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  1. (1 other version)The Future of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Topoi 32 (1):75-79.
    I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later work provides (...)
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  • The Influence of James B. Conant on Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions.K. Brad Wray - 2016 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1):1-23.
    I examine the influence of James B. Conant on the writing of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By clarifying Conant’s influence on Kuhn, I also clarify the influence that others had on Kuhn’s thinking. And by identifying the various influences that Conant had on Kuhn’s view of science, I identify Kuhn’s most original contributions in Structure. On the one hand, I argue that much of the framework and many of the concepts that figure in Structure were part of Conant’s picture (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Future of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Topoi 32 (1):75-79.
    I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later work provides (...)
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  • Success and truth in the realism/anti-realism debate.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.
    I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...)
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  • Kuhn and the Discovery of Paradigms.K. Brad Wray - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (3):380-397.
    I present a history of Kuhn’s discovery of paradigms, one that takes account of the complexity of the discovery process. Rather than emerging fully formed in Structure , the concept paradigm emerged through a series of phases. Early criticism of Structure revealed that the role of paradigms was unclear. It was only as Kuhn responded to criticism that he finally articulated a precise understanding of the concept paradigm. In a series of publications in the 1970s, he settled on a conception (...)
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  • A new philosophy of science from the history of arcane natural science: Eric Scerri’s: A tale of seven scientists and a new philosophy of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. [REVIEW]K. Brad Wray - 2017 - Foundations of Chemistry 19 (3):281-285.
    This is a book review of Eric Scerri's book, A Tale of Seven Scientists.
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  • Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence.John Worrall - 2009 - Synthese 180 (2):157 - 172.
    Are theories ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically (...)
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  • Impetus Mechanics as a Physical Argument for Copernicanism Copernicus, Benedetti, Galileo.Michael Wolff - 1987 - Science in Context 1 (2):215-256.
    The ArgumentOne of the earliest arguments for Copernicanism was a widely accepted fact: that on a horizontal plane a body subject to no external resistance can be set in motion by the smallest of all possible forces. This fact was contrary to Aristotelian physics; but it was a physical argument (by abduction) for the possibility of the Copernican world system. For it would be explained if that system was true or at least possible.Galileo argued: only nonviolent motions can be caused (...)
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  • MUDdy understanding.Daniel A. Wilkenfeld - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4).
    This paper focuses on two questions: Is understanding intimately bound up with accurately representing the world? Is understanding intimately bound up with downstream abilities? We will argue that the answer to both these questions is “yes”, and for the same reason-both accuracy and ability are important elements of orthogonal evaluative criteria along which understanding can be assessed. More precisely, we will argue that representational-accuracy and intelligibility are good-making features of a state of understanding. Interestingly, both evaluative claims have been defended (...)
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  • The Duhemian historiographical project.Robert S. Westman - 1990 - Synthese 83 (2):261-272.
    Duhem regarded the history of physical science as carrying a twofold lesson for the practicing physicist. First, history revealed the slow, groping, yet continuous development of physical theory toward a true description of the relations among natural entities. Second, history also unmasked false explanations and metaphysical beliefs that might seduce the unwary scientist into following an unfruitful line of research. This paper brings forth the central images underlying Duhem's historiographical project and uses the papers by S. Menn and W. A. (...)
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  • The Copernican Question Revisited: A Reply to Noel Swerdlow and John Heilbron.Robert S. Westman - 2013 - Perspectives on Science 21 (1):100-136.
    In separate reviews of The Copernican Question published in the Summer 2012 issue of this journal, Noel Swerdlow and John Heilbron find little that meets their approval while failing to provide readers with a full and accurate summary of the book’s major claims and arguments.* The reviewers engage in an exercise in deconstructive surgery, essentially breaking down and reconstituting the work into separate studies. Swerdlow, who devotes most of his twenty-five page treatment to chapter 3 (with brief side-glances at the (...)
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  • Lines of Descent: Kuhn and Beyond.Friedel Weinert - 2014 - Foundations of Science 19 (4):331-352.
    Thomas S. Kuhn is famous both for his work on the Copernican Revolution and his ‘paradigm’ view of scientific revolutions. But Kuhn later abandoned the notion of paradigm in favour of a more ‘evolutionary’ view of the history of science. Kuhn’s position therefore moved closer to ‘continuity’ models of scientific progress, for instance ‘chain-of-reasoning’ models, originally championed by D. Shapere. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate around Kuhn’s new ‘developmental’ view and to evaluate these competing (...)
