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Graham Oppy [77]G. Oppy [3]
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Graham Oppy
Monash University
  1. Minimalism and Truth Aptness.Michael Smith, Frank Jackson & Graham Oppy - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):287 - 302.
    This paper, while neutral on questions about the minimality of truth, argues for the non-minimality of truth-aptness.
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  2. Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments From Evil.Michael J. Almeida & Graham Oppy - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516.
    Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.
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  3. Disagreement.Graham Oppy - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):183-199.
    There has been a recent explosion of interest in the epistemology of disagreement. Much of the recent literature is concerned with a particular range of puzzle cases (discussed in the Cases section of my paper). Almost all of the papers that contribute to that recent literature make mention of questions about religious disagreement in ways that suggest that there are interesting connections between those puzzle cases and real life cases of religious disagreement. One important aim of my paper is to (...)
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  4. Where’s the Biff?Toby Handfield, Charles R. Twardy, Kevin B. Korb & Graham Oppy - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):149-68.
    This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and other cases (...)
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  5. Objection to a Simplified Ontological Argument.G. Oppy - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):105-106.
    This paper offers a short extension of the dialogue between Anselm and the Fool that is contained in "The Ontological Argument Simplified" by Gary Matthews and Lynne Rudder Baker. My extension of the dialogue ends with the Fool proclaiming that "what looks like an argument of elegant simplicity turns out to be no argument at all".
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  6. Minimalism and Truth.John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Graham Oppy - 1997 - Noûs 31 (2):170-196.
    This paper canvasses the various dimensions along which theories of truth may disagree about the extent to which truth is minimal.
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  7. Cosmological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):31-48.
    This paper provides a taxonomy of cosmological arguments and givesgeneral reasons for thinking that arguments that belong to a given category do not succeed.
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  8. Perfection, Near-Perfection, Maximality, and Anselmian Theism.Graham Oppy - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (2):119-138.
    Anselmian theists claim (a) that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived; and (b) that it is knowable on purely—solely, entirely—a priori grounds that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived. In this paper, I argue that Anselmian Theism gains traction by conflating different interpretations of the key description ‘being than which no greater can be conceived’. In particular, I insist that it is very important to distinguish between ideal excellence and maximal (...)
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  9. The Devilish Complexities of Divine Simplicity.Graham Oppy - 2003 - Philo 6 (1):10-22.
    In On the Nature and Existence of God, Richard Gale follows majority opinion in giving very short shrift to the doctrine of divine simplicity: in his view, there is no coherent expressible doctrine of divine simplicity. Rising to the implicit challenge, I argue that---contrary to what is widely believed---there is a coherently expressible doctrine of divine simplicity, though it is rather different from the views that are typically expressed by defenders of this doctrine. At the very least, I think that (...)
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  10. Pantheism, Quantification and Mereology.Graham Oppy - 1997 - The Monist 80 (2):320-336.
    I provide a classification of varieties of pantheism. I argue that there are two different kinds of commitments that pantheists have. On the one hand, there is an ontological commitment to the existence of a sum of all things. On the other hand, there is an ideological commitment: either collectively or distributively, the sum of all things is divine.
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  11. What Derivations Cannot Do.Graham Oppy - 2015 - Religious Studies 51 (3):323-333.
    I argue that the only proper role for traditional arguments for and against the existence of God in philosophy of religion is in demonstrating that given worldviews -- theism, naturalism -- are inconsistent.
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  12. On ‘a New Cosmological Argument’.Graham Oppy - 2000 - Religious Studies 36 (3):345-353.
    Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss contend that their ‘new cosmological argument’ is an improvement over familiar cosmological arguments because it relies upon a weaker version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason than that used in those more familiar arguments. However, I note that their ‘weaker’ version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason entails the ‘stronger’ version of that principle which is used in more familiar arguments, so that the alleged advantage of their proof turns out to be illusory. Moreover, I (...)
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  13. Reply to Trakakis and Nagasawa.Michael Almeida & Graham Oppy - 2005 - Ars Disputandi 5 (1):5-11.
    Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa criticise the argument in Almeida and Oppy . According to Trakakis and Nagasawa, we are mistaken in our claim that the sceptical theist response to evidential arguments from evil is unacceptable because it would undermine ordinary moral reasoning. In their view, there is no good reason to think that sceptical theism leads to an objectionable form of moral scepticism. We disagree. In this paper, we explain why we think that the argument of Nagasawa and Trakakis (...)
