- The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
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Phenomenal concepts: Neither circular nor opaque. E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1186-1199.details
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Dretske on Non‐Epistemic Seeing.Erhan Demircioglu - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):364-393.details
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Do near-death experiences provide a rational basis for belief in life after death?Andrew J. Dell’Olio - 2010 - Sophia 49 (1):113 - 128.details
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An argument against dispositionalist HOT.David Jehle & Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476.details
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Mechanisms and Constitutive Relevance.Mark B. Couch - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):375-388.details
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Shadows of consciousness: the problem of phenomenal properties.Jason Mark Costanzo - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):851-865.details
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Quotational higher-order thought theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.details
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Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Iconicity instead of Indexicality.Marc Champagne - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):135-182.details
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Russellian Physicalism and its Dilemma.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:2043-2062.details
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Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Cham: Springer.details
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Why we should lower our expectations about the explanatory gap.Neil Campbell - 2009 - Theoria 75 (1):34-51.details
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Color and the Mind‐Body Problem.Alex Byrne - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.details
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Eight Arguments for First‐Person Realism.David Builes - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (1):e12959.details
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Minds Within Minds: An Infinite Descent of Mentality in a Physical World.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1339-1350.details
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Fundamental mentality in a physical world.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2841-2860.details
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Consciousness and Categorical Properties.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):365-387.details
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Monty hall, doomsday and confirmation.Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):23–31.details
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How to be a type-C physicalist.Adrian Boutel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.details
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The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.details
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Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg.N. Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):443-448.details
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Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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Hat das Leben eine "Würde"?Dieter Birnbacher - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 4 (2):41-62.details
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A Phenomenal Case for Sport.Jens E. Birch - 2009 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 3 (1):30-48.details
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Why Are We Certain that We Exist?Alexandre Billon - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.details
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Abduction and Modality.Stephen Biggs - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.details
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On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness.Bernard Molyneux - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.details
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How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists.Jacob Berger - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):503-526.details
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Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.details
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Realization Relations in Metaphysics.Umut Baysan - 2015 - Minds and Machines (3):1-14.details
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Introspective humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.details
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Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization.Umut Baysan - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):525-531.details
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Whither internalism? How internalists should respond to the extended mind hypothesis.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.details
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What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):919-932.details
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In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Zombies and Epiphenomenalism.Andrew Bailey - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):129.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Lightweight and Heavyweight Anti-physicalism.Damian Aleksiev - 2022 - Synthese 200 (112):1-23.details
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Swampman's revenge: Squabbles among the representationalists.Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.details
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Dualist emergentism Martine. Nida-Rmelin - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.details
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The minimal self hypothesis.Timothy Lane - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103029.details
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For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.details
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Subjective consciousness and self-representation.Robert Van Gulick - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.details
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Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-27.details
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Two Kinds of Introspection.Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes From the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Introduction to the Philosophy of Colour.Derek H. Brown & Fiona Macpherson - 2021 - In Derek H. Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. New York: Routledge.details
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Consciousness, type physicalism, and inference to the best explanation.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.details
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Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional.David Papineau - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.details
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Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Defense of Hume's Dictum.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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