- Do we have a coherent set of intuitions about moral responsibility?Dana K. Nelkin - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.details
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(1 other version)The rise and fall of experimental philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.details
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.details
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Analytic epistemology and experimental philosophy.Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.details
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Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.details
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The phenomenology of free will.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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The role of free will beliefs in social behavior: Priority areas for future research.Tom St Quinton, David Trafimow & Oliver Genschow - 2023 - Consciousness and Cognition 115 (C):103586.details
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Do group agents have free will?Christian List - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Empirical Conceptual Analysis: An Exposition.Hristo Valchev - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):757-776.details
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The weirdness of belief in free will.Renatas Berniūnas, Audrius Beinorius, Vilius Dranseika, Vytis Silius & Paulius Rimkevičius - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 87:103054.details
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The method(s) of cases.Jeffrey Maynes - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):102-124.details
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Piercing the smoke screen: Dualism, free will, and Christianity.Samuel Murray, Elise Dykhuis & Thomas Nadelhoffer - forthcoming - Journal of Cognition and Culture.details
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Експериментальна філософія: Новий напрям у філософії та нові можливості для міждисциплінарних досліджень.Oleksiy V. Polunin - 2018 - Вісник Харківського Національного Університету Імені В. Н. Каразіна. Серія «Філософія. Філософські Перипетії» 58:13-28.details
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.Cory J. Clark, Bo M. Winegard & Roy F. Baumeister - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:397001.details
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Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.details
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Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.details
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(1 other version)Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Philosophy.Andrew Higgins & Alexis Dyschkant - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (3):372-398.details
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Bringing free will down to Earth: People’s psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment.Andrew E. Monroe, Kyle D. Dillon & Bertram F. Malle - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 27:100-108.details
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Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey.Florian Cova & Yasuko Kitano - 2014 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22:17-37.details
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(1 other version)Remaking responsibility: complexity and scattered causes in human agency.Joshua Fost & Coventry Angela - 2013 - In Tangjia Wang (ed.), Proceedings of the 1st International Conference of Philosophy: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow. Global Science and Technology Forum. pp. 91-101.details
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In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy.David Rose & David Danks - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.details
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Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will.Adam Feltz - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):53-63.details
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(1 other version)Book Review of Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction.David J. Frost - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):903-917.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: Still compatibilists.Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Bruno Dubois - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):851-864.details
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Free will in everyday life: Autobiographical accounts of free and unfree actions.Tyler F. Stillman, Roy F. Baumeister & Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):381 - 394.details
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Surveying Philosophers About Philosophical Intuition.J. R. Kuntz & J. R. C. Kuntz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):643-665.details
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Agnosticism about moral responsibility.Jeremy Byrd - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.details
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Temperament and intuition: A commentary on Feltz and Cokely.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Trevor Kvaran & Eddy Nahmias - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):351-355.details
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(1 other version)Accentuate the Negative.Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.details
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Positive Illusions, Perceived Control and the Free Will Debate.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Tatyana Matveeva - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (5):495-522.details
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Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.details
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Neuroscience and the free will conundrum.Stephen G. Morris - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5):20 – 22.details
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Moral responsibility and agents' histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.details
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(1 other version)On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Are the folk agent-causationists?Jason Turner & Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609.details
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(1 other version)Experimental Philosophy and the Incentivisation Challenge: a Proposed Application of the Bayesian Truth Serum.Philipp Schoenegger - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-26.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases and Moral Responsibility: A Methodological Reflection.Koji Ota - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3):295-319.details
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Responsibility Without Freedom? Folk Judgements About Deliberate Actions.Tillmann Vierkant, Robert Deutschländer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & John-Dylan Haynes - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10 (1133):1--6.details
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A Proposal for a Scientifically-Informed and Instrumentalist Account of Free Will and Voluntary Action.Eric Racine - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Free will, bound and unbound: reflections on Shaun Nichols’ bound.Robert Kane - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2479-2488.details
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Subjective correlates and consequences of belief in free will.A. Will Crescioni, Roy F. Baumeister, Sarah E. Ainsworth, Michael Ent & Nathaniel M. Lambert - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):41-63.details
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Basic desert, conceptual revision, and moral justification.Nadine Elzein - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):212-225.details
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Predicting Philosophical Disagreement.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):978-989.details
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Perception of Addiction and Its Effects on One's Moral Responsibility.Justin Caouette & David Boutland - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (3):43-44.details
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Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board.Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.details
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Reading conflicted minds: An empirical follow-up to Knobe and roedder.Chad Gonnerman - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):193 – 205.details
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