- Justification as a Dimension of Rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
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Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.details
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Verstehen verstehen. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung.Federica Isabella Malfatti - 2023 - Berlin, Deutschland: Schwabe Verlag.details
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Dynamic Introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Dissertation, Stanford Universitydetails
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Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.Helen Steward - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (1):1-20.details
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On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
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On the regress argument for infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.details
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Reflective awareness, phenomenal conservatism, and phenomenal explanationism.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
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Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.details
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The Point of Moore's Proof.Charles Raff - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):1-27.details
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Introduction.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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The Bayesian Objection.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Antiscepticism and Easy Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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An Explanationist Account of Genealogical Defeat.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):176-195.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.details
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Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the Existence of an External World.Sebastian Sunday Grève - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1023-1031.details
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Full Blooded Entitlement.Martin Smith - 2019 - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Peter Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Entitlement, epistemic risk and scepticism.Luca Moretti - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):576-586.details
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Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility.Luca Moretti - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):381-403.details
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Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism.Adam Leite - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 158–179.details
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Extended circularity: a new puzzle for extended cognition.Joseph Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2018 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 42-63.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - Introduction 5 (36):i-vi.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - Introduction 5 (36):i-vi.details
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Hume and reliabilism.Qu Hsueh - 2021 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (34):27-51.details
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Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives : is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - In Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What's Wrong with McKinsey-style Reasoning?James Pryor - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Value of Presence.David de Bruijn - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):319-336.details
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Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account.Eleonora Cresto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3737-3753.details
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Replacement and reasoning: a reliabilist account of epistemic defeat.Jan Constantin - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3437-3457.details
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Which Hinge Epistemology?Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):79-96.details
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Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission: what else?!).Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):235-254.details
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The paradox of Moore's proof of an external world.Annalisa Coliva - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.details
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Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):217-234.details
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Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects.Annalisa Coliva - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.details
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Introduction.Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):221-234.details
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The problem of perception and the no-miracles principle.Michael Cohen - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):11065-11080.details
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Problems for Foley's Accounts of Rational Belief and Responsible Belief.E. J. Coffman & Matt Deaton - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):147-160.details
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The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.details
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Recent Work on Moore’s Proof.J. Adam Carter - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):115-144.details
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Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-26.details
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Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1229-1254.details
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Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.details
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Archimedean Metanorms.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1075-1085.details
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Safely Denying Phenomenal Conservatism.Aaran Burns - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2685-2700.details
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A phenomenal conservative perspective on religious experience.Aaran Burns - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (3):247-261.details
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Non-cognitivism and rational inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.details
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The rational roles of experiences of utterance meanings.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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