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  1. How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less A d Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.Malcolm R. Forster & Elliott Sober - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35.
    Traditional analyses of the curve fitting problem maintain that the data do not indicate what form the fitted curve should take. Rather, this issue is said to be settled by prior probabilities, by simplicity, or by a background theory. In this paper, we describe a result due to Akaike [1973], which shows how the data can underwrite an inference concerning the curve's form based on an estimate of how predictively accurate it will be. We argue that this approach throws light (...)
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  • (1 other version)Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 193.
    Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a given hypothesis. Similarly, scientists may judge that, given all the available evidence, a hypothesis ought to be accepted as correct or nearly so, rejected as false, or neither. Occasionally, these evidential judgments can be made on deductive grounds. If an experimental result strictly contradicts a hypothesis, then the truth of (...)
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  • Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
    I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to (...)
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  • Scientific realism and the stratagema de divide et impera.Timothy D. Lyons - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):537-560.
    In response to historical challenges, advocates of a sophisticated variant of scientific realism emphasize that theoretical systems can be divided into numerous constituents. Setting aside any epistemic commitment to the systems themselves, they maintain that we can justifiably believe those specific constituents that are deployed in key successful predictions. Stathis Psillos articulates an explicit criterion for discerning exactly which theoretical constituents qualify. I critique Psillos's criterion in detail. I then test the more general deployment realist intuition against a set of (...)
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  • The Case Study Method in Philosophy of Science: An Empirical Study.Moti Mizrahi - 2020 - Perspectives on Science 28 (1):63-88.
    There is an ongoing methodological debate in philosophy of science concerning the use of case studies as evidence for and/or against theories about science. In this paper, I aim to make a contribution to this debate by taking an empirical approach. I present the results of a systematic survey of the PhilSci-Archive, which suggest that a sizeable proportion of papers in philosophy of science contain appeals to case studies, as indicated by the occurrence of the indicator words “case study” and/or (...)
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  • Not enough there there evidence, reasons, and language independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.
    Begins by explaining then proving a generalized language dependence result similar to Goodman's "grue" problem. I then use this result to cast doubt on the existence of an objective evidential favoring relation (such as "the evidence confirms one hypothesis over another," "the evidence provides more reason to believe one hypothesis over the other," "the evidence justifies one hypothesis over the other," etc.). Once we understand what language dependence tells us about evidential favoring, our options are an implausibly strong conception of (...)
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  • (Mis)Understanding scientific disagreement: Success versus pursuit-worthiness in theory choice.Eli I. Lichtenstein - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:166-175.
    Scientists often diverge widely when choosing between research programs. This can seem to be rooted in disagreements about which of several theories, competing to address shared questions or phenomena, is currently the most epistemically or explanatorily valuable—i.e. most successful. But many such cases are actually more directly rooted in differing judgments of pursuit-worthiness, concerning which theory will be best down the line, or which addresses the most significant data or questions. Using case studies from 16th-century astronomy and 20th-century geology and (...)
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  • MUDdy understanding.Daniel A. Wilkenfeld - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4).
    This paper focuses on two questions: Is understanding intimately bound up with accurately representing the world? Is understanding intimately bound up with downstream abilities? We will argue that the answer to both these questions is “yes”, and for the same reason-both accuracy and ability are important elements of orthogonal evaluative criteria along which understanding can be assessed. More precisely, we will argue that representational-accuracy and intelligibility are good-making features of a state of understanding. Interestingly, both evaluative claims have been defended (...)
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  • Presentist History for Pluralist Science.Hasok Chang - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1):97-114.
    Building on my previous writings on presentism, pluralism, and “complementary science”, I develop an activist view of historiography. I begin by recognizing the inevitability of presentism. Our own purposes and perspectives do and should guide the production of our accounts of the past; like funerals, history-writing is for the living. There are different kinds of presentist history, depending on the historians’ purposes and perspectives. My particular inclination is pluralist. Science remembers its own history from a particular perspective, which views the (...)
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  • Evaluating Formal Models of Science.Michael Thicke - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (2):315-335.
    This paper presents an account of how to evaluate formal models of science: models and simulations in social epistemology designed to draw normative conclusions about the social structure of scientific research. I argue that such models should be evaluated according to their representational and predictive accuracy. Using these criteria and comparisons with familiar models from science, I argue that most formal models of science are incapable of supporting normative conclusions.
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  • Aristotle's demonstrative logic.John Corcoran - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):1-20.
    Demonstrative logic, the study of demonstration as opposed to persuasion, is the subject of Aristotle's two-volume Analytics. Many examples are geometrical. Demonstration produces knowledge (of the truth of propositions). Persuasion merely produces opinion. Aristotle presented a general truth-and-consequence conception of demonstration meant to apply to all demonstrations. According to him, a demonstration, which normally proves a conclusion not previously known to be true, is an extended argumentation beginning with premises known to be truths and containing a chain of reasoning showing (...)