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  14. Arguments From Moral Evil.Graham Oppy - 2004 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2/3):59 - 87.
    In this paper, I argue that -- contrary to widely received opinion -- logical arguments from evil are well and truly alive and kicking.
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  15. Arguing About The Kalam Cosmological Argument.Graham Oppy - 2002 - Philo 5 (1):34-61.
    This paper begins with a fairly careful and detailed discussion of the conditions under which someone who presents an argument ought to be prepared to concede that the argument is unsuccessful. The conclusions reached in this discussion are then applied to William Lane Craig’s defense of what he calls “the kalam cosmological argument.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, the chief contention of the paper is that Craig ought to be prepared to concede that “the kalam cosmological argument” is not a successful argument. The (...)
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  16. Uncaused Beginnings.Graham Oppy - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (1):61-71.
    I defend the view that it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the causal relation even though it is impossible for any other (non-overlapping) parts of reality to have no cause. I claim that, while there are good theoretical and commonsense grounds for maintaining that it is simply not possible for non-initial parts of reality to have no cause, these good grounds do not require one to claim that it is impossible that reality has an (...)
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  17. Omnipotence.Graham Oppy - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):58–84.
    Recently, many philosophers have supposed that the divine attribute of omnipotence is properly understood as some kind of maximal power. I argue that all of the best known attempts to analyse omnipotence in terms of maximal power are multiply flawed. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for supposing that, on orthodox theistic conceptions, maximal power is not one of the divine attributes.
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  18. Evidential Arguments From Evil and Skeptical Theism.Michael Almeida & Graham Oppy - 2004 - Philo 8 (2):84 - 94.
    In this paper we respond to criticisms by Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea in their “In Defense of Sceptical Theism : A Reply to Almeida and Oppy,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83.
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  19. Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument.Graham Oppy - 2004 - Philo 7 (2):203-211.
    This paper is a reply to Robert Maydole’s “The Modal Perfection Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being,” published in Philo 6, 2, 2003. I argue that Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument fails, and that there is no evident way in which it can be repaired.
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  20. Rowe's Evidential Arguments From Evil.Graham Oppy - 2013 - In Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), A Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 49-66.
    This chapter discusses the two most prominent recent evidential arguments from evil, due, respectively, to William Rowe and Paul Draper. I argue that neither of these evidential arguments from evil is successful, i.e. such that it ought to persuade anyone who believes in God to give up that belief. In my view, theists can rationally maintain that each of these evidential arguments from evil contains at least one false premise.
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  21. Arguments for Atheism.Graham Oppy - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 53.
    This paper consider three families of arguments for atheism. First, there are direct arguments for atheism: arguments that theism is meaningless, or incoherent, or logically inconsistent, or impossible, or inconsistent with known fact, of improbable given known fact, or morally repugnant, or the like. Second, there are indirect arguments for atheism: direct arguments for something that entails atheism. Third, there are comparative arguments for atheism: e.g., arguments for the view that (atheistic) naturalism is more theoretically virtuous than theism.
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  22. Faulty Reasoning About Default Principles in Cosmological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2004 - Faith and Philosophy 21 (2):242-249.
    Robert Koons claims that my previous critique of his “new” cosmological argument is vitiated by confusion about the nature of defeasible argumentation.In response, I claim that Koons misrepresents—and perhaps misunderstands—the nature of my objections to his “new” cosmological argument. The main claims which I defend are: (1) that the move from a non-defeasible to a defeasible causal principle makes absolutely no difference to the success of the cosmological argument in which it is contained; and (2) that, since it is perfectly (...)
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  23. The Tristram Shandy Paradox.Graham Oppy - 2002 - Philosophia Christi 4 (2):335-349.
    This paper is a response to David Oderberg's discussion of the Tristram Shandy paradox. I defend the claim that the Tristram Shandy paradox does not support the claim that it is impossible that the past is infinite.
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  24. Salmon on the Contingent a Priori and the Necessary a Posteriori.Graham Oppy - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (1):5 - 33.
    This paper is an examination of the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori. In particular, it considers -- and assesses -- the criticisms that Nathan Salmon makes of the views of Saul Kripke.
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  25. Semantics for Propositional Attitude Ascriptions.Graham Oppy - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (1):1 - 18.
    This paper provides a semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions. (In this respect, the title of the paper is quite well chosen.).