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  • Chinese Logic and the Absence of Theoretical Sciences in Ancient China.Sun Weimin - 2009 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 8 (4):403-423.
    In this essay, I examine the nature of Chinese logic and Chinese sciences in the history of China. I conclude that Chinese logic is essentially analogical, and that the Chinese did not have theoretical sciences. I then connect these together and explain why the Chinese failed to develop theoretical sciences, even though they enjoyed an advanced civilization and great scientific and technological innovations. This is because a deductive system of logic is necessary for the development of theoretical sciences, and analogical (...)
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  • Justifying Scientific Progress.Jacob Stegenga - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    I defend a novel account of scientific progress centred around justification. Science progresses, on this account, where there is a change in justification. I consider three options for explicating this notion of change in justification. This account of scientific progress dispels with a condition for scientific progress that requires accumulation of truth or truthlikeness, and it emphasises the social nature of scientific justification.
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  • (1 other version)In how far is science accumulative?W. A. Verloren van Themaat - 1986 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 17 (1):119-130.
    Der Streit darüber, ob es objektive Wahrheitskriterien gibt, wird oft mit der Frage vermengt, ob Wissenschaft immer fortschreite. Vor allem Popper in "Objective Knowledge" unterstellt in starkem Maße einen allgemeinen Trend der Wissenschaft zum Fortschritt. In diesem Beitrag wird gezeigt, daß Wissen verloren gehen kann: 1. Weil es nicht aufgezeichnet wird; 2. weil die Dokumente, in denen es niedergelegt wurde, verloren gehen; 3. weil das Wissen um die Sprache der Dokumente, in denen es niedergelegt wurde, verloren gegangen ist, 4. weil (...)
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  • The Frege–Hilbert controversy in context.Tabea Rohr - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-30.
    This paper aims to show that Frege’s and Hilbert’s mutual disagreement results from different notions of Anschauung and their relation to axioms. In the first section of the paper, evidence is provided to support that Frege and Hilbert were influenced by the same developments of 19th-century geometry, in particular the work of Gauss, Plücker, and von Staudt. The second section of the paper shows that Frege and Hilbert take different approaches to deal with the problems that the developments in 19th-century (...)
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  • Peirce's Conception of Metaphysics.Joshua Black - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis develops and defends a Peircean conception of the task of metaphysics and critically compares it with recent anti-metaphysical forms of pragmatism. Peirce characterises metaphysics in terms of its place within his hierarchical classification of the sciences. According to the classification, metaphysics depends on logic for principles and provides principles to the natural and social sciences. This arrangement of the sciences is defended by appeal to Peirce's account of philosophy as 'cenoscopy'. The dependence of the natural and social sciences (...)
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  • Thomas Kuhn e seus modificadores intercontinentais.Barbara Tuchanska - 2012 - Scientiae Studia 10 (3):505-534.
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  • A Reply to Laura Purdy.Nancy Tuana - 1986 - Hypatia 1 (1):175 - 178.
    This essay is a response to the comments and critique of Laura Purdy to my earlier paper "Re-Fusing Nature/Nurture" (1983, 621-632). In it I re-emphasize that the traditional nature/nurture dichotomy is based upon an unacceptable ontology and briefly note the type of metaphysic that would serve as a more appropriate basis.
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  • Disagreement and Consensus in Science.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge.
    Consensus and disagreement play important roles in the practice, development, and dissemination of science. This raises a host of important philosophical questions. Some of these issues are conceptual: When, exactly, does a scientific agreement count as a consensus? And in what sense, if any, is disagreement the opposite of consensus? Other questions concern the role of consensus and disagreement in the development of science: For example, is consensus on central methodological issues and assumptions necessary for scientific work to proceed normally? (...)
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  • Thomas Kuhn ve Bilimin Doğası: Fen Eğitimi ve Bilim Felsefesi Açısından Bir İnceleme.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2022 - Tabula Rasa: Felsefe Ve Teoloji 1 (39):30-42.