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  • Extending the Argument from Unconceived Alternatives: Observations, Models, Predictions, Explanations, Methods, Instruments, Experiments, and Values.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2016 - Synthese (10).
    Stanford’s argument against scientific realism focuses on theories, just as many earlier arguments from inconceivability have. However, there are possible arguments against scientific realism involving unconceived (or inconceivable) entities of different types: observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values. This paper charts such arguments. In combination, they present the strongest challenge yet to scientific realism.
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  • International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching.Michael R. Matthews (ed.) - 2014 - Springer.
    This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...)
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  • Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence.John Worrall - 2009 - Synthese 180 (2):157 - 172.
    Are theories ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically (...)
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  • Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective?Marcin Miłkowski & Przemysław Nowakowski - 2019 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 1):67-88.
    In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this (...)
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  • Success and truth in the realism/anti-realism debate.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.
    I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...)
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  • Understandings of the nature of science and decision making on science and technology based issues.Randy L. Bell & Norman G. Lederman - 2003 - Science Education 87 (3):352-377.
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  • Philosophical responses to underdetermination in science.Seungbae Park - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):115–124.
    What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.
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  • Replicability or reproducibility? On the replication crisis in computational neuroscience and sharing only relevant detail.Marcin Miłkowski, Witold M. Hensel & Mateusz Hohol - 2018 - Journal of Computational Neuroscience 3 (45):163-172.
    Replicability and reproducibility of computational models has been somewhat understudied by “the replication movement.” In this paper, we draw on methodological studies into the replicability of psychological experiments and on the mechanistic account of explanation to analyze the functions of model replications and model reproductions in computational neuroscience. We contend that model replicability, or independent researchers' ability to obtain the same output using original code and data, and model reproducibility, or independent researchers' ability to recreate a model without original code, (...)
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  • Means-ends epistemology.O. Schulte - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):1-31.
    This paper describes the corner-stones of a means-ends approach to the philosophy of inductive inference. I begin with a fallibilist ideal of convergence to the truth in the long run, or in the 'limit of inquiry'. I determine which methods are optimal for attaining additional epistemic aims (notably fast and steady convergence to the truth). Means-ends vindications of (a version of) Occam's Razor and the natural generalizations in a Goodmanian Riddle of Induction illustrate the power of this approach. The paper (...)
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  • The replacement of time.Steven F. Savitt - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):463 – 474.
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  • An Intuitive Solution to the Problem of Induction.Andrew Bassford - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (2):205-232.
    The subject of this essay is the classical problem of induction, which is sometimes attributed to David Hume and called “the Humean Problem of Induction.” Here, I examine a certain sort of Neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem, which appeals to the concept of natural kinds in its response to the inductive skeptic. This position is most notably represented by Howard Sankey and Marc Lange. The purpose of this paper is partly destructive and partly constructive. I raise two questions. The first (...)
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  • Scientific Realism Versus Antirealism in Science Education.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 24 (1):72-81.
    Scientific realists believe both what a scientific theory says about observables and unobservables. In contrast, scientific antirealists believe what a scientific theory says about observables, but not about unobservables. I argue that scientific realism is a more useful doctrine than scientific antirealism in science classrooms. If science teachers are antirealists, they are caught in Moore’s paradox when they help their students grasp the content of a scientific theory, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Teachers (...)
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  • (1 other version)The philosophy of computer science.Raymond Turner - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Novelty, coherence, and Mendeleev’s periodic table.Samuel Schindler - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:62-69.
    Predictivism is the view that successful predictions of “novel” evidence carry more confirmational weight than accommodations of already known evidence. Novelty, in this context, has traditionally been conceived of as temporal novelty. However temporal predictivism has been criticized for lacking a rationale: why should the time order of theory and evidence matter? Instead, it has been proposed, novelty should be construed in terms of use-novelty, according to which evidence is novel if it was not used in the construction of a (...)
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  • Doxastic voluntarism and forced belief.Murray Clarke - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):39 - 51.
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  • Extending the Dynamics of Reason.Michael Friedman - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (3):431-444.
    What I call the dynamics of reason is a post-Kuhnian approach to the history and philosophy of science articulating a relativized and historicized version of the Kantian conception of the rationality and objectivity of the modern physical sciences. I here discuss two extensions of this approach. I argue that, although the relativized standards of rationality in question change over time, the particular way in which they do this still preserves the trans-historical rationality of the entire process. I also make a (...)