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  26. Leftow on God and Necessity.Graham Oppy - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (3):5-16.
    This paper is a critical examination of some of the major themes of Brian Leftow's book *God and Necessity*.
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  27. Molinism and Divine Prophecy of Free Actions.Graham Oppy & Mark Saward - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (2):1-10.
    Among challenges to Molinism, the challenge posed by divine prophecy of human free action has received insufficient attention. We argue that this challenge is a significant addition to the array of challenges that confront Molinism.
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  28. Pruss's Ontological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (3):355-363.
    First, I suggest that it is possible to make some further improvements upon the Gödelian ontological arguments that Pruss develops. Then, I argue that it is possible to parody Pruss's Gödelian ontological arguments in a way that shows that they make no contribution towards 'lowering the probability of atheism and raising the probability of theism'. I conclude with some remarks about ways in which the arguments of this paper can be extended to apply to the whole family of Gödelian ontological (...)
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  29. Ultimate Naturalistic Casual Explanations.Graham Oppy - 2013 - In Ty Goldschmidt (ed.), Why is the something rather than nothing? Routledge. pp. 46-63.
    This paper discusses attempts to explain why there are more than zero instances of the causal relation. In particular, it argues for the conclusion that theism is no better placed than naturalism to provide an "ultimate causal explanation".
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  30. Modal Theistic Arguments.Graham Oppy - 1993 - Sophia 32 (2):17-24.
    This paper discusses a range of modal ontological arguments. It is claimed that these modal ontological arguments fail because they depend upon controversial assumptions about the nature of modal space.
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  31. Reply to Richard Davis.Graham Oppy - 2009 - Philosophia Christi 11 (2):423-436.
    This paper is a response to a paper by Rich Davis in which he argues that David Lewis' modal realism is inconsistent with classical theism. I provide what I take to be a coherent modal realist formulation of classical theism.
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  32. More Than One Flaw: Reply to Millican.Graham Oppy - 2007 - Sophia 46 (3):295-304.
    Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004) claims to have detected ‘the one fatal flaw in Anselm’s ontological argument.’ I argue that there is more than one important flaw in the position defended in Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004). First, Millican’s reconstruction of Anselm’s argument does serious violence to the original text. Second, Millican’s generalised objection fails to diagnose any flaw in a vast range of ontological arguments. Third, there are independent reasons for thinking that Millican’s generalised objection is unpersuasive.
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  33. On Defining Art Historically.Graham Oppy - 1991 - British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (2):153-161.
    This paper is an extended critical discussion of Jerrold Levinson's historical definition of art. I try out various different avenues of attack; it is not clear whether any of them is ultimately successful.
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  34. Swinburne on ‘Mental’ and ‘Physical’.Graham Oppy - 1998 - Religious Studies 34 (4):483-495.
    This paper examines Richard Swinburne's definitions of 'mental property' and 'physical property'. After some preliminary tidying up (Section 1), the paper introduces eight putative counter-examples to Swinburne's definitions (Section 2). The paper then considers amendments to Swinburne's account of 'mental property' (Section 3) and 'physical property' (Section 4) which deal with these counter-examples. Finally, the paper closes with some brief remarks about the metaphysics of properties (Appendix). Along the way, the paper provides various reasons for thinking that Swinburne's definitions are (...)
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  35. Epistemological Foundations for Koons' Cosmological Argument?Graham Oppy - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):107 - 125.
    Some people -- including the present author -- have proposed and defended alternative restricted causal principles that block Robert Koons’s ’new’ cosmological argument without undermining the intuition that causation is very close to ubiquitous. In "Epistemological Foundations for the Cosmological Argument", Koons argues that any restricted causal principles that are insufficient for the purposes of his cosmological argument cause epistemological collapse into general scepticism. In this paper I argue, against Koons, that there is no reason to suppose that my favourite (...)
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  36. Kalām Cosmological Arguments: Reply to Professor Craig.Graham Oppy - 1995 - Sophia 34 (2):15-29.
    This paper is a reply to Professor William Lane Craig's “Graham Oppy On The kalām Cosmological Argument” Sophia 32.1, 1993, pp. 1–11. Further references to the literature are contained therein.
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  37.  95
    Reply to Langtry.Graham Oppy - 2001 - Sophia 40 (1):73-80.
    This paper is a response to Bruce Langtry's criticisms of views advanced in my book *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God*. In particular, the paper discusses his criticisms of "the general objection" to ontological arguments that is developed in that work.