    Fen eğitimi ve öğretiminin anahtar unsurlarından bir tanesi bilimin doğasının ve özelliklerinin doğru bir şekilde tespit edilmesidir. Bilimin doğasına yönelik tespitler fen eğitimi yöntemlerini birçok açıdan etkilemektedir. Fen eğitimi ve fen öğretimi ile ilgili olan kişiler bilimin doğasının açık bir şekilde öğretilmesi gerektiğini kabul etmektedir. Thomas Kuhn’un bilim tarihi, bilim felsefesi ve bilim sosyolojisi alanlarını içeren incelemeleri neticesinde ileri sürdüğü bilimin yapısına, işleyişine ve doğasına yönelik tezleri (paradigma, olağan bilim, bilimsel devrimler, eşölçülemezlik, bulmaca çözme, kuram seçimi, keşif ve gerekçelendirme ayrımı) (...)
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  • Not enough there there evidence, reasons, and language independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.
    Begins by explaining then proving a generalized language dependence result similar to Goodman's "grue" problem. I then use this result to cast doubt on the existence of an objective evidential favoring relation (such as "the evidence confirms one hypothesis over another," "the evidence provides more reason to believe one hypothesis over the other," "the evidence justifies one hypothesis over the other," etc.). Once we understand what language dependence tells us about evidential favoring, our options are an implausibly strong conception of (...)
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  • Information technology from Homer to DENDRAL.J. E. Tiles - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):205-220.
    To understand the impact which the newly self‐conscious technology of information is likely to have, and to develop that technology effectively, it is necessary to appreciate two previous revolutions in information technology, those which followed the introductions of writing and of printing. Understanding the role which these technologies have in our intellectual lives may help to avoid the misconceptions which are generated by the temptation to think of the instruments of communication as having a life independent of the use to (...)
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  • The Unity of Reason: Kant’s Copernican Presupposition.Edward Thornton - 2021 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 2 (2):213-235.
    In the controversial Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant claims to “complete the critical work of pure reason” [A670/b698] by providing a transcendental deduction of the ideas of pure reason. In order to analyse the role that this Appendix plays in the first Critique, this paper will read the Appendix alongside Kant’s comments in the B-Preface concerning the astronomy of Copernicus. Through an analysis of the nature of Kant and Copernicus’ respective use of presuppositions, and by looking at their respective (...)
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  • Could Lakatos, even with Zahar's criterion for novel fact, evaluate the copernican research programme?Neil Thomason - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (2):161-200.
    Why did Copernicus's research programme supersede Ptolemy's?’, Lakatos and Zahar argued that, on Zahar's criterion for ‘novel fact’, Copernican theory was objectively scientifically superior to Ptolemaic theory. They are mistaken, Lakatos and Zahar applied Zahar's criterion to ‘a historical thought-experiment’—fictional rather than real history. Further, in their fictional history, they compared Copernicus to Eudoxus rather than Ptolemy, ignored Tycho Brahe, and did not consider facts that would be novel for geostatic theories. When Zahar's criterion is applied to real history, the (...)
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  • Evaluating Formal Models of Science.Michael Thicke - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (2):315-335.
    This paper presents an account of how to evaluate formal models of science: models and simulations in social epistemology designed to draw normative conclusions about the social structure of scientific research. I argue that such models should be evaluated according to their representational and predictive accuracy. Using these criteria and comparisons with familiar models from science, I argue that most formal models of science are incapable of supporting normative conclusions.
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  • Time-space-Technics: The evolution of societal systems and World-views.Alastair Taylor - 1999 - World Futures 54 (1):21-102.
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  • Scientific Realism and Blocking Strategies.Raimund Pils - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):1-17.
    My target is the epistemological dimension of the realism debate. After establishing a stance voluntarist framework with a Jamesian background, drawing mostly on Wylie, Chakravarty, and van Fraassen, I argue that current voluntarists are too permissive. I show that especially various anti-realist stances but also some realist and selective realist stances block themselves from refutation by the history of science. I argue that such stances should be rejected. Finally, I propose that any disagreement that cannot be resolved by this strategy (...)
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  • The Origins of Species Concepts.John Simpson Wilkins - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Melbourne
    The longstanding species problem in biology has a history that suggests a solution, and that history is not the received history found in many texts written by biologists or philosophers. The notion of species as the division into subordinate groups of any generic predicate was the staple of logic from Aristotle through the middle ages until quite recently. However, the biological species concept during the same period was at first subtly and then overtly different. Unlike the logic sense, which relied (...)
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  • An Intuitive Solution to the Problem of Induction.Andrew Bassford - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (2):205-232.
