- Countering Justification Holism in the Epistemology of Logic: The Argument from Pre-Theoretic Universality.Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Logic 20 (3):375-396.details
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Emotions and their reasons.Laura Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.details
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Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause.Julius Schönherr - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-18.details
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Hybrid Virtue Epistemology and the A Priori.Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis - forthcoming - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), The A Priori: Its Significance, Sources, and Extent. Oxford University Press.details
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Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
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The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging: Reply to Grundmann.Jonathan Matheson & Valerie Joly Chock - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (8):36-42.details
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Quasi-Dependence.Selim Berker - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:195-218.details
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Groundwork for a Fallibilist Account of Mathematics.Silvia De Toffoli - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):823-844.details
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Epistemic Justice and the Principle of Total Evidence.Sherrilyn Roush - manuscriptdetails
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Epistemic Autonomy and Externalism.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Understanding as a Source of Justification.Joachim Horvath - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):509-534.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition.Zoe Jenkin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):251-298.details
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Revisiting the Argument from Action Guidance.Philip Fox - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (3).details
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The Superstitious Lawyer's Inference.J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: Routledge.details
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Sneaky Assertions.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):188-218.details
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Knowledge, infallibility, and skepticism.Gregory Douglas Stoutenburg - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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A taxonomy of types of epistemic dependence: introduction to the Synthese special issue on epistemic dependence.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Jesús Vega-Encabo - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2745-2763.details
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Knowledge, evidence, and multiple process types.Jeffrey Tolly - 2019 - Synthese 198 (S23):5625-5652.details
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Replacement and reasoning: a reliabilist account of epistemic defeat.Jan Constantin - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3437-3457.details
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Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.details
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Reliabilism, scepticism, and evidentia in Ockham.Philip Choi - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (1):23-45.details
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Defeaters and Disqualifiers.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):887-906.details
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Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.details
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The Reliability of Memory: An Argument from the Armchair.Ali Hasan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):142-159.details
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Basing for the Bayesian.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3815-3840.details
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Reasons for Belief and Normativity.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin & Wikforss Åsa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 575-599.details
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First-Person Investigations of Consciousness.Brentyn Ramm - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National Universitydetails
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Epistemic infinitism and the conditional character of inferential justification.Erhan Demircioglu - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2313-2334.details
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Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - 2017 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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Foundationalism with infinite regresses of probabilistic support.William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3899-3917.details
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E=K and The Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin.Rodrigo Borges - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1031-1041.details
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Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism.Tommaso Piazza - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):148-165.details
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No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.details
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Knowing how to put knowledge first in the theory of justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.details
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The debasing demon.J. Schaffer - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):228-237.details
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Dimensions of Reliability in Phenomenal Judgment.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):101-127.details
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There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood.Ian Schnee - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):53-74.details
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Basic factive perceptual reasons.Ian Schnee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1103-1118.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1271-1290.details
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The Sense of Natural Meaning in Conscious Inference.Anders Nes - 2015 - In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-115.details
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Experiential evidence?Jack C. Lyons - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Sophia 53 (4):427-434.details
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(1 other version)A Priori Testimony Revisited.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.details
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Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.details
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Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.details
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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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How Infallibilists Can Have It All.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):363-380.details
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