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  • Disagreement and Consensus in Science.Finnur Dellsén - 2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Consensus and disagreement play important roles in the practice, development, and dissemination of science. This raises a host of important philosophical questions. Some of these issues are conceptual: When, exactly, does a scientific agreement count as a consensus? And in what sense, if any, is disagreement the opposite of consensus? Other questions concern the role of consensus and disagreement in the development of science: For example, is consensus on central methodological issues and assumptions necessary for scientific work to proceed normally? (...)
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  • On Generalization of Definitional Equivalence to Non-Disjoint Languages.Koen Lefever & Gergely Székely - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (4):709-729.
    For simplicity, most of the literature introduces the concept of definitional equivalence only for disjoint languages. In a recent paper, Barrett and Halvorson introduce a straightforward generalization to non-disjoint languages and they show that their generalization is not equivalent to intertranslatability in general. In this paper, we show that their generalization is not transitive and hence it is not an equivalence relation. Then we introduce another formalization of definitional equivalence due to Andréka and Németi which is equivalent to the Barrett–Halvorson (...)
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  • Narrating the history of reason itself: Friedman, Kuhn, and a constitutive a priori for the twenty-first century.Alan W. Richardson - 2002 - Perspectives on Science 10 (3):253-274.
    : This essay explores some themes in use of a relativized Kantian a priori in the work of Thomas Kuhn and Michael Friedman. It teases out some shared and some divergent beliefs and attitudes in these two philosophers by comparing their characteristic questions and problems to the questions and problems that seem most appropriately to attend to an adequate understanding of games and their histories. It argues for a way forward within a relativized Kantian framework that is suggested but not (...)
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  • A Philosopher’s Guide to Empirical Success.Malcolm R. Forster - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):588-600.
    The simple question, what is empirical success? turns out to have a surprisingly complicated answer. We need to distinguish between meritorious fit and ‘fudged fit', which is akin to the distinction between prediction and accommodation. The final proposal is that empirical success emerges in a theory dependent way from the agreement of independent measurements of theoretically postulated quantities. Implications for realism and Bayesianism are discussed. ‡This paper was written when I was a visiting fellow at the Center for Philosophy of (...)
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  • In Defense of Mathematical Inferentialism.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Analysis and Metaphysics 16:70-83.
    I defend a new position in philosophy of mathematics that I call mathematical inferentialism. It holds that a mathematical sentence can perform the function of facilitating deductive inferences from some concrete sentences to other concrete sentences, that a mathematical sentence is true if and only if all of its concrete consequences are true, that the abstract world does not exist, and that we acquire mathematical knowledge by confirming concrete sentences. Mathematical inferentialism has several advantages over mathematical realism and fictionalism.
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  • The anthropology of incommensurability.Mario Biagioli - 1990 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (2):183-209.
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  • The nature and rationality of conversion.Paul Faulkner - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):821-836.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Peter Barker - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (3):445-465.
    For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these (...)
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  • Explaining Systematicity.Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):115-136.
    Despite the considerable attention that the systematicity argument has enjoyed, it is worthwhile examining the argument within the context of similar explanatory arguments from the history of science. This kind of analysis helps show that Connectionism, qua Connectionism, really does not have an explanation of systematicity. Second, and more surprisingly, one finds that the systematicity argument sets such a high explanatory standard that not even Classicism can explain the systematicity of thought.
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  • Kant and Hume on causality.Graciela De Pierris & Michael Friedman - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Computing and Experiments: A Methodological View on the Debate on the Scientific Nature of Computing.Viola Schiaffonati & Mario Verdicchio - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (3):359-376.
    The question about the scientific nature of computing has been widely debated with no universal consensus reached about its disciplinary status. Positions vary from acknowledging computing as the science of computers to defining it as a synthetic engineering discipline. In this paper, we aim at discussing the nature of computing from a methodological perspective. We consider, in particular, the nature and role of experiments in this field, whether they can be considered close to the traditional experimental scientific method or, instead, (...)
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  • Underdetermination as an epistemological test tube: expounding hidden values of the scientific community.Martin Carrier - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):189 - 204.
    Duhem—Quine underdetermination plays a constructive role in epistemology by pinpointing the impact of non-empirical virtues or cognitive values on theory choice. Underdetermination thus contributes to illuminating the nature of scientific rationality. Scientists prefer and accept one account among empirical equivalent alternatives. The non-empirical virtues operating in science are laid open in such theory choice decisions. The latter act as an epistemological test tube in making explicit commitments to how scientific knowledge should be like.
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  • The Influence of James B. Conant on Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions.K. Brad Wray - 2016 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1):1-23.
