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  1. Perceptual symbol systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
    Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the (...)
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  • How To Conceptually Engineer Conceptual Engineering?Manuel Gustavo Https://Orcidorg Isaac - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    Conceptual engineering means to provide a method to assess and improve our concepts working as cognitive devices. But conceptual engineering still lacks an account of what concepts are (as cognitive devices) and of what engineering is (in the case of cognition). And without such prior understanding of its subject matter, or so it is claimed here, conceptual engineering is bound to remain useless, merely operating as a piecemeal approach, with no overall grip on its target domain. The purpose of this (...)
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  • Polysemy and thought: Toward a generative theory of concepts.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (1):158-185.
    Most theories of concepts take concepts to be structured bodies of information used in categorization and inference. This paper argues for a version of atomism, on which concepts are unstructured symbols. However, traditional Fodorian atomism is falsified by polysemy and fails to provide an account of how concepts figure in cognition. This paper argues that concepts are generative pointers, that is, unstructured symbols that point to memory locations where cognitively useful bodies of information are stored and can be deployed to (...)
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  • (1 other version)Toward an instance theory of automatization.Gordon D. Logan - 1988 - Psychological Review 95 (4):492-527.
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  • Learning and development in neural networks: the importance of starting small.Jeffrey L. Elman - 1993 - Cognition 48 (1):71-99.
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  • Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems.David R. Shanks & Mark F. St John - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):367-447.
    A number of ways of taxonomizing human learning have been proposed. We examine the evidence for one such proposal, namely, that there exist independent explicit and implicit learning systems. This combines two further distinctions, (1) between learning that takes place with versus without concurrent awareness, and (2) between learning that involves the encoding of instances (or fragments) versus the induction of abstract rules or hypotheses. Implicit learning is assumed to involve unconscious rule learning. We examine the evidence for implicit learning (...)
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  • "Schema abstraction" in a multiple-trace memory model.Douglas L. Hintzman - 1986 - Psychological Review 93 (4):411-428.
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  • Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation.Joshua Knobe, Sandeep Prasada & George Newman - 2013 - Cognition 127 (2):242-257.
    Five experiments provide evidence for a class of ‘dual character concepts.’ Dual character concepts characterize their members in terms of both (a) a set of concrete features and (b) the abstract values that these features serve to realize. As such, these concepts provide two bases for evaluating category members and two different criteria for category membership. Experiment 1 provides support for the notion that dual character concepts have two bases for evaluation. Experiments 2-4 explore the claim that dual character concepts (...)
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  • Distributed memory and the representation of general and specific information.James L. McClelland & David E. Rumelhart - 1985 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 114 (2):159-188.
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  • Against Logicist Cognitive Science.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (1):1-38.
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  • The Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology Diverge.Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin J. S. Zollman & David Danks - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):653-677.
    In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers of science have argued (implicitly and explicitly) that epistemically rational individuals might compose epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, epistemically rational groups might be composed of epistemically irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they together imply that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists might be logically independent of one another. We develop a formal model of scientific inquiry, define four (...)
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  • The plurality of concepts.Daniel Aaron Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
    Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, (...)
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  • Why I stopped worrying about the definition of life... and why you should as well.Edouard Machery - 2012 - Synthese 185 (1):145-164.
    In several disciplines within science—evolutionary biology, molecular biology, astrobiology, synthetic biology, artificial life—and outside science—primarily ethics—efforts to define life have recently multiplied. However, no consensus has emerged. In this article, I argue that this is no accident. I propose a dilemma showing that the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless. The notion of life at stake in this project is either the folk concept of life or a scientific concept. In the former case, empirical evidence shows that (...)
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  • Is human cognition adaptive?John R. Anderson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):471-485.