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  38. Colonizing the Galaxies.Graham Oppy - 2000 - Sophia 39 (2):117-142.
    Paper presented in East-West Symposium on Science, Philosophy and Religion, Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Meeting with Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, July 1999.
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  39. From the Tristram Shandy Paradox to the Christmas Shandy Paradox: Reply to Oderberg.Graham Oppy - 2003 - Ars Disputandi 3 (1):172-195.
    This paper is a response to David Oderberg's criticisms of a previous paper of mine. (Bibliographical details are provided in the article.).
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  40. Can We Describe Possible Circumstances in Which We Would Have.Graham Oppy - 2004 - Ratio 17 (1):68-83.
    This paper investigates the question whether we could have reason to believe that time is two-dimensional. I connect discussion of this question to discussion of the question whether we could have reason to believe that there has been a global time freeze.
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  41. Professor William Craig’s Criticisms of Critiques of Kalam Cosmological Arguments By Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking, and Adolf Grunbaum.Graham Oppy - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (2):237-250.
    Kalam cosmological arguments have recently been the subject of criticisms, at least inter alia, by physicists---Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking---and philosophers of science---Adolf Grunbaum. In a series of recent articles, William Craig has attempted to show that these criticisms are “superficial, iII-conceived, and based on misunderstanding.” I argue that, while some of the discussion of Davies and Hawking is not philosophically sophisticated, the points raised by Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum do suffice to undermine the dialectical efficacy of kalam cosmological arguments.
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  42.  84
    Langtry on God, the Best and Evil: Review Discussion of Bruce Langtry, God, the Best and Evil, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-923879-8, Hb, Ix+237pp.Graham Oppy - 2010 - Sophia 49 (4):591-601.
    Bruce Langtry's ‘God, the Best and Evil’ is a fine contribution to the literature. Here, I review the contents of the book, and then provide some critical remarks that, as fas as I know, have not been made elsewhere. In particular, I argue that his criticism of my formulations of logical arguments from evil (in my Arguing about Gods) is unsuccessful.
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  43. Facing Facts?Graham Oppy - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):621 – 643.
    In his recent book, Stephen Neale provides an extended defence of the claim that Gödel's slingshot has dramatic consequences for fact theorists (and, in particular, for fact theorists who look with favour on referential treatments of definite descriptions). I argue that the book-length treatment provides no strengthening of the case that Neale has made elsewhere for this implausible claim. Moreover, I also argue that various criticisms of Neale's case that I made on a previous occasion have met with no successful (...)
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  44. Is God Good by Definition?Graham Oppy - 1992 - Religious Studies 28 (4):467 - 474.
    As a matter of historical fact, most philosophers and theologians who have defended traditional theistic views have been moral realists. Some "divine command" theorists have held that the good is constituted by the content of divine approval -i.e. that things are good because, and insofar as, they have divine approval. However, even amongst those theists who hold that the good is independently constituted -i.e. those who hold that God's pattern of approval is explained by the fact that he approves of (...)
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  45. Review: Daniel A. Dombrowski: Rethinking the Ontological Argument: A Neoclassical Theistic Response. [REVIEW]G. Oppy - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):690-693.
    Critical review of Daniel Dombrowski's "Rethinking the Ontological Argument".
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  46. Williams on Kaplan on the Contingent Analytic.Graham Oppy - 1995 - Ratio 8 (2):189-192.
    This paper is a reply to a prior work by C. J. F. Williams in which he criticised David Kaplan's account of the contingent analytic. In this paper, I take myself to be defending Kaplan's views against Williams' attack.
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  47. Craig’s Kalam Cosmology.Graham Oppy - 2009 - Philo 12 (2):200-216.
    Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...)
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  48. Craig’s Kalam Cosmology.Graham Oppy - 2009 - Philo 12 (2):200-216.
    Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...)
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  49. Critical Notice of J.P. Moreland's Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument.Graham Oppy - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):193-212.
    This paper is a detailed examination of some parts of J. P. Moreland's book on "the argument from consciousness". (There is a companion article that discusses the parts of the book not taken up in this critical notice.).
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  50.  83
    Creationism on Trial.Graham Oppy - 2003 - Sophia 42 (2):113-127.
    This paper discusses the judgment of Judge William Overton in McLean vs. Arkansas Board of Education (1982), and the subsequent philosophical literature that discusses this judgment.
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