- La neutralité axiologique, une exigence épistémologique ou éthique?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2013 - In Éliot Litalien, Cléa Bénoliel, Simon-Pierre Cherie-Cossette, Emmanuelle Gauthier-Lamer, Thiago Hunter, Thomas Mekhaël & Louis Sagnières (eds.), Peut-on tirer une éthique de l'observation de la nature ? Les Cahiers d'Ithaque. pp. 07-23.details
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In Defense of Empathy: A response to Prinz.Claudia Passos-Ferreira - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2):31-51.details
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Charting Moral Psychology’s Significance for Bioethics: Routes to Bioethical Progress, its Limits, and Lessons from Moral Philosophy.Michael Klenk - 2020 - Diametros 17 (64):36-55.details
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Splintering the gamer’s dilemma: moral intuitions, motivational assumptions, and action prototypes.Jens Kjeldgaard-Christiansen - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 22 (1):93-102.details
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A Humean theory of moral intuition.Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381.details
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How Cooperation Became the Norm. [REVIEW]Jonathan Birch - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):433-444.details
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Motivational internalism and folk intuitions.Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):715-734.details
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The Error In 'The Error In The Error Theory'.Richard Joyce - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):519-534.details
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Evolutionary Psychology and Morality. Review Essay.Huib Looren de Jong - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):117 - 125.details
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Anger and Morality.Benoît Dubreuil - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):475-482.details
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Empirical moral rationalism and the social constitution of normativity.Joseph Jebari - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2429-2453.details
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Varieties of Moral Naturalism.David Copp - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).details
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Attitudes to suffering: Parfit and Nietzsche.Christopher Janaway - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (1-2):66-95.details
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Emotion, Intentionality and Appropriateness of Emotion: In Defense of a Response Dependence Theory.Sunny Yang - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (1):82-104.details
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The epistemic account of faultless disagreement.Xingming Hu - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2613-2630.details
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Affordances and the normativity of emotions.Rebekka Hufendiek - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4455-4476.details
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Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition?Bryce Huebner - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):427-440.details
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Critiquing Empirical Moral Psychology.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):50-83.details
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Ordering effects, updating effects, and the specter of global skepticism.Zachary Horne & Jonathan Livengood - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1189-1218.details
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Belief Updating in Moral Dilemmas.Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & Joseph Spino - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):705-714.details
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A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision.Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & John Hummel - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (8):1950-1964.details
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The Agency-Last Paradigm: Free Will as Moral Ether.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):435-458.details
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How Does Reasoning Contribute to Moral Judgment? Dumbfounding and Disengagement.Frank Hindriks - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):237-250.details
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Svavarsdóttir’s Burden.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):577-589.details
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(1 other version)Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulford - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).details
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Predicting Philosophical Disagreement.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):978-989.details
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Deontology defended.Nora Heinzelmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5197–5216.details
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Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition.Benjamin James Fraser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):457-473.details
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Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation.Alex Barber - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):633-653.details
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Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem.Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):1-38.details
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Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement.Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.details
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Internalists Beware—we Might all be Amoralists!Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):1-14.details
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Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics).Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Principle-Based Moral Judgement.Maike Albertzart - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.details
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Just an anger synonym? Moral context influences predictors of disgust word use.Roberto Gutierrez, Roger Giner-Sorolla & Milica Vasiljevic - 2012 - Cognition and Emotion 26 (1):53-64.details
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Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?Caj Strandberg & Fredrik Björklund - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335.details
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Recent Work on Motivational Internalism.Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Caj Strandberg - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):124-137.details
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Against Empathy.Jesse Prinz - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):214-233.details
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Constructivism, intersubjectivity, provability, and triviality.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):515-527.details
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The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory.Lorraine Besser-Jones - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.details
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Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.details
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Current Emotion Research in Philosophy.Paul E. Griffiths - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (2):215-222.details
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(1 other version)Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Cole Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Towards a Cognitive Scientific Vindication of Moral Realism: The Semantic Argument.Abraham D. Graber - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1059-1069.details
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Do theories of implicit race bias change moral judgments?C. Daryl Cameron, Joshua Knobe & B. Keith Payne - 2010 - Social Justice Research 23:272-289.details
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Creating truths by winning arguments: the problem of methodological artifacts in philosophy.Abraham Graber - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):487-503.details
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(2 other versions)Moral dilemmas and moral rules.Shaun Nichols & Ron Mallon - 2006 - Cognition 100 (3):530-542.details
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The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy. [REVIEW]Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):161-188.details
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