    Can the output of human cognition be predicted from the assumption that it is an optimal response to the information-processing demands of the environment? A methodology called rational analysis is described for deriving predictions about cognitive phenomena using optimization assumptions. The predictions flow from the statistical structure of the environment and not the assumed structure of the mind. Bayesian inference is used, assuming that people start with a weak prior model of the world which they integrate with experience to develop (...)
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  • The Career of Metaphor.Brian F. Bowdle & Dedre Gentner - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (1):193-216.
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  • Rule-plus-exception model of classification learning.Robert M. Nosofsky, Thomas J. Palmeri & Stephen C. McKinley - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (1):53-79.
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  • Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being).Marco Facchin - 2023 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 4.
    Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identifying all instances of cognition. They claim that the mark of the cognitive is needed to steer the development of cognitive science on the right path. Here, I argue that, at least at present, it cannot be provided. First (§2), I identify some of the factors motivating the search for a mark of the cognitive, each yielding a desideratum the mark is supposed (...)
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  • SUSTAIN: A Network Model of Category Learning.Bradley C. Love, Douglas L. Medin & Todd M. Gureckis - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (2):309-332.
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  • Rational approximations to rational models: Alternative algorithms for category learning.Adam N. Sanborn, Thomas L. Griffiths & Daniel J. Navarro - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (4):1144-1167.
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  • A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More Mama, more milk, and more mouse.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):55-65.
    Concepts are highly theoretical entities. One cannot study them empirically without committing oneself to substantial preliminary assumptions. Among the competing theories of concepts and categorization developed by psychologists in the last thirty years, the implicit theoretical assumption that what falls under a concept is determined by description () has never been seriously challenged. I present a nondescriptionist theory of our most basic concepts, which include (1) stuffs (gold, milk), (2) real kinds (cat, chair), and (3) individuals (Mama, Bill Clinton, the (...)
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  • Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
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  • Conceptual and Semantic Development as Theory Change: The Case of Object Permanence.Alison Gopnik - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (3):197-216.
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  • MAC/FAC: A Model of Similarity‐Based Retrieval.Kenneth D. Forbus, Dedre Gentner & Keith Law - 1995 - Cognitive Science 19 (2):141-205.
    We present a model of similarity‐based retrieval that attempts to capture three seemingly contradictory psychological phenomena: (a) structural commonalities are weighed more heavily than surface commonalities in similarity judgments for items in working memory; (b) in retrieval, superficial similarity is more important than structural similarity; and yet (c) purely structural (analogical) remindings e sometimes experienced. Our model, MAC/FAC, explains these phenomena in terms of a two‐stage process. The first stage uses a computationally cheap, non‐structural matcher to filter candidate long‐term memory (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
    According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism (...)
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  • A Rational Analysis of Rule‐Based Concept Learning.Noah D. Goodman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Jacob Feldman & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2008 - Cognitive Science 32 (1):108-154.
    This article proposes a new model of human concept learning that provides a rational analysis of learning feature‐based concepts. This model is built upon Bayesian inference for a grammatically structured hypothesis space—a concept language of logical rules. This article compares the model predictions to human generalization judgments in several well‐known category learning experiments, and finds good agreement for both average and individual participant generalizations. This article further investigates judgments for a broad set of 7‐feature concepts—a more natural setting in several (...)
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  • Dual PECCS: A Cognitive System for Conceptual Representation and Categorization.Antonio Lieto, Daniele Radicioni & Valentina Rho - 2017 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 29 (2):433-452.
    In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense categorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic categorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a representational perspective, the system relies on the hypothesis of conceptual (...)
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  • The Typicality Effect in Basic Needs.Thomas Pölzler & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-26.
    According to the so-called Classical Theory, concepts are mentally represented by individually necessary and jointly sufficient application conditions. One of the principal empirical objections against this view stems from evidence that people judge some instances of a concept to be more typical than others. In this paper we present and discuss four empirical studies that investigate the extent to which this ‘typicality effect’ holds for the concept of basic needs. Through multiple operationalizations of typicality, our studies yielded evidence for a (...)
