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A Virtue Reliabilist Error-Theory of Defeat.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2449-2466.details
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The Superstitious Lawyer's Inference.J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: Routledge.details
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Safety and epistemic luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.details
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On Luck and Modality.Jesse Hill - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1873-1887.details
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On Luck and Modality.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1873-1887.details
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On luck and significance.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.details
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Does folk disagreement about ambiguous lucky cases warrant an error theory? A response to Hales and Johnson.Jesse Hill - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (6):876-891.details
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A Conceptual Analysis of Clutch Performances in Competitive Sports.Darren Hibbs - 2010 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 37 (1):47-59.details
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Yes, Safety is in Danger.Tomas Bogardus & Chad Marxen - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):321-334.details
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On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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Counterfactual theories of knowledge and the notion of actuality.Jan Heylen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1647-1673.details
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The redundancy problem: From knowledge-infallibilism to knowledge-minimalism.Stephen Hetherington - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4683-4702.details
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The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier’s Challenge: A Case Study.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.details
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The Gettier-illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):217-230.details
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Knowledge, evidence, and multiple process types.Jeffrey Tolly - 2019 - Synthese 198 (S23):5625-5652.details
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Is the folk concept of luck normative?Mario Attie-Picker - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1-35.details
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Do Safety Failures Preclude Knowledge?J. R. Fett - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (2):301-319.details
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A case for a certainty norm of assertion.Esben Nedenskov Petersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4691-4710.details
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Amodal completion and knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):415-423.details
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A Practical Guide to Intellectualism.Yuri Cath - 2008 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & Joshua Shepherd - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):701-734.details
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Looking beyond reductionism and anti-reductionism.Felix Bräuer - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):230-248.details
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Confabulating as Unreliable Imagining: In Defence of the Simulationist Account of Unsuccessful Remembering.Kourken Michaelian - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):133-148.details
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The maturation of the Gettier problem.Allan Hazlett - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):1-6.details
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Knowledge-yielding communication.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3303-3327.details
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Illness Narratives and Epistemic Injustice: Toward Extended Empathic Knowledge.Seisuke Hayakawa - 2021 - In Karyn L. Lai (ed.), Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy: Epistemology Extended. Springer Nature. pp. 111-138.details
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Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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Succeeding competently: towards an anti-luck condition for achievement.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):394-418.details
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Utilitarian Moral Virtue, Admiration, and Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):77-95.details
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Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Henry Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.details
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Luck: An Introduction.Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-10.details
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Testimonial Knowledge and Context-Sensitivity: a New Diagnosis of the Threat.Alex Davies - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):53-69.details
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Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second‐Order Skepticism.Alexander S. Harper - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.details
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Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Knowledge, Truth, and Unethical Conduct.Christopher Baird & Thomas S. Calvard - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 160 (1):263-276.details
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Accepting Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.details
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Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2845-2865.details
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Luck and Significance.Nathan Ballantyne & Samuel Kampa - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge. pp. 160-70.details
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Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1119-1146.details
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Introspecting knowledge.John Gibbons - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):559-579.details
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Swampman: a dilemma for proper functionalism.Jeffrey Tolly - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1725-1750.details
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Um problema para a epistemologia anti-sorte de Pritchard.Lucas Roisenberg Rodrigues - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):683-704.details
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Lucky Math: Anti-luck Epistemology and Necessary Truth.Danilo Suster - 2017 - In Bojan Borstner Smiljana Gartner (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 119-133.details
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Why Every Theory of Luck is Wrong.Steven D. Hales - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):490-508.details
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The epistemic significance of political disagreement.Bjørn G. Hallsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2187-2202.details
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Moral Luck and Control.Steven D. Hales - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):42-58.details
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Luck Attributions and Cognitive Bias.Steven D. Hales & Jennifer Adrienne Johnson - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):509-528.details
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Defining knowledge in terms of belief: The modal logic perspective.Joseph Y. Halpern, Dov Samet & Ella Segev - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):469-487.details
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A problem for moral luck.Steven D. Hales - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.details
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