    The subject of this essay is the classical problem of induction, which is sometimes attributed to David Hume and called “the Humean Problem of Induction.” Here, I examine a certain sort of Neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem, which appeals to the concept of natural kinds in its response to the inductive skeptic. This position is most notably represented by Howard Sankey and Marc Lange. The purpose of this paper is partly destructive and partly constructive. I raise two questions. The first (...)
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  • A Pluralism Worth Having: Feyerabend's Well-Ordered Science.Jamie Shaw - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    The goal of this dissertation is to reconstruct, critically evaluate, and apply the pluralism of Paul Feyerabend. I conclude by suggesting future points of contact between Feyerabend’s pluralism and topics of interest in contemporary philosophy of science. I begin, in Chapter 1, by reconstructing Feyerabend’s critical philosophy. I show how his published works from 1948 until 1970 show a remarkably consistent argumentative strategy which becomes more refined and general as Feyerabend’s thought matures. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend develops a persuasive (...)
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  • Edgar Allan Poe, Eureka, and Scientific Imagination.David N. Stamos - 2017 - SUNY Press.
    Explores the science and creative process behind Poe’s cosmological treatise. Silver Winner for Philosophy, 2017 Foreword INDIES Book of the Year Awards In 1848, almost a year and a half before Edgar Allan Poe died at the age of forty, his book Eureka was published. In it, he weaved together his scientific speculations about the universe with his own literary theory, theology, and philosophy of science. Although Poe himself considered it to be his magnum opus, Eureka has mostly been overlooked (...)
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  • Science without reduction.Helmut F. Spinner - 1973 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-4):16 – 94.
    The aim of this essay is a criticism of reductionism ? both in its ?static? interpretation (usually referred to as the layer model or level?picture of science) and in its ?dynamic? interpretation (as a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge), with emphasis on the latter ? from the point of view of Popperian fallibilism and Feyerabendian pluralism, but without being committed to the idiosyncrasies of these standpoints. In both aspects of criticism, the rejection is based on the proposal of (...)
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  • In Defense of Wild Night.Kimberly M. Dill - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (2):153-177.
    In this piece, I extend a transformative power account to the conservation of dark (and starry) night skies. More specifically, I argue that the transformative power that dark nights bear warrants their conservation and is best understood in terms of the important intellectual, cultural, aesthetic, and (psycho-physiologically) restorative effects that they afford. This gives us a pressing set of reasons to combat the growing, global phenomenon of light pollution. To do so, I argue, we ought to preserve the few remaining (...)
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  • A Multilevel Architecture of Creative Dynamic Agency.Marco Somalvico, Viola Schiaffonati & Francesco Amigoni - 2000 - Foundations of Science 5 (2):157-184.
    There are two classical and opposite positions about scientific discovery: the one that conceives scientific discovery activity as fully rational and the one that conceives scientific discovery activity as fully irrational. In the first case, machines are regarded as able to perform the scientific discovery process whereas, in the second case, machines are considered unable to perform any part of the scientific discovery process.We adopt a third intermediate approach that envisages a new role for machines, which are conceived as descriptions (...)
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  • Parsimony and predictive equivalence.Elliott Sober - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (2):167 - 197.
    If a parsimony criterion may be used to choose between theories that make different predictions, may the same criterion be used to choose between theories that are predictively equivalent? The work of the statistician H. Akaike (1973) is discussed in connection with this question. The results are applied to two examples in which parsimony has been invoked to choose between philosophical theories-Shoemaker's (1969) discussion of the possibility of time without change and the discussion by Smart (1959) and Brandt and Kim (...)
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  • (Mis)Understanding scientific disagreement: Success versus pursuit-worthiness in theory choice.Eli I. Lichtenstein - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:166-175.
    Scientists often diverge widely when choosing between research programs. This can seem to be rooted in disagreements about which of several theories, competing to address shared questions or phenomena, is currently the most epistemically or explanatorily valuable—i.e. most successful. But many such cases are actually more directly rooted in differing judgments of pursuit-worthiness, concerning which theory will be best down the line, or which addresses the most significant data or questions. Using case studies from 16th-century astronomy and 20th-century geology and (...)
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  • Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
    I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to (...)
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  • Objectivity, rationality, incommensurability, and more. [REVIEW]Harvey Siegel - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (4):359-375.
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  • Truth and Scientific Change.Gila Sher - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394.
    The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?
