- Can We Perceive the Past?E. J. Green - forthcoming - In Sara Aronowitz & Lynn Nadel (eds.), Space, Time, and Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Nonconceptual modes of presentation.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:65-81.details
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(Im)moral theorizing?Stavros Orfeas Zormpalas - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):1881-1903.details
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Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence and the Alien Experience Problem.Zijian Zhu - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):1019-1040.details
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Perceptual warrant and internal access.John Zeimbekis - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):191-206.details
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How I Know I'm Not a Brain in a Vat.José L. Zalabardo - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:65-88.details
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Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem.José Zalabardo - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):615-627.details
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In Defence of Transmission.Stephen Wright - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):13-28.details
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Moorean responses to skepticism: a defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.details
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Delusions, dreams, and the nature of identification.Sam Wilkinson - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):203-226.details
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Against the Additive View of Imagination.Nick Wiltsher - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):266-282.details
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The problem of the problem of induction.Roger White - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):275-290.details
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Other minds are neither seen nor inferred.Mason Westfall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11977-11997.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.details
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Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.details
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How we know what ought to be.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):61–84.details
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The Role of Naturalness in Lewis's Theory of Meaning.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (10).details
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On G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’.James Owen Weatherall - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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"Humean" Supervenience?G. Oppy - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):77-105.details
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For Bayesians, Rational Modesty Requires Imprecision.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
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Defending interest-relative invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):591-609.details
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Centrality and marginalisation.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):517-533.details
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The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.details
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Underdetermination Skepticism and Skeptical Dogmatism.Mark Walker - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (3):218-251.details
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Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism.Mark Walker - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):1-29.details
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Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.details
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Contrastive Hinge Epistemology.Giorgio Volpe - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1222-1249.details
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Skeptical arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.details
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Is Thinking a Matter of Knowing?Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio - 2013 - Agora 32 (1).details
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What's It Like to Be a BIV? A Dialogue.Michael Veber - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):734--756.details
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A different kind of dream-based skepticism.Michael Veber - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1827-1839.details
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Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.details
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The ‘Conditional Position Problem’ for epistemic externalism.Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5203-5224.details
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Sosa on easy knowledge and the problem of the criterion.James Van Cleve - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):19-28.details
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Emotion and the new epistemic challenge from cognitive penetrability.Jona Vance - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):257-283.details
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Religious Diversity.Hamid Vahid - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):219-236.details
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Skepticism and the Liberal/Conservative Conceptions of Perceptual Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):45-61.details
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The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1887-1904.details
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Entitlement and the Epistemic Status of Cornerstone Beliefs.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):126-137.details
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Cognitive penetration, the downgrade principle, and extended cognition.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):439-459.details
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Dogmatism and perceptual justification: A reason‐theoretic foundation.Hamid Vahid - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):655-668.details
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Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):206-224.details
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Basic beliefs and the perceptual learning problem: A substantial challenge for moderate foundationalism.Bram Vaassen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):133-149.details
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Cohen on Color Relationism.Michael Tye - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):297-305.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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On the regress argument for infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.details
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The Fragmentation of Being. [REVIEW]Kelly Trogdon - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):149-153.details
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