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The Concept of Inductive Probability.Patrick Maher - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):185-206.details
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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Probabilistic Alternatives to Bayesianism: The Case of Explanationism.Igor Douven & Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.details
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Preferences and Positivist Methodology in Economics.Christopher Clarke - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (2):192-212.details
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Introduction: Cognitive attitudes and values in science.Daniel J. McKaughan & Kevin C. Elliott - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:57-61.details
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Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.details
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Conservation Biology.Sahotra Sarkar - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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Evidential diversity and premise probability in young children's inductive judgment.Yafen Lo, Ashley Sides, Joseph Rozelle & Daniel Osherson - 2002 - Cognitive Science 26 (2):181-206.details
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Confirmación hipotético-deductiva y confirmación bayesiana.Alejandro Cassini - 2003 - Análisis Filosófico 23 (1):41-84.details
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The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed.Luigi Secchi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):287-295.details
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Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.details
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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):281-301.details
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Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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Incoherence without Exploitability.Brian Hedden - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):482-495.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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Decision theory and cognitive choice.John R. Welch - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):147-172.details
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Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
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Survey article. Verisimilitude: the third period.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):1-29.details
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From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.details
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Representation theorems and the foundations of decision theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.details
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In support of anti-intellectualism.Victor Kumar - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.details
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Belief and contextual acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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In defense of modest probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.details
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Bayesian probability.Patrick Maher - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127.details
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Aiming at truth.Nicholas Unwin - 2007 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method.Robert Nola & Howard Sankey (eds.) - 2000 - Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.details
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Higher-order preferences and the master rationality motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.details
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Can the skepticism debate be resolved?Igor Douven - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):23 - 52.details
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Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 75--93.details
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Begging the Question and Bayesians.Brian Weatherson - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30:687-697.details
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Knowledge and practical reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101–118.details
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The notion of consistency for partial belief.Susan Vineberg - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):281 - 296.details
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Preference reversal in Ellsberg problems.Patrick Maher & Yoshihisa Kashima - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (2):187-207.details
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Resurrecting logical probability.James Franklin - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):277-305.details
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Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism.Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):115–129.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Static justification in the dynamics of belief.John Cantwell - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):481-503.details
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Inductive rules are no problem.Daniel Steel - manuscriptdetails
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Subjective and objective confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.details
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Depragmatized dutch book arguments.Patrick Maher - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):291-305.details
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Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011details
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