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Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self‐Knowledge.Ram Neta - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):396-411.details
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Rigged lotteries: a diachronic problem for reducing belief to credence.Jonathan Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1355-1373.details
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Explanation = Unification? A New Criticism of Friedman’s Theory and a Reply to an Old One.Roche William & Sober Elliott - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):391-413.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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Epistemology and artificial intelligence.Gregory R. Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira - 2004 - Journal of Applied Logic 2 (4):469-493.details
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What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):281-301.details
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Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
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Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):957-993.details
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A Bayesian Solution to the Conflict of Narrowness and Precision in Direct Inference.Christian Wallmann - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):485-500.details
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Psychology and the foundations of rational belief.Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford R. Mynatt - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):262-263.details
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Two Problems of Direct Inference.Paul D. Thorn - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):299-318.details
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The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief.Paul D. Thorn - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5389-5409.details
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Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.details
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Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
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Justification and Argumentation.Krzysztof Szymanek - 2014 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 36 (1):231-239.details
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Probaility and information.Patrick Suppes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):81-82.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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The Normative Force of Logical and Probabilistic Reasoning in Improving Beliefs.Corina Strössner - 2019 - Theoria 85 (6):435-458.details
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Philosophy and WEIRD intuition.Stephen Stich - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):110-111.details
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A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.details
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Kyburg on ignoring base rates.Stephen Spielman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):261-262.details
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On the “content” and “relevance” of information-theoretic epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):79-81.details
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To give a surprise exam, use game theory.Elliott Sober - 1998 - Synthese 115 (3):355-373.details
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Explanation and causation. [REVIEW]Elliott Sober - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):243-257.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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On the Rationality of Inconsistent Predictions: The March Madness Paradox.Rory Smead - 2016 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 43 (1):163-169.details
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The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy.Tomoji Shogenji - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):29-48.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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An objectivist argument for thirdism.The Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149–155.details
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An objectivist argument for thirdism.Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149-155.details
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Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-261.details
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Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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Some untoward consequences of Dretske's “causal theory” of information.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-79.details
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The sufficiency of information-caused belief for knowledge.Bede Rundle - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-78.details
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Can information be de-cognitized?William W. Rozeboom - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):76-77.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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The logic is in the representation.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-259.details
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The norms of acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.details
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A Bayesian framework for knowledge attribution: Evidence from semantic integration.Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Ángel Pinillos & Keith Holyoak - 2015 - Cognition 139 (C):92-104.details
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Confirming confirmation bias.P. Pollard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):258-259.details
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Unbelievable thoughts and doxastic oughts.Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2010 - Theoria 76 (2):112-118.details
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Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):319-333.details
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Psychology, statistics, and analytical epistemology.Richard E. Nisbett & Paul Thagard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):257-258.details
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Justificação, Probabilidade e Independência.André Neiva & Tatiane Marks - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):207-230.details
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Consciousness, Certainty, and Epistemic Operators.Masaharu Mizumoto - 2005 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 38 (1):1-15.details
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What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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II—Peter Milne: What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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Contrapositivism; or, The only evidence worth paying for is contained in the negatives.David Miller - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):256-257.details
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