chances.Jonathan SchaAer - unknowndetails
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Unsharp Best System Chances.Luke Fenton-Glynn - unknowndetails
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Objective Chances in a Deterministic World.Daniel Lambright - 2012 - Dissertation, Bates Collegedetails
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Chance and the dynamics of de se beliefs.Christopher G. J. Meacham - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgersdetails
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Vindicating Chance: One the Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate.Ramiro Caso - 2016 - Critica 48 (142):3-33.details
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Modeling scientific evidence: the challenge of specifying likelihoods.Patrick Forber - 2010 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 55--65.details
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Can Bayesian agents always be rational? A principled analysis of consistency of an Abstract Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - unknowndetails
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The lion, the 'which?' And the wardrobe -- reading Lewis as a closet one-Boxer.Huw Price - unknowndetails
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Additivity Requirements in Classical and Quantum Probability.John Earman - unknowndetails
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