- Moral Value, Response-Dependence, and Rigid Designation.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):71-94.details
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Color: A vision scientist's perspective.Davida Y. Teller - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):48-49.details
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Nagel's case against physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS 3 (2):91-108.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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The Consequences Of Intentionalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):247-270.details
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The argument from diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):341--90.details
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Physicalist and Dispositionalist Views on Colour: a Physiological Objection.Andraž Stožer & Janez Bregant - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):73-93.details
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Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):389-410.details
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A cognitive theory of pretense.Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols - 2000 - Cognition 74 (2):115-147.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?Susanna Siegel - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):127-142.details
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Direct realism and perceptual consciousness.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):378-410.details
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What is an agent that it experiences P-consciousness? And what is P-consciousness that it moves an agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.details
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Must conceptually informed perceptual experience involve nonconceptual content?Sonia Sedivy - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):413-31.details
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Hume's Table, Peacocke's Trees, the Tilted Penny and the Reversed Seeing‐in Account.Robert Schroer - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):209-230.details
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Surreptitious substitution.Barbara Saunders - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):47-48.details
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Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia.Işık Sarıhan - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (1):5-32.details
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How to Index Visual Contents.Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez - 2019 - Filozofia Nauki 27 (3):29-54.details
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Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context.Michael E. Rudd - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-47.details
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Seeing empty space.Louise Richardson - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):227-243.details
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Block's philosophical anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.details
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Conscious and nonconscious control of action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.details
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Reconsidering the Case for Colour Relativism.Stefan Reining - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (1):57-86.details
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Color as a factor analytic approximation to nature.Adam Reeves - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-46.details
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Mind, space and objectivity in non-human animals.Joëlle Proust - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (1):545-562.details
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Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception.Simon Prosser - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):475-513.details
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Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception.Olga Fernández Prat - 2010 - Theoria 21 (2):133-145.details
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Problemas abiertos en el debate «Percepción conceptual vs. Percepción no conceptual».Santiago Peleteiro Prada - 2016 - Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 15:281-299.details
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Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?Adam Pautz - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.details
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Against representationalism.David Papineau - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):324-347.details
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Levels of perceptual content.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2000 - Philsophical Studies 100 (3):237-54.details
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Naïve realism and the problem of illusion.Søren Overgaard - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (3):174-191.details
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Enactivism and the Perception of Others’ Emotions.Søren Overgaard - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):105-129.details
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Ambiguous figures and representationalism.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):307-323.details
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Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports.James Openshaw - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437.details
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Defending Dispositionalism of Color:色の傾向性理論を擁護する.Yasushi Ogusa - 2018 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 45 (1-2):1-21.details
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A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia.John O'dea - 2007 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):81-93.details
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Intermodal binding awareness.Casey O'Callaghan - 2014 - In David J. Bennett & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 73-103.details
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Spatial position and perceived color of objects.Romi Nijhawan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):43-44.details
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Phenomena and Representation.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-547.details
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A-consciousness: The local newspaper of the mind?David Navon - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-265.details
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How access-consciousness might be a kind of consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.details
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An account of color without a subject?Erik Myin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):42-43.details
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Perception, nonconceptual content, and immunity to error through misidentification.Kristina Musholt & Arnon Cahen - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):703-723.details
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Phenomenal and attentional consciousness may be inextricable.Adam Morton - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):263-264.details
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The Phenomenal Contribution of Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546.details
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V*—The Idea of Experience.Alan Millar - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):75-90.details
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Smelling objects.Becky Millar - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4279-4303.details
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Peacocke’s trees.Boyd Millar - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):445-461.details
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