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  • The Case Study Method in Philosophy of Science: An Empirical Study.Moti Mizrahi - 2020 - Perspectives on Science 28 (1):63-88.
    There is an ongoing methodological debate in philosophy of science concerning the use of case studies as evidence for and/or against theories about science. In this paper, I aim to make a contribution to this debate by taking an empirical approach. I present the results of a systematic survey of the PhilSci-Archive, which suggest that a sizeable proportion of papers in philosophy of science contain appeals to case studies, as indicated by the occurrence of the indicator words “case study” and/or (...)
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  • Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective?Marcin Miłkowski & Przemysław Nowakowski - 2019 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 1):67-88.
    In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this (...)
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  • Téléologie et fonctions en biologie. Une approche non causale des explications téléofonctionnelles.Alberto Molina Pérez - 2017 - Dissertation, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
    This dissertation focuses on teleology and functions in biology. More precisely, it focuses on the scientific legitimacy of teleofunctional attributions and explanations in biology. It belongs to a multi-faceted debate that can be traced back to at least the 1970s. One aspect of the debate concerns the naturalization of functions. Most authors try to reduce, translate or explain functions and teleology in terms of efficient causes so that they find their place in the framework of the natural sciences. Our approach (...)
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  • Novelty, coherence, and Mendeleev’s periodic table.Samuel Schindler - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:62-69.
    Predictivism is the view that successful predictions of “novel” evidence carry more confirmational weight than accommodations of already known evidence. Novelty, in this context, has traditionally been conceived of as temporal novelty. However temporal predictivism has been criticized for lacking a rationale: why should the time order of theory and evidence matter? Instead, it has been proposed, novelty should be construed in terms of use-novelty, according to which evidence is novel if it was not used in the construction of a (...)
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  • Means-ends epistemology.O. Schulte - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):1-31.
    This paper describes the corner-stones of a means-ends approach to the philosophy of inductive inference. I begin with a fallibilist ideal of convergence to the truth in the long run, or in the 'limit of inquiry'. I determine which methods are optimal for attaining additional epistemic aims (notably fast and steady convergence to the truth). Means-ends vindications of (a version of) Occam's Razor and the natural generalizations in a Goodmanian Riddle of Induction illustrate the power of this approach. The paper (...)
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  • Kuhnian theory-choice and virtue convergence: Facing the base rate fallacy.Samuel Schindler - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64:30-37.
    Perhaps the strongest argument for scientific realism, the no-miracles-argument, has been said to commit the so-called base rate fallacy. The apparent elusiveness of the base rate of true theories has even been said to undermine the rationality of the entire realism debate. In this paper, I confront this challenge by arguing, on the basis of the Kuhnian picture of theory choice, that a theory is likely to be true if it possesses multiple theoretical virtues and is embraced by numerous scientists, (...)
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  • Replicability or reproducibility? On the replication crisis in computational neuroscience and sharing only relevant detail.Marcin Miłkowski, Witold M. Hensel & Mateusz Hohol - 2018 - Journal of Computational Neuroscience 3 (45):163-172.
    Replicability and reproducibility of computational models has been somewhat understudied by “the replication movement.” In this paper, we draw on methodological studies into the replicability of psychological experiments and on the mechanistic account of explanation to analyze the functions of model replications and model reproductions in computational neuroscience. We contend that model replicability, or independent researchers' ability to obtain the same output using original code and data, and model reproducibility, or independent researchers' ability to recreate a model without original code, (...)
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  • Computing and Experiments: A Methodological View on the Debate on the Scientific Nature of Computing.Viola Schiaffonati & Mario Verdicchio - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (3):359-376.
    The question about the scientific nature of computing has been widely debated with no universal consensus reached about its disciplinary status. Positions vary from acknowledging computing as the science of computers to defining it as a synthetic engineering discipline. In this paper, we aim at discussing the nature of computing from a methodological perspective. We consider, in particular, the nature and role of experiments in this field, whether they can be considered close to the traditional experimental scientific method or, instead, (...)
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  • A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypotheses.Samuel Schindler - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 67:54-64.
    What does it mean for a hypothesis to be ad hoc? One prominent account has it that ad hoc hypotheses have no independent empirical support. Others have viewed ad hoc judgements as subjective. Here I critically review both of these views and defend my own Coherentist Conception of Ad hocness by working out its conceptual and descriptive attractions.
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  • The replacement of time.Steven F. Savitt - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):463 – 474.
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