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  • An exemplar-based random walk model of speeded classification.Robert M. Nosofsky & Thomas J. Palmeri - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):266-300.
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  • (4 other versions)Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):401-410.
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  • Personal semantics: at the crossroads of semantic and episodic memory.Louis Renoult, Patrick Sr Davidson, Daniela J. Palombo, Morris Moscovitch & Brian Levine - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (11):550-558.
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  • The role of similarity in categorization: providing a groundwork.Robert L. Goldstone - 1994 - Cognition 52 (2):125-157.
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  • On the nature and scope of featural representations of word meaning.Ken McRae, Virginia R. de Sa & Mark S. Seidenberg - 1997 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 126 (2):99-130.
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  • From overt behavior to hypothetical behavior to memory: Inference in the wrong direction.Howard Rachlin - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):147-148.
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  • Structuring Memory Through Inference‐Based Event Segmentation.Yeon Soon Shin & Sarah DuBrow - 2021 - Topics in Cognitive Science 13 (1):106-127.
    Shin and DuBrow propose that a key principle driving event segmentation relates to causal analyses: specifically, that experiences that are attributed as having the same underlying cause are grouped together into an event. This offers an alternative to accounts of segmentation based on prediction error.
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  • Combining Prototypes: A Selective Modification Model.Edward E. Smith, Daniel N. Osherson, Lance J. Rips & Margaret Keane - 1988 - Cognitive Science 12 (4):485-527.
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  • Connectionist and Memory‐Array Models of Artificial Grammar Learning.Zoltan Dienes - 1992 - Cognitive Science 16 (1):41-79.
    Subjects exposed to strings of letters generated by a finite state grammar can later classify grammatical and nongrammatical test strings, even though they cannot adequately say what the rules of the grammar are (e.g., Reber, 1989). The MINERVA 2 (Hintzman, 1986) and Medin and Schaffer (1978) memory‐array models and a number of connectionist outoassociator models are tested against experimental data by deriving mainly parameter‐free predictions from the models of the rank order of classification difficulty of test strings. The importance of (...)
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  • Above and beyond the concrete: The diverse representational substrates of the predictive brain.Michael Gilead, Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43:e121.
    In recent years, scientists have increasingly taken to investigate the predictive nature of cognition. We argue that prediction relies on abstraction, and thus theories of predictive cognition need an explicit theory of abstract representation. We propose such a theory of the abstract representational capacities that allow humans to transcend the “here-and-now.” Consistent with the predictive cognition literature, we suggest that the representational substrates of the mind are built as ahierarchy, ranging from the concrete to the abstract; however, we argue that (...)
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  • Transcending inductive category formation in learning.Roger C. Schank, Gregg C. Collins & Lawrence E. Hunter - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):639-651.
    The inductive category formation framework, an influential set of theories of learning in psychology and artificial intelligence, is deeply flawed. In this framework a set of necessary and sufficient features is taken to define a category. Such definitions are not functionally justified, are not used by people, and are not inducible by a learning system. Inductive theories depend on having access to all and only relevant features, which is not only impossible but begs a key question in learning. The crucial (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Broad-spectrum conceptual engineering.Manuel Gustavo Https://Orcidorg Isaac - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):286-302.
    Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. On its ‘broad‐spectrum’ version, it is expected to be appropriately applicable to any of our representation‐involving cognitive activities, with major consequences for our whole cognitive life. This paper is about the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering thus characterised. With a view to ensuring the actionability of conceptual engineering as a broad‐spectrum method, it addresses the issue of how best to construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering and successively (...)
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  • Why are different features central for natural kinds and artifacts?: the role of causal status in determining feature centrality.Woo-Kyoung Ahn - 1998 - Cognition 69 (2):135-178.
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  • (2 other versions)Broad‐spectrum conceptual engineering.Manuel Gustavo Https://Orcidorg Isaac - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):286-302.
    Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 286-302, December 2021.
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  • The Role of Explanation in Discovery and Generalization: Evidence From Category Learning.Joseph J. Williams & Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (5):776-806.
    Research in education and cognitive development suggests that explaining plays a key role in learning and generalization: When learners provide explanations—even to themselves—they learn more effectively and generalize more readily to novel situations. This paper proposes and tests a subsumptive constraints account of this effect. Motivated by philosophical theories of explanation, this account predicts that explaining guides learners to interpret what they are learning in terms of unifying patterns or regularities, which promotes the discovery of broad generalizations. Three experiments provide (...)
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  • Tracing the identity of objects.Lance J. Rips, Sergey Blok & George Newman - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (1):1-30.
    This article considers how people judge the identity of objects (e.g., how people decide that a description of an object at one time, t₀, belongs to the same object as a description of it at another time, t₁). The authors propose a causal continuer model for these judgments, based on an earlier theory by Nozick (1981). According to this model, the 2 descriptions belong to the same object if (a) the object at t₁ is among those that are causally close (...)
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  • Ease of learning explains semantic universals.Shane Steinert-Threlkeld & Jakub Szymanik - 2020 - Cognition 195:104076.
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  • The Logic of God: A Pluralistic Representational Theory of Concepts.Ricardo Sousa Silvestre - 2024 - Logica Universalis 18 (4):465-488.
    In this paper I present a formalization of the theory of ideal concepts applied to the concept of God. It is done within a version of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML) and attempts to solve three meta-problems related to the concept of God: the unicity of extension problem, the homogeneity/heterogeneity problem and the problem of conceptual unity.
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  • Typicality, Graded Membership, and Vagueness.James A. Hampton - 2007 - Cognitive Science 31 (3):355-384.
    This paper addresses theoretical problems arising from the vagueness of language terms, and intuitions of the vagueness of the concepts to which they refer. It is argued that the central intuitions of prototype theory are sufficient to account for both typicality phenomena and psychological intuitions about degrees of membership in vaguely defined classes. The first section explains the importance of the relation between degrees of membership and typicality (or goodness of example) in conceptual categorization. The second and third section address (...)
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  • Two dogmas of conceptual empiricism: implications for hybrid models of the structure of knowledge.Frank Keil - 1998 - Cognition 65 (2-3):103-135.
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  • Contextualizing concepts using a mathematical generalization of the quantum formalism.Liane Gabora & Diederik Aerts - 2002 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 14 (4):327-358.
    We outline the rationale and preliminary results of using the State Context Property (SCOP) formalism, originally developed as a generalization of quantum mechanics, to describe the contextual manner in which concepts are evoked, used, and combined to generate meaning. The quantum formalism was developed to cope with problems arising in the description of (1) the measurement process, and (2) the generation of new states with new properties when particles become entangled. Similar problems arising with concepts motivated the formal treatment introduced (...)
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  • Measuring Graded Membership: The Case of Color.Igor Douven, Sylvia Wenmackers, Yasmina Jraissati & Lieven Decock - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (3):686-722.
    This paper considers Kamp and Partee's account of graded membership within a conceptual spaces framework and puts the account to the test in the domain of colors. Three experiments are reported that are meant to determine, on the one hand, the regions in color space where the typical instances of blue and green are located and, on the other hand, the degrees of blueness/greenness of various shades in the blue–green region as judged by human observers. From the locations of the (...)
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  • Mental imagery.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mental imagery (varieties of which are sometimes colloquially refered to as “visualizing,” “seeing in the mind's eye,” “hearing in the head,” “imagining the feel of,” etc.) is quasi-perceptual experience; it resembles perceptual experience, but occurs in the absence of the appropriate external stimuli. It is also generally understood to bear intentionality (i.e., mental images are always images of something or other), and thereby to function as a form of mental representation. Traditionally, visual mental imagery, the most discussed variety, was thought (...)
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