- Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):647-664.details
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Space Colonization and Existential Risk.Joseph Gottlieb - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):306-320.details
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Why logical pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.details
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Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.details
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The Dark Side of Morality: Group Polarization and Moral Epistemology.Marcus Arvan - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):87-115.details
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The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.details
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Utilitarianism about animals and the moral significance of use.David Killoren & Robert Streiffer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1043-1063.details
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Virtuous vs. utilitarian artificial moral agents.William A. Bauer - 2020 - AI and Society (1):263-271.details
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Beyond Moral Fundamentalism: Dewey’s Pragmatic Pluralism in Ethics and Politics [preprint].Steven Fesmire - 2017 - In The Oxford Handbook of Dewey [Intro available free from OUP]. Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 209-234.details
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Reasons why in normative explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):607-623.details
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Can Prudence Be Enhanced?Jason T. Eberl - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):506-526.details
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In Defense of an End-Relational Account of Goodness.Brian Coffey - 2014 - Dissertation, University of California, Davisdetails
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The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
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Harming as making worse off.Duncan Purves - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2629-2656.details
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Empirical ignorance as defeating moral intuitions? A puzzle for rule consequentialists.Caleb Perl - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):62-72.details
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Mental time-travel, semantic flexibility, and A.I. ethics.Marcus Arvan - 2023 - AI and Society 38 (6):2577-2596.details
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The independence of medical ethics.Johan Brännmark - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (1):5-15.details
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Against reductive ethical naturalism.Justin Klocksiem - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1991-2010.details
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Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):459-484.details
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Hitting Retributivism Where It Hurts.Nathan Hanna - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):109-127.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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Integration and authority: rescuing the ‘one thought too many’ problem.Nicholas Smyth - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):812-830.details
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Beyond sacrificial harm: A two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology.Guy Kahane, Jim A. C. Everett, Brian D. Earp, Lucius Caviola, Nadira S. Faber, Molly J. Crockett & Julian Savulescu - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (2):131-164.details
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Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Right Action as Virtuous Action.Nicholas Ryan Smith - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):241-254.details
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Rethinking the presumption of atheism.Keith Burgess-Jackson - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1):93-111.details
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Traditional literary interpretation versus subversive interpretation.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2022 - Asian Journal of Advances in Research 16 (3):34-39.details
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Epistemic modesty in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1577-1596.details
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Non-Naturalism and Reference.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-24.details
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The Moral Dimensions of Boredom: A call for research.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Review of General Psychology 21 (1):30-48.details
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(1 other version)The Duty to Disregard the Law.Michael Huemer - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):1-18.details
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Intellect versus affect: finding leverage in an old debate.Michael Milona - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2251-2276.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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Rossian totalism about intrinsic value.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2069-2086.details
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The buck passing account of value: assessing the negative thesis.Philip Stratton-Lake - unknowndetails
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The denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal.Michael Cholbi - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):268-289.details
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(1 other version)When Ignorance is No Excuse.Maria Alvarez & Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 64-81.details
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El filosofar y la filosofía analítica.Alejandro Pérez - 2015 - Forum: Supplement to Acta Philosophica 1:391-403.details
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E. F. Carritt (1876-1964).Anthony Skelton - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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‘Attack of the Hybrid Swarm?’.Jennifer Welchman - 2015 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (3):252-255.details
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Moral dilemmas.Shyam Nair - 2015 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The TARES Test: Five Principles for Ethical Persuasion.Sherry Baker & David Martinson - 2001 - Journal of Mass Media Ethics 16 (2-3):148-175.details
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A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.details
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How Do Reasons Accrue?Shyam Nair - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 56–73.details
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Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity.Per Algander - 2013 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 142 (4):529-548.details
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V—What's Wrong with ‘Deontology’?Jens Timmermann - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (1pt1):75-92.details
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The Ethics of Imagination and Fantasy.Aaron Smuts - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. New York: Routledge.details
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