    I examine the influence of James B. Conant on the writing of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By clarifying Conant’s influence on Kuhn, I also clarify the influence that others had on Kuhn’s thinking. And by identifying the various influences that Conant had on Kuhn’s view of science, I identify Kuhn’s most original contributions in Structure. On the one hand, I argue that much of the framework and many of the concepts that figure in Structure were part of Conant’s picture (...)
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  • Scientific Realism and Blocking Strategies.Raimund Pils - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):1-17.
    My target is the epistemological dimension of the realism debate. After establishing a stance voluntarist framework with a Jamesian background, drawing mostly on Wylie, Chakravarty, and van Fraassen, I argue that current voluntarists are too permissive. I show that especially various anti-realist stances but also some realist and selective realist stances block themselves from refutation by the history of science. I argue that such stances should be rejected. Finally, I propose that any disagreement that cannot be resolved by this strategy (...)
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  • A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypotheses.Samuel Schindler - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 67:54-64.
    What does it mean for a hypothesis to be ad hoc? One prominent account has it that ad hoc hypotheses have no independent empirical support. Others have viewed ad hoc judgements as subjective. Here I critically review both of these views and defend my own Coherentist Conception of Ad hocness by working out its conceptual and descriptive attractions.
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  • Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: What’s the Argument?Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (4):361-378.
    In this paper, I argue that there is neither valid deductive support nor strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. There is no valid deductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis because, from the fact that the reference of the same kind terms changes or discontinues from one theoretical framework to another, it does not necessarily follow that these two theoretical frameworks are taxonomically incommensurable. There is no strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, since there are rebutting defeaters against it (...)
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  • Parsimony and predictive equivalence.Elliott Sober - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (2):167 - 197.
    If a parsimony criterion may be used to choose between theories that make different predictions, may the same criterion be used to choose between theories that are predictively equivalent? The work of the statistician H. Akaike (1973) is discussed in connection with this question. The results are applied to two examples in which parsimony has been invoked to choose between philosophical theories-Shoemaker's (1969) discussion of the possibility of time without change and the discussion by Smart (1959) and Brandt and Kim (...)
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  • The underdetermination of theory by data and the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge.Samir Okasha - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):283 – 297.
    Advocates of the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge have argued that, because scientific theories are "underdetermined" by data, sociological factors must be invoked to explain why scientists believe the theories they do. I examine this argument, and the responses to it by J.R. Brown (1989) and L. Laudan (1996). I distinguish between a number of different versions of the underdetermination thesis, some trivial, some substantive. I show that Brown's and Laudan's attempts to refute the sociologists' argument fail. Nonetheless, (...)
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  • What’s in It for the Historian of Science? Reflections on the Value of Philosophy of Science for History of Science.Theodore Arabatzis - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (1):69-82.
    In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science and philosophical history of science. I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. (...)
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  • Scientific revolutions.Thomas Nickles - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Thomas Kuhn ve Bilimin Doğası: Fen Eğitimi ve Bilim Felsefesi Açısından Bir İnceleme.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2022 - Tabula Rasa: Felsefe Ve Teoloji 1 (39):30-42.
    Fen eğitimi ve öğretiminin anahtar unsurlarından bir tanesi bilimin doğasının ve özelliklerinin doğru bir şekilde tespit edilmesidir. Bilimin doğasına yönelik tespitler fen eğitimi yöntemlerini birçok açıdan etkilemektedir. Fen eğitimi ve fen öğretimi ile ilgili olan kişiler bilimin doğasının açık bir şekilde öğretilmesi gerektiğini kabul etmektedir. Thomas Kuhn’un bilim tarihi, bilim felsefesi ve bilim sosyolojisi alanlarını içeren incelemeleri neticesinde ileri sürdüğü bilimin yapısına, işleyişine ve doğasına yönelik tezleri (paradigma, olağan bilim, bilimsel devrimler, eşölçülemezlik, bulmaca çözme, kuram seçimi, keşif ve gerekçelendirme ayrımı) (...)
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  • (1 other version)Incubating a Future Metaphysics: Quantum Gravity.Joshua Norton - unknown
    In this paper, I will argue that metaphysicians ought to utilize quantum theories of gravity as incubators for a future metaphysics. In §1, I will argue why this ought to be done. In §2, I will present case studies from the history of science where physical theories have challenged both the dogmatic and speculative metaphysician. In §3, I will present two theories of QG and demonstrate the challenge they pose to certain aspects of our current metaphysics; in particular, how they (...)
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  • Justifying Scientific Progress.Jacob Stegenga - 2024 - Philosophy of Science 91:543-560.
    I defend a novel account of scientific progress centred around justification. Science progresses, on this account, where there is a change in justification. I consider three options for explicating this notion of change in justification. This account of scientific progress dispels with a condition for scientific progress that requires accumulation of truth or truthlikeness, and it emphasises the social nature of scientific justification.
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