- Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):333-359.details
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
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Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.details
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Systematizing the theoretical virtues.Michael N. Keas - 2017 - Synthese 1 (6):1-33.details
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How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis, Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.details
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Rational social and political polarization.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Jiin Jung, Karen Kovaka, Anika Ranginani & William J. Berger - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2243-2267.details
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Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
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Permissivist Evidentialism.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup, Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup, The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Brian P. McLaughlin, Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.details
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The Weirdness of the World.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2024 - Princeton University Press.details
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Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting, Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
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String Theory, Non-Empirical Theory Assessment, and the Context of Pursuit.Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese 198:3671–3699.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star, The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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What Makes Evolution a Defeater?Matt Lutz - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1105-1126.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited).Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (3):243-259.details
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(1 other version)Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.details
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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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Countering Justification Holism in the Epistemology of Logic: The Argument from Pre-Theoretic Universality.Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Logic 20 (3):375-396.details
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The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:284-308.details
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A Timid and Tepid Appropriation: Divine Presence, the Sensus Divinitatis, and Phenomenal Conservativism.Timothy Perrine - 2024 - Res Philosophica 101 (1):109-129.details
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Reasoned Change in Logic.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup, Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude.Joshua Smart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11797-11813.details
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Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506.details
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(1 other version)Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2017 - Synthese:1-18.details
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Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):63-79.details
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Knowledge and Prizes.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet, Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Rules for the Inquiring Mind: A Unified Framework of Norms of Inquiry.Luis Rosa - 2024 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
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No Infelicity for the Infallibilist.Giada Fratantonio - 2021 - Theoria (5):1307-1321.details
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Background beliefs and plausibility thresholds: defending explanationist evidentialism.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2631-2647.details
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Armchair Access and Imagination.Giada Fratantonio - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):525-547.details
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On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Forgetting memory skepticism.Matthew Frise & Kevin McCain - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):253-263.details
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Pritchard’s Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:201-219.details
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Two new objections to explanationism.Bryan C. Appley & Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3069-3084.details
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The No-Defeater Clause.Simon Graf - forthcoming - Episteme.details
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The Reliability of Memory: An Argument from the Armchair.Ali Hasan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):142-159.details
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(1 other version)Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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(1 other version)Justifying the principle of indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.details
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Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):285-304.details
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Explanationist aid for phenomenal conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3035-3050.details
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Skepticism and Spatial Objects.Ali Hasan - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):73-95.details
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Problems for Explanationism on Both Sides.T. Ryan Byerly & Kraig Martin - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):773-791.details
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The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
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On what we should believe (and when (and why) we should believe what we know we should not believe).Